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United States Policy Toward the For...

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST AND SECOND SESSION

HEARINGS HELD

JUNE 7, 1995, JULY 11, 1995, OCTOBER 17, 18, 1995, NOVEMBER 2, 8, 15, 30, 1995, DECEMBER 6, 1995 AND SEPTEMBER 25, 1996

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UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 7, 1995.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:15 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd Spence (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

The CHAIRMAN. We still have members coming back from a roll-call vote but we will go ahead and proceed.

Mr. Secretary, General Shalikashvili, welcome to the committee this afternoon. We appreciate your willingness to testify on this important issue on such short notice and we realize how busy you have been and how busy you are. We especially appreciate you coming.

Recent events in the former Yugoslavia suggest that we are once again at a crossroads. War in this tragic land is being waged more violently and on more fronts than it has been for several years. The Croatian Army has reemerged as a force capable of offensive action. The Bosnian Serbs have resumed their shelling of Sarajevo and other isolated enclaves. The Bosnian Federation is directing its own offensives against the Serbs. In short, the local combatants are more than ready and willing to continue fighting.

Against this backdrop it is obvious that the mirage of an effective peacekeeping operation has more or less evaporated. The French in particular, but also the British, are losing heart for this impossible mission. Faced with this deepening crisis, the administration has without any meaningful consultation with the Congress apparently undertaken a major shift in its policy toward United States involvement in the former Yugoslavia. Despite several days of denials, the shift would seem to deepen American involvement in the Yugoslavia war and move us closer to a deployment of United States ground troops to the region.

The United States' inability to chart a consistent course in Bosnia is deeply troubling. We are reminded almost daily of the consequences of conducting foreign policy on the fly. Although we have no ground troops at risk in Bosnia, the administration led the charge I understand in pressing for recent NATO air strikes.

As with previous air strikes, retaliation did little but enrage the Serbs without materially changing their ability to operate. It resulted in the immediate taking of several hundred UNPROFOR

hostages and perhaps even a more aggressive air defense stance that resulted in the apparent loss of an American F–16 pilot. Either the administration was negligent in assuming the Serbs would not react in such an obvious way or callously ignoring the flight of overexposed European peacekeepers. Either way, the implications are deeply disturbing.

Whatever the case, it is obvious that proper precautions were not taken. Not only were the United Nations troops left without protection or warning, but questions remain as to why during a period of high tension with the Serbs American aircraft were sent to fly deep over Bosnian territory without benefit of dedicated air defense air suppression support.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the administration is only planning one move at a time in the former Yugoslavia. These developments are particularly troubling in light of the administration's announced intent to support a reconfiguration of U.N. forces in Bosnia.

Reconfiguration, consolidation, realignment, try as you may, all these terms go in the same direction: The introduction of United States forces into the Balkan conflict to shore up an unsuccessful U.N. peacekeeping operation. While the President has vowed to consult the Congress on this significant policy shift, I frankly don't see where he has left any room for such meaningful discussions. By publicly committing the United States to favorably respond to a U.N. request for help in reconfiguration and strengthening of UNPROFOR, the decision on whether American soldiers are headed toward Bosnia appears to have shifted from Congress and the American people to the U.N. headquarters in New York.

Mr. Secretary, I believe that the burden of proof on these issues rests squarely with the administration. This committee, this Congress, and ultimately all Americans deserve to know for what ends American military power is being employed in the former Yugoslavia, for what operational goals, and for what strategic purpose.

I do not support the introduction of ground troops in Bosnia nor do I believe that Congress or the American public will look favorably upon a creeping United States military commitment in this region. We also need to know how a reconfigured U.N. mission will stand any better chance of achieving any different outcome. If our priority is to contain the conflict, how does the continued presence of the U.N. where peacekeepers themselves become combatants and targets serve that end?

All the major powers realize the danger of a wider war. But what vital American national interest is served by an open ended commitment to intervene in the Balkans? In sum, before the United States undertakes any deeper military commitment in the former Yugoslavia, the administration is going to have to make a far more convincing case than it has to date.

Before proceeding, the gentleman from California, Mr. Dellums, is recognized for any comments you would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We are here to consider an issue of dramatic importance and urgency, one which will have a significant impact on the continuing development of the post-cold war peacekeeping policy and the role of the United States in influencing the evolving era.

I join you in extending a welcome to Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili. I look forward to hearing their insights into this problem. I believe that each of our distinguished witnesses has labored mightily to help formulate peacekeeping policies generally and a policy with respect to Bosnia in particular that will fit well into an effective national security strategy.

As we have discussed on many occasions, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, cases such as Bosnia, like those of Somalia and Haiti, sorely test the international community in its effort to vindicate important human rights norms and Democratic values. Difficult and painful lessons are learned as we traverse uncharted grounds in the early stages of this new era. They are lessons that this member hopes will help us to improve how both the U.S. Government and the international community can respond to these challenges.

Bosnia, Mr. Chairman, like Somalia is an especially chilling problem because of the large scale numbers of deaths of innocent children, the elderly, and the defenseless. None would argue I hope that the United States has no interest in ending the slaughter, in containing the conflict, and in seeing that those who have committed war crimes are brought to justice. All these concerns have properly informed U.S. policy for two administrations. What has been debated during this time is which path would best achieve these ends.

I recall that the United States raised concerns about early recognition of the nations that emerge from the dissolving Yugoslav states. Unfortunately, accurate predictions of widespread violence were made to argue against such early recognition. The underlying principle was that the consensual agreement had to be achieved as to how Yugoslavia would dissolve in a peaceful manner or violence would surely follow.

What has followed in this gentleman's judgment has been an effort to prevent that violence from spreading, but it is a policy that has been constrained by the imperfect beginnings of the diplomacy and by choices made along the path that were based on a view that the Serbian faction was the more guilty party in the conflict; indeed, a party to the conflict that has lowered its conduct to such a level that war crimes proceedings are warranted against some of its leaders.

Despite these obstacles, U.N. peacekeepers have dramatically reduced by an order of magnitude at least the numbers of innocent civilians being killed, a point that should not be skirted over lightly. While being asked to perform this mission, their task has been complicated by escalating military intervention in the conflict.

Recent events recall to my mind the warnings and concerns that many of us, Mr. Chairman, raised some time ago that bombing

strikes would inevitably drag the U.N. mission into conflict and defeat its ability to mediate local disputes, protect citizens and relief efforts.

While we are here today to hear from the Secretary and the Chairman regarding military preparations, let me say that I believe our military strategy, the things we are prepared to do, must be linked to our larger diplomatic effort to secure an effective dialogue on the root issue of the violence, something not many people are talking about because our focus tends to be on the immediate crisis. I would suggest that there is a crisis within a crisis within a crisis. And if we are to resolve the immediate crisis, it ought to be in concert with what our larger and long-term objective is, and that is to stop the violence and move to a diplomatic peaceful solution.

The nature of the boundaries between these newly emerging states lie at the root cause of the violence and at some point in the diplomatic process I believe must be addressed. Any perceptions that our witnesses can shed on these developments would be welcomed by this gentleman.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, I would urge that we bring before the committee the appropriate persons from the State Department who along with our DOD and national security establishment colleagues can further explore these issues with us. I think that is important and you and I have discussed these matters on numerous occasions. It is my belief, Mr. Chairman, that only an imaginative, diplomatic approach to this fundamental issue will contain the conflict, end the slaughter of innocents and bring justice to the region.

Thank you for your generosity, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Before proceeding, Mr. Secretary, without objection, your statement and the General's will be submitted for the record and you may proceed as you would like.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. PERRY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to describe to you the United States policy in Bosnia with specific attention to being explicit about which contingencies might develop that would require the use of ground forces there. I also would like to describe to you the outcome of the meeting of NATO defense ministers in Paris last Saturday on which they decided to establish a rapid reaction force to strengthen the U.N. peacekeeping force, and along with that describe to you the possible United States support for that rapid reaction force, what it consists of and what it would not consist of.

Then I will be followed by General Shalikashvili, who will describe to you the circumstances surrounding the bombing a few weeks ago, the NATO bombing; second, the circumstances surrounding the F–16 shootdown, and finally he will describe to you the NATO plan called 40104, which is the contingency plan for the withdrawal of the U.N. forces from position. That is what I would propose to cover this morning. Is that satisfactory?

Let me begin by outlining the overall United States policy on Bosnia and I am going to describe it in four separate components.

The first chart lists these four components. The first one is a negative statement but I want to emphasize that. We will not take sides as a combatant in this war. Second is we will fully engage in a diplomatic effort to bring about a peace settlement. Third, we will take what action we can to keep the war from spreading; and, fourth, we will take what actions we can to reduce the impact of violence on the civilians in Bosnia.

This policy on Bosnia, and this is a brief but accurate description of our policy in Bosnia, has been consistent through the 2½ years of the Clinton administration. Indeed, it extends over from—most of these policies were also in the Bush administration. The discussion of changing policies I think is quite inappropriate. These remain constant as the policies in Bosnia. What is changing, what has changed is the strategic implementation of policies as the facts on the ground change.

Let me take each one of these policies and describe how the implementation has evolved in the last few years and where we stand today. Taking the first one, not taking sides as a combatant, this is not to suggest that we have no point of view about this war. We do have a point of view. We believe that the aggressors are the Bosnian Serbs and that the victims are the Bosnian Government and their people.

Some critics who have that same conclusion about Bosnia believe that the United States has a moral obligation to see that justice is done by entering the war as a combatant on the side of the Bosnian Government. I respect the moral aspect of this argument but I reject the conclusion based on three separate judgments; first of all, a professional judgment that to affect, to truly affect the outcome of this war would require a commitment of several hundred thousand American troops, a long war, and thousands of casualties.

Second, I offer a value judgment. The value judgment is that I don't believe that while Bosnia is in our interest, it is not in our vital interest and therefore it does not pose a sufficiently great threat to United States interests to warrant the risk of the lives of thousands of troops.

Finally, I offer political judgment, and that is that there is no support among the public or the Congress for entering this war as a combatant. So our policy remains that we will not do that and for those reasons.

However, there are three strictly proscribed conditions under which we might use U.S. troops in discrete temporary conditions and then only after consulting with Congress. Let me briefly describe three of those and the next chart lists those three conditions.

First, as a part of a NATO force to help implement a peace settlement, this has been a long-standing plan that if we are able to reach finally a real peace settlement in Bosnia agreed to by all sides, that we would be willing to then participate in a real peacekeeping operation.

Second, we have agreed as part of a NATO force to help withdraw the U.N. peacekeeping force if it decides it can no longer perform its mission and requests NATO assistance. General Shalikashvili will describe that NATO plan to you during his briefing.

And third, we would be willing—I am going to spend a little more time describing the third bullet because there has been some confusion about that in the media. We would be willing, in principle, to use United States troops to assist NATO in an emergency extraction of units whose positions have become untenable to points of safety in Bosnia. Any such operation would be short term and aimed at specific problems and tasks, and once the specific limited operations were completed, which I would envision would be like a day or two, our troops would withdraw immediately from Bosnia. But let me be clear: This does not suggest that we have any intention of becoming UNPROFOR's transportation service and let it also be clear that we have not yet been asked to undertake a commitment to assist in emergency relocation and any such request would be regarded on the merits of the particular request and on the uniqueness of U.S. forces in being able to help out its allies that are in a tough position.

Let me go to our second prong, which is the diplomatic policy. Some have said that this is a failed policy for the obvious reason that it has not succeeded in reaching a negotiated peace settlement. I can point out to you it is far easier to criticize peace negotiations that actually achieve a peace settlement in Bosnia given the centuries of hatred and mistrust there. But these peace negotiations have in fact yielded some progress, most significantly the Croatian Muslim Accord that was reached last year that has significantly stopped the fighting in central Bosnia, and all you have to do is think back to the tragedy that was going on in the town of Mostar a little over a year ago to realize the benefit that has been reached by bringing a peace settlement between two of the warring parties.

Therefore, the stakes are high enough that I believe it is important to stick with this peace negotiation and the U.S. effort to facilitate it, and we will. While we do it, we must recognize that real progress may take many, many months. That is why it is all the more important to stand firmly by the other two prongs of our policy, preventing the spread of the war and reducing the impact of the violence. Both of these prongs have been successful, not self-evident when it comes to the objective of preventing the spread of the war because indeed the war has not spread beyond Bosnia. We should not take that for granted.

The tension and circumstances which might cause this war to spill out north into Croatia, south into Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania, and possibly even into Greece and Turkey, those conditions exist and we have to continue to work very hard to be sure that that does not happen. Because if the war were to spread, particularly if it were to engulf our NATO allies of Greece and Turkey, then I would change my judgment about the national interest and it then becomes a vital national interest of the United States.

Let me get to the fourth and last objective. We have been successful in limiting the violence and the civilian casualties. The key to that success has been UNPROFOR, the U.N. peacekeeping operations supported by NATO. UNPROFOR has 19 nations with about 23,000 troops in Bosnia and their job is to mitigate the effects of the violence and to deliver humanitarian service. They have been criticized as being ineffective and some critics have even called

them counterproductive. This is simply not borne out by the facts. Let me just tell you what the principal facts are to suggest to you that that criticism is ill-founded.

They are doing a very difficult job under very difficult conditions. You should base them on how effective they are in achieving their mission. The mission is to reduce civilian casualties. In 1992, the year that they went in, they went in at the end of that year, there were over 100,000 civilian casualties in Bosnia. The best estimates we have are 130,000. In 1993, the first year that they were there fully, those casualties dropped to 12,000, and last year, 1994, they were just under 3,000. Now 3,000 casualties is still a tragedy, but is dramatically better as a result of UNPROFOR and as a result of the NATO efforts.

My concern put in simple terms is if the U.N. forces are removed from Bosnia I greatly fear we are going to be back to the casualty levels of 1992, tens of thousands of civilians being killed every year, and I also fear that we greatly increase the danger of this war spreading beyond Bosnia. So I wanted to make my position very clear that for all of the criticism of UNPROFOR and of NATO support for it, based on results, it has had a good degree of effectiveness.

Now, I want to shift at this point to talk to you about the decision that was made in Paris by the defense ministers there on Saturday. General Shalikashvili will be talking with you in a few minutes about the bombing and about the aftermath of the bombing, including the shootdown of the F–16.

But in the face of those provocations, the United Nations was confronted with either the alternative of pulling out or of entering the war as a major combatant, both of which they rejected, or of strengthening UNPROFOR. They gave their chief of staff the job of coming up with a plan to strengthen UNPROFOR. That was done at the meeting on Saturday. It involved two components, the first creating a rapid reaction force consisting of two brigades of multinational forces. It would be there to protect UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission.

The second decision they made had to do with consolidation and repositioning UNPROFOR so that it would be easier to protect. They decided not, and I repeat not, to pull UNPROFOR out of the enclave, which had been a consideration, because they felt that that would lead to humanitarian disasters. Instead, they are going to stay the course in the enclaves and decided instead that they would do minor repositioning, bringing some of the forces in from weapon collection points surrounding Sarajevo and pulling in some of the U.N. military observers. This was, I think, a positive conclusion and the nations involved, the military forces are working now to put the final details together on that plan.

The United States' position at that meeting was that we would not contribute forces to this rapid reaction force for the same reason we are not contributing ground forces to UNPROFOR. But we did strongly support it and offered assistance in the following ways. The next chart will describe to you the proposals we made at that meeting.

The first is that we will continue close air support for the rapid reaction force just as we have for UNPROFOR. I think it will be

more effective for the rapid reaction force for reasons I will be glad to discuss.

Second, we have offered to provide weapons and support systems for the rapid reaction forces. That is under discussion now as to what particular weapons they may want to use. These weapons do not come equipped with cruise weapons only. Third, we have offered to provide strategic lift when we have unique capabilities to help move our allies into, in this case, Croatia.

Finally, we have offered to establish an intelligence coordination cell modeled after the intelligence system that we had in—and that proved so effective in Desert Storm.

That is a summary of what was done at that meeting. Many details still remain to be worked out on that.

Now I would like General Shalikashvili to cover his part of the briefing.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General SHALIKASHVILI. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would like to begin by discussing the two events of the past few weeks that I know are matters of great concern to this committee, the air strikes that occurred on the May 25 and 26 and the June 2 downing of our F–16 participating as part of the NATO force enforcing the no-fly-zone. Following that, I would like to make some remarks on NATO's plan 40104, which is the plan for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia.

Let me start with the events that led to the air strikes on May 25 and 26. You are all aware that NATO had agreed to provide close air support to protect UNPROFOR personnel and to provide air strikes in support of enforcement of U.N. mandates. Throughout the winter of 1995, the fighting in Bosnia was at a low level due largely to the secession of hostilities as well as the traditional winter refitting and reposturing of forces that we have repeatedly seen being done by both sides.

In early spring, however, the fighting intensified first when a stronger Bosnian Government force opened limited offensive actions and at the same time the Bosnian Serbs intensified their own attacks and began what appeared to be a systematic harassment of UNPROFOR forces as well as stepped up artillery attacks against civilians in safe areas.

On April 8, the Bosnia Serbs announced that they would no longer guarantee the safety of flights in and out of Sarajevo airports, in effect closing that airport. Throughout May, Bosnian Serb harassment and restrictions of ground convoys grew so severe that only 38 percent of that month's scheduled humanitarian aid was able to be delivered to Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serbs used the same tactics to limit humanitarian aid deliveries and UNPROFOR resupply to other enclaves as well. Then in mid-May the fighting in and around Sarajevo increased dramatically. In one day alone, more than 1,000 artillery rounds rained down on the city of Sarajevo.

Between May 22 and 24, the Serbs entered weapons control points outside of Sarajevo and withdrew four heavy weapons. In response, on the same day the commander of UNPROFOR issued an ultimatum giving 24 hours for both sides to cease firing heavy

weapons and for the Serbs to return the four heavy weapons taken from a weapons control point, and within 48 hours to remove to locations outside the exclusion zone outside of Sarajevo all heavy weapons not inside approved weapons control points.

The next day, on May 25, in response to the failure of the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the first part of the ultimatum, the UNPROFOR commander requested a NATO air strike against the Pale ammunition depot. That afternoon at 2:33 a strike was launched in response to that request. NATO attack aircraft shot the Pale ammunition depot and destroyed two bunkers. Later in the day, probably in response to that strike against a purely military target, the Bosnian Serbs shelled a public market square in Tuzla and 70 civilians died.

The next day, on May 26, because the Serbs still had failed to comply with the ultimatum, the UNPROFOR commander requested NATO to conduct an additional strike against the Pale ammunition depot and at mid-morning the second strike was launched against the six remaining bunkers.

The procedure for requesting air strikes runs from the U.N. commander requesting the strike directly to the NATO commander, CINCSOUTH, currently U.S. Admiral Leighton Smith. On this occasion, as has been the case every time in the past when the option of an air strike has been raised, the risk of retaliation was considered, and so was the likelihood that Serbs would take hostages. But that risk had to be weighed against the consideration that if NATO air power were not called in, then the Bosnian Serbs would continue to shell the civilian population. Furthermore, UNPROFOR judged it impractical to consolidate its forces before the air strikes because that act itself they felt would have been a clear signal that air strikes were imminent and would most likely have provoked the same preemptive hostage taking. The belief was that accepting the risk of Serb retaliation was preferable to allowing the shelling to continue and the violations to go unchecked.

Now let me turn to the shootdown of the F–16 that occurred on June 2, just 1 week after the second air strike. The F–16 was part of a two-ship formation that took off from Aviano Air Base at around 7 o'clock on the morning of June 2. They were on a combat air patrol mission over Bosnia and they were armed as well to conduct close air support in the event that they needed to do so. The two aircraft were orbiting at approximately 21,000 feet when a track-mounted Bosnian Serb SA–6 fired two missiles at the flight. The first missile exploded between the two fighters, who were flying some distance a part, but the second missile apparently struck the underbelly of the number two aircraft.

The flight leader observed his wingman's aircraft as it began its descent but lost sight when the aircraft entered the cloud cover below. Search and rescue missions commenced immediately and have continued ever since, but as of right now the status of the pilot remains unknown. A number of conflicting reports have appeared, but frankly, we still have no confirmation on the status of the pilot. We are vigorously continuing our search efforts. In the meantime, our sympathies are with his family and we continue to work for his safe return.

Because the fighters were orbiting in an area that had no history of known or suspected surface-to-air missile activity, these F–16's were not accompanied by aircraft with the capability to suppress enemy air defenses. They had their own radar warning equipment, electronic jamming equipment, and chaff. Other flights that day, those that were operating over areas where there were known or suspected surface-to-air missile threats, were accompanied by aircraft with the capability to suppress enemy air defenses. The command was practicing a standard tactical procedure of tailoring their air packages for the expected missions and threats. Tactical judgments like this have been made over the last 2 years and for over 69,000 sorties, which is a remarkable testimony to the command's operational acumen.

By the way, those decisions are made by the commander of the overall operation, Adm. Leighton Smith, a Navy fighter pilot with over 300 combat missions, with over 4,000 flying hours, and some 1,000 carrier landings. His principal air component commander is an Air Force lieutenant general with also in the vicinity of 300 combat missions and slightly over 3,000 hours in fighter aircraft, some of our Nation's best leaders and experienced combat fighter pilots, and I trust their judgment implicitly.

However, in light of this incident, Admiral Smith has directed that all operations over Bosnia-Herzegovina must now assume a surface-to-air missile threat throughout the area and must be accompanied by aircraft with the capability to suppress enemy air defenses in order to limit future risk to NATO aircraft.

With that, let me turn to a few words on the NATO plan 40104 and to answer any questions that you might have on it.

Let me start with a brief description of the area and the scale of this plan. I am confident that you are all very familiar with the territory of the former Yugoslavia. U.N. peace forces are located in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Of the 38,500 forces from some 35 contributing nations, 22,500 are the UNPROFOR forces located in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In positions stretching throughout the breadth of that nation, they are distributed in many pockets, including those in and around the various enclaves and safe areas.

The road network and logistics infrastructure are rugged and very limited. Much of the terrain is mountainous and many of the UNPROFOR units are in isolated and vulnerable positions. So a secure withdrawal of all these forces presents many obstacles and difficulties in part because of UNPROFOR's widespread distribution, in part because of the logistics and intelligence difficulties, in part because a withdrawal could become vulnerable to harassment and military disruption.

The plan that has been developed by NATO could be used to withdraw U.N. forces from either Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, but today I will focus on plans to handle the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is right now the most volatile area of United Nations operations.

The plan is flexible in that it is designed to accommodate either deliberate withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces, or should the need arise, an emergency extraction of those forces. The most likely scenario for an emergency extraction involves the eastern enclaves,

where the situation has always been most tenuous. The execution of the deliberate plan would have to be triggered by an UNPROFOR request to the U.N. Security Council to withdraw UNPROFOR forces. This would then be followed by a United Nations Security Council request to the North Atlantic Council of NATO to support this withdrawal.

I should note that the plan is limited to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces. It does not provide for humanitarian or refugee support either during or after the withdrawal operation, nor does it include planning for any subsequent operations by U.S. or NATO forces once a withdrawal has been completed. This plan will be executed under a single chain of command, under NATO command and control, using robust NATO rules of engagement, and there will be no dual key arrangement for NATO forces. At execution, all forces, UNPROFOR included, will fall under and will remain under NATO command and control until released back to the United Nations or the national command authorities.

The operation will be conducted sequentially in five phases and if executed as I describe today, which is the most robust option, could take up to some 22 weeks to complete from the time it is implemented until the last UNPROFOR soldier and NATO soldier are out of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

First is the preparation phase. The purpose is to establish the theater communications and logistics architecture and where possible to secure support for staging bases and needed facilities. While these initial steps are being taken, the forces designated for the plan will conduct training and other preparatory actions.

Second is the theater opening and deployment phase. In this phase the logistics elements will deploy to establish logistics bases and to open port facilities for follow-on units. Upon establishment of the logistics structure, the main body forces will conduct a withdrawal and will deploy into theater and assemble outside Bosnia.

Third is the execution phase. This is the critical phase. The combat forces will deploy into the interior of Bosnia to conduct withdrawal operations that will facilitate and safeguard the movement of UNPROFOR. In the fourth phase, reorganization, UNPROFOR units would be moved to holding areas near ports of embarkation and released from NATO control back to United Nations or national command and control. In phase five, redeployment NATO units will depart the staging area locations to return to their home bases.

In the event the situation arises that requires an emergency extraction while these forces deploy, the plan has a quick response option using selected NATO forces that are in close proximity to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

American participation and support for this plan is essential. The plan is built to a large degree on capabilities that only we possess. But just as importantly, our European allies, who are even now in the process of increasing their contributions to UNPROFOR, as we just heard from Secretary Perry, feel it is essential that there is a viable, workable, and supported plan capable of assisting their withdrawal of their forces in the event becomes necessary. Because it will be executed under NATO command control using NATO rules of engagement and there will be no dual key for NATO forces,

the right arrangements will be in place. Let me add that I believe it is extremely prudent for NATO to have such a plan on the shelf and to be prepared to execute it. It is never a good idea to wait until an unwelcome contingency arises before beginning preparations.

The approval of this plan is the best insurance possible that it will not have to be carried out. It gives the UNPROFOR-contributing nations the assurance that they must have to sustain their commitments to that very important mission.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks, and I believe Secretary Perry and I are prepared to try to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I have listened carefully to what you both said and obviously I have been concerned about all these things for a long time, and I haven't been as intimately involved as you have on this, but I think we all have to agree, and you said it yourself, Mr. Secretary, in peacekeeping you don't take sides, as our ranking member has said on numerous occasions, and make no enemies. That is basic in peacekeeping.

And here we have a situation that reminds me of a place called Somalia where we went into a situation for humanitarian reasons and I think did a good job at that, and then the mission was changed from peacekeeping to nation building wherein you take sides, and if you remember we took sides and we went after Mr. Aideed. The result was that we had a lot of people killed and some drug through the streets. I know a lot of people had good judgment and had a lot of experience, people who were behind that operation, but it blew up and what did we do? We had to withdraw from Somalia. And luckily they let us withdraw without a wholesale fight. We were prepared to defend ourselves in withdrawing, as I remember.

Not long ago one of my constituents compared the two situations and asked me, what is the difference in what happened in Somalia and what is happening in Bosnia—air strikes—I remember our visits at the White House, Mr. Dellums, we had a couple of them there a year or so ago talking about air strikes and the advisability of air strikes. As I remember there were only two people in the whole room that were in favor of air strikes. The military advisors were opposed to them. Mr. Dellums made a comment that he and I and Sam Nunn were on the same side in being against air strikes for not only a couple of reasons—they couldn't be effective—our military leaders even weighed in on that, and the result would be that you would get deeper involved in a land war because people would get shot down, we would try to get them out, hostages taken, and we would just end up in a deeper war. You changed the mission.

So my constituent asked me, he said, when you start bombing somebody, air strikes, is that taking sides? And I had to agree with him it surely looked like it. If you lose the umbrella of peacekeeping, you do that. And then what happened was hostages were taken. Luckily some are being released now. We don't know about the pilot. It only goes downhill after this.

So if you could help me explain to my constituents the difference between what happened in Somalia and what is happening here it would be a lot of help.

Secretary PERRY. Mr. Chairman, one of—several very important differences. One difference is what is at stake, what—where our national interests lie, quite aside from the fact that our use, NATO's use of air power has demonstrably greatly reduced the casualties that have been taking place in Bosnia, the thousands of shells a day that were going into Sarajevo before we started using it.

I think the most important point from national interest has to do with the extent of our—is the extent to which our national interest is going to be affected if this war spreads, how important it is to our national interest to keep the war from spreading. That was not a threat or risk we saw in Somalia, but it is very much a very real risk in Bosnia.

If Bosnia becomes a Balkan war or European war, then it begins to affect our vital interests in a very fundamental way. Not to be overly dramatic, but that was where, as you will recall, where the First World War started. It wasn't the dispute in Bosnia in those days that affected European and finally America's interests; it was the spreading of that war beyond Bosnia. It was an issue then and is an issue today also. And that is a very important difference.

The other point I would make is that even in a peacekeeping mission, the peacekeepers have a right to defend themselves. And when they are attacked, when they are harassed, they have a right to defend themselves. The U.N. forces have not done that much, because they haven't had much capability to defend themselves. And the introduction of this rapid reaction force by the British, the French and the Dutch is intended to correct that. It may not work. If it does not work, I will forecast to you that the European members of UNPROFOR will then decide to pull out.

Indeed, if it does not work by this summer, I think they will decide to pull out in the fall. But they felt that it was the chance of it working and that they ought to give it that chance, rather than cut and run at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I think that is exactly what happened in Somalia. We thought it was a chance to do something, and we did what we did and it blew up and so we left. I don't want to pursue it any further.

Secretary PERRY. That can happen, that can happen in Bosnia, but I would point out to you, if it happens, the consequences will be far, far more serious than they were in Somalia, because of the possibility of this war spreading beyond Bosnia.

Our pulling out or UNPROFOR pulling out will not be the end of it. It will not allow us to just wash—exit and say we have no more concerns or worries in the future. That is just the beginning of a bigger set of problems, not the ending.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dellums.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your question. Let me just say that I have had an opportunity in the context of my opening remarks to lay out some concerns. I have also communicated in a substantive letter to the President, with a copy to the Secretary, of my concerns and proposals as to how to work our way through this long term. And so I would be very keenly interested in hearing at this point from more

junior members, give them an opportunity to engage our witnesses, and I would reserve my time at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for being with us. And, General, thank you for taking time to explain this very complex situation to us today.

Mr. Secretary, I was taken with your chart that is there that displays the 35 NATO countries and the large number of non-NATO countries that are involved in the peacekeeping effort in Bosnia. I guess my first question would be that, although this is a difficult effort, it is meeting with strong resistance now from the Serbs, there is harassment, there are some injuries, this might be viewed as a maturation, if you will, of the Europeans in terms of carrying their own burden.

The policy of American—behind American presence in Europe during the cold war days, was the idea that only the United States as a superpower could confront, successfully confront the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, also a superpower. And that was the justification for our large military presence.

This is a situation, post-cold war, which really engages the Europeans. And it would appear to me that the argument could be strongly made that the Europeans are doing about as well, and the other nations that are involved in this peacekeeping effort are doing about as well as could be expected.

So I guess the first question would be, why is it necessary to bring the United States into the mix?

Second, you stated that the U.N. forces has had a salutary effect on the situation, it has reduced casualties. And yet your plan here, as I understand it, is a plan that basically supports a withdrawal of that beneficial force. If the force itself, if the U.N. force is beneficial to the situation and has had a good effect with respect to reducing casualties and providing a buffer and lowering the shelling of certain key areas, why are we now—why are we now hinging American participation on a plan that appears to move that beneficial force out of the area of operations? And those are my two questions.

Secretary PERRY. Those are all very good questions. Let me try a few of them.

The point that the Europeans are going through a maturation process here is a very astute point, I believe, and indeed I think that is happening. And if we go back to 1992, when the U.N. force was put in there, there was an opportunity at that point for the United States to participate. The United States decided not to. That was then the Bush administration. And the Europeans decided they could handle it.

Well, it has been tougher than they thought, but they are maturing, I think. And at this Paris meeting, it was not chaired by an American minister of defense, it was chaired by a French minister of defense, and we were there in a supporting and advising role, not in a leadership role. And at that meeting, they showed resolve. They agreed to put up another 10,000 troops, they agreed they did not want to cut and run in the face of pressure.

Why bring in the United States? Well, we are not—we are in, in a very limited way. We are not in particular in the rapid reaction force. The Europeans would like us to be in, but they understand that that is—that we are not going to be. We have offered to provide support, particularly in areas where we have unique capabilities, that intelligence coordination cell, and be in one of those, and strategic airlift we have being another.

You make a very good point about the withdrawal plan. Why do we support a withdrawal plan, when in fact we do not want UNPROFOR to withdraw? Because we don't. First of all, it will be their decision, the decision of the nations in that force whether to withdraw. And if they withdraw, it will be, I believe, because they have concluded that their mission was a failure.

Some of the members of this committee may already believe that their mission is a failure. They haven't come to that conviction yet. But they could come to that conviction after this last serious try of bringing in the new rapid reaction force. And if they do, they will have difficulty withdrawing and they will turn to us for assistance at that point.

But I emphasize again, we do not want them to withdraw. And the other point I would make is by their knowing that we would be there to help them if they needed it, that has helped firm up the resolve and I think influenced their willingness to stay longer.

General SHALIKASHVILI. May I add to that issue?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHALIKASHVILI. On the issue of why the United States, I think it is important to remember that this is also about NATO, about that alliance. If UNPROFOR turns to NATO and asks NATO's assistance in withdrawing their forces, it is inconceivable to me that we, as the leader of that alliance, could then step back and say, Not us, without doing great, great damage to our leadership position and to the alliance as a whole.

So I think as terribly important as the Bosnia tragedy is right now, we have to also keep in mind that this is about NATO, this is about NATO helping UNPROFOR withdraw, and you cannot remain a leader of that alliance by refusing to be with them at the time when they really need us.

So I would just ask all of you to keep in mind how deeply that whole notion about NATO and the importance of that alliance is intertwined with that issue, whether the United States should or should not participate.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Montgomery.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank our two distinguished witnesses being here today.

You know, I see where you are coming from in the big world picture, as we have gotten involved over there in France and other parts, going to these big meetings. But basically, I am kind of concerned back here at the local level, and I would like to maybe explain that to you. I am really not comfortable even being in Bosnia in any way. I did support the flyovers. But now I am not so sure.

It really—it really shocked me a little when they had the surface-to-air missile and knocked down the aircraft, I believe you said at 21,000 feet. I think we have to take another look at that position.

And I read somewhere, where we are thinking about supporting NATO and the United Nations with more money and equipment.

Now, my question to you is, where do we get the money from? We go in, we get involved in these areas, then you have to come back and ask for supplementals. I hope you don't reduce readiness, I hope you don't continue to close military bases.

And the other thing that worries me is about the equipment. You know, when these things happen, I have seen it happen over and over again, Mr. Secretary. You take it away from the National Guard and Reserves, and you know I have a deep interest in that. And I would—I would think we ought to go slow on this whole situation, but I appreciate you explaining to me about where we get the money and where do we get the equipment to help those folks out over there.

Secretary PERRY. The answer to your first question, where could we get the money, we have only one source of money and I am looking at it right now. We would have to come to the Congress.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. You don't want a vote today.

Secretary PERRY. And in terms of the equipment, equipment would have to come from a drawdown from excess equipment which we have. And it would be temporarily provided for the purpose of this force.

I say temporary, but I could not at the time I made the proposal, I would not be able to put a specific time limit on it. But it is not intended to give the equipment permanently. It is intended to make it available for this purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Montgomery, is that——

Mr. MONTGOMERY. General Shalikashvili was going to make a comment.

General SHALIKASHVILI. I believe your specific question was on the money and the list of equipment that Secretary Perry had indicated was offered to——

Mr. MONTGOMERY. That is correct.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Several points I will make. First of all, as of right now, we don't have, to the best of my knowledge, a single specific request for it. So we don't know yet what the answer will be. We do have a number of arrangements with our NATO allies, cross-servicing agreements and so on.

So it is depending on what it is they want, whether that is a strategic lift or not, could very well be that they are the ones that actually pay for that. So I am not trying to evade the issue, but it is too early to tell how much money might be involved, if any, in that particular thing.

The most likely thing, I think, that they might ask us for, is assistance with strategic lift, to get those forces over to Croatia. And I fully agree with Secretary Perry where the equipment would come from, but again, that depends on what they are asking us to provide to them. And I would be very hopeful that it does not, as you have expressed, come from the National Guard or the Reserves. They need the equipment badly.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Montgomery.

I guess we better break and vote, then come right back. And I want to remind everyone, the Secretary has to leave by 5 o'clock, so we have got to hurry right along.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will reconvene.

Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and a very cordial welcome to our witnesses. The committee is genuinely pleased to have you today and be able to have your views on this seemingly intractable issue of what our role should be in the Balkans.

I certainly do not mean to be critical, because I have no solution that is satisfactory to myself as to these problems that we face. But I am not sure that I have the degree of understanding and confidence in what I have heard today and where we as a nation really are in terms of our policies.

We apparently have indicated to our NATO allies and to the United Nations a willingness to, under certain conditions and upon request for them, to lend American ground forces to a redeployment of United Nations or UNPROFOR units, peacekeeping units in Bosnia.

What I saw on the chart, I could take as, if anything, an arrangement by which, through redeployment, we facilitated the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia. And one of the unfortunate and tragic things that occurs to me is that may well be becoming our only reasoned alternative. If 20-some-thousand peacekeepers can't keep a peace where no peace exists, I am not sure that a rapid reaction force of 10,000 or 20,000 more is going to keep a peace that doesn't exist, and where there is no political will among the contestants that they want a peace more than they want more victory of one kind or dimension or another.

So I find myself wondering, if there is no peace, how do we sustain and continue to sustain a peacekeeping effort? Especially if there is a political will among our allies, our European allies, they have the resources equal to more than what anyone is talking about our adding to the equation, if they had the political will to do so.

I suspect that the entire problem, as the rest of the world looks at Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Balkan situation, no one has the political will to enforce or bring about or to impose sanctions sufficient to pacify the area so that they will live in some degree of peace among themselves without ruthlessly slaughtering one another.

I do not really find the notion of American ground forces to assist someone to redeploy peacekeeping units as having the kind of logic that I would have hoped to have found in it. I don't know if you are going to redeploy UNPROFOR forces and bring them back to where they are more remote, to where the areas of greatest sensitivity are, the so-called neutral zones or peaceful zones that we are supposed to be holding inviolate, or if you are going to bring them back from the areas where conflict is most likely, that is going to be a very robust peacekeeping effort. And yet you will be involving more and more people.

I don't see it as a policy that is going to lead to a peace. I see it, if anything, if we are going to be sending in forces using our assets to redeploy and to be a rapid reaction force, it seems to have a larger potential of bringing us further and further, more and more into an escalating involvement which I can't see an end to.

These are my concerns and I totally sympathize with you in your efforts to try and find a solution that makes sense for the United States, a solution that makes sense for the people of the Balkans who are the victims of all of these centuries of distrust and hatred of one another, that they don't seem to be able to come to grips with. But I don't know how we can make them do that, especially if there is this absence of a political will throughout the United Nations, if there is this absence of political will among their European neighbors who have let the situation fester and become what it has become, and where I see no real indications that they are willing to pay a significantly higher price to be effective. And anything less than that just seems to be doomed to continue ineffectiveness. And if any of this is worthy of any comment or reaction, I would certainly like to have you do so.

Secretary PERRY. I will just make two points on that. The first, to restate our objective but to state it in a way that addresses itself to one of the early points you made, our objective is to keep the UNPROFOR forces in, and to keep U.S. ground forces out. Simply stated, that is what we are trying to achieve.

Second, comment about the rapid reaction force, that would be a way of strengthening UNPROFOR, and therefore maintaining the likelihood that it will stay in. Therefore, it would support our objective. It will not involve U.S. ground forces and therefore it is consistent with our objective of keeping U.S. ground forces out.

Mr. BATEMAN. May I follow up, Mr. Chairman?

I take it you are being unequivocal that there would be no American ground forces in this rapid reaction force?

Secretary PERRY. There will be no American ground forces in the rapid reaction forces, that is correct. We stated that, both General Shali and I stated that very clearly, not just to you, but to the Europeans when we met with them last Saturday.

Mr. BATEMAN. Does that still leave open the possibility of American ground forces in the redeployment of existing UNPROFOR forces?

Secretary PERRY. We don't see a role for U.S. ground forces in the redeployment. If UNPROFOR is redeploying or reconfiguring its forces, that is a job they could manage and would manage by themselves.

The only possible role we held out, and this is a contingency which I think is unlikely, is that if one of the units, for example, the Dutch unit in Srebrenica, comes under attack and they are in danger of losing their 300 or 400 troops there, and they sent out an emergency for help, the nation that has the best resources for going in in an emergency rescue operation is the United States. It is ground forces in the sense that it would be a helicopter assault team. That is an operation that would take probably 24 hours. We would go in, pull the forces out of there and come out again. We could not pull their equipment out. We just pull the troops out. It is a rescue operation.

I do not envision that happening, but if it did happen, there is no question that we have the best almost unique resources for doing that. And if one of our allies asked us to do that, and if the conditions were right, I would recommend to the President and he would come to the Congress and explain this to you.

We are not asking for permission to do that. I am just saying that is one of the contingency plans we have in mind. That is the only one I can identify that really would involve the use of U.S. Army forces, except for this broad plan that General Shali laid out for you of the withdrawal of all of the U.N. forces. That is the other one.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Appreciate you coming before us on this all-important topic. Mr. Bateman touched on this topic and I was going to ask a question of each of you.

General Shalikashvili, let me first compliment you on your statement the other day that I saw when I was in Lexington, MO, and you were in Vienna on television, the very succinct and clear statement of the U.S. policy.

The question I have, General, is really a rephrasing of what Mr. Bateman asked: Under what circumstances would these so-called emergency movement, this third very unlikely contingency, come to pass? Would you care to explain that a bit further, in addition to what the Secretary did?

General SHALIKASHVILI. The first point I would make, Mr. Skelton, is that the plan 40104 that I described is a plan that addresses only the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces. Either, if we have the luxury in a deliberate way, that might take a long time, or if we are prevented from doing it in a deliberate way and have to at some time on an emergency basis extract them out of there, we have this capability to do so. So that plan is within the context of withdrawal from Bosnia.

We do not now have a plan for a relocation as described by Secretary Perry. We do not have such a request. But it is an issue that came up during the planning for 40104, and someone said this is a possibility that a nation like the Secretary mentioned, for instance, the Dutch, would come to NATO and say, Can you assist us. And we then—the thought process was that in such an eventuality, we would do what Secretary Perry stated.

But it is important to understand, there is no such plan in existence today, there is no such request, nor is this something that we are here to consult with you about. It is just an issue that came up during the planning process.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much.

I would like to ask my next and last question to Secretary Perry. A few moments ago you used the phrase "vital interests," Mr. Secretary, to the United States. Looking back to a remark made by Bismarck many years ago, when he said the Balkans are not worth the healthy bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. And I wish to ask you, at what point does Bosnia, at what point do the Balkans become a vital national interest to the United States of America?

Secretary PERRY. In my judgment, Mr. Skelton, this conflict could become a vital national interest to the United States if it spreads beyond Bosnia to a wider Balkan war, and even outside of the Balkans. And I believe that is a real possibility, not an academic possibility.

And I believe that of the policy objectives I put on a display in that first chart, the one which is most important to the United States, is the one which says we will keep the war from spreading. Because that is the one that would affect our vital national interest. And if this war spread and involved both Greece and Turkey, for example, both of them NATO allies, then it has clearly become vital national interest.

I don't want to suggest a repeat of history of 1914, but potential of what was a civil dispute in the Balkans igniting and erupting into a broader European war is the concern that I have. And that is somewhat an interest but not a vital national interest. It could become a vital national interest, and our policy should be directed to preventing that spreading, preventing it from becoming a vital national interest.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Secretary, in that context, it appears that the policy has been somewhat successful in, A, bringing humanitarian and medical relief to much of the population in the area, and second, in containing the conflict within those borders. Do you not agree?

Secretary PERRY. I think the policy in Bosnia has had a remarkable degree of effectiveness based on those four policy objectives. It has not brought about a negotiated peace settlement. It has failed in that regard, but it certainly has limited the violence dramatically and it certainly has prevented the war from spreading. It is a tough problem, but there has been—the emphasis so far has been on the areas of failure, failing to achieve a negotiated peace settlement and the fact that the war is still going on and there are still are civilian casualties. But dramatic reduction in civilian casualties over the period, compared to the period before UNPROFOR and NATO went in there.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Cunningham.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't believe that you can control—I think you can control policy of a campaign with polling data, but I don't think you can do it in a combat situation. And let me give you just a little different view, when you say the President looked at the risks in lieu of the civilians killed when they ordered the bombing strikes.

I wrote over 17 months ago what I thought, exactly what the tactical missions would be of the Bosnian Serbs if we conducted bombing strikes. And that first of all is that they would retaliate and hit not only the Croatians but the Muslims and inflict as many casualties, civilian casualties as they could and military casualties. They could take and chain the peacekeepers and capture them to high-priority targets and basically say, Come ahead, bomb me. And that is exactly what happened and there was over 70 people killed in that. And immediately the Serbs are still bombing, they are still

striking, and yet they have shut us down from what we attempted to do and say that the bombing would prevent.

I have a lot of regard for both the general and the admiral in charge of the air campaign. I know them personally. But I also looked down, I had 36 SAMs fired at me in pairs, and I was shot down by a surface-to-air missile myself, so I know exactly what was going through that young F–16's pilot's mind. And an SA–6 is a mobile transport, capable of over 50 miles an hour, and that thing could be anywhere at any time.

And also testified in this committee, is that we don't know where those things are, and that if we did conduct air power, we are going to lose people in that. I also look at the Muslim leader, where he trained. He trained in Libya, under Muammar Qadhafi, with terrorists and with fundamentalists. I look at the Croatian leader who, with Croatia, fought with Nazi Germany during the war. But I also look at Serbia who is a former Communist, and I quote, "former Communist."

So the point is that all of them are equally as bad, and I think we focus on the Serbs. But I also look at Russia's willingness to engage in this conflict, Mr. Secretary, and that, you know, of course bothers us. But I believe they probably support the Bosnian Serbs because they were on their side during the war against Nazi Germany in Europe.

What I would ask you is that we can't control the Serbs, the Bosnian Serbs. And if you just put peacekeepers in there, I think you are just putting cannon fodder if you don't have a policy on how to solve the problem instead of just trying to maintain current.

With that in mind, would you be willing to take a look at possibly giving the Serbians what they have asked for, maybe not quite as much, and then being able to control the Muslims and the Croatians in such a way that if the Serbians feel that they are gaining something, then we are able to maybe stop at least the hostilities in that portion of the world?

Second question I have for you, if I can leave tomorrow or the next day and pick up an American F–16 pilot, will you provide me an airplane?

Secretary PERRY. Would you repeat that second question?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. If I can go over to the Bosnian Serb area and pick up an American F–16 airplane—F–16 pilot that was shot down, will you provide me an airplane?

Secretary PERRY. I would look very—let me answer all of your questions. Let me answer that one first. I would certainly look very seriously at that one. Anything that I can do that gives me a chance of bringing that American pilot back, would get my very high priority and very high attention.

On your point about the taking a look at giving the Serbs what they ask for, this is a classic problem in negotiation. I can think of—I could have solved the Bosnian problem peace negotiations several years ago if I could sit on both sides of the negotiating table. All of the proposals that have been—the proposals that have been made now by the contact group, accepted by the Bosnian Government, not by the Serbs. And now if I switch it around to give a proposal that the Serbs are going to accept, I feel quite confident

that the Bosnian Government, the Muslims, are not going to accept it. And so the fighting continues.

The challenge is to find an agreement that both of them would accept and it may be that neither side has reached enough state of war weariness yet where they are ready to compromise sufficiently.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Secretary, my point is if you can stop the side that we cannot control, if you can give them maybe not all of what they want, we can control the Muslims and the Croatians. We can't control the Serbians. So maybe you give the Serbians a little more and control the other two.

Secretary PERRY. I do understand your point. I would suggest to you we do not control the Bosnian Government and Muslims to that extent. The passions and the feelings of the injustice being done to them run very deeply in that country.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Oh, yes, sir.

Secretary PERRY. And I do not think we can control them.

I have, by the way, I read your paper, not just recently, but at the time you wrote it. And I do understand, understood then and still understand the risks that you spelled out. And I believe that the UNPROFOR commander who called for that air strike also understood those risks and had to balance out against the risk of allowing the Serbs to continue shelling Sarajevo, which was going on.

Also, I make one other comment. I believe the judgment I think implied by your statement, that the Serb's retaliation has been successful, I think that is a premature judgment. This has not played out fully yet. And I believe, it is my opinion that the Serbs have made a strategic blunder in the moves they have taken in retaliation for this, and it is going to hurt them long—over the medium to long term, substantially.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sisisky.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank both you gentlemen for being here. Knowing your schedule, that you are going to Brussels in a little while, I know we doubly appreciate you being here.

Obviously it is easy to complain. I just came back from the North Atlantic Assembly, and for three days that was the topic of discussion. Nobody has a solution. But may I suggest that one of the problems that you laid out here is, I hope it will not change in the next hour, that has been one of the problems. It has been a moving target. I understand the problems in doing that, but the people that I have talked to are just very upset, what is our policy. And I mean that is not your doing, I know that, Mr. Secretary. But hopefully this administration will get down to a policy and try to work it out.

I think the other thing that the administration could do, and you probably do a better job than anybody in the administration, of really expressing the national interest of this country, that is the hardest thing to tell the public. And there is another national interest, and General Shali bordered on it, and really I think it may be the future of NATO, the confidence of NATO. We are forgetting that, the most successful compact the world has ever seen for so

many years to keep peace, and it could be the demise of NATO if we—at least the watering down of it.

But there are some specific questions I want to ask. And one of them is I think in the next day or two we may be voting on the unilateral lifting of the embargo. I happen to believe that it is the wrong thing to do unilaterally. I do believe we want to lift the embargo, if everybody agrees to it, but I would like to have your comment on how this will affect the troops on the ground and any plans that we may have.

And the other thing is the plan 40104 that you talked about, the 22-week thing. Is there any breakdown on the time? Are we going to be on the ground 20 weeks? Are we going to be on the ground 8 weeks or whatever you plan on doing? I think that would be of interest.

We have some real problems as relates to the United Nations, and I would like for you to state that the decision to put troops, if we do troops, will be the decision of the United States and not the United Nations. Do you follow what I am talking about?

Thank you.

Secretary PERRY. I will comment on the first question you raise, which is unilateral lift, in stating again that our objective is to keep UNPROFOR in and to keep United States ground forces out of Bosnia. Unilateral lift would be contrary to both of those objectives.

If there is unilateral lift, there is a certainty that UNPROFOR comes out. And there is a probability that in time the situation will develop which will cause U.S. ground forces to go in. And that is the reason that I oppose it.

On the question of the—could you answer the next question, John?

General SHALIKASHVILI. The question on how long the force actually would be in Bosnia, under the worst of circumstances, we envision probably something from 8 to 10 weeks. But it is difficult to tell how long, because we don't know what difficulties one would encounter in getting folks out of there. The less opposition is encountered, the quicker this goes.

But in fairness, the most difficult scenario that we envision, where people are in fact trying to impede the withdrawal, the actual time that people would be in Bosnia, that NATO forces would be in Bosnia, probably between 8 and 10 weeks. Hopefully, it can be done much quicker than that.

Mr. SISISKY. One other question that you didn't answer about the United Nations, of American troops going, it would be our decision. Am I correct?

Secretary PERRY. Our decision.

Mr. SISISKY. Very good.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Torkildsen.

Mr. TORKILDSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also want to thank Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili for again appearing before us on this very important subject.

General Shalikashvili, a couple questions about this proposal from NATO about either redeploying or withdrawing the U.N. force there. How many troops—how many NATO troops would it take to

accomplish that withdrawal? How many would you see necessary to implement that?

General SHALIKASHVILI. NATO—first of all, you mentioned the withdrawal or relocation. NATO does not have a plan for the relocation.

Mr. TORKILDSEN. Okay. They only have a plan for the withdrawal?

General SHALIKASHVILI. The plan is for the withdrawal. NATO's planning now for the withdrawal call for approximately 58,000 non-U.S. troops and some 25,000 U.S. troops. That is not in Bosnia. That is the naval force that is necessary to bring them across from Italy, those are the logistics bases in Italy and so on. It is a much, much smaller force that actually goes into Bosnia.

Let me give you an example. For instance, it is now envisioned that out of approximately the 25,000 American troops, something much more in the vicinity of 10,000 would actually go into Bosnia. The rest would be the logistics folks, airplane people and whatnot.

Mr. TORKILDSEN. And what type of timeframe would we be looking at for a withdrawal to be accomplished? Are you talking months, a year, something along those lines?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Again, under the most difficult circumstances, from the time that the plan is approved and put into motion and you start prepositioning and beginning to deploy people from home stations into Italy and so on, it could take up to 22 weeks, until the last NATO soldier and UNPROFOR soldier are back out of Bosnia.

The time inside Bosnia, as I just mentioned to Mr. Sisisky, is probably closer to 10 to 8 weeks, again under the worst possible case.

Mr. TORKILDSEN. OK. I thank you.

Also in following up under the NATO plan, is there a determination whether we are only going to, under the NATO proposal, are they only advocating to withdraw troops and military equipment, or are they talking about withdrawing all of the supplies that the different countries have brought to this effort?

Obviously it would have a major impact on the timeframe as well as the personnel needed.

General SHALIKASHVILI. I think it is fair to say that it depends on the degree of opposition you get. No one is interested in risking the lives of soldiers to bring out vans of equipment. If the situation is benign, they would like to bring them out. It is a different matter about weapons systems. People are much more concerned about leaving heavy weapons that could be used by the Serbs, for instance, or any other side. There you would probably take on a bigger effort.

But once again, you would rather destroy it than risk the loss of soldiers. So the plan is built and part of that long timeline is that if you have the time and you are not opposed, then you can take everything out. If you are opposed and then you just have to destroy it and leave it, that is what would be done.

Mr. TORKILDSEN. Secretary Perry, now to shift to the broader policy questions and implications, if I remember correctly, earlier the general testified that one of the provisions, one thing that the United States might provide under this NATO proposal would be

close air support. And at the same time, it is the stated administration policy that the United States not take sides.

Isn't that somewhat inconsistent? I mean, could we really say we were not taking sides if we were providing close air support, wouldn't that undercut the very stated policy of the administration?

Secretary PERRY. No, it is entirely consistent with the administration position. We would not be taking sides. We would not supply close air support for either of the combatant forces. We would only supply it for the UNPROFOR force or their rapid reaction force. And it would only be called for to protect them from anybody who happened to be attacking and assaulting them. Conceivably it would be either side that would do that.

So anybody that does not want to suffer an attack from the NATO close air support, should not mess with the UNPROFOR troops.

Mr. TORKILDSEN. Where in theory, you know, either side may end up attacking the United States, in reality, isn't the only group there that has been hostile to us the Bosnian Serbs, or is there something else there that is not readily known?

Secretary PERRY. Of course not hostile to the United States, it is to the United Nations, the attacking is on the United Nations. But there have been actually instances of the United Nations being attacked by all sides to the war over there. But by far the greatest majority, the greatest proportion of them have been from the Bosnian Serbs.

Mr. TORKILDSEN. To move on, if the NATO proposal were to go forward and the administration were to sign onto it, is it the administration's viewpoint that the War Powers Act would have to be adhered to under such an operation?

Secretary PERRY. Let me get you an answer for that for the record. It does not strike me as a War Power Act case, but I am not a lawyer. And we need to get——

Mr. TORKILDSEN. OK.

Secretary PERRY [continuing]. A better reading of this. I will get a reading of that for the record.

[The following information was submitted for the record:]

WAR POWERS ACT AND CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

Question. If the NATO proposal (regarding the use of NATO troops to execute an emergency extraction of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia) were to go forward and the administration were to sign onto it, is it the administration's viewpoint that the War Powers Act would have to be adhered to under such an operation?

Answer. If the United States had participated in an emergency withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the spring or summer of 1995, the administration, in all likelihood, would have acted consistent with the reporting aspects of the War Powers Act as part of its continuing dialog with the Congress regarding the situation in the former Yugoslavia.

Mr. TORKILDSEN. That would be appreciated. Obviously, as you know, the sooner the better. As you know, the House may be debating that very subject today.

In general terms of the War Powers Act, clearly one of the areas that is not as defined in that, in the War Powers Act, is when different missions are now called into question which were not envisioned when the original law was written. So the sooner you can do that, Secretary, I think we would all appreciate it.

Secretary PERRY. I will try to expedite that.

Mr. TORKILDSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Pickett, the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to welcome our witnesses here today also.

We read in the paper almost daily about the atrocities being committed against the civilian population by the Bosnian Serbs. And the conduct that they have pursued over the past several years seems to indicate that the only thing that will cause them to abandon their aggressive tendencies is some force that they will come up against.

If that is a valid way to look at this, why is it that we are so reluctant to arm the Bosnians? I read after several years spent rebuilding, the Croatian army has emerged as a force capable of offensive action, and if the Bosnians also were made capable of offensive action it would seem to me that we need to bring about a balance of power in the region which would be more likely to bring about peace rather than to sit there and allow the Bosnians to be pounded to shreds by the Serbs.

Secretary PERRY. I certainly see the logic in your position, Mr. Pickett. I start off with a profound sympathy for the position of the Bosnian Government. I do believe they and the people have been the victims of the Bosnian Serbs in this war. But I do not believe that simply lifting the embargo so we could provide them arms——

Mr. PICKETT. I didn't say lifting the embargo. I was careful not to use that term. I said that they would be armed and made a force to be reckoned with because we seem to get bogged down in the ideas of the unilateral lifting of the embargo. But short of establishing some reasonable balance of power either through use of people already in the region or by bringing forces into the region, you are not going to stop the aggression.

Secretary PERRY. They have become, as a matter of fact, a military force to be reckoned with in the last 8 or 9 months, I would say, partly through better training and discipline and partly because they have acquired some arms illegally in spite of the embargo, just as the Bosnian Serbs have received some arms in spite of the embargo.

So I think that tends to make the point which you were just making. I don't know how to—I don't know what action the United States can take, though, to move forward in that direction short of a lifting of the unilateral embargo, and that will undoubtedly cause UNPROFOR to go out of the country which will have a series of undesirable effects, undesirable from the point of view of the Bosnian Government.

Mr. PICKETT. I don't want to belabor the point, Mr. Secretary, but it seems to me that as a part of the group that is going to be looked at to provide the forces and the capability and the leadership to bring about some kind of change in this area, we should be urging this view on our allies that without some counterposing force against the Serbs, they will continue to ravage the country. We might as well recognize that and get busy to do something about it.

Secretary PERRY. We have discussed that point of view with our allies that if they were to pull out the U.N. forces there, they may be open to such a proposal. But they are opposed to arming the Bosnian Government as long as they have peacekeeping forces in the country. We have had many discussions with them on that and they are absolutely unwavering on that point.

Mr. PICKETT. I can understand that issue.

Secretary PERRY. That is why I connect it with the pulling out of the U.N. forces. I think if that were to happen, we would certainly attempt to get a multilateral agreement for multilateral lift, get our allies to agree with us on that for the very reasons you described.

The danger is in getting from here to there. Because when the UNPROFOR forces go out of the country, there will be a period of time when the Bosnian Serbs will have a great advantage, will probably exercise that advantage, and in particular, certainly will attack the enclaves, I think with disastrous results.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Secretary, I want to go back to a point that our Chairman started out with, and that is, when we cross the line from peacekeepers as basically buffers between two factions, to combatants, when we are actually the ones, when the peacekeepers are actually the ones dropping the bombs on people, doesn't that lead us into a very difficult situation?

As a matter of fact, I am reminded of one of General Powell's comments on this situation a couple of years ago. He said something like, "A few well-placed bombs are not going to eradicate centuries of ethnic hatred in Bosnia." I keep coming back to what is our long-term goal and when are we going to get there.

From what you have said today, our policy and goal is primarily to keep the war from spreading. If to accomplish that goal it requires U.S. forces to participate in the United Nations or NATO, whichever it is, there seems to me to be no end. We are in a situation where we are going to be there participating for the indefinite future because there is no plan or no long-term goal there.

My second question is something that you mentioned earlier, and that is confusion over U.S. policy and especially on the point about emergency movement of forces. As several members have indicated earlier, there has been a great deal of confusion, it may have been clear to you, and I don't think the confusion is as a result of statements that you or the general have made, but I also don't think it can be laid on the media.

My question is, aren't you concerned that this kind of perception that U.S. policy changes nearly day to day, that sort of vacillation encourages aggression or at least a testing of the United States to see whether we are going to—what our policy is and whether we are going to do anything or not?

Secretary PERRY. I would like to comment on several of those points. The first, I repeat, we are not combatants on the side of either force. Our only role there is in the role of NATO Air Force, to protect peacekeepers, and that is a mission which is compatible with peacekeeping.

Having said that, let me be very clear, I believe that in the beginning, back to 1992, this was not an appropriate operation for

peacekeeping; it was more appropriate for peacemaking and peace enforcement operations. I believe when the decision was made in 1992 to treat this as peacekeeping and send the United Nations in there, in retrospect I think that was the wrong decision. It should have been, in my judgment, considered peace enforcement and should have been a NATO force to go in because it was a peace enforcement. I don't know how to rewrite that history.

So we now have a peacekeeping force there confronted with combatants who are still fighting, not only with each other but occasionally attacking the peacekeeping forces as well. In spite of those difficulties, they have done a remarkably good job in their goal. Their goal was only holding down the violence and providing humanitarian relief. In that goal, they have done a good job.

The long-term goal is to get a negotiated peace settlement. While that has moved slowly, there has been progress on it, and the most encouraging has been the peace accord between the Croats and the Bosnian Government. So where there were three combatants there a year and a half ago, now there are only two. Unfortunately, the two that are still fighting show no inclination to becoming ready to make a peace settlement themselves.

We have not given up on that. I think we should continue to try hard. That has to be our long-term goal, a negotiated peace settlement.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Tanner.

Mr. TANNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to thank Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili for being here. I know you all are very busy. We appreciate your being here.

Mr. Sisisky really asked the question that I was most interested in, so I will just ask for a comment on Russia's presence in this equation given the historical alliance with one of the combatants there, and if there was anything we could do as a Congress to help move that situation to the table in some way.

Secretary PERRY. Russia's presence on balance has been constructive. They have contributed forces on the ground to UNPROFOR. They have, I believe, several thousand troops at UNPROFOR. The number isn't fixed in my head but it is a significant number.

They are a member of the contact group, and therefore they are working to try to get a negotiated peace settlement. They bring a point of view to the contact group which is both a plus and a minus, which is their attachment to the Serb cause.

You can see how that is both a plus and minus. On balance, I think that is worth having, and that it has facilitated the move toward a negotiated peace settlement. It is premature to say that it was positive until we actually get a peace settlement, but so far it has been a net plus.

General SHALIKASHVILI. After the Paris meeting I went to Vienna to meet with my Russian counterpart, General Kalashnikov, and one of the reasons for going was to brief him on what had occurred in Paris. He was very supportive of what was agreed upon and caused no—voiced no particular objection to any part of it. So in

that sense, as Secretary Perry said, it has been generally a supportive view.

I think it is so important to keep in mind how very different that is from previous Balkan problems where the Russians were always on a different side. So you have to think of the conflict spreading not only in terms of geographically, but also major nations siding with different parties that are actually involved in that conflict.

This has not happened, and I think UNPROFOR and Russia's participation has helped, and Russia's participation in the contact group have kept all the major powers together on this issue. So I think that is another one of those important side effects of both UNPROFOR and the diplomatic contact group effort.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Longley, the gentleman from Maine.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES B. LONGLEY, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MAINE

Mr. LONGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, General Shalikashvili, I very much appreciate your being here today. I have never heard such a clear explanation of such a confused policy in my limited time here in the Congress. I say that with all due respect, that I heard a discussion that it is our primary policy not to take sides and that we don't have, in your words, what we would call a vital national security interest in Bosnia. Yet our policy also seems to reflect the belief that we believe the Bosnian Serbs are the aggressors.

I would submit that those two positions are inconsistent, that if we are not taking sides, then truly we should refrain from judging the situation.

That leads to my second point, which is that it clearly is not a peacekeeping operation. There is no peace to keep. It is an attempt to use the United Nations, or for the United Nations to develop some type of a peace-making operation, and I don't think that is something within their range of capability.

I might add that I traveled to the region in April, received an extensive number of briefs, flew a mission in the Adriatic with some of the maritime patrol aircraft, and also visited our troops in Macedonia, including about five different observation posts on the Serbian border. I came back through Naples, received again a brief at command headquarters; at every single stop every military officer that I spoke to repeated the refrain that the United Nations has no business attempting to manage this. Its bureaucracy is incapable of doing so. It does not understand the military situation, and that in and of itself is a major threat to our ability to successfully implement any policy that we may presume to have in that area.

So I would like to comment and ask for your reaction to it. I think what was explained to me, we have U.N. bureaucracy attempting to manage a NATO bureaucracy, attempting to simultaneously manage our own command structure, and I believe that getting the United Nations out of the military chain of command, it isn't a peacekeeping operation, it is a peace-making operation.

I come back to what you said, and I wouldn't necessarily look at the policy, the four policy objectives that you set in terms of grouping them all together; I think we have two objectives and two

means to those objectives. The objective is containment, preventing this from spreading beyond the republic and certainly reducing the impact of the war on civilians. But the means to those objectives are to remain neutral and frankly to fully engage in the diplomatic effort.

But I think we need, to the extent that we are going to be talking military force, we need to be talking either primarily NATO, and I think we need to be showing greater deference to our NATO allies, particularly those nations that deem the region to be a significant enough threat to their vital interests that they have actually committed forces to that area.

I think it is very presumptuous for us to be taking a position that from what I understand is at odds with the NATO position, which is that they aren't as interested in making a judgment about the situation. They feel it is a civil war. I would like to ask you to comment upon the differences within NATO because I think our policy is a serious threat to our ability to keep NATO united and focusing on its objectives.

I apologize for making more of a statement, perhaps, than a question, but I would appreciate your comments.

Secretary PERRY. I am very close to your assessment of the situation in Bosnia today in that I believe that it is more appropriate, it is really a peace enforcement, a peacemaking operation instead of a peacekeeping.

Having said that, I think I would urge people not to be so critical of the United Nations. They were handed this tough job, they don't have the capability to do a peacekeeping operation, and in spite of that, they have gotten remarkably effective results under very, very difficult conditions.

By results, I mean in terms of the two things they were supposed to do, which is to keep the war from spreading and hold down civilian casualties; that has happened.

Mr. LONGLEY. Could I interject?

If that is the case, and I certainly don't mean to unnecessarily criticize the United Nations, if we have moved to a point that is beyond their capability, shouldn't we be addressing that?

Secretary PERRY. The European nations—we, the United States, or we, the international community—we, the United States, have said this is primarily a European responsibility. We said that in 1992 and have stuck with that since then. That is why we don't have forces on the ground there. That is why when I went to Paris, I was sitting there supporting the British and the French and the Dutch, not leading them; because we do consider this an European operation.

They have decided they can strengthen that operation. They are willing to put in another 10,000 troops to do it, and I hope they succeed. I talked about policy but my strategy is to keep UNPROFOR in and keep U.S. ground forces out. That is the best way to achieve our policy, I think.

Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, could I ask unanimous consent for a quick followup question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. LONGLEY. Having said that, sir, isn't it appropriate to, if in fact this is primarily a military mission, not a peacekeeping oper-

ation, a peacemaking operation, isn't it time to—I want to get back to the fundamental question. Shouldn't we do this through a military chain of command, primarily NATO, and isn't that the most effective means of implementing your stated objective—I am not so sure to keep UNPROFOR there, but to keep forces in certain key positions to manage the conflict?

Secretary PERRY. Without trying to second guess what the Bush administration was thinking about in 1992 and the conditions they faced in 1992, I believe that it would have been more appropriate to have had NATO take over that operation as a peace enforcement operation. But I don't see any way of turning the clock back or even converting over to that at this stage.

The actions that have been taken to try to shore up this operation, to try to protect the peacekeeping operation that is in there, has been to provide NATO air support and now more recently putting a rapid reaction force on the ground. It would have been far better if there had been a NATO force on the ground in the first place.

Mr. LONGLEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to know for the record, has a promise been made or implied by the administration to rescue or extract U.N. forces should they find themselves in a jam?

I have heard you mention several times that you have put together a plan to do so. I would not think you would be putting together a plan unless you felt there was a distinct possibility that you would have to use that plan.

Secretary PERRY. Let me distinguish between two cases, an emergency rescue during a withdrawal of the forces under the so-called NATO 40104 plan. In that case, if NATO approves that plan, and it is not yet approved, the United States would be approving along with it, and when we reach that stage, the answer to your question would be yes. The approval of the 40104 plan, if and when that occurs, would effectively be that commitment.

The other condition is if an emergency arises before the plan is put in place—my example was a Dutch unit in Serbanechya is in extremis and calls for help, what our allies understand our position to be there is that we would seriously consider helping in that case. It would have to depend on the conditions, the conditions being how great a danger they were in, how unique our abilities were to help them. Could they be extracted with other resources already there? It would depend on the reasons. We cannot make a commitment to do that. We can only tell our allies that we would consider that if a situation arose.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Secretary, how much sense does it make to lead those people to believe that we are going to rescue them when you number one are admitting they might have to be rescued, which tells me that they are not in a very good military position to begin with, and you are complicating that by giving them the impression that the Marines and the airbornes will come rushing to the rescue.

Mr. Secretary, this is something that you inherited, and I am not going to try to make this a Republican or a Democrat issue, but

I have told two of your predecessors that we don't belong there. This has been going on for at least 700 years.

Since you weren't here, I will quote what General McKenzie said when he sat in that chair. He said, the way he saw it is there were three serial killers, one had killed 15, one had killed 10 and one had killed five. He pointed at then Congressman McCloskey who was interested in getting us involved and said that he did not buy the argument that we had to rush to the aid of the serial killer that has killed five.

Mr. Secretary, I can't say anything stronger than that. We don't belong there. And I would hope that you in your position would not lead our allies to believe that we could get drawn into this, or for that matter, since we know it has happened, since the Muslims do want us involved, what if the Muslims were the ones to initiate the hostilities and do it in a place where we thought the Serbs had done it.

If the embargo comes down, we know the Middle East will help the Muslims, we know that the hard-core Russians would go to the help of the Serbs. This is a no-win situation, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary PERRY. I take your point, I accept your point. I think I have directed my energies as a Secretary to keeping us from getting involved in a war in Bosnia. I stated that as the number-one policy, keeping our ground forces out of Bosnia. And that is because I agree we don't belong their. But we do belong in NATO, and therefore if one of our NATO allies gets into a tough position, I think we have an obligation to consider at least whether we can—if we have a unique ability to rescue them, I think we have responsibilities to consider that.

Mr. TAYLOR. They are two different things. We are a country that lives by its word and I am sure we will honor whatever treaty we have with NATO. But you also spoke of going in unilaterally should the case be, should NATO not have voted on this, and aren't you by your testimony today leading people to take chances they should not be taking because you hold out the promise of a rescue by the American forces?

Let's face it; that is not our place. It is a horrible place to fight a war and there is no good guy in this situation. It is hard for the American people to believe that there is no good guy but there is no good guy in this struggle. They have all done horrible things to each other over the course of history.

I would certainly encourage this administration to make it perfectly clear to those forces, with forces on the ground, if you are in a situation where you feel threatened, get the heck out of there; don't wait for the American rescue to come.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hostettler.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Secretary, I was interested over the break to see the transformation take place from a U.N. situation in Bosnia to one of NATO allies changing various targets and that we would possibly be sending ground troops in to rescue NATO allies.

Has the conclusion been made, as a result of testimony that we have heard today, has the conclusion been made that there is an eminent threat to a NATO member nation as a result of what is going on in Bosnia, a imminent threat?

Secretary PERRY. No. We have not reached that conclusion and based on my discussions with the defense ministers on Saturday, they have not reached that conclusion.

I repeat, this is a contingency, and I think a remote contingency, and I almost regret having brought it up, except it could happen and we need to think about things that could happen even if they are remote.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Can I ask, by what treaty authority is NATO operating in Bosnia?

Secretary PERRY. NATO is not operating on the ground in Bosnia. They are only operating in the air in Bosnia and it was by a determination made by the North Atlantic Council that they would provide air support to the U.N. operations.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. But we have had a plane shot down over Bosnia, the F–16, so I think we are very involved with that.

I would like to change course a bit to the rapid reaction force. In your prepared testimony and in your remarks as well, you spoke to the provision of various systems that would be part of the—could be part of the rapid reaction force, and the second part of that was the inclusion of attack helicopters, artillery locating radar, communications gear, GPS navigation systems, and night vision equipment, very advanced technology. Would this system's provision, would that include personnel?

Secretary PERRY. No.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Is there a precedent for the direct use of this technology by our allies?

Secretary PERRY. Yes. We sent in artillery-locating radar to Bosnia about a year-and-a-half ago to detect artillery mortar shells being fired into Sarajevo, operated I believe by Jordanians.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. How about GPS navigational systems?

Secretary PERRY. We are talking about the hand-held units that a squad or platoon would take with them. These are actually available commercially now.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. So we are not handing over sensitive——

Secretary PERRY. In the case of the GPS, if you own a boat you can buy one and put it on your boat and use it today.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. So it wouldn't be manning the attack helicopters; there would be no personnel in the helicopters?

Secretary PERRY. No. These would be Cobra attack helicopters, the previous generation helicopters, and to the extent they ask for these, we would have to determine whether we can draw them down from excess equipment in the U.S. Army.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Geren.

Mr. GEREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank our witnesses. I appreciate their insight and testimony.

I was pleased, Mr. Secretary, that you said that, when you listed the three circumstances under which we might use ground troops, you said, after consulting with the Congress. But after listening to them and then listening to you further talk about the circumstances under which this might be necessary, it occurred to me that there likely might not be time to consult with Congress. If there were an emergency, I suspect the President would say there is no time to consult Congress, and if the United Nations said we

want to reconfigure our troops, you would say there will not be time to consult Congress. We have to help you withdraw; there is probably not time to consult Congress.

That worries me. I was here during the gulf war debate and had a lot of time then to think about the role of Congress in matters such as these and became deeply convicted that it is critical that Members of Congress that are going to have to—I guess for want of a better way to describe it—attend the funerals, they need to be involved in decisions such as this.

And I thought we did the right thing, even though President Bush resisted it, by forcing him to come to the Congress before the Gulf war. I was disappointed that we didn't come to Congress before we went into Haiti. Thank goodness it was done in a way that we didn't have casualties.

But I worry in spite of the commitment to come to Congress here that both you have made and the President has made publicly, the circumstances you describe are not going to be the sort of circumstances where we are going to have an opportunity for a meaningful congressional consideration.

I guess I ask you to comment on that and then ask if you wouldn't consider having Congress debate these in advance and see if this is something Congress could sign off on in advance so we don't have them in dire straits and then really leave us no room for meaningful congressional consideration of that decision.

Secretary PERRY. Of the three cases you mentioned, the assisting and reconfiguration of the UNPROFOR forces, we are not proposing to be involved in the reconfiguration of the forces. That is something that they can do themselves. So I rule that one out.

In terms of withdrawal, as part of what General Shalikashvili called the 40104 plan, in that one we would have full, detailed consultation with the Congress in advance. In fact, it is a very expensive operation; we have to come to the Congress to get the funds for it. So in that one I think I can assure you that there will be what you are asking for, adequate detailed consultation.

Mr. GEREN. That is assuming that things don't go to pieces over there and they have to withdraw.

Secretary PERRY. The third case is an emergency. If an emergency were to come up next week, say, and we were asked to go in and save one unit of the countries, this is a 24-hour operation where you fly your helicopters in, pick them up and bring them out again. That one, one of the reasons we are talking to the Congress today is we wanted to alert you to the fact that we are thinking that that is a contingency that could arise.

As I indicated to one of the other Congressmen, I almost regret having brought it up because it seems to suggest that we are planning or intending to do it or that it is imminent. That is not correct. It is just a contingency that could happen.

The purpose of mentioning it in this meeting today is to give you prior notification of what we are thinking. If it arose and we were actually asked to do it, we still, even in an emergency, we would still consult with the Congress but we would not have time for a detailed, full discussion like we are having on the 40104 withdrawal plan where we are giving detailed briefings to your staff

and laying out the plan in quite a lot of detail and where we have to come to you for funding.

But the emergency extraction would be a 24-hour turnaround operation and we would come and brief the leaders of the Congress at least and tell them what we were planning to do, but there would not be time in that case for full discussion. That is why we are trying to give you some heads up on that now.

Mr. GEREN. I hope the circumstances—if the unfortunate situation should arise where we find ourselves going in, I hope we anticipate it with sufficient time, because I know this is an area that all administrations, not just this administration, they don't like to consult on these sort of things.

I very much appreciate that you offered that up at the very beginning and the President has made those comments. I know many Members of Congress feel strongly about that issue and I hope that remains the policy.

Let me mention another—I think perhaps my colleague, Mr. McHale, is going to talk about it, too, but I saw on that list close air support. That sounds to me like that ain't ground troops but we are talking about getting down in the middle of things.

Will we offer to provide close air support as just an offering of equipment, offering them overflights? Are we talking about giving them close air support in battle situations?

Secretary PERRY. That is no different than what we are already providing, we, in this case, NATO. NATO is providing close air support on request to the UNPROFOR forces on the ground. It has only been requested a few times in the last year and a half but has been available to them during that period and it would be available to this rapid reaction force.

The close air support would be enacted under two conditions. First, the ground unit rapid reaction force asking for it, and second, the air commander deciding that it was reasonable and prudent to supply it. You can imagine conditions in which the air defense situation may be such or the uncertainty about the operation may be such that we may not want to provide it. But in particular, for it to be effective, the ground unit has to have tactical air control, they have to have spotters to tell the airplanes where to direct their weapons.

So we have done that. We have been doing it for the UNPROFOR forces well over a year now. But it has only been used on a few occasions.

Mr. GEREN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The situation is this. The Secretary has to leave by 5 o'clock. Mr. Dornan assured me that he only needs 3 minutes and Mr. Dellums wants to wrap it up. I am afraid we won't get past that, and I apologize to Members who haven't had an opportunity to ask questions.

Mr. Dornan.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To do away with the War Powers Act and give the sitting President more power, as I pointed out on the Floor, people don't think of the word decisiveness with the current leadership, let alone semper paratus, semper fidelis, or a lot of other military expressions, but I am thinking of future Presidents. So I am in a contradictory

position, because I am digging in my heels, gentlemen, on the loss of one more life after that F–16 pilot.

Charles Krauthammer wrote brilliantly that the administration can't seem to think 48 hours into the future, let alone tactically for a few months or strategically or a few years, because anybody with common sense having watched the Serbs over the last 4 years would know that they would react to further air strikes, particularly hitting an ammunition depot, the way they reacted to the prior air strikes 14 months ago.

We were very, very very lucky over the last 2 years to only have one British sea Harrier shot down. The pilot successfully ejected, break one; break two, his parachute brought him down into friendly territory and not into hostile territory.

I knew this was going to happen. The President spoke at the Air Force Academy with a speech, and I am not being cute with alliteration, these are the first three words that popped in my head; that the speech was confusing, convoluted and contradictory, and I bet your fate is going to dish you up an Air Force Academy graduate who did not die, but who is hiding out somewhere in the bush that was shot down within 5 working days from Monday to Friday.

Gentleman, here is my problem. I want to submit seven questions that were developed based on your appearance before the Senate. Here is my problem. I geographically worked out all the nations in there. There are 12 out of the 16 NATO nations. Iceland has no forces, Germany has a World War II problem so their young men won't die. Our young men will die because of their World War II problem. Italy, another Axis power, has an Aviano Air Base and a Brindesi and a Vincenza and all that, so they are running for cover. And Greece has gone the other way. They have already endorsed the genocidal maniac country that established itself over the blood and sniping tiny children and killing their mothers in front of the children. So Greece is going the wrong way on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Dornan, 3 minutes.

Mr. DORNAN. Thirty seconds, Mr. Chairman.

And here are the Muslim nations involved: Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, part of Kenya, part of Nigeria, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia. Of course they are in there.

Here is my problem. The United States and Canada have sailed across the North Atlantic several times in this century and lost tens of thousands of lives because of European civil wars. Yes, it started, and I stood on the spot where it started, where there are Grumman's Chinese footprints for Gabriel Princeps. It started there June 28, 1914 and it was royal powers itching to get into a fight and bleed their young men to death on all sides.

Serbia aligned to their Slav cousins up in the north, weird royal family treaties all over the place—why does one more American have to die in Europe? Let Europeans and NATO solve this and we will give them—and this is my closing statement—and I think this is a hell of a lot when we don't have the money to do it—we will give them sealift, we will give them airlift, we will give them medicine, we will give them food, we will give them more intelligence than they know how to use, we will give them everything under quartermaster, we will give them seapower to protect the ports and give them Tomahawk missiles in the dead of night to dump the

bridges where Milosevic supplies his killing genocidal cousins in the south. No release of the arms embargo to Muslims to start a Jihad, no American young men and now women, thanks to Les Aspin, to die in combat in the tinder box of the Balkans. Never again. Let European boys die, including Greek, German, Italian boys, not Icelandic, Canadian or American.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dellums is recognized.

Secretary PERRY. I would like to respond to one element of that impassioned speech and that is a reference to the Krauthammer article. I have to say that I react with anger and indignation at Krauthammer's comment.

To suggest that I didn't think or that General Shalikashvili or that Admiral Smith didn't think about the welfare of that pilot out there just makes my blood boil. Of course, we thought about it and of course we understood what could happen. We also understood what could happen if no action were taken. Somehow that had to be weighed and we did weigh it.

Mr. DORNAN. I don't think he meant you gentlemen. I think he meant at the top where political decisions overlay your decisions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dellums is recognized. The Secretary has to leave and if members have questions for the record, they can submit them.

Secretary PERRY. I would like to hear Mr. Dellums first.

Mr. DELLUMS. I will just take a couple of minutes. I just want to say, first of all, I think that it is appropriate that we held these hearings and I appreciate our distinguished witnesses coming before us. I think we have a responsibility as an integral part of the body politic to be analytical, to be substantive, to be critical, at times to be naysayers, but I also think that we have a responsibility often above and beyond simply being critics and naysayers, and that is to challenge ourselves to be substantive and to offer alternatives and to offer suggestions.

In that regard, last week when I sensed that we were moving rapidly toward a crossroads in Bosnia, I sat down and tried to write a thoughtful letter to the President of the United States on Bosnia to lay out what I thought were some ways of trying to address the long-term problems. I would not read the entire letter, but I would like to give my colleagues some of the thoughts that were contained in the letter that I wrote the President.

In part,

> What would be appropriate and essential to resolving the long-term crisis is redoubled diplomatic initiatives that would coincide with the reestablishment of the original mission of UNPROFOR, and an effort to secure cease-fire in place during the pendency of these initiatives. Some would say that this has been tried and failed.
>
> My thought is that efforts to bring directly to the table all of the parties to the problems created by the devolution of Yugoslavia, including, for example, Croatia and Macedonia, could move the process of a negotiated solution forward and provide a basis for a more meaningful cease-fire. These negotiations should revisit the issues that have emerged since the devolution of former Yugoslavia began including the question of the fixing of borders.
>
> Let us recall

And I would say, Mr. Chairman,

> Our earlier concerns that the devolution proceeded too quickly and that the borders were established without weighty enough consideration to the consequences

now so visibly and murderously wrought on the people of the region of proceeding without consensus.

Renewing our thinking on this issue would not be an appeasement to violence and war crimes which must be comdemned and prosecuted in the appropriate forum. Rather, it is a recognition that if we are to achieve the negotiated resolution of this conflict, that is the only way to bring it to a halt. We must be prepared to discuss the real issues that separate the parties.

Reaching to the Offices of the International Court of Justice for the designation of experts who could assist in the border discussions might help to resolve these issues and could also be pursued. These and other possibilities all raise potential for reigniting the diplomatic process that will be necessary ultimately to resolve the underlying issues.

In such a context, a cease-fire might be possible that could properly be monitored and enforced by a peacekeeping force that is truly accepted by all of the parties to the conflict and which is appropriately sized and equipped. U.S. military involvement in such a peacekeeping operation could be an important and would be an appropriate element of such an overall diplomatic strategy.

My comments are not intended to ignore the significant diplomatic efforts that have transpired to date to resolve the underlying issues to the conflict, nor to denigrate the good-faith placement of peacekeepers and to do the best possible to contain the violence and the enormous sacrifices that they have made in an effort to achieve their mission.

My comments instead are intended to point out that we are at a painful crossroads that require us to revisit without prejudice all of the underlying issues at stake, including the assumptions that have underpinned U.S. diplomacy in the hope that this might provide sufficient incentive for the belligerents to come to the table to seek what must be ultimately negotiated solutions to their outstanding grievances.

Those who believe the conflict can be resolved in favor of the Bosnian state on the battlefield are, in my humble opinion, painfully wrong. And so if it is true that a negotiated settlement that has been alluded to several times in this discussion of these issues must ultimately occur, let us pursue a policy that is calculated to get these issues to the table quickly before the military situation deteriorates so badly that no number of U.N. peacekeepers can prevent the levels of slaughter that once plagued the troubled region.

So in conclusion, I am saying that three years ago we all understood that these administrative lines were drawn quickly and without consensus, and that many of us said that battle and pain and death and suffering would ensue. Unfortunately, we were accurate. That has indeed taken place.

What I am saying is that it is not simply about negotiating the plan on the battlefield by the contact group. It is going back to the basic issues. A cease-fire has never been sought that was tied to a major new diplomatic initiative. A cease-fire has always been sought to celebrate the holidays or to deal with the weather or whatever; but we have never really laid down a cease-fire based on a major initiative.

I think the major initiative is to say to all of the parties, let's go back to the table based upon the fundamental issues that are the boundaries in the first place that has created this violence, and spend some time—it will take 2 years or more to get that down. But it seems to me that all of the parties in my opinion would have some stake in going back to the table if the fundamental issue is redrawing boundaries and borders that people could live in that respects the differences that have brought the violence and the pain and the death and destruction so far. So that is a point of departure.

I conclude on this. I said that this is a crisis within a crisis within a crisis. The immediate crisis, the hostages, the F–16 pilot, whatever we do in that regard should be consistent with our long-term objective. If our long-term objective is ending the violence, a

negotiated peace, then whatever we do needs to be consistent with that.

I believe that we must now break out of the confines of where we have been in the past and try to find a more creative way to deal with these issues. I think a more creative way is to go back to the fundamental question, the basic root cause of these issues that would allow people to go back to the negotiating table and let them negotiate new levels of boundary.

At that point in a cease-fire, the United States could participate in a peacekeeping operation that would be configured differently and equipped differently that would allow the parties to maintain the integrity of a cease-fire while people are negotiating what ultimately I believe is the solution, and that is a negotiated settlement dealing with the fundamental issues.

That is something—with all due respect, people are not talking about going back to the fundamental question of the root causes. We tend to be dealing with the crisis within the crisis, but we are not dealing with the fundamental crisis.

With those remarks, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you giving me this time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, these are my observations. Whether they are good, bad or indifferent, I think as Members of the body politic we have a responsibility that goes beyond simply being naysayers, be willing to put your behind on the line, give the thoughts and ideas, and if they are good, hopefully they are; and if they don't work, then let's get on and try to find some other way of dealing with it. And I choose to assume the responsibility of trying to lay an idea on the table.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Secretary, General Shalikashvili, I apologize. We will try to write an excuse for you if it will help. I want to apologize to the Members who have waited and not had an opportunity to ask questions.

The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

UNITED STATES F–16 SHOOTDOWN OVER FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 11, 1995.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd Spence (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting of the committee will come to order.

This morning the committee will receive testimony on the DOD's recent investigation into the circumstances surrounding the June 2 shootdown of a U.S. Air Force F–16 over Bosnia and subsequent rescue of its pilot Capt. Scott O'Grady.

Our witnesses are the Honorable Walter Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Gen. John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Adm. C.W. Moore, Director for Current Operations on the Joint Staff and the senior officer responsible for review of this incident.

We welcome all of you here for this hearing.

The committee will shortly hear in great detail how it came to be that Capt. Scott O'Grady's F–16 was so suddenly shot down on June 2. While it is unfortunate that elements of the Department's conclusions were released to both the New York Times and Washington Post over the weekend, and in advance of the Congress being briefed, I nonetheless look forward to this morning's presentation and hope that it will cover in thorough fashion a number of important operational questions.

However, I believe that the most critical questions before all of us are strategic, not tactical. Why are we in Bosnia? What risks are we asking our men and women in uniform to take, especially under highly questionable rules of engagement, and for what end? And are we providing our personnel with the proper authority and capabilities to effectively and safely carry out their mission, as ambiguous as it might be?

The events of early June over Bosnia were an important reminder of the price that the United States is being asked to pay for the West's failed Bosnian policy. In the name of U.N. Security Council pronouncements, the other states have once again fallen into the trap of asking our military to operate in a nether world of peacekeeping where coalition unity and other political considerations are higher priorities than sound operational doctrine and

practice. Unlike the other two no-fly zone operations we conducted in Iraq, our pilots over Bosnia continue to fly over an increasingly hostile environment and the United Nations refuses to allow our commanders to take action against air defense threats.

Capt. Scott O'Grady almost paid the ultimate price for the United Nations failure and refusal to allow military judgment to prevail in a military situation. The next pilot may not be so fortunate.

Today we are putting our own pilots in harm's way, but if we follow the present course to its logical conclusion, tomorrow we may have up to 25,000 young Americans asked to accept similar politically-dictated risks due to the U.N. peacekeeping doctrine as well as our alliance politics. The administration has already started down this slippery slope with its ill-advised decision over the specific objections of Members of Congress to provide direct support for the European Reaction Force. I recently wrote to Secretary Perry asking for clarification on the significance and impact of this action and on our military, and look forward to a prompt response.

In closing, I believe it is important that today's discussion be viewed in the context of the broader debate in Bosnia. While Captain O'Grady's ordeal has given all of us a renewed sense of pride in our military, the circumstances that put him high over Bosnia that day, tactically defenseless against Soviet missiles, should serve as an important and sobering lesson for what lies ahead if our military involvement in the Balkans continues to deepen.

Before proceeding, I would like to notify members that, due to the nature of some of the material to be discussed, I plan to close this hearing after some initial questions in the open. It is my intention to keep this hearing open as long possible after the witness' presentations to allow as many members as possible to ask questions. However, I ask my colleagues' understanding on the need and desirability to go closed in order to present and permit a more detailed give-and-take with our witnesses on certain aspects of this incident.

Before turning to the witnesses, I would like to recognize the senior Democrat, Mr. Montgomery, for any comments he might like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSISSIPPI

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Dellums will be here before this hearing is over.

I would like to welcome our witnesses here today from our side of the aisle. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the full statement of Mr. Dellums put in the record. I would like to quote one part of his statement, though, when he says, "Many important issues are raised by the shootdown." I hope that our hearing will be able to avoid needless finger-pointing and unnecessary second-guessing of those in the field.

So this is a very important hearing; and with that, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the request will be granted.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dellums follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT
HONORABLE RONALD V. DELLUMS
RANKING DEMOCRAT, NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
HEARING ON F-16 SHOOT DOWN
JULY 11, 1995

Mr. Chairman:

Today we will learn from the Department of Defense concerning the events the led to the shoot down and rescue of Air Force Captain O'Grady's F-16. I welcome Defense Undersecretary Walter Slocombe, JCS Chairman General John Shalikashvili and Rear Admiral Charles Moore, and look forward to their comments.

Many important issues are raised by the shoot down. I hope, though, that our hearing will be able to avoid needless finger pointing and unnecessary second guessing of those in the field. When we have received the information available and the recommendations from the JCS staff, it should help us to make informed judgements about the continued wisdom, viability and cost-effectiveness of Operation Deny Flight; the need to modify rules of engagement or operation procedures;

and whether to make technical modifications to the equipment available to our air forces and those of our allies in the theater.

As I have indicated in the past, the early stages of a new era are fraught with difficulty and sometimes painful learning processes. The execution of Operation Deny Flight — an air operation of a military nature that is symbiotically linked to a more difficult and complex U.N. ground operation — typifies the new and less straightforward application of military power in this new era. Whether or not Operation Deny Flight is the best course of action in pursuit of U.N. or U.S. objectives is not on the table here today, although the hearing today will help to inform us as to the limits of such an air operation in pursuit of more complicated diplomatic and humanitarian operations.

In addition, our assessment of the information available today must also be applied to an assessment of the ultimate calls for changes in procedures and new

and different equipment for our aircraft and allied aircraft. Are the rules of engagement appropriate for the mission and the threat? Would new equipment make a difference; if so, when, how and at what expense and effectiveness? Any solution to these problems must be reasonable and accessible and factored against less costly methods of achieving the mission. These are among the many questions that will occupy us in the wake of this hearing.

I look forward to the insights of those who have reviewed this event and all of the minutia of the record and welcome them to this hearing. Their work will prove an invaluable aid to our effort to understand the conflict, the operation and the shortcomings, if any, that led to the loss of Captain O'Grady's aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. General, do you want to lead off and then Mr. Slocombe and Admiral Moore.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General SHALIKASHVILI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. My purpose is to offer you a summary of the after-action review we conducted of the events surrounding the shootdown of Capt. Scott O'Grady's aircraft June 2, 1995, and the resulting search and rescue. An after-action review is not an investigation. It is a standard procedure in our forces to carefully review important operations and events to look for ways that we can improve our operations and then to disseminate these lessons learned throughout our forces.

In this case, there were two reasons that we needed a very thorough after-action review. First is to understand the facts surrounding the shootdown of Captain O'Grady's F–16. In addition, although Captain O'Grady was shot down while serving as part of the NATO operation enforcing the United Nations no-fly zone over Bosnia, our forces also enforce no-fly zones over northern Iraq and southern Iraq, and we wanted to make sure we understood what lessons might apply to these operations as well.

Enforcing a no-fly zone over selected territory is a very complex and difficult task. It involves building an electronic air traffic control and warning system over another nation's territory, and in the case of Iraq and Bosnia, over territory that is interlaced with air- and ground-based threats to the safety of our air crews. It is a matter of policing a very discriminating aerial embargo 24 hours a day 365 days a year and remaining watchful for any sign that a dormant threat is being activated.

In the case of our operations over Bosnia, there is the added complexity that Deny Flight crews are also on call to provide air strikes and close air support to UNPROFOR forces on the ground, forces who are vulnerable to retaliation.

It is important to understand that the no-fly operation depends on dozens and dozens of electronic systems from radars to an assortment of communication systems to a wide spectrum of various kinds of sensors, and it depends on the actions and decisions of very many people who serve in dozens of different capacities from the operations commander and staffs to various intelligence collectors to the combat pilots who fly the air missions. So those compiling this after-action report headed by Admiral Moore on my left, the pilot who led the first-ever Deny Flight mission over Bosnia, had to cast a very wide net to review both the actions of those involved in the shootdown and recovery as well as the key systems that supported their efforts.

The second reason for this very thorough review was to carefully study Captain O'Grady's evasion techniques, the ensuing search by our forces to determine his condition and location, and the rescue operation that brought him home safely. In this case, we were studying a very successful operation. The key to the overall success was the courage and the resourcefulness of a first-rate pilot who was very well trained to survive the dangers he faced and who had

the cool nerves and great endurance to employ that training in the midst of great danger.

The search for Captain O'Grady and his eventual rescue were as well textbook cases of great skill, resourcefulness, and courage on the part of the superb team that looked for him and brought him safely home.

As you are aware, Deny Flight flight operations are continuing, and much of the after-action report deals with sensitive matters that could compromise the ability of our crews to carry out this mission. Therefore, during this open testimony, I must limit my remarks to preserve the security of our forces and their mission. If you wish, we are available to provide additional insights in the event that you choose to convene a closed session.

Let me begin by providing a quick synopsis of the history of the Bosnian Serb Army and the Republic of Serbia Krajina air defense and SAM activity before the shootdown. When Yugoslavia disintegrated, the Bosnian Serb Army inherited the remnants of a very sophisticated and reasonably extensive air defense network. In late 1991 and early 1992, they consolidated their medium- and high-altitude surface-to-air missiles, their SA–2's and SA–6's at Banja Luka, presumably to train their crews and as a central logistics point.

In 1994 when NATO conducted the first air strikes, their response was to begin deploying the SA–2's and SA–6's, but with one exception. The easternmost side near the Serbian border that is depicted on this map, the SA–2's and SA–6's stayed in north of the red line you see on the chart. The majority of the deployments were on Banja Luka and Bihac. Over the course of monitoring hundreds of emissions from these air defense sites, nearly all of their emissions were from north of this red line.

While I cannot specifically describe in an open forum all the details of our analysis, there were only two brief emissions, widely separated in time, picked up south of this red line since 1993, but in every case the indications were inconclusive. And the latest of these, two emissions occurred over 6 months before the shootdown on June 2.

Our analysis, going back to the beginning of the Deny Flight operations, has confirmed that there had not been any SAM deployments in the vicinity or range of where our F–16 was shot down. The black circle on the chart shows the location Basher 51 and Basher 52 flight patterns. They were flying a circular pattern, what is known as a "combat air patrol," outside the range of any known or suspected SAM activity. However, NATO was not oblivious to the heightened threat to Deny Flight aircraft resulting from the air strikes it conducted against the Pale munitions depot on May 25 and 26.

In the aftermath of the two strikes, both of which had been requested by the U.N. commander in Bosnia, and after observing the Bosnian Serb retaliation against the peacekeepers on the ground that included hostage-taking and increased attacks against safe areas, and in response to the rhetoric from Bosnian Serb leaders that they would no longer abide by the conditions of the no-flight regime, the NATO commander of Deny Flight, Admiral Smith, issued new guidance to his NATO crews. Perceiving a heightened

threat, he acted to minimize the exposure of his air crews by ordering no penetration of known or suspected SAM rings unless the NATO operations center specifically directed such a mission.

Further, any flight that was so ordered to penetrate known or suspected SAM rings had to be accompanied by air defense suppression aircraft. Our review concluded that all flights after 26 May met this guidance.

Shown here is a snapshot depicting the forces involved in Deny Flight operations shortly before the shootdown. As you can see, the operation involved a number of aircraft, ships and satellites. Day-to-day a great many aircraft and crews cycled through the operations area under NATO command and control.

Now, having looked at the threat and the nature of the Deny Flight operation, let me spend just a moment on the rules of engagement under which Captain O'Grady's flight was operating. NATO rules of engagement were in effect, and while I cannot disclose the specific rules of engagement in open session, this slide summarizes the key features and nature of those rules of engagement. They acknowledge the right of NATO aircraft to self-defense and offer the flexibility to respond when a threat is detected. They list and define the specific indicators under which air crews can decide to take action for their own defense, defining more precisely the nature of hostile intent and hostile actions that justify aggressive defensive actions. On a daily basis, the crews are provided with additional guidance that responds to known changes in conditions or the threat to their safety.

These are the blanket NATO rules of engagement that pertain to all flights in the Deny Flight operations area. But Deny Flight aircraft involved in responding to U.N. requests for air strikes and close air support are subject to dual key arrangements, as we all know.

Let me turn to the events and conditions on June 2 when the F–16 aircraft took off on their mission. Prior to the takeoff, there was no clear indication of any SAM activity in the vicinity of their assigned combat air patrol station. Our review of the evidence after the fact found nothing that would show flawed intelligence. Based on everything the Deny Flight commanders knew at that time, they had reasonable grounds to believe that Basher flight was going to be operating outside of any known or suspected SAM rings. However, just minutes before the shootdown occurred, indications of SA–6 presence in southwest Bosnia-Herzegovina were picked up and these reports were transmitted into the threat-warning communications network. However, at least in large measure due to garbled voice communications, the warning was not relayed to Basher flight in time for the F–16's to take precautionary actions.

Let me play for you now, if I may, a recording of the actual first attempt made to transmit that alert. The first attempt was made a full three minutes before the shootdown actually occurred. By the time the message could be understood, Basher 52 had been shot down.

[Transmission played.]

General SHALIKASHVILI. As you can hear, the message was clearly so garbled that it could not be understood, it had to be repeated

several times and as I mentioned, the clear transmission did not arrive until after the aircraft had been shot down.

Analysis indicates that our threat-warning systems and the threat-warning net operated precisely as they were designed to operate by picking up indications of the SA–6 presence. However, the threat warning of the unexpected SA–6 presence simply wasn't relayed through the whole system to the F–16 before the SA–6 was fired. The warning that was processing through the system concerned the possible presence of an SA–6, but the very first indication that the SA–6 was actually targeting Basher flight came only seconds before the shootdown.

Our review found that all reasonable efforts were made to relay the warning to Basher flight, but because of distortions of the voice transmissions, they were unclear and had to be retransmitted a number of times before they were understood. That leads to our first set of conclusions, those dealing with the architecture and guidance for future Deny Flight operations.

Based on our confidence that the threat-warning system operated properly and was able to detect the presence of the SA–6, we concluded that the breakdown was in communicating that threat to the pilots in time. As a result, we need to add certain enhancements to the threat-warning communications architecture that will further accelerate the flow of transmissions.

However, we are still left with a sensitive linkage between Deny Flight air activities and the safety of the UNPROFOR peacekeepers on the ground. Therefore, Deny Flight remains constrained by U.N. concerns about threat of retaliation to its ground forces. These concerns are legitimate because the threat to the ground forces is real, but the result is to limit the effectiveness of NATO's Deny Flight operations.

Let me turn to our specific recommendations. Despite the fact that threat-warning architecture functioned properly, we believe there are enhancements that we must add to further reduce future vulnerability.

Second, we have recommended certain enhancements to the communications architecture itself.

Third, we should continue to press the United Nations to approve stand-alone suppression of enemy air defenses as needed.

Fourth, as a minimum, we must continue to limit the exposure of Deny Flight aircraft to Bosnian air defense systems.

Let me turn to what happened after Captain O'Grady's plane was hit. The SA–6 missile actually caused the F–16 to explode and to begin disintegrating in the air when Captain O'Grady pulled the handle that ejected him in his ejection seat from the aircraft. Put simply, given the catastrophic nature of the hit, as well as the fact that he ejected in the midst of a fireball, Captain O'Grady was extraordinarily fortunate to have survived the ejection with only minor injury.

Basher 51, the flight leader, saw the aircraft disintegrating, but he did not observe Captain O'Grady's ejection. His last sight of the aircraft was of still-disintegrating pieces descending into a cloud bank.

The automatic emergency locator beacon in his ejection seat was not used, which was fully in compliance with the standard oper-

ations procedures for Deny Flight. Had the aircraft gone down over water, where there would be little risk of enemy capture, the beacon would have been used, but over hostile territory, the beacon could be picked up by an adversary and used to get a fix on the downed pilot's location. So it was kept off to keep potential adversaries in the blind about the pilot's location.

In addition, while Captain O'Grady was still descending, he could have used his survival radio which he had in his personal survival kit, except it was wrapped and sealed in plastic to keep it dry in the event that he went down over water, and so he decided not to use it. As it was, Captain O'Grady believed they must have seen his ejection and descent, so he assumed that his command would know both that he had survived the shootdown and the general vicinity of his landing.

As Captain O'Grady was descending, he formed a mindset and strategy that was to carry him through the next 6 days. After he passed through the clouds and was able to see the ground below him for the first time, he saw a large town to his west, and along a major east-west road he noticed a group of military vehicles and some men who appeared to be in uniforms looking up in the sky at him.

He knew that he had to avoid the built-up area to his west, which he expected would be heavily populated, in order to avoid capture. Because he assumed that we knew he had ejected safely and would be searching for him, his paramount concern was to find concealment and to stay well hidden from ground searchers, but he also noticed high ground to the southeast of where he was about to land which would afford better terrain from which to communicate and a good location for a eventual helicopter recovery. So he decided that once he landed he would find a hiding place and stay concealed from searchers on the ground and that he would gradually move further and further away from the populated area to his west and north to improve his chances of avoiding detection.

Because he had seen the men on the road watching him, he assumed that the Bosnian Serbs knew he had survived the shootdown, that they knew roughly where he was about to land, and that they would come looking for him. He decided that once he landed he would move immediately to a hiding position and remain stationary, and that he would only move at night.

Because he believed that his command knew he was alive and because he wanted to limit the chances either that the ground searchers might hear his transmissions or that they might electronically intercept his transmissions, he decided to limit his attempts to make radio contact.

In the meantime, as soon as the command learned of his shootdown, although it had no indications that he had safely ejected, a 24-hour listening watch was immediately established in theater to monitor survival channels and Priority One was established for all intelligence collectors to search for the downed pilot. All source sensors were optimized to gain the maximum available coverage over the vicinity of the shootdown and numerous sorties were flown over the area to look for any indications that Captain O'Grady was alive. This activity began as soon as the shootdown was reported and was maintained until he was found. There was

never any assumption that Captain O'Grady had been killed in the shootdown. The search effort operated as if he were alive and had to be found.

In the time between June 2 and 6, while the search continued unabated, Captain O'Grady on the ground stayed with his evasion plan, moving from hide-site to hide-site, trying to avoid detection. This kept him on low ground, and the high ground in his vicinity masked his limited attempts to communicate. It was not until the night of June 7, that Captain O'Grady, by this time physically exhausted, hungry, and concerned by the long time he had been on the ground, changed his mindset from evasion to the need to be recovered.

That night, hearing the sound of aircraft in the air, he moved to the high ground and started frequent attempts to establish communications. Nearly as soon as he started these transmissions, contact was made and the NATO command was alerted that Captain O'Grady was alive and waiting to be recovered.

Once contact was established, the command had to decide how, when, and where to pick him up. After a very short discussion, the commander on the scene decided upon an immediate pickup. Although it meant a daytime operation, he had considered that the confluence of fair weather, his understanding of potential threats and the vulnerability of Captain O'Grady to detection argued for an immediate extraction.

Consequently, he notified the Marines on the Kearsage, who were in a ready status, to prepare for an immediate rescue operation, and quickly notified the other units who would be needed to ensure rescue. Included were aircraft to fly in advance and to maintain cover for the operation, and a backup force in the event that anything went wrong with that rescue attempt.

It was, by any measure, a remarkably successful operation. The Marine helicopters, using global positioning systems [GPS] they carried on board and the GPS that was with Captain O'Grady, were able to fly directly to Captain O'Grady's location. Once they were in sight, Captain O'Grady signaled his exact location and the helicopters landed in a clearing right next to his hiding site. In fact, the link-up went so well that Captain O'Grady was already in the first helicopter before the Marines in the second helicopter were able to dismount and form their half of the security perimeter. After taking a very quick head count to assure that personnel were accounted for, the two helicopters then departed and began the flight back to the Kearsage. On the route back, they came under fire from missiles or rockets and some small arms fire, but the recovery force made it back to the Kearsage without casualties.

The conclusions of this part of our after-action review were really very heartening. Captain O'Grady was well trained for the position he found himself in, used the training that he had received in a textbook manner to evade detection and capture, and to arrange the recovery.

The actual recovery was equally a textbook case of superb planning and execution. The men and women who searched for him and then found him and extracted him were the best force that any downed pilot could have prayed for.

Its success notwithstanding, our review indicated that future efforts of this nature would benefit from a better survival radio for our pilots, and it emphasized the importance of ensuring that both survivors and the rescue forces are equipped with global positioning systems. Consequently, we are recommending that we accelerate the procurement of an improved survival radio and we are recommending that all combat air crews in search and rescue forces be equipped with global positioning systems.

That, Mr. Chairman, concludes my unclassified briefing of the after-action report, and we are now prepared to answer your questions. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. I take it that Mr. Slocombe or Admiral Moore will reserve their part for later?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask a question and get this whole thing in proper perspective. First of all we being the United States and NATO—have been asked by the United Nations to provide flights over hostile territory in pursuit of peacekeeping operations conducted by the United Nations. In doing this, if we come across a situation where we know that there is a hostile act to engage our aircraft, we have to go back and get approval from the United Nations before we can take offensive action to suppress this activity on the part of the hostile people in that area; and I further understand that we have been turned down on occasion, before this, when we have gone to the United Nations for permission to take offensive action to suppress the ground-to-air missiles, that they have in those areas—unlike the situation in Iraq, where we had the authority if the other side so much as paints our people with radar, we can go ahead and take action to suppress that, those missile threats.

In Bosnia, the way I understand it, we have kind of a dual key arrangement. We have to go to the United Nations and ask for permission, authority, and this gives the United Nations a virtual veto over our tactical decisions that we have to make in these kinds of operations. So that is the problem I have with this whole thing and the dilemma we seem to have in trying to deal with the problem.

If I might just ask some questions to bring out this point. Prior to June 2, how many times has NATO or any NATO or United States commander requested that preemptive action be taken against Bosnian Serb air defense assets?

Second, will we continue to provide aircraft to participate in operation Deny Flight if the United Nations or NATO opposes taking defensive preemptive action against the Bosnian Serbs' integrated system.

And third, if the only way we can safely operate a no-fly zone over Bosnia is to take preemptive action against Serb radar ground installations, does this not cross the threshold between peacekeeping and the more traditional military operations?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Mr. Chairman, to the best of our knowledge, prior to June 2, NATO commanders had asked to suppress air defenses on three occasions. One time it was approved and on two occasions it was not.

As far as whether, if we cannot suppress air defenses and deem it necessary, we would refuse to participate in Deny Flight oper-

ations, I would rather answer that in closed session, if I may, Mr. Chairman, because it involves getting into rules of engagement, and the answer is not that clear-cut.

As far as the last point is concerned, whether having to suppress air defenses in order to be able to operate in that kind of environment crosses the threshold between peacekeeping and more conventional combat operations, I don't know how you would characterize it, but it certainly is away from conventional peacekeeping and it is now in the—in that world where you in fact are enforcing an action upon one or more of the sides that are involved in the—the two antagonists on the ground, so you are certainly away from traditional peacekeeping operations and now entering into the world of enforcing an action on one side or the other. In that sense, you are approaching combat operations.

The CHAIRMAN. I won't pursue it further at this time. I will let others ask questions.

Mr. Montgomery from Mississippi.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask the General, in his briefing he said that Captain O'Grady never used his radio until the night that the signal was picked up; is that correct?

General SHALIKASHVILI. No, Congressman Montgomery. He did use his radio very infrequently and only for extremely short periods of time, and he did not change his method of transmitting until the last day, when he moved to the high ground. The reason he gave for using very short transmissions is that while he wanted to establish contact, it was much more important for him, in his own mind, in the first case, to remain undetected, and he was afraid that any kind of a lengthy transmission that had a reasonable chance of being detected by us also had a reasonable chance to be detected by the people who were looking for him.

Mr. DORNAN. Would the gentleman yield? Captain O'Grady told me—when he was here, he told me he was up on the radio every night, on the 2d, the 3d, the 4th, and the 5th.

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is correct.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. My question is, when did the Defense Department know that there was a possibility that Captain O'Grady could be on the ground? Did you ever know that—some messages came out of the Defense Department, and I got calls in my office that were confusing, that it was said from the Defense Department, maybe they thought he was on the ground.

General SHALIKASHVILI. First of all, I did not know and I don't believe any of my senior staff knew—nor the commanders in NATO—until we picked up that transmission, I believe it was on the 7th. I don't know who those quoted DOD spokesmen were that supposedly were talking about signals picked up, or Morse code.

There was one report about some Morse signals. None of it was sent, none of it was true, and I don't know where that information came from. We made every attempt every day to find out——

Mr. MONTGOMERY. You did not know until you got the clear signal?

General SHALIKASHVILI. No, sir.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. We are very proud of our forces. Would you tell us what Reserve and National Guard units were involved in

this, and the F–16 pilot that picked up the first clear radio message, was he Reserve, National Guard or what?

Admiral MOORE. In regards to Basher 11, who picked up the first communication from Captain O'Grady, he was in Captain O'Grady's squadron, a regular Air Force squadron, and was not Reserve or National Guard.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Any Reserve or National Guard in the Marines also flying the helicopters? They were all active?

Admiral MOORE. All active duty.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Saxton, the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, Mr. Chairman, let me commend you for holding this hearing today. This has been a matter of great interest and some concern to many.

General, let me ask you, as you began your testimony—and I might add it was quite articulate—you used a series of charts, and one of the charts had the approximate location of Captain O'Grady's aircraft or what you believed it to be when it was shot down. It was delineated by—directed away from Banja Luka by a red line. I assume that you had information, and we agree that we were aware that there were SA–6's north of that red line; is that correct?

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is correct, Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. How far south of the red line would you say the aircraft was when it was shot down?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I am told about 35 miles.

Mr. SAXTON. I am not an expert on these matters. The gentleman to my right is probably one of the best experts I know, and I will let him get into the technical aspects of this; but I have a terrible time trying to rationalize how whoever made the decision to send these two F–16's out into that location, knowing that there were SA–6's on mobile platforms 30 or 30 kilometers away, I just am at a complete loss intellectually to figure out how that decision was made, and then all of us react with great surprise that this aircraft was shot at and ultimately shot down.

I don't understand that. Can you explain it to me?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I think that the decision was made based upon an analysis of what they knew about the threat, what the movement of that threat had been over a long, long period of time, hundreds if not thousands of flights flown, and where they knew or suspected SAM sites to be located. And based upon that analysis, they made the judgment that those two flights were going to operate in an area where there had not been any known or suspected SAM activity, and therefore, those two aircraft were not accompanied by enemy air defense suppression aircraft.

As you know, F–16's have built-in equipment, as well, that gives them some limited protection, so it is not like they were totally unprotected and could have taken some action. I would rather go into that in closed session.

But that was a judgment made upon that, the fact that they had examined for a long period of time, had a history of a long period of time where those SAM's did or didn't go, and they had not gone into that area.

Mr. SAXTON. I don't claim to be an expert in these matters, but I was concerned for some time—in fact, in 1993, there was a group of us that had formed, under the Republican Study Committee, a task force on terrorism and unconventional warfare, and we happened to come across information at that time, which we felt compelled to share, that expressed our concern that these SA–6's were a potential danger to our aircraft in that area; and forwarded that information to a variety of agencies, including your office. And just coincidentally, a few days before this aircraft was shot down, we reissued that paper expressing our concern about this matter.

As it turned out, the aircraft did in fact get shot down by the SA–6's that we were concerned about; and it is very difficult—I guess I have no further questions, but it is just very difficult for me to understand how we sent these two aircraft out there protected from a distance by surveillance aircraft, unprotected close up by Wild Weasels or whatever, other close-in defensive capabilities we have for these types of missions flying in, apparently, the same area where we have flown over and over again, making it easy for the Serbs to position themselves to be able to shoot down one or more of our aircraft, which in fact happened.

I don't cast any blame at anybody; I just don't understand how NATO commanders in the field made these decisions which turned out to be so incorrect. I just leave that question with you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from Colorado, Mrs. Schroeder.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the witnesses for being here today.

What percentage of our transmissions are that garbled? That was really incredible.

General SHALIKASHVILI. I cannot give you a percentage, but as always happens in these instances, all communications that we monitored, other than from that station, were clear and readable; and I can't give you an explanation why that is so. It is the same net on which other stations and aircraft operated, and their transmissions were clear.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. It is kind of Murphy's Law? Had Captain O'Grady gotten that out when it went out the first time, would that have been enough time to react?

General SHALIKASHVILI. It is the judgment of those who looked at this in detail that if that report had gotten through right away, he would have had enough time to get out of the area.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I am sure you are looking at better communications. You can have all the intelligence in the world; if you can't communicate, it doesn't do any good.

Do you see any kind of increased threat in Operation Deny Flights; was this a critical break point on which there is an increased threat, or do you see it as about the same?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I see an increased threat to our operating in that area. It is that while the number of air defense systems have not changed, what has changed is the clear intent on their part to use those systems against NATO aircraft. Therefore, I have to assume that no matter where you go and whatever you do, you are under that threat, so the situation has become more tense. As a result, the NATO commander of this operation has taken a num-

ber of additional steps, which I will be glad to go into in closed session, to minimize the risk to the pilots.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. The other thing that I kind of hear in some of the debate about this is, there is rather an implication that the United Nations is kind of wimpy, that they are on the ground and they won't let you do what real pilots should be able to do, and we are just going along because we don't want to hurt their feelings.

You are an esteemed military man. How do you evaluate that? Maybe I am oversensitive, but I hear the tone that the United Nations won't let us—are they being unduly cautious or delicate?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I think it is very difficult to answer unless you find yourself in a position where you have both your own soldiers on the ground and your own pilots in the air. In our case, we have our pilots in the air, so my first concern is for their safety.

If you look at some of our NATO allies, all of them, as a matter of fact, who have both soldiers on the ground and pilots in the air, they must weigh the risks to both; so they are facing a much different dilemma than we are. I certainly am in no position to characterize their conduct one way or the other, other than that they have a very, very difficult decision to make each time they consider either conducting a flight overhead or conducting an airstrike that might result in increasing the danger to their people on the ground.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I think the thing that would be reassuring to the American people, one, to know that the U.S. military isn't like a poodle on a leash for these guys—you may not want to go into this in open session—but you don't feel like you have to do what they tell you to do within their limits.

If it is too limited, would you say no?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Certainly the dual key implies that NATO simply doesn't turn its key and doesn't fly the operation if it feels that the risk outweighs the gain of that operation. Dual key works both ways. UNPROFOR can keep you from attacking a certain site and NATO can refuse to go in there and carry out that mission. That is what dual key means.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Do you feel you have any restraints over you on using your key?

General SHALIKASHVILI. NATO, I don't believe, feels any concern. That is my judgment. Certainly when I was SACEUR, I did not feel that I had a constraint on me.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Do you think that people feel Operation Deny Flight is fairly critical to the mission over there?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I think that the Deny Flight operation that is keeping their aircraft from bombing targets on the ground is critical. I also feel that it has been one of the most successful operations over there.

What the consequences would be of terminating such an operation, I don't know, but we are now at a point where we need to balance the safety of pilots, NATO pilots flying in this operation, against the damage that would be done should we terminate that. Clearly, that is an issue that needs to be discussed and is being discussed in the North Atlantic Council, as it is in all the capitals.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from San Diego, Mr. Duke Cunningham.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to take just a little bit different tack. What I would like to do is educate, I think, some of my colleagues as well as ask a question.

General, I would say that regardless—we could have done everything correct, we could have had jammers there, if an ALQ–131 could be functioning, the chaff, the flares, Captain O'Grady in Basher flight could have been maneuvering, and we could still lose airplanes. That is an inherent portion of combat.

So when you say that were they shot down and were there things that we could have done, there are always things that we could do no matter in what combat, and I would like to put that in context.

We lose about 20 percent of our air crew in combat and just in training here in the United States over a 20-year period. It is a dangerous, hazardous flight program that we have, but it is necessary.

The SA–6 is a very mobile SAM, unlike the SA–2 that we had in Vietnam; and I think that if we consider that the SA–6 can't be placed somewhere and it moves at a very high speed, then if we are going to say that we are not going to fly where its SAM rings are, and without getting classified, with the envelope of those missiles, then we are not going to fly at all, because those SAM's can be put almost anywhere at any time, because they are very mobile and are on half-tracks.

Second, the Serbs are not going to treat our airplanes different as far as their ROE from peacekeepers. Combatants and peacekeepers to them are the same when they are getting attacked. We have to realize that as well.

When I talked to Scott O'Grady 2 weeks ago when he was here in town, he made a statement that they are getting zero training in that particular area. Let me define that.

He said that they have very limited air combat maneuvering training when they get there, and he has been in the service for quite awhile, and that while they are over there, they fly a lot, but they can't train.

I asked, can't you engage each other, two F–16's when you come back, and even though it is similar, it is not training against Russian-type formations and tactics, and he says, no, we are not qualified; we don't have the Jack-in-the-box to do that. ECM is dangerous even in training. But I would like you to look into that, which you have agreed to do, as far as there are all kinds of things we can do in the Navy and the Air Force. They have F–16's. We have F–18C/D's. Or even the allies if we can run in a limited program. Bosnia has MiG–29's and A–10's, and so does Russia if they would ever intervene.

I would also recommend that you look into—with the cutbacks we have had in defense, the Air Force and the Navy have done away with nearly all of their adversary training. They have lost the F–16's out of the Navy, which simulate MiG–29, MiG–31, and we have post-Korean airplanes we are using in air combat maneuver and training in all services now because of the cutbacks. I feel that is critical. We lost airplanes over Vin, and we asked that we didn't have to fly over an overcast on Operation Proud Deep, and we were

told that we had to, that those were the only 3 days. We lost nearly 37 airplanes there because we flew over a highly defended—and those were SA–2's, they weren't SA–6's, and as I understand it, it was an overcast area, and when you have a missile coming at twice the speed of sound, and coming through those clouds, you don't have much time to maneuver.

I suggest you look at the weather when we operate over those areas, because even if you have all the jammers, you have got the tactics going, the limited time that you have to react to those things is different.

I would say to the gentlelady from Colorado, garbled radios are part of an aviator's life. Capt. Steve Richey, who was the first ace for the Air Force in Vietnam, one of the first things he said was, we need to improve our radios in airplanes. I think they have done that, especially with secure voice.

Another thing that I would ask to look at as the gentlelady said, is it like being a poodle on a leash? When our own administration limits our capability; and I would say, first of all, I would look—I disdained what happened under the Bush administration in Lebanon where our Marines were pinned down, we did an Alpha strike, we lost an A–6 where we had to send the Reverend Jackson in to get that. It was wrong. If you look at the history of Somalia and denying of armor and Haiti, across the board, we need to be very careful in the policy because we are talking about these kids and everything we do right, we lose them. And I think it is important to take a look at those.

I think you have done a good job, General, and I know there are some areas that we need to step up and take a look at. One area is, I think we do have to assume that there is a hostile threat anywhere over there with the air order of battle. When the ROE, the rules of engagement can be controlled by the United Nations, and not us, that is like a poodle on a leash to me.

And I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

General, thank you for coming over and visiting with us about this and our concerns today. As I understand it, general, there were three NATO requests made to authorize the suppression of surface-to-air missiles; am I correct?

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is correct.

Mr. SKELTON. And one of those three was approved; is that correct?

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is correct.

Mr. SKELTON. On the two occasions they were not approved, I assume that the missions were not flown?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I am told that is correct; they were not flown.

Mr. SKELTON. This is a rather delicate situation. If we look at the end game of the UNPROFOR, it has broad humanitarian assistance and has contained the fighting within the former Yugoslavia and it has not bled over into other countries, so we have to say there is a limited success there and UNPROFOR has performed well.

On the other hand, if we allow rules of engagement or suppression, as you would like to do, there is a fear of angering the Bosnian Serbs, which would take it out on the UNPROFOR troops on the ground; is that not correct?

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is correct.

Mr. SKELTON. So that is a dilemma. The United Nations gives the approval or disapproval to NATO to suppress. What is the face behind the U.N.? Is that Mr. Akashi or who could that be, sir?

General SHALIKASHVILI. It has changed over time. It can be either Mr. Akashi or it could be the military commander of the U.N. forces on the ground in Bosnia, or in Zagreb, the overall commander. So——

Mr. SKELTON. It would be one of those two?

General SHALIKASHVILI. It is one of those three that could turn it down if he feels that in this particular instance that kind of attack would unduly jeopardize the forces on the ground.

Mr. SKELTON. Can you speak in open session, general, as to whether there have been previous surface-to-air missiles shot at American or NATO airplanes?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I would prefer—the answer is yes, in one instance, but to give you any more details, I would rather do that in closed session.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Torkildsen, the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. TORKILDSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank the general and the witnesses for the testimony today.

Just a few brief questions. General Shalikashvili, under the rules of engagement, the ones you have discussed in open session, in your estimation, if we were not operating under those special rules of engagement, would the situation have been different in your best judgment?

General SHALIKASHVILI. The rules of engagement that we are operating under, and that I summarized on the chart I showed you, are NATO rules of engagement and almost identical to standard U.S. rules of engagement. Without playing semantics, I must separate from that the issue of having the ability to conduct preemptive strikes on air defense sites without them having committed a hostile act or indicated a hostile intent.

Clearly, if we had taken action beforehand to take out all air defenses in Bosnia, the outcome would have been different. Taking out all air defenses, of course, you can take out all air defenses you can find, irradiate, you still are facing a heat-seeking shoulder-fired missile that you would not find.

So you must be clear you would not be able to take out all air defense, but certainly in this particular instance the odds would have been good that the outcome would have been different.

Mr. TORKILDSEN. And the reason for that slight difference again was concern that—that not angering the Bosnian Serbs because of what they would have done to U.N. ground troops?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I am not sure I would use the word "angering" the Bosnians, but that is to protect the safety of the forces on the ground and that is first and foremost the reason.

Second, that it might bring the UNPROFOR operation to an end, with all the consequences of that; that is, the end of delivery of humanitarian assistance and the situation that might develop in that eventuality.

So it is, in fact, weighing the risks to the people on the ground and to the overall accomplishment of the mission.

Mr. TORKILDSEN. Thank you, General. I appreciate your answers. I know the situation is extremely difficult. I just wanted to have them on the record.

So I thank you for your answers and I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. It appears that most of the questions have been asked in open session except for Mr. Sisisky, and I am going to allow him to go ahead and ask a question and then we will take a recess and go closed at that time and the remainder of the questions can be addressed.

Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, if you want to go ahead and close the session, because one of my main questions would be in closed session anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. If we have members feeling compelled to ask questions in open session. Mr. Dornan.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to get one question on the record before we go closed.

The last time I saw you, general, you were sitting right about there and I was right about here, and I caught myself in mid-sentence, because I had written O'Grady off in my mind. And he told me in my office the other day so had his father, his mother, his sister, and his brother, and they love him. They thought he was gone. And I cut myself off in mid-sentence, and my exact words to you were, as we speak, we hope our F–16 pilot is hiding in the bush. And he was. And it was about 8 minutes before his—8 hours before his rescue.

On your last chart you came up with a suggestion, and I am the chairman of the Tactical and Technical Intelligence Subcommittee and I put in legislation on friendly fire and on advanced electronic equipment for years. I knew that Scott O'Grady was going to come up with this. I talked to the other pilots in the House, like Cunningham, and we all knew a PRC–90, which was his backup radio, was all but worthless, and a PRC–12 is not that great.

Scott O'Grady told me what absolutely blew his mind was the marine commander of the rescue operation who actually went out there on the Sea Stallion, was in the bowels of the carrier, the Kerisage, and he says, do you want to talk to your skipper and your friends at Aviano, and he flipped open a mobile phone and punched up Aviano and handed the phone to O'Grady and O'Grady said, not joking, get me a couple of mobile car phones if I have to do this again.

So you said, we need better radios. General, we are all here to help you. Put this on the fastest track humanly possible, buy it off the shelf from the Japanese or anybody else in the world, and let's give every air crewman over the Balkans—I don't want them there at all, as I told you, but if they are going to be there, get them two of whatever there is out there that is the best in the world.

How fast, general, can we do that?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Would the gentleman yield? Can we make that American-made mobile phones?

Mr. DORNAN. I recommend the Motorolla out of my car. I will lend it to you. I will give up my car phone, as a Congressman, if you will give it to some combat pilot.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us let the general respond.

General SHALIKASHVILI. I deeply appreciate, and I know for you these are not just words, but you really mean it. And for the pilots and all the crews, I appreciate it.

I will tell you that, as we speak, there are 500 of those new radios going out to our Navy and Air Force pilots. We will have hopefully the full buy by September. They have such innovations as burst transmission, so the pilot doesn't have to worry about a lengthy transmission. Second, they have integrated precut messages so he just calls up the right message and pushes a button, and the chances someone will pick it up are extremely slim.

I was hoping to have one here to show you. I think they are a giant step forward. And within days the folks flying the night flight operations will have those radios.

Mr. DORNAN. I will be back at you on friendly fire for ground vehicles, because we have the same technology available.

Final thought, more an open thought, then we can go into detail in closed session.

I have been sitting here trying to think about all the people I met with at Aviano and how, as we spent more and more time together they got more and more frank, and I don't want to hurt anybody's career so I thought of a way to do it. Sitting at this giant briefing table down at the Combat Air Center in Vincenza was an RAF commander, a handsome fellow with about 5,000 hours in the Harrier, the leading world flight time Harrier pilot.

I told him he looked like a Luftwaffe commander in his black leather jacket. And he said to me, we are being wrecked here. We are degrading our equipment, beating our airplanes up. We are getting no training and we are bankrupting ourselves here. And then later they asked for the wild weasels that are to be transferred up to Aviano to use. And they were almost decommissioned a couple years ago, hanging on with just literally a few aircraft in the wild weasel department.

We have to rethink the whole thing because, as they told me, their R key is always turned and the key at the NATO is never turned. The recent U.N. Commander General Rose would go in the Karachayevsk or Maladitch and make all these threats and walk out and say I'm going to bomb you, and by the time he got back to his headquarters he would say, well, maybe not.

And just picture those tough Serbians looking at that ceremony in the Rose Garden today with Vietnamese war criminals who beat our airmen to death and kept them captive 7, 8 and 9 years. If they had captured O'Grady and beaten him to death, they can project forward 20 years to a Rose Garden ceremony where someone who avoided the draft three times rewards the war criminals who are still committing human rights violations with the dignity of normalization and diplomatic relations.

Those Serbs are tough. I think we ought to get out of there or else wipe out, with rules of engagement, every site that comes up

on the radar. Put a ARM missile down their throat and kill them, because we don't have that respect factor going for us. And everybody I spoke to, from every nation, the Dutch, the Danes, everybody, agreed no respect factor. They are laughing at us and they are laughing at the Rose Garden ceremony in an hour.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. You have just stirred up some other people who want to be seen and heard in open session, and Mr. Sisisky and Mr. Mehan.

Mr. Mehan from Massachusetts.

Mr. MEHAN. Thank you very much for your testimony to the witnesses.

General, it is my understanding that NATO aircraft are engaged in close air support right now, or at least earlier today around the Bosnian safe haven of Srebrenica, with Dutch peacekeepers who are being attacked.

My question is, were NATO aircraft allowed to suppress SA–6 missiles before going into that mission today?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I am hesitating only because I want to say only that which is safe to say. Let me say that for that close air support mission, NATO crews were allowed—NATO airplanes were allowed to suppress air defense sites. And they had, in addition to that, they had all the SEAD aircraft with them as well.

So, yes, they had both. Obviously, always have NATO's clearance, but they had U.N. clearance, UNPROFOR's clearance to suppress air defense sites in—whatever they needed to do in order to carry out that operation safely.

Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, might I make a suggestion?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. I need all the help I can get.

Mr. BATEMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, it occurs to me we have learned about as much as we are going to learn in open session. There are things we need to learn that will only be learned in closed session. So it would seem to me the obvious thing for us to do is go to closed session, bearing in mind I have been here throughout and I have questions I would like to ask. But I think for the efficient utilization of our time, it is time we went to closed session.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. We still have people who want to be seen and heard on television, and in open session, so we better let them have their go at it.

Mr. Longley from Maine.

Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that introduction. I have two quick questions, and I do think, Mr. Chairman, they need to be asked on the public record.

There were two press reports that the rescue aircraft were met up by hostile antiaircraft missiles on the rescue mission on June 8. Is that true, General?

General SHALIKASHVILI. No, I have no such information, and we could not find such information.

Mr. LONGLEY. The press reports also included the allegation that aircraft covering the rescue mission requested permission to take out the antiaircraft sites and permission was denied. Do you have any information about that?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We do, and I want to answer that in closed session.

Mr. LONGLEY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Peterson, gentleman from Florida.

Mr. PETERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I assume we will have an opportunity to ask questions in closed session as well, so I just want to cover a couple of little things.

One, I have the unique distinction of having seen a SAM in the air. In fact, it hit my airplane. So I know that, as Mr. Cunningham, my friend from California, has elaborated, and I certainly associate myself with his comments, combat is dangerous, and for us to suggest that we went into this thing without the possibility of a loss is absolutely ludicrous.

What we have to do is to make sure that our combat pilots are as well informed as we can possibly make them. And as we will get into the details of the closed session, I want to ask some questions about that aspect of it and also about the financial arrangements that are incorporated into conducting the operation at the site.

But I can't leave unresponded to the comment from Mr. Dornan that because of an experience in Vietnam, that after 20 years that now we are going to have a circumstance in which normalization is taking place that is totally without reason and concept. It clearly is.

The things that we learned in Vietnam we are using all over the world now in all of our combat forces. The people sitting right here at this desk learned a great deal of their military expertise in that process, as did I and as did Mr. Cunningham and others.

We have evolved since then. We have evolved in a lot of cases, and one of the major processes is that we don't put our people under a circumstance in which they are inappropriately and without counsel understanding the danger and the rigors associated with combat.

But then the next point is that it is 20 years since the Vietnam war closed, essentially, on the front. And now it is time to move on and engage Vietnam as a diplomatic partner in the world of nations. And without that, we leave Southeast Asia open and very, very vulnerable to a security threat.

We will find ourselves back in Vietnam fighting another war in the jungles, and I don't want to do that. So let us move on. There is great reason behind a normalization process, and I think most military individuals wearing a uniform today would agree with that.

I just, in a final passage, the atrocities in the Pacific and in Europe, conducted by the Axis and the Japanese during World War II, far exceeded anything we saw in Vietnam. The only difference was Vietnam was on television and in every home in America, and it has a vivid picture and imprint on every American citizen, as opposed to news reels that we had during World War II.

Look what we did. We made the world safer by virtue of normalization. We made the economies of all the planet essentially better and more secure and stronger. And we have made our own country

stronger by virtue of normalization of our enemies during the World War II process.

Mr. DORNAN. And we hung the war criminals. We hung them; we didn't toast them.

Mr. PETERSON. We clearly have to move on. We cannot live in the past or rewrite history, no more than we can absolutely totally predict the future. While we disagree on this issue, I think there is another side to this rather than just Mr. Dornan's.

So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do have questions for the closed session.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate it. The remainder of the session will be conducted in closed session and we are going to recess for a few minutes to clear the room.

[Whereupon, at 10:55 a.m., the committee proceeded to other business.]

DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES TO BOSNIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, October 17, 1995.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:11 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd D. Spence (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

This afternoon the committee begins its inquiry into the administration's plans for deployment of United States Armed Forces into Bosnia to enforce a peace agreement, if such an agreement is attained.

While many of us already hold strong beliefs on this issue, it is this committee's responsibility to seek the answers to many hard questions in order to inform and, in the end, influence the emerging debate. To this end, today we will hear from a distinguished panel of experts who will offer their views on the situation in Bosnia, its relationship to the United States national security interest, and the advisability and operational implication of United States troop deployments.

Tomorrow morning Secretary of Defense Perry, Secretary of State Christopher, and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Shalikashvili will present the administration's plans and rationale to the committee. This afternoon we are pleased to welcome Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, former chief of staff of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia; Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Mr. Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy; and Ms. Susan Woodward, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

While the chances of some type of peace agreement in Bosnia have increased, the prospect that front-line American ground troops will be called upon to serve as both peacekeepers and peacemakers in a conflict with such violent and deep-seated roots is troubling. The possibility that United States forces may face another Somalia, a situation where our forces initially deployed to enforce the peace became targets and ultimately hostages to the conflict itself, should concern all of us. This is especially true in the case of Bosnia where there certainly is no national consensus that vital interests are at risk.

I believe a number of fundamental issues need to be addressed in detail before our ground troops are committed to Bosnia. For example, what are our national security interests in Bosnia? And do these interests justify the potential long-term deployment of American combat troops? If American ground troops are deployed to Bosnia, why the apparently arbitrary nature of planning to date on the size of the United States contingent and the 1-year duration of its mission? And regardless of how long our troops might be deployed in Bosnia, how will American, NATO, and U.N. leaders objectively assess whether or not the mission has succeeded or failed?

Basically, how will meaningful exit criteria be defined and assessed? And what reaction to an American ground presence should we expect from any or all of the warring factions, especially over time?

These are just some of the questions and the issues that we need to begin discussing this afternoon. Therefore, let me again welcome our witnesses and, before proceeding, recognize Mr. Dellums, the ranking member, for any remarks he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to join with you in welcoming today's witnesses to our first hearing on the diplomatic and military situation in Bosnia and on the administration's plan to address these important events. I look forward to hearing from Messrs. MacKenzie, Perle, Wolfowitz, and Dr. Woodward, and I would like to at this point thank each and every one of you for coming and taking the time out of your busy schedule to address this panel on this very significant occasion.

Mr. Chairman, as you and I have noted so often before, today we live in a world of transition, one in which the United States must determine and implement a new strategy that will govern its role in world affairs. What are our responsibilities in eliminating regional instability, cross-border or civil warfare, genocidal ethnic violence, massive human rights abuses, or starvation? How do we best achieve these goals if we adopt them as part of our national security?

In Bosnia, we are presented immediately with another question. Having engineered a cease-fire and possibly a peace agreement, what are the U.S. responsibilities to help keep that peace? Some will argue there is too nebulous a connection to our vital national security interests to become immersed in the Balkan conflict. We should explore what our national security interests are and what their connections to the events in the Balkans may be?

Some will argue that we must leave our troops ready to fight wars in other areas of the globe and cannot do so if they are deployed in Bosnia. We should explore how it is that our troops can best help to achieve our national security goals and whether peacekeeping missions such as these fit these criteria.

Some will argue that using U.S. forces in peacekeeping missions such as this will have little positive impact upon U.S. interests. We should determine whether U.S. forces can afford to be or can afford

not to be part of helping to prevent the killing that is currently ongoing and that is all too real at this moment.

Some will argue that the use of military troops is the wrong method of achieving peacekeeping. I certainly share the view that finding nonmilitary mechanisms to provide confidence significant to allow warring parties to cease their conflict is an urgent and desirable goal. In the context of the Balkans, we must explore whether meaningful peace can be brought without military forces being used, with the consent of the belligerents to help stop the conflict.

Some will argue that the administration's plan is insufficiently robust to keep the peace, that we should certainly seek to inquire if it is significant or too large. Some will be concerned that potential United States plans to train Bosnian troops would deprive our forces of their neutrality and, thus, the ability to act efficiently as peacekeepers.

As you and I have pointed out, one of the important goals is to take no sides or make no enemies. We need to look at that in this context.

Some will be concerned that the use of non-NATO forces, especially the possible use of Russian troops, will limit the effectiveness or degrade the operational command and control. We should explore these issues to ensure that any actions we implement are done so prudently and with an eye toward achieving the goal of keeping the peace.

It is the assessment of these and many other issues and the answering of many important questions regarding both the diplomacy and the military plans that would seek to aid the diplomacy that should guide our deliberation today and again tomorrow when we hear from the administration witnesses.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I welcome the contribution of these significant and important persons who are significant witnesses here today and will make this committee's efforts to come to a fuller understanding of this dynamic and complex event, make a contribution to that, and I look forward to their testimony and I thank you for your generosity.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Dellums.

First of all, to save time, without objection the witnesses' prepared statements will be submitted for the record. Second, before turning over this agenda to the witnesses, let me ask all members to be considerate of the use of our time. The committee will operate under the 5-minute rule. If members wish to pursue a line of questioning, please take that into account as you use your 5 minutes.

To begin, we will start with the lady and let her go first. Dr. Woodward.

STATEMENT OF SUSAN WOODWARD, SENIOR FELLOW, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Ms. WOODWARD. Thank you, Chairman Spence. I wish to express my appreciation to you and to Mr. Dellums and the committee for hearing me today. This is an issue, in my view, of inordinate significance for U.S. leadership. I am afraid that, in my view, the really substantial significant questions that both you and Mr. Dellums have raised always end up being answered in the particulars, and that is where we are at today.

Over the past 3 years this committee has recognized the serious need for public debate about the use of force and American forces in this new international environment, and I am quite honored to be a small part of those ongoing deliberations.

Let me begin by saying my bottom line: The events of the past 3 months have brought a dramatic turnaround in the Balkans. There is now a very real basis for optimism in bringing the war in Bosnia to an end, stopping the cycles of killing and atrocities, and beginning the long process of political normalization necessary to peace in the region. The key change, however, lies not in the strategic shifts on the ground but in the nature and extent of U.S. diplomatic and military involvement. Which way the conflict now goes will depend almost entirely on U.S. policy and commitment.

The possibility of a political settlement that could end the killing is very real. President Milosevic of Serbia wants an end to the war so much that he is willing to concede almost everything put before him by negotiators, far more than anyone ever imagined. People throughout Bosnia are tired of war. It is ever more palpable, even among the most loyal supporters of the Bosnian Government. The time has come, in their view, to pursue their goals with political and economic means, not with warfare.

The recent strategic shifts on the battlefield in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina are real. The Serbs are on the run and ever weaker. But contrary to the view expressed widely in the United States that you will only get peace when there is a military balance, in this part of the world equilibrium is not generated from within. People always try to use a momentary advantage to get a little more than is in their long-term interest to seek, appealing to external powers for assistance as they are. Now Croatia and some elements of the Bosnian Government will want to take as much advantage as they can of the situation, just as Serbia did earlier, but that will only continue the rounds of fighting. There is no long-term stable solution based on total defeat. Expelling people from one area only opens up new wars in adjoining territory or puts off accounts to the next generation and feeds unstable dictatorship in the short run.

At the moment, the refugees flowing into Serbia, hundreds and hundreds of thousands, are creating conditions for civil war there. The governments of Hungary and Bulgaria have begun again to play destabilizing roles respectively in Vojvodina and Macedonia. The great diplomatic victory in September in relations between Macedonia and Greece that began lifting of the trade embargo yesterday could easily be reversed by the new fragility in the ruling party in Greece and by the turmoil in Macedonia that has resulted from the assassination attempt that debilitated President Gligorov several weeks ago.

In other words, the conditions for peace are here if they can be cemented by a political settlement in Bosnia now and an international implementation force to ensure that it holds. But those conditions will not last if action does not occur soon, and the danger of war in Serbia and Macedonia—of the southern Balkans erupting—is getting closer and must be prevented.

Moreover, the Bosnia federation between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims that the United States brokered last year and

that was implemented by U.N. forces in sector southwest under British command has clearly demonstrated that even a political settlement that is no more than a cease-fire can be implemented with almost no casualties to foreign troops if the parties find it in their interest, even momentarily, to stop fighting and to shift their arena of conflict to economic and political means. This has been going on for 1½ years. But without UNPROFOR there to implement that agreement, the Washington agreement, the war between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims would never have stopped. We can see that well in the recent campaign where these two armies are now working side by side, not together but side by side, to take territory held by Serbs in western Bosnia. Once a town is taken, however, the two armies start fighting each other for who will control it. Many think that the better outcome now is to let the Bosnian Government Army and the Croatian Army continue fighting and expelling Serbs from Bosnia, but these two armies do not have common interests. Their war could resume, despite the Washington agreement, if there is no political settlement from Bosnia soon and an implementing force to stand between them.

Let me then turn to why I think the United States must participate in such an implementation force. It is very simple: this is our agreement. The Europeans also want an end to this war and their participation on the ground, and they are ready to make many sacrifices to get it now, as witnessed by the French willingness to accept American command and control over the last week. That is really quite an extraordinary event.

If we do not participate, if the United States does not send troops, after persuading all other NATO allies to sign up at the meetings in Williamsburg, even where this will be politically or economically very difficult, as for Greece, for example, or Italy, then the moment will be lost, and our credibility in Europe and our leadership in NATO, in my view, is gone. Moreover, having pressured the U.N. forces in Bosnia to leave, as they are now in the process of doing very rapidly, to be replaced under American command and NATO forces, we have no alternative structure there to implement a settlement. And having taken the diplomatic lead, any way that continues will now be our responsibility. If it extends to Kosovo or Macedonia, we will be sending troops in any case, but into a worse war, because we have made commitments there. It is no longer U.N. or NATO credibility that is at stake, but American credibility. And it is difficult to imagine that U.S. diplomacy any place in the world will be effective if it is known in advance that we do not follow through on our commitments for reasons of domestic politics.

Finally, the participation of U.S. forces currently being contemplated is the least costly option we have at the moment. The price of noninvolvement in the past 4 years has been far costlier than involvement early on, for example, a longer lasting war than was necessary and a very costly air campaign. This will continue to be the case. But the critical core of the current administration strategy in the negotiations and in the planning for this implementation force is to hand back responsibility to the Europeans, first for financing the peace and, if needed after 12 months, for longer term military involvement. But we will not be able to transfer this

burden back to the Europeans if we do not do our part now up front.

Let me, however, provide a warning, a set of questions. The issue of United States troop deployment in Bosnia is not, in my view, whether we should go, but under what terms. The success of that troop deployment, including minimal casualties, does not depend on the rules of engagement—how robust or not, what force package is provided, when one uses force, how large the contingent. It depends on the mandate. Problems and casualties come when the mandate defining what commanders and soldiers do on the ground is not clear or is internally contradictory.

At the moment, the public statements by the administration and U.S. negotiators contain two mutually contradictory objectives. Is, on the one hand, the goal to stop the fighting, accept that a partition of the country along ethnic lines has already taken place, and help all three sides reverse restore confidence and find rules of power sharing so that they can begin to live together again, as I am convinced they can? Or, on the other hand, is our objective to assist the current Bosnian Government of President Izetbegovic and Foreign Minister Sacirbey in defeating the Serbs and recreating and defending a Bosnian state?

If the first is our objective, the mandate would specify impartiality. Anyone breaking the peace would be warned and, if necessary, punished. Deployment would be along confrontation lines, to separate forces and gradually replace foreign troops with joint patrols among local police officers, in exactly the same way that the British, the Spanish, and others have done quite successfully on the territory of the Bosnian federation. The burden of deployment instead would fall increasing on nonmilitary tasks, as Mr. Dellums has said rightly. The vulnerability of the operation would be coordination among the separate organizational hierarchies for each task: NATO for military tasks, UNHCR for humanitarian tasks, OSCE for human rights monitoring and organizing elections, and the European Union for economic and infrastructural reconstruction. The coordination pieces of these have not yet been decided.

If, on the other hand, the second is our objective, then the mandate would specify friend and foe, telling soldiers whom to fire at and whom to assist militarily, as in the current air campaign. It will also be vulnerable to problems of functional and organizational coordination like the first objective, the first mandate. But it will, in addition, confront problems of coordination among national units of the IFOR. Will we have agreement from our European partners, above all the British and the French, on this political objective and its mandate specifications? If not, will national chains of reporting on violations and nationally defined sectors of patrol yield a confusing picture and revive serious political conflicts within NATO and weaken unity of command and control? Will we come into political conflict or face military confrontations, accidents perhaps, with the Russians, if they are deployed as currently planned in areas of Bosnian Serbs? If we accept the Bosnian Government's position that the return of all displaced persons and refugees to their homes, if they wish to go, must precede elections, will the mandate for the forces require them to restore the physical security necessary for resettlement before they leave? If the United States

troops are headquartered in Tuzla, which is now the one genuine case of multiethnic coexistence and moderate local leadership left in Bosnia and on which the goal of a single, multiethnic Bosnia can indeed be rebuilt, what will the mandate tell United States commanders if a conflict arises between Tuzla authorities and the Sarajevo government, as has happened for the United Nations time and again? And if the United States exit strategy is based on the training and professionalization of the Bosnian Army so that it can take over the task of defending its state, does the mandate then include disarming the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat armies? Or does this exit strategy expect the resumption of hostilities once the United States leaves?

There is some virtue in vagueness and multiple public messages during the diplomatic stage, but the deployment of troops and their preparation require an unambiguous, clear statement of the objectives. Clarity in goals and a coherent mandate are essential to give clear instructions to officers and soldiers. The clearer the purpose is known to the parties on the ground, the fewer the risks.

Success also depends on a second issue that I think still needs clarification. What role will this political settlement in Bosnia and United States troop deployment play in restoring peace and stability to the region? Bosnia is only a part of a region. It cannot be treated independently. The current diplomatic negotiations have two possible outcomes: a good model and a bad model.

The bad model is a Bosnian state so weak and internally divided that its purpose lies only in providing a buffer between two hostile states of Croatia and Serbia, including fifth columns of Croats and Serbs within Bosnia and Herzegovina. This might be a cold peace but one of large military budgets, economic stagnation, and a Muslim buffer that might in the end require foreign protection after all. It suggests a Croatia supported by and aligned with the West, and an isolated Serbia—and, by geopolitical necessity, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and perhaps Romania—that provide the constituency for an alliance of the rejected under Russian patronage and perhaps including Slovakia. Much more worrisome, in other words, than a partition of Bosnia alone is a partition of the Balkans and of Europe that could result from such a settlement.

The good model is a Bosnia that serves as a linking magnet for the peninsula, requiring Croatia and Serbia to cooperate in order to protect Croats and Serbs who remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This outcome could still result if the warfare stops now and if a political settlement recognizes the equal rights of all three nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina with substantial regional autonomy, as long as they remain within a Bosnian state. The special relationships with Croatia and Serbia already identified in the political negotiations could be designed to be part of this connective tissue of common interest. The model would require a regional arms control regime in place of building up forces for an elusive military equilibrium. Let's not fool ourselves. Training a Bosnian army to defend its territory or lifting the arms embargo on the current Bosnian Government in place of American deployment is partition. Armies are needed to defend external boundaries, not internal boundaries against people who do not want to live there. But Bosnia as an integrating presence rather than as a buffer state

would shift the burden of implementing a peace very rapidly from military enforcement to economic reconstruction and stages of incorporation for the entire region into Europe, tasks that we can very rapidly hand back to Europe.

The bad model of Bosnia as buffer is most likely to result if the United States is unwilling to put in time, effort, and assets now to stimulate a stable outcome in the Balkans, but this is not less costly in the long run. The indirect unforeseen costs of not doing so now will grow. And neither part, Republican or Democrat, will be immune from making this calculation because the Balkan conflict cannot disappear from the television screens or domestic pressures the way that Somalia could.

The good model, however, requires that the United States decide on what its political objective for Bosnia is before it deploys troops, and it requires troop deployment and a peacekeeping mandate. It requires United States leadership to keep Europeans, including Russians, engaged and working together. But it is a faster route to an American exit, because it places Bosnia and the region into Europe and European responsibility and assets. It also lays the basis for an economic revival in another emerging market of 70 million for American businesses.

To conclude, we would not be here today in terms of a possible negotiated end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina if it had not been for congressional action on the subject and executive-legislative relations in Washington. That action, in my view, has not always been a positive influence on the Balkans. I do not myself think that lifting the arms embargo and abandoning the Bosnians will work. But the result of that pressure has been a search by the administration to find an alternative, through a reassertion of American diplomatic leadership, to achieve the same goals that the Congress wants and end the tragic war. In this, the Congress has been playing its constitutional role, and it should be commended. I have attempted to identify ways in which it can continue this, by supporting American troop commitments to implement a peace settlement and by raising questions about the viability of that settlement and our preparation for it.

If the current American initiative succeeds—and that will require United States troop deployment—the United States will finish the task it began in 1989, of withdrawing from the Balkans and allowing southeastern Europe to return to its geopolitical place as one, relatively insignificant part of Europe. But contrary to the belief of the Bush administration at the time, this could not happen automatically. It was not only a European problem. The United States could not just withdraw and leave a vacuum and not expect the reemergence of conflict among Europeans over what the Balkans was, whose sphere of interest it should be, and who could most successfully avoid getting involved. Instead, the United States could not leave an open gravesite; it had to bury the cold war and the preceding Balkan tinderbox and fill in the dirt, before the Europeans could see the grass and turn the spot into what I consider a beautiful but otherwise unimportant part of the landscape. Those who argued that former Yugoslavia was no longer significant to the United States, that we had no national interest there, said it too soon. They were ahead of their times. It has to be made insignifi-

cant, and that will take a bit more doing on this side of the Atlantic. If we don't, it still has plenty of potential to resume its historical role, of dragging in major powers who thought the place insignificant and found it otherwise, beginning now with a confrontation between the United States and Russia and revived conflicts that could spell the death of NATO; of creating a new source of terrorism and drug havens in Europe, which have already developed; and of strengthening antidemocratic political forces throughout the region that repeat a politics of the 1930's.

Thank you, Chairman Spence.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Woodward follows:]

STATEMENT BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

by Susan L. Woodward
Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

Hearing on U.S. Troop Deployment to Bosnia
2:00 p.m., October 17, 1995

I wish to express my appreciation to Chairman Spence and this committee for this opportunity to appear before it on an issue of inordinate significance for United States leadership in the post-cold war era and its role in protecting the peace and stability on which our prosperity depends. Over the past three years, this committee has taken the lead in stimulating public debate on the difficult issue of the use of force and American forces in this new international environment, and I am honored to be a small part of its deliberations.

I. The events of the past three months have brought a dramatic turn around in the Balkans. There is now a very real basis for optimism in bringing the war in Bosnia to an end, stopping the killing and atrocities, and beginning the long process of political normalization necessary to peace in the region. The key change lies not in the strategic shifts on the ground but in the nature and extent of United States diplomatic and military involvement. Which way the conflict now goes will depend almost entirely on U. S. policy and commitment.

The possibility of a political settlement that could end the killing is very real. President Milošević of Serbia wants an end to the war so much that he is willing to concede almost everything put before him, far more than anyone ever imagined. People

throughout the region are tired of war--they have been for a year, but it is ever more palpable, even in the open admission of the most loyal supporters of the Bosnian government. The time has come, in their view, to pursue their goals with political and economic means, not with warfare, and to realize their democratic hopes through political normalization.

The strategic shifts on the battlefield in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are real--the Serbs are on the run and ever weaker, but contrary to the American idea that you will only get peace when there is a military balance, this is not a part of the world where equilibrium is generated from within. People always try to use a momentary advantage to get a little more than is in their long-term interest to seek. Now Croatia and some elements of the Bosnian government will want to take as much advantage as they can of the situation, just as Serbia did earlier, but there is no stable, political solution based on total defeat. All peoples of former Yugoslavia are minorities, all must feel secure where they live, and all must find a way to live alongside each other in peace. Total expulsion is not an answer; it only opens up new wars in the adjoining territory or delays accounts into the next generation. The refugees flowing into Serbia are now setting up the conditions for civil war there and further instability if the path of war is not replaced soon by a path of peace in the region. The governments of Hungary and Bulgaria, perhaps because of domestic difficulties exacerbated by the economic costs of Balkan instability and trade disruptions, are beginning this fall to play destabilizing roles in Vojvodina and Macedonia, respectively. The great diplomatic victory in September in relations between Macedonia and Greece could easily be reversed by the new fragility of the Greek ruling party and by the turmoil in Macedonia as a result of the assassination attempt that debilitated President Gligorov.

In other words, the conditions for peace are here if they can be cemented by a political settlement in Bosnia and an international implementation force to ensure it holds. But those conditions will not last if action does not occur soon, and the danger of war in

Serbia and Macedonia--of the southern Balkans erupting--is getting closer and must be prevented.

As we have seen with the Bosnian federation between Croats and Muslims brokered by the United States (the Washington Agreement of March 1994) and implemented by United Nations forces in Sector Southwest under British command, even a political settlement that is no more than a ceasefire can be implemented with almost no casualties if the parties find it in their interest to stop fighting and to shift their arena of conflict to economic and political means. But without UNPROFOR there to implement that agreement, the war between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims would never have stopped. We can see that well in the recent campaign where the two armies are working side by side to take territory held by Serbs in western Bosnia. Once a town is taken, the two armies start fighting each other for who will control it. Those who think that the better outcome now is to let the Bosnian government army and the Croatian army continue fighting and expelling Serbs do not realize that they do not have common interests and their war could resume if there is no political settlement soon and an implementing force--the U.N. or a new IFOR--to stand between them.

II. Why must the U.S. participate in such an implementation force? It is very simple: this is our agreement. Our objection to previous peace plans for Bosnia and to certain outcomes there have prevented three European-brokered plans, even while Europeans were willing to participate on the ground in the U.N. force. Now we are brokering a peace, on our own, and one that will require heavy military and economic responsibilities from our NATO partners. If we do not participate, after persuading all other NATO allies to sign up even if they do not know where they will find the money or political support (such as in Greece and Italy), then our credibility in Europe and our leadership in NATO is gone. Since this is our plan, only our leadership and military participation will ensure that it works. And since part of the Administration's plan has been to pressure the United Nations forces to leave (as they are now in the process of doing very rapidly), to be

replaced by NATO forces under U.S. command, there is no alternative structure ready to implement it. There simply will be no peace if we do not fulfill the role we have set out for ourselves. Any war that continues will be our responsibility, and if it extends to Kosovo or Macedonia, we will be sending troops in any case--but into a war. It is no longer U.N. or NATO credibility that is at stake, but American credibility. And it is difficult to imagine that U.S. diplomacy any place in the world will be effective if it is known in advance that we do not follow through on our commitments.

Finally, the participation of U.S. forces currently being contemplated is the least costly option we have at the moment. As we have already seen, the price of non-involvement in the past four years has been far costlier than involvement (for example, a longer lasting war than necessary, a very costly air campaign); this will continue to be the case. The idea behind the current U.S. program for deployment and its wider package is to hand back responsibility to the Europeans for financing this peace and, if needed after 12 months, for longer-term military involvement; but if we do not do our part now, next time around, we cannot expect their cooperation.

III. The issue of U.S. troop deployment in Bosnia is not whether we should go, but under what terms. The success of that troop deployment, including the minimization of casualties, does not depend on the rules of engagement--how robust or not, what force package is provided, when one uses force; it depends on the mandate. We have seen this in the United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operation already, and any military commander will tell you the same: tell me what the mission is, and I'll fulfill it. Problems and casualties come when the mandate defining what commanders and soldiers do on the ground is not clear or is internally contradictory.

The public statements by the Administration and U.S. negotiators contain two mutually contradictory goals, suggesting that they may not have made up their mind which of the two they favor. Is our objective to stop the fighting, accept that a partition

of the country along ethnic lines has taken place, and help all three sides restore confidence and find rules of power sharing so that they can begin to live together again or, at some future date, separate peacefully? Or is our objective to assist the current Bosnian government of President Izetbegović and foreign minister Sacirbey in defeating the Serbs and recreating a Bosnian state?

If the first is our objective, the mandate would specify impartiality--any one breaking the peace would be warned or punished. Deployment would be along confrontation lines, to separate forces and gradually replace foreign troops with joint patrols among local police forces, as the British, Spanish, and others have done on the territory of the Bosnian federation. And the burden of deployment would fall increasingly on non-military tasks. The vulnerability of the operation would be coordination among the separate organizational hierarchies for each task: NATO for military tasks, UNHCR for humanitarian tasks, OSCE for human rights monitoring and organizing elections, and the European Union for economic and infrastructural reconstruction.

If the second is our objective, then the mandate would not specify impartiality but partiality, telling soldiers whom to fire at and whom to assist militarily (as we have seen in the current air campaign). It will be just as vulnerable to problems of functional and organizational coordination, but it will also have to deal with problems of coordination among national units. Will we have agreement from our European partners, above all the British and French, on this political objective and its mandate specifications? If not, will national chains of reporting on violations and nationally defined sectors of patrol yield a confusing picture and revive serious political conflicts within NATO at the level of overall command? Will we come into political conflict or face military accidents with Russians, if they are deployed in areas of Bosnian Serbs? If we accept the Bosnian government's position that the return of all displaced persons and refugees to their homes, if they wish to go, must precede elections, will the mandate require the implementation force to restore security sufficient for resettlement before it exits? If the U.S. troops are based in Tuzla,

the one genuine case of multiethnic coexistence and moderate local leadership left and on which the goal of a single, multiethnic Bosnia can be built, what will the mandate tell U.S. commanders if a conflict arises between the Sarajevo government and local Tuzla authorities (such as on questions of humanitarian aid and refugees)? And if the U.S. exit strategy is based on the training and professionalization of the Bosnian army so that it can take over the task of defending its state, does the mandate include disarming the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat armies? Or does this exit strategy expect the resumption of hostilities once the U.S. leaves?

There is some virtue in vagueness and multiple public messages during the diplomatic stage, but the deployment of troops and their preparation require an unambiguous, clear statement of the objective. Clarity in goals and a coherent mandate are essential to give clear instructions to officers and soldiers. In deciding whether to deploy American troops, you may want to ask these questions of the Administration. Indeed, the terms of an implementable political settlement could certainly be part of the conditions that the Administration demands in negotiations.

IV. There is a second clarification needed to assess what assets we are willing to commit to peace in the Balkans and stability in Europe. What is the role of this political settlement in Bosnia for the region? The lack of clarity on the political objective in the current diplomatic initiative extends to the equally important purpose of U.S. troop deployment: the contribution of a Bosnian peace to restoring peace and stability to the region. The current diplomatic negotiations have two possible outcomes: a good model and a bad model.

The bad model is a Bosnian state so weak and internally divided that its purpose lies only in providing a buffer between two hostile states of Croatia and Serbia, including fifth columns of Croats and Serbs within Bosnia-Herzegovina. This might be a cold peace but one of large military budgets, economic stagnation, and a Muslim buffer that might in

the end require foreign protection. It suggests a Croatia supported by and aligned with the West, and an isolated Serbia (and by geopolitical necessity, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and perhaps Romania) that provide the constituency for an alliance of the rejected under Russian patronage and perhaps including Slovakia. Much more worrisome, in other words, than a partition of Bosnia alone is a partition of the Balkans and of Europe that could result from the settlement in Bosnia.

The good model is a Bosnia that serves as a linking magnet for the peninsula, requiring Croatia and Serbia to cooperate in order to protect Croats and Serbs who remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This outcome could still result if the warfare stops now and if a political settlement recognizes the equal rights of all three nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina with substantial regional autonomy, as long as they remain within a Bosnian state. The special relationships with Croatia and Serbia already identified in the political negotiations could be designed to be part of this connective tissue of common interest. The model would require a regional arms control regime in place of building up forces for an elusive military equilibrium. Let's not fool ourselves that training a Bosnian army to defend its territory, or lifting the arms embargo on the current Bosnian government in place of American deployment, is not partition; armies are needed to defend external boundaries, not internal boundaries against people who do not want to live there. Moreover, Bosnia as an integrating presence rather than as buffer state would shift the burden of implementing a peace very rapidly from military enforcement to economic reconstruction and stages of incorporation for the entire region into Europe.

The bad model of Bosnia as buffer is most likely if the United States is unwilling to put in the time, effort, and assets now to stimulate a stable outcome in the Balkans, that is, if instead, the United States repeats the last four years. But as we have already seen, the indirect, unforeseen costs of this choice are very high and will get larger. And neither party, Republicans or Democrats, is immune from this calculation because the Balkan conflict cannot disappear from the television screen or domestic pressures the way that

Somalia could.

The good model requires the United States to decide on what its political objective for Bosnia is before it deploys troops, and it requires troop deployment and a peacekeeping mandate. It may require more assets up front and more sustained U.S. political attention so as to keep Europeans (including Russians) working together. But it is a faster route, in fact, for American exit, by designing a path that plays to European advantage, European assets, and the path of European economic integration of the region. It also lays the basis for an economic revival of the entire Balkans in place of long-run stagnation, and therefore another emerging market of 70 million for American business.

V. To conclude, we would not be where we are today in terms of a possible negotiated end to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina if it had not been for congressional action on the subject and executive-legislative relations in Washington. That action has not always been a positive influence in the Balkans; I do not think lifting the arms embargo and abandoning the Bosnians will work. But the result of that pressure has been a search by the Administration to find an alternative, through a reassertion of American diplomatic leadership, to achieve the same goals of ending this tragic war. In this sense the Congress has been playing its constitutional role, and it should be commended. I have attempted above to identify ways in which it can continue this, by supporting American troop commitments to implement a peace settlement and by raising questions about the viability of that settlement and our preparation for it.

If the current American initiative succeeds, and that will require U.S. troop deployment, the United States will finish the task it began in 1989--of withdrawing from the Balkans and allowing southeastern Europe to return to its geopolitical place as one, relatively insignificant part of Europe. Contrary to the belief of the Bush Administration, this would not happen automatically; it was not only a European problem. The U.S. could not just withdraw and leave a vacuum and not expect the reemergence of conflict among

Europeans over what the Balkans was, whose sphere of interest it should be, and who could most successfully avoid getting involved. Instead, the United States could not leave an open gravesite; it had to bury the cold war and the preceding Balkan tinderbox and fill in the dirt, before the Europeans could seed the grass and turn the spot into a beautiful but otherwise unimportant part of the landscape. Those who argued that former Yugoslavia was no longer significant to the United States said it too soon; they were ahead of their times. It has to be *made* insignificant, and that will take a bit more doing on this side of the Atlantic. If we don't, it still has plenty of potential to resume its historical role--of dragging in major powers who thought the place insignificant, beginning with a confrontation between the United States and Russia and revived conflicts that could spell the death of NATO; of creating a new source of terrorism and drug havens in Europe; and of strengthening anti-democratic political forces in the region that repeat a politics of the 1930s.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, maam.

General MacKenzie, you have been there. Maybe you can really tell us what the situation is like. We appreciate your being here.

STATEMENT OF GEN. LEWIS MacKENZIE (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE—YUGOSLAVIA

General MACKENZIE. Sir, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman and members, thank you for the invitation. It hardly seems possible that it was just over 2 years ago I was here discussing possible United States ground involvement in the Balkans, and Bosnia in particular, and I guess my advice hasn't changed since that time, which is don't touch it with a 10-foot pole.

However, that is strictly from a military perspective. I am able to say that and at the same time endorse the very eloquent analysis by my colleague on the right. You have not asked me here as a retired soldier to tell you what I think you want to hear. I will tell you what I think as a service person who spent some time in and around Bosnia. Therefore, in the next few minutes, I am going to try and justify why, from a military perspective, I really don't think you should get involved on the ground, because it is your soldiers who are going to wear the consequences and, therefore, their situation deserves at least a little attention beforehand.

If you deploy United States ground forces to Bosnia, they will be exposed to a degree of risk out of all proportion to any other soldiers participating on a NATO-led mission. No matter how you try and wordsmith it, no matter what the spin doctors do, it is clearly evident that the United States has taken sides in the Bosnian conflict.

To insist that NATO's air strikes, primarily United States air strikes, were merely in support of U.N. resolutions and the designed to protect remaining safe havens ignores the fact that the air strikes away from the safe havens match very nicely with some of the ground tactical objectives of the Bosnian Muslim Croatian coalition during their recent major objective. Like it or not, to one side in the conflict you are the enemy.

Paradoxically, precisely because you can react strategically to attacks on your soldiers, you will be attacked. Each side in the conflict will do everything within their power to present themselves in the best possible light to you. If that means killing U.S. soldiers and making it look like the other side did it, so be it. And it will be easy to do. A mortar infiltrated to the other side of the demilitarized zone or the cease-fire line, whatever is established, one round into U.S. troop concentrations, and quite likely you will react against the side that you think did the firing. It worked in Somalia. It will work in Bosnia. In fact, it wouldn't even be necessary to infiltrate the mortar to the other side of the cease-fire line. In Bosnia, one side can hire somebody on the other side to fire the mortar.

Your soldiers' situation is different from anyone else's. As an example, if Canadian or, say, Norwegian soldiers are targeted, their countries agonize, debate it in Congress, Parliament, whatever; both of those countries are members of NATO, but they can't do anything about it on the ground strategically. And, therefore, it

really doesn't make a lot of difference if Canadians or Norwegians are slightly biased for or against one of the sides in the conflict. It makes a big difference if you are. We don't get attacked. You will be.

Forgive me for saying so, but another U.S. characteristic which makes you, your soldiers, a favorite target is your political reaction to casualties. In Beirut in 1983 and 10 years later in Mogadishu, you did create the impression that you have a relatively low pain threshold when it comes to casualties where you do not have significant national self-interests.

As an example, everything in my country is multiplied by 10 to compare it with yours. It is how our population relates. My country has had 10 killed and 90 seriously injured in the former Yugoslavia since the U.N. operation went in there. It doesn't sound like a lot. For you that is 100 killed and 900 seriously injured. I am really curious how you would have reacted to that casualty count over the last couple of years.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am a graduate of your U.S. Army War College. I have many friends in the U.S. forces, and I have great respect for your military's credibility and capability. And that is why I am recommending against your participation on the ground in Bosnia. Don't risk your credibility. Encourage the Europeans and some of their allies, including Canadians, to do the job. If they can't maintain 50,000 or 60,000 troops on the ground, we had better go back and rethink NATO. Save your forces for the major conflicts that threaten your national self-interest.

Having said that, if for purely political reasons you do deploy—and I don't think you have much choice—I leave you with one thought: Your television networks and the BBC normally end up with the same question over the last couple of weeks. OK, General MacKenzie, you are the notional commander of the NATO force, what do you want? And I think they all expect me to spell out tanks and armored personnel carriers and numbers of troops. And I give them the same answer: Clear, unequivocal, political direction, which hopefully is not an oxymoron, as to what the bloody objective is. You have got to tell me what you want me to do, as Dr. Woodward very clearly pointed out. And, quite frankly, after you tell me what you want me to do, then I will come back with the bill for resources, and hopefully you can give me at least 50 percent of what I am asking for.

The Security Council has provided neither of those in the last 3 years—not a clear mandate, and frequently less than 10 percent of the resources to do the job. Soldiers don't solve these conflicts. Their responsibility is to create a pause where the diplomatic process can make some headway. Unfortunately, there is a nasty characteristic that when the fighting stops—and I remind you that in Croatia the United Nations considered 250 cease-fire violations a day as cease-fire holding—that when the fighting stops, the diplomats have a nasty habit of disappearing and going on to the next problem. That can't happen in Bosnia. You put a full-court press on the diplomatic arena for which I compliment you, and you have got to keep it up. But if I was one of your soldiers and you were asking me whether we should be going to Bosnia, I would say thanks, but no thanks.

Thanks very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Dr. Wolfowitz.

STATEMENT OF PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEAN, PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I too appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee on these very important questions that Congress has been asked to face. Unfortunately, I do not have simple answers. I don't believe there are simple answers. The questions that you have to answer are made all the more difficult by the fact that the administration is asserting that the answer is to send 25,000 troops to keep the peace before it is possible to answer basic questions because there is not yet any agreement and not yet an ability to say what that peace is.

I have submitted a longer statement for the record, but let me try to summarize it here. And I would begin with two basic observations which, to me, are important in framing this issue.

First of all, there is no question in my mind that peace in Bosnia, peace in the Balkans, would very much serve important American interests, although I would note that I think the administration needs to do a much better job, the President, particularly of explaining what those interests are. But good intentions in this matter are not enough. I believe it is relevant here to go back to the experience of Lebanon in 1983, 1982, when we sent American troops into Lebanon with the best of intentions to try to bring about peace in that tortured country, to try to end the massacres that had just taken place in Sabra and Shatila of innocent Palestinians at the hands of Christian proxies of our Israeli allies. We sent marines in initially trying to be neutral. Before long, they found themselves viewed as partisans. Before much longer, 250 marines were blown up, and the United States left Lebanon with its tail between its legs.

We had not only lost 250 good Americans; we, in fact, had set back American credibility and prestige for quite a long time in the Middle East. So it is not just enough to want peace and to think that peace is a good thing. It is very important to be hardheaded here.

Second, it seems to me that the last 2 months have revealed that the key to peace in Bosnia is the ability, first of all, of the Bosnians to take care of themselves on the ground, and in the second place, the ability of NATO perhaps in a modest way to assist them from the air.

I have some real questions that I will explain in the statement whether sending in peacekeepers is the way to achieve either of those objectives. It seems to me that over the last 3 years it has been the presence of peacekeepers that has been one of the most powerful arguments against doing what we should have done under two administrations and failed to do, that is, to give the Bosnians the means to defend themselves. And with regard to the recent bombing, it was the Chief of Staff of our Air Force, General Fogleman, who wrote very recently that it was the withdrawal of lightly armed U.N. peacekeepers that gave air power the freedom

of maneuver to attack the range of targets called for by the NATO strategy.

At the very time when those two instruments seem to be working, it seems to me it is the wrong thing to be pushing with such determination to put peacekeepers in where there may not be a peace. And the history of peacekeepers in Bosnia to date raises some fundamental questions about their efficacy. We read recently about the shame felt in Holland that Dutch peacekeepers were forced to surrender custody of the helpless people in Srebrenica whom they were sent to protect, even though the Bosnian Serb commander had warned the Dutch of what he would do with his victims by slitting the throat of a live pig before their eyes.

Earlier we had the episode of Bosnian Serbs opening the door of a French armored car and murdering the Vice President of Bosnia who was traveling under French protection.

Nor have the peacekeepers merely been weak and ineffective. They have also tied the hands of NATO and the international community from pursuing more effective policies. Protecting the safety of UNPROFOR frequently seems to have become the major goal of international policy in Bosnia, most spectacularly earlier this year when the Bosnian Serbs seized hundreds of U.N. hostages in retaliation for some very limited NATO air attacks.

In order to answer the question of whether we should send peacekeepers, I think there are three sets of issues that need to be addressed:

First, perhaps the most fundamental question about any peacekeeping force is what is the nature of the peace that they are being sent to keep. Obviously, until there is a peace, that is a difficult question to answer, but it has two parts, and there are grounds for skepticism on both.

First of all, what is the attitude and outlook of the parties concerning the peace agreement? We have had very successful peacekeeping in the Sinai Desert between Egypt and Israel, but those two countries have been committed to the peace, and the purpose of peacekeepers is simply to reassure each party that the other is, in fact, abiding by the agreement. I think there is a real question whether that would be the case in the wake of a peace agreement in Bosnia or whether we would not, in fact, have both sides or, more accurately, all five sides—the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian Government, not to mention the Croatian and Serbian Governments—all jockeying for the best position when hostilities resume.

Second, the nature of the agreement is important in terms of its clarity. And from everything one can discern, the arrangements that will be negotiated are likely to be full of enormous complexity that will lead to great confusion as to the responsibility to sign on any particular cease-fire violations.

The second set of questions concerns the purposes that peacekeepers are supposed to serve. It seems to me that there are at least three possible answers. The first answer would be that they are simply to observe the agreement so as to encourage voluntary compliance by the parties and provide the basis for decisions on further actions in the event of violations. For that purpose, it is

very unclear why combat divisions are necessary, much less American combat divisions.

Given the history of how peacekeepers have been treated in the Balkan, having a large force to ensure their safety is not absurd. But if that is the purpose, the Congress should ask whether we are not once again making American policy hostage to the safety of peacekeepers and whether having observers on the ground is so valuable as to be worth that cost.

A second possible purpose would be to impose an agreement on all parties, despite likely efforts to violate it. This seems, unfortunately, the most likely function of peacekeepers given the direction that we are going. But to call that peacekeeping is a gross misnomer. Even to call it peace enforcement I think conceals the complexity and difficulty of the task. Policing the peace would be a better description, and it is hard to see how any outside force can do that without quickly getting into hostilities with all the parties to the conflict, like the situation of the British in Northern Ireland. It begins to look too much like our own experience in Lebanon for comfort.

A third possibility and the one purpose that to me might make some sense would be to help the Bosnians defend what they are able to get out of this agreement. Of course, this too would be better called peace enforcement than peacekeeping, but it is a kind of peace enforcement that we know how to do and that we have done for many years in Korea and Germany. It is a mission that American forces can do extremely well.

But if that is the mission, it is important to acknowledge it as such so that there can be some clarity of purpose as to what we do. Moreover, there needs to be some concept of how long we are committed to this mission and what the American interests are that are served by doing so.

That brings me to the third set of questions which would pertain to that kind of peacekeeping arrangement, and I think there are at least six fundamental questions that the Congress must demand answers to before an informed decision can be made.

First, are the borders of the territory assigned to the Bosnians defensible? The more precarious the position in which the Bosnians are left by this agreement, the more responsibility the United States will incur for having pressured them to accept it and the longer it will be before American forces can leave. In the present Contact Group borders, the long appendage stretching southeast of Sarajevo through Gorazde and the smaller appendage snaking southeast from Bihac are not defensible. Sarajevo itself, though ostensibly internationalized, remains vulnerable.

Second, under whose command will the peacekeepers operate and with what rules of engagement? A repetition of the dual key arrangement that rendered the effective use of force virtually impossible earlier would be disastrous. But it is wrong to blame all of the failings of that arrangement on the United Nations. The responsibility lies equally with the governments of many of our allies, who were afraid that an effective use of force would endanger their forces. American troops must not be deployed except with command arrangements and rules of engagement that ensure their effectiveness and their ability to protect themselves.

The third question that Congress should ask for answers on is: What will be the relation between NATO and Russian peacekeepers? There may be a useful role for Russian troops to play, but this role must be defined with extreme care. One of the worst possible outcomes we could imagine would be if poorly designed arrangements lead to interventions by NATO forces and Russian forces in support of opposing parties in the conflict.

The fourth question: What role is the continued threat of bombing supposed to play in enforcing the peace agreement? Ironically, just at the moment that the administration has finally used American air power with enough decisiveness to have at least a modest effect on events in Bosnia, we are talking about committing more peacekeepers on the ground, despite the fact that concern about the safety of peacekeepers has been one of the major inhibitions in the past on the effective use of air power.

Earlier I quoted General Fogleman, the Air Force Chief of Staff, on the connection, the adverse connection between peacekeepers on the ground and the threat of bombing.

The Congress should demand that the administration answer the question of the relationship between peacekeepers on the ground and the ability to use bombing or the threat of bombing to enforce the terms of the agreement. If this is not thought out clearly ahead of time, the commitment of NATO ground forces, and particularly of American forces, could actually weaken NATO's ability to use air power to enforce the agreement.

Fifth, the Congress should insist on the administration giving some idea of when the mission of American peacekeepers will end.

Sixth, and in my view most importantly, the question is: Will the Bosnians be provided with the means eventually to defend themselves? This goes immediately to one of the central mistakes in American policy toward Bosnia under both the Bush and Clinton administrations, the continuation of the arms embargo on the Bosnians. There is a disturbing lack of direct addressal by the administration of this issue in the context of the peace negotiations. Although there have been vague hints that the embargo might be lifted, the administration does not appear to be making this a central point in the negotiations. Although we are told that alliance solidarity obliges us to join our allies in an ill-defined peacekeeping mission, those same allies still seem to be prepared to veto the one step that would eventually make it possible for peacekeepers to withdraw.

The Congress has correctly made the issue of the Bosnians' ability to defend themselves a central concern of American policy. This is the right time to press this issue. American peacekeepers should not be sent to protect Bosnians who continue to be rendered helpless by an arms embargo that is not only immoral but strategically foolish.

In the absence of an agreement—and, of course, there is no agreement yet—it is impossible to make an informed judgment about the wisdom of sending peacekeepers. The President has apparently decided to commit a large American peacekeeping force even though he and his advisers do not know the answers to these questions either, and that makes the decision disturbing. Once the President has committed the prestige and power of the United

States, the Congress can reverse that decision only at enormous cost. This makes it all the more important for Congress to force a very thorough examination of what it is that the administration thinks it is doing while there is still time to change direction.

Nor is it enough for the administration to say that our allies are sending peacekeepers and we must do so also or else we will be letting down our allies. Whatever our allies are doing now will be pursuant to an agreement that is being negotiated and designed by the United States. Before the President and his negotiators conclude an agreement that requires NATO to send peacekeepers, they need to answer the question of why they are sending anyone's peacekeepers at all.

And beyond that, as General MacKenzie has pointed out, there is a difference between American peacekeepers and other peacekeepers. Americans become targets when other peacekeepers are not, and Americans cannot be withdrawn without an enormous loss of credibility that other countries do not have to think about.

An enormous burden in the end falls on the Congress to support the President unless there is an overwhelming case to the contrary. But that is all the more reason for the Congress to force the administration, whose course in Bosnia has been consistently marked by vagueness, confusion, and ambiguity, to provide clear answers to these questions before, not after, it has committed American troops or committed our allies to an essentially impossible policing mission in Bosnia. While the failure of the current peacekeeping efforts would be a setback, it will be a far greater setback if we commit the prestige and power of the United States to a mission that cannot be achieved and cannot be sustained.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfowitz follows:]

TESTIMONY OF

PAUL WOLFOWITZ .

DEAN OF THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
OF THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

FOR THE

HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

HEARINGS ON PEACEKEEPERS FOR BOSNIA

OCTOBER 17, 1995.

The history of peacekeepers in Bosnia to date raises fundamental questions about their efficacy. We have read recently about the shame felt in Holland that Dutch peacekeepers were forced to surrender custody of the helpless people in Srebrenica whom they were sent to protect, even though the Bosnian Serb commander had warned the Dutch of what he would do with his victims by slitting the throat of a live pig before their eyes. Earlier we had the episode of Bosnian Serbs opening the door of a French armored car and murdering the Deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia who was travelling under French protection.

Nor have the peacekeepers of UNPROFOR merely been weak and ineffective in many circumstances. Even worse, they have tied the hands of NATO and the international community from pursuing more effective policies. Protecting the safety of UNPROFOR frequently seems to have become the major goal of international policy in Bosnia, most spectacularly when the Bosnian Serbs seized hundreds of U.N. hostages earlier this year in retaliation for some very limited NATO air attacks earlier this spring.

FIRST, the most fundamental question to be asked about any peacekeeping force is what is the nature of the peace that they are being sent to keep. This is itself a two-part question:

1) One set of questions concerns the attitude and outlook of the parties toward the agreement. Is it -- like the peace between Egypt and Israel which U.S. peacekeepers have been helping to support for nearly fifteen years -- a peace that both parties genuinely want, and therefore the function of peacekeepers is largely to assure each party of the other's good faith? Or is it nothing more than, at best, a temporary pause in fighting that either party can be expected to break as soon as it sees the possibility of significant gains in doing so, a description that seems much more likely to apply in Bosnia? The situation in the former Yugoslavia is even more complicated because there are not only the three parties in Bosnia itself but also the governments of Serbia and Croatia who have great influence over their respective allies in Bosnia, but not official responsibility for them. This complexity will make it very difficult to determine who to hold responsible for violations of an agreement.

2) A second set of questions concerns the clarity of the agreement itself and the likelihood of disputes continuing under it. Is it, again like the Egypt-Israel agreement, one whose terms are very clear and one where the responsibility for a violation of those terms can be reasonably clearly established? This seems like an unlikely outcome in Bosnia, particulalry given

what little we can discern about the complicated geographical lines along which this agreement seems to be negotiated, not to mention the host of other issues concerning: a) free passage; or b) the delivery of utilities; or, c) the intermixing of mutually hostile and fearful populations. d) Finally, there is the ambiguous allocation of authority between the Bosnian government and a Serb "entity" on its territory. The agreement now being negotiated gives full sovereignty to neither. Even in local areas where the lines separating the parties are relatively clear, we have had repeated demonstrations of how easy it is for snipers or mortar shelling or acts of terrorism to disrupt any temporary cease fire. And the no-fly zone has been violated repeatedly since its inception three years ago.

Second, the Administration must address the question of what purpose peacekeepers are supposed to serve. At least three answers seem possible:

1) To observe the agreement, so as to encourage voluntary compliance by the parties and provide the basis for decisions on further actions in the event of violations. For this purpose it is unclear why combat divisions are necessary, much less American combat divisions, unless their purpose is to ensure the safety of the observers themselves. Given the history of how peacekeepers have been treated in the Balkans, having a large force to ensure their safety is not absurd. But if that is the purpose, the Congress should ask whether we are not once again making American policy hostage to the safety of peacekeepers and whether having observers on the ground is so valuable as to be worth that cost.

Even more important, if we are sending a large combat force simply to observe an agreement, are we prepared simply to have that force stand by when violations occur? It is doubtful that this is either feasible or desirable, and thus the mission of the peacekeepers is likely expand, whether intended or not.

2) To impose an agreement on all parties, despite likely efforts to violate it. This seems like the most likely function of peacekeepers, given impossibly ambiguous character of agreement that is emerging and the bad faith in which most of the parties are probably negotiating. To call this peacekeeping, however, is a misnomer. Even "peace enforcement" conceals the complexity and difficulty of the task. "Policing" the agreement would be a better description, and it is hard to see how any outside force can do that without quickly getting into hostilities with all the parties to the conflict, like the situation of the British in Northern Ireland. Nor is there any clear end point to this function, other than the exhaustion of the political will of the peacekeepers themselves. It begins to look too much like the American experience in Lebanon for comfort. While we might be initially more successful, and we

might easily last longer, the end result might not be much different. If that is the role envisioned for peacekeepers, one should ask whether any country should send peacekeepers, and particularly whether the United States -- with the special responsibilities and special burdens that American troops carry -- should do so.

3) To help the Bosnians defend what they are able to get from this agreement. This is the one purpose that makes some sense out the deployment of a large American peace-keeping force. Of course, this too would be better called "peace enforcement" than "peace keeping," but it is a kind of peace enforcement that we know how to do, and that we have done for many years in Korea and Germany, and more recently in Kuwait since its liberation. It is a mission that American forces can do extremely well.

But if that is the mission, it is important to acknowledge it as such so that there can be some clarity of purpose to what we do. Moreover, there needs to be some concept of how long we are committed to this mission and what the American interests are that are served by doing so. In fact, it is deeply disturbing that the President seems to have committed himself to deploying a large American combat force but he has not yet made a serious attempt to convince the American people that there are important American interests justifying such a commitment.

Third, if the purpose of American peace-keepers is to make the precarious position of the Bosnians more defensible, then there are fundamental questions about the prospective agreement that the Administration must address:

1) Are the borders of the territory assigned to the Bosnians defensible? The more precarious the position in which the Bosnians are left by this agreement, the more responsibility the U.S. will incur for having pressured them to accept it and the longer it will be before American forces can leave. In the present Contact Group borders the long appendage stretching southeast of Sarajevo through Gorazde and the smaller appendage snaking southeast from Bihac are not defensible. Sarajevo itself, though ostensibly internationalized, remains vulnerable to the Serbs in the Pale area.

2) Under whose command will the peacekeepers operate and with what rules of engagement? A repetition of the dual key arrangement that rendered the effective use of force virtually impossible would be disastrous. But it would be wrong to blame all of the failings of that arrangement on the United Nations. The responsibility lies equally with the governments of many of our allies, who were afraid that an effective use of force would endanger their forces. American troops must not be deployed except with command arrangements and rules of engagement that

ensure their effectiveness and their ability to protect themselves.

3) What will be the relation between NATO and Russian peacekeepers? There may be a useful role for Russian troops to play, but this role must be defined with extreme care. One of the worst possible outcomes would be if poorly designed arrangements lead to interventions by NATO forces and Russian forces in support of opposing parties in the conflict.

4) What role is the continued threat of bombing supposed to play in enforcing the peace agreement? Ironically, just at the moment that the Administration has finally used American air power with enough decisiveness to have at least a modest effect on events in Bosnia, we are talking about committing more peacekeepers on the ground, despite the fact that concern about the safety of peacekeepers has been one of the major inhibitions in the past on the effective use of air power.

As General Ronald R. Fogleman, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force recently wrote:

> "It was the withdrawal and consolidation of lightly armed U.N. peacekeepers that gave air power the freedom of maneuver to attack the range of targets caqlled for by the NATO strategy."

The Congress should force the Administration to address the question of the relation between peacekeepers on the ground and the ability to use bombing or the threat of bombing to enforce the terms of the agreement. If this is not thought out clearly ahead of time, the commitment of NATO ground forces, and particularly of American forces, could actually weaken NATO's ability to enforce the agreement with air power.

5) The Congress should insist on the Administration giving some idea of when the mission of American peacekeepers will end. This is not only a matter of defining the length of time American peacekeepers will be deployed, but what the criteria will be for the completion of their mission. Since it is difficult to conceive of a plausible exit without a Bosnian capability to defend themselves, this again makes it essential to address the question of the arms embargo.

6) Most importantly, will the Bosnians be provided with the means eventually to defend themselves? This goes immediately to one of the central issues in American policy toward Bosnia under two Administrations, the continuation of the arms embargo on the Bosnians. There is a disturbing lack of direct addressal by the Administration of this issue in the context of the peace negotiations. Although there are vague hints that the embargo might be lifted, the Administration does not appear to be making

this the central point in the negotiations that it should be. Although we are told that alliance solidarity obliges us to join our allies in an ill-defined peace-keeping mission, they still seem to be prepared to veto the one step that would eventually make it possible for peacekeepers to withdraw. After his meeting with Secretary of Defense Perry, the French Defense Minister Millon announced that the arms embargo on Bosnia would have to continue. The American response to this has been tepid, consisting of "background" assurances to journalists that the U.S. is giving some thought to the Bosnians military needs, but that these would be supplied by other countries, not the United States.

The Congress has correctly made the issue of the Bosnians ability to defend themselves a central concern of American policy. This is the right time to press this issue. American peacekeepers should not be sent to protect Bosnians who continue to be rendered helpless by an arms embargo that is not only immoral but foolish.

* * *

In the absence of an agreement, and of course there is no agreement yet, it is impossible to make an informed judgment about the wisdom of sending peacekeepers. The President has apparently decided to commit a large American peace-keeping force even though he and his advisers do not know the answers to these questions either, and that makes this decision disturbing. Once the President has committed the prestige and power of the United States, the Congress can reverse that decision only at enormous cost. This makes it all the more important for Congress to force a very thorough examination of what it is that the Administration thinks it is doing while there is still time to change direction.

Nor is it enough for the Administration to say that our allies are sending peacekeepers and we must do so also or we will be letting down our allies. Whatever our allies do now will be pursuant to an agreement that is being negotiated and designed by the United States. Before the President and his negotiators conclude an agreement that requires NATO peacekeepers, they need to answer the question of why they are sending peacekeepers at all.

Even then, there is a major difference between peacekeepers and NATO peacekeepers. If the function of peacekeepers, for example, is to be an essentially neutral one, it might be better to send peacekeepers from neutral countries and reserve NATO forces for actions that are not neutral. If the function of peacekeepers is to monitor a peace agreement, rather than to enforce it, it might be better to reserve NATO forces for enforcement actions. And even if it makes sense to send NATO

forces, there are further questions to be asked before including U.S. forces among those NATO ones, for several reasons:

1) American forces become potential targets and hostages, even more than those of any other country, because some may try to change or influence American policy by going after our troops;

2) American troops are much more difficult to withdraw once they are committed than those of any other country, because the credibility of American military power is of far greater consequence than that of anyone else;

3) if enforcement actions become necessary, the greatest burden may fall on the United States, particularly for any action involving air power, and American freedom of action may be inhibited if there are American peacekeepers on the ground.

In the end, these are questions, under our Constitution, that the President is elected to answer. An enormous burden falls on the Congress to support the President in such decisions unless there is an overwhelming case to the contrary. And it is important to avoid any course that would compound the already great damage done to NATO by American failure to lead. But that is all the more reason for the Congress to force the Administration, whose course in Bosnia has been consistently marked by vagueness, confusion, and ambiguity, to provide clear answers to these questions <u>before</u>, not after, it decides to commmit American troops or to recommend that our allies commit their troops to an essentially impossible policing mission in Bosnia. While the failure of the current peacekeeping efforts would be a setback, it will be a far greater setback if we commit the prestige and power of the United States to a mission that cannot be achieved and cannot be sustained.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Wolfowitz.
Mr. Perle.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD PERLE, RESIDENT FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Mr. PERLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

No matter how meritorious the cause, few decisions are as daunting as the decision to send our soldiers in harm's way. So I want to begin by commending the committee for initiating hearings on whether the United States should provide some tens of thousands of ground troops to a NATO deployment in Bosnia. You are wise to look ahead. And the President would be wise to reflect on the questions this committee and others in the Congress will almost certainly raise.

I hope you will allow me to add, Mr. Chairman, that in responding to your kind invitation to testify this afternoon, I am mindful of the effort by some in the administration to dismiss as an isolationist anyone who is skeptical about an American-Bosnian deployment. While there are undoubtedly isolationists around who oppose America assuming the responsibilities of world leadership, I am not among them.

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, I have repeatedly testified, written, argued, and debated the proper role of the United States in the war in Bosnia. In every instance I have argued for greater, not lesser American involvement, for more aggressive leadership, for greater independence in setting a policy for the Western allies, for bolder initiatives. I have deplored the acquiescence of this administration—and its predecessor—in the pathetically weak response of our NATO allies to the infamous "ethnic cleansing" of Bosnia by brutal Serb Armed Forces.

If there have been isolationists on the question of Bosnia, they are to be found, in my view, in an administration that has compiled a 32-month record of weakness, vacillation, and hollow threats followed only now by 1½ months of a preferable, but still inadequate, use of air power to compensate for the imbalance of power in favor of the Serbs—an imbalance that has prolonged this tragic war.

Now we are faced by an administration effort to enlist support for the dispatch of 25,000 Americans to Bosnia to keep a peace that has not yet been made or defined. They would be sent on a hopelessly ill-defined mission under circumstances that have not yet been negotiations to administer a territorial partition of Bosnia that would reward Serb aggression to a considerable, though not yet known degree. In all likelihood, our young men and women will find themselves guarding the perimeter of a Bosnian ghetto whose viability as an independent state is far from assured. This is not a purpose for which they should be asked to risk their lives.

I am at a loss, Mr. Chairman, to understand how or why the administration has decided to ask for American troops before it can answer many of the questions on which the wisdom of such a move must depend.

Would American troops be called upon to prevent the Bosnian Government from reclaiming territory seized by Serb forces? Would they superintend and then enforce the relocation of people from their homes into designated ethnically cleansed territories? Would

they use deadly force if necessary to prevent the crossing of internal lines of demarkation?

Will we accept a de facto partition of Bosnia as a legitimate, internationally recognized arrangement? Will we now arm the Bosnians so they can defend themselves? Will we train them? Under what circumstances would American troops leave Bosnia? Would they be pulled out or reinforced if fighting were to break out again? Would they leave if their departure would lead to a resumption of hostilities? How are we to understand the claim that they will come home in a year? A hope? A promise? An unqualified, irrevocable promise? Why a year rather than 6 or 18 months? After all, an exit date is not an exit strategy.

What will our deployment cost? Are we also to provide the logistic and other support for non-U.S. troops? Is our share of the burden equitable? Could the troops of other nations fulfill the role the administration has in mind for Americans? We have heard two persuasive arguments today that we are more likely to be targets, and, therefore, perhaps others should assume that role. What will be the Russian role in any Bosnian deployment?

The administration argues that a NATO force, including a significant American component, will be tough and decisive, "the meanest dog in town," as Secretary Perry put it in testimony in the other body this morning. But can he be sure that the United States will be in charge of the pound? Is he or any other American official prepared to state categorically that we will act alone if necessary rather than acquiesce in the more timid and uncertain policies we have come to expect from our allies, in particular the British and the French? Are we, in short, ready to take charge even if it means trouble within the alliance?

At this point we know only this: the administration which only days ago argued against lifting the arms embargo that kept the Bosnian Government hopelessly outgunned on the grounds that it would Americanize the war now wishes to Americanize the not-yet-materialized peace by sending in an American division.

But what sort of peace can we expect? How stable will it be? Will it be a peace accepted freely and without coercion by all the parties? Or has the Bosnian Government, which has pleaded in vain for an end to the embargo which kept it from defending itself, been intimidated into accepting the loss of half its national territory? Can we look forward to a peace that Bosnians can defend, or are we creating a permanent dependency in a truncated city-state with vulnerable outlying territories linked by indefensible corridors to Sarajevo?

I think Paul Wolfowitz was quite right to place the emphasis he did on the question of whether this agreement will lead to a defensible border for Bosnia or whether we will be there forever defending that for them.

These are the questions you should be asking. But perhaps, more to the point, these are the questions the administration itself should be asking. After nearly 3 years of dithering, the haste with which the administration has committed itself to sending Americans to Bosnia is astonishing.

The idea of peace, Mr. Chairman, is so powerful, so appealing, so universally acclaimed that we are often tempted to do foolish

things, shortsighted things to achieve it. Perhaps the greatest temptation is to lose sight of the ultimate objective. In this case, that objective ought to be the survival of a multiethnic independent Bosnia at peace with its neighbors. Peace that is mere varnish on an ethnic partition, peace that is a way station to the eventual disappearance of the Bosnian state, peace that is a lull in the fighting—these are outcomes that cannot possibly justify even the safe presence of Americans, let alone their deployment in the face of great danger.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Perle follows:]

STATEMENT OF RICHARD PERLE
Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

before the Committee on National Security
U.S. House of Representatives

October 17, 1995

No matter how meritorious the cause, few decisions are as daunting as the decision to send our soldiers in harm's way. So I want to begin by commending the Committee for initiating hearings on whether the United States should provide some tens of thousands of ground troops to a NATO deployment in Bosnia. You are wise to look ahead. And the President would be wise to reflect on the questions this committee and others in the congress will most certainly raise.

I hope you will allow me to add, Mr. Chairman, that in responding to your kind invitation to testify this afternoon, I am mindful of the effort by some in the administration to dismiss as an isolationist anyone who is skeptical about an American Bosnian deployment. While there are undoubtedly isolationists around who oppose America assuming the responsibilities of world leadership, I am not among them.

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, I have repeatedly testified, written, argued and debated the proper role of the United States in the war in Bosnia. In every instance I have argued for greater, not lesser American involvement, for more aggressive leadership, for greater independence in setting a policy for the western allies, for bolder initiatives. I have deplored the acquiescence of this administration--and its predecessor--in the pathetically weak response of our NATO allies to the infamous "ethnic cleansing" of Bosnia by brutal Serb armed forces.

If there have been isolationists on the question of Bosnia they are to be found, in my view, in an administration that has compiled a 32 month record of weakness, vacillation and hollow threats followed, only now, by a month and a half of a preferable--but still inadequate--use of airpower to compensate for the imbalance of power in favor of the Serbs--an imbalance that has prolonged this tragic war.

Now we are faced by an administration effort to enlist support for the dispatch of 25,000 Americans to Bosnia to keep a peace that has not yet been made or defined. They would be sent on a hopelessly ill-defined mission under circumstances that have not yet been negotiated to administer a territorial partition of Bosnia that would reward Serb aggression to a considerable, though not-yet-known degree. In all likelihood, our young men and women will find themselves guarding the perimeter of a Bosnian ghetto whose viability as an independent state is far from assured. This is not a purpose for which they should be asked to risk their lives.

I am at a loss, Mr. Chairman, to understand how or why the administration has decided to ask for American troops before it can answer any of the questions on which the wisdom of such a move must depend.

Would American troops be called upon to prevent the Bosnian government from reclaiming territory seized by Serb forces? Would they superintend and then enforce the

relocation of people from their homes into designated ethnically "cleansed" territories? Would they use deadly force if necessary to prevent the crossing of internal lines of demarkation?

Will we accept a *de facto* partition of Bosnia as a legitimate, internationally recognized arrangement? Will we now arm the Bosnians so they can defend themselves? Will we train them? Under what circumstances would American troops leave Bosnia? Would they be pulled out or reinforced if fighting were to break out again? Would they leave if their departure would lead to a resumption of hostilities? How are we to understand the claim that they will come home in a year? A hope? A promise? An *unqualified, irrevocable* promise? Why a year rather than six months or eighteen months? After all, an exit date is not an exit strategy.

What will our deployment cost? Are we also to provide logistic and other support for non-U.S. troops? Is our share of the burden equitable? Could the troops of other nations fulfill the role the administration has in mind for Americans? Why not? What will be the Russian role in any Bosnian deployment?

The administration argues that a NATO force including a significant American component will be tough and decisive, "the meanest dog in town," as Secretary Perry put it in testimony this morning. Can he be sure the U.S. will be in charge of the pound? Is he or any other American official prepared to state categorically that we will act alone if necessary rather than acquiesce in the more timid and uncertain policies we have come to expect from our allies. Are we, in short, ready to take charge even if it means trouble within the alliance?

At this point we know only this: the administration which only days ago argued against lifting the arms embargo that kept the Bosnian government hopelessly outgunned on the grounds that it would "Americanize" the war now wishes to "Americanize" the peace by sending in an American division.

But what sort of "peace" can we expect? How stable will it be? Will it be a peace accepted freely and without coercion by all parties? Or has the Bosnian government, which has pleaded in vain for ending the embargo which kept it from defending itself, been intimidated into accepting the loss of half its national territory? Can we look forward to a peace the Bosnians can defend or are we creating a permanent dependency in a truncated city-state with vulnerable outlying territories linked by indefensible corridors to Sarajevo?

These are the questions you should be asking. But perhaps more to the point, these are the questions the administration itself should be asking. After nearly three years of dithering, the haste with which the administration has committed itself to sending Americans to Bosnia is astonishing.

The idea of peace is so powerful, so appealing, so universally acclaimed that we are often tempted to do foolish things, short-sighted things to achieve it. Perhaps the greatest temptation is to lose sight of the ultimate objective. In this case that objective ought to be the survival of a multi-ethnic independent Bosnia at peace with its neighbors. "Peace" that is mere varnish on an ethnic partition, peace that is a way station to the eventual disappearance of the Bosnian state, peace that is a lull in the fighting--these are outcomes that cannot possibly justify even the safe presence of Americans, let alone their deployment in the face of great danger.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Perle, and thank you all.

Mr. Dellums.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First I would like to say to Mr. Perle specifically, I have said before and believe very strongly that once the Berlin Wall came down and the cold war ended, there were no experts. There are no post-cold-war experts, brilliant panelists notwithstanding. All of us are bumping our heads against new realities, and there is no Bible out there. We are all reaching to new paradigms. And so to be able to look back and say could have, would have, should have 3 years ago, there were no post-cold-war experts.

We developed a lot of Henry Kissingers and what have you who were cold war experts, who wrote brilliantly and scholarly works about the cold war. But I would venture to say that there are no experts in post-cold-war. We all start at the same point, and we are all grappling with new realities, and we are trying to come fundamentally to it.

The second observation that I would make is that several of the witnesses have spoken to the so-called vagueness of this plan. Without suggesting whether I am for or against that, I would simply suggest that is a straw man, because it is very clear that at some point they are going to come with a proposal based upon a specific plan because we all know that the predicate for the deployment of these troops is a peace plan. So once you do have a peace plan, then you can have the specifics. So to put this straw man up and beat it to death in public about the vagueness it seems to me is not a useful exercise because it seems to me we are here to grapple.

That then leads me to ask Professor Wolfowitz a specific question. For example, let's for the moment grant all of your analysis about the weaknesses of the past 3 years and the lack of brilliance, the lack of peacekeeping capability, let's grant all of that for the moment. But it seems to me that the moment you and I stand in for whatever reason it seems as if people in the Bosnian area, whether they become fatigued, they are tired of all the killing, they are tired of all the war, or whatever, it seems to me that people are now saying—and let's get out of the political context of challenging the administration. Let's for a moment just deal with the human lives of people, killing and dying in Bosnia. It seems to me that people are saying on all sides of that we are tired of the killing.

But there is an interesting predicate that apparently has been now joined in by the Bosnian Serbs as well as the Bosnian Muslims who say, No United States, no peace, because we are tired as hell, we are tired of killing each other, we are tired of war. We are prepared to come to the table and sit down to try to negotiate some kind of peace. But we don't trust each other to keep it, and we need some other people to come in here and keep us cool, as it were, until such time as we regain the capacity to trust each other and move on.

If that is indeed the case, what is our responsibility to that? Lift the arms embargo? A bizarre and absurd strategy because it doesn't speak to the reality of the parties in Bosnia now. So my question to you is: Let's grant all that past business. But what

about the moment we have now when people are saying we are tired and we are prepared to come to peace, but we don't quite trust each other and we need some other parties in there to keep us apart for long enough for this thing to lock in. My question to you is: What then is the American responsibility? If the Serbs are saying no United States, no peace, if the Bosnian Muslims are saying, no United States, no peace, what do we do? Do we walk away? Do we close our eyes? What do we do?

That is my question to you.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I guess first of all I don't think that what is going on there now is that people are tired of fighting. I think that what is going on there now is there has been a major change in fortunes of the battlefield in that we have for the first time in 3 years Mr. Karadzic demanding that the United States stop the Bosnian Muslims from attacking him. It is not that he is tired of fighting. He doesn't want to lose. And I am not so sure that the people that we have somewhat lined up with over the last 3 years really want to stop as much as they have been somewhat intimidated into stopping, which may not be a bad thing but it is different from saying that they are tired, they have given up. In fact, I think both sides want more, and it is why I said that I think——

Mr. DELLUMS. Maybe the soldiers might want to keep fighting. I think a hell of a lot of people there are tired of fighting.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. But there have been a lot of people——

Mr. DELLUMS. They talk on television every single day, and we all see them talking about they are tired of the war. These are Bosnian people speaking. This is not something I pulled out of the air.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. There are millions of people who are tired of the fighting, but the leaders on both sides and a lot of the troops are not tired of fighting. And I think it makes it very different from places where we have sent in genuine peacekeepers like between Egypt and Israel. As I said, there are cases where the situation is exactly what you describe where each side wants to stop but they don't really trust the other to stop. But I don't think that is—I would like to learn that that is, in fact, the case in Bosnia. I don't think it is the case.

Mr. DELLUMS. But let's deal with it as a hypothetical, OK, because none of us have crystal balls here. Let's say that they don't trust each other; they are prepared—let's say that they sign a peace agreement, and that is possible. We are all saying it. The order of probability I don't know, but at least it is possible at this moment that we may be moving toward stopping the killing in Bosnia. Let's as a hypothetical say that they sign a peace agreement but they don't trust each other to keep the peace agreement. My question, again, to you is: What is the U.S. role in that situation since we are a party trying to bring this peace agreement and ostensibly designed to stop the killing and the taking of human life? What is our role then?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think our most important role is to make sure that the Bosnians, who are the victims of aggression in this case, have the ability to defend themselves. And I don't think that means defending every square inch of what was once called Bosnia, but to defend the reasonable, defensible borders of a reasonable

Bosnian state. And I think that is much better done by they themselves than by an international peacekeeping force. I think that is the first responsibility of the United States, and when I talk about the vagueness of this agreement, I think the Congress has the time and the responsibility now to push the administration to fill in the proper details. And one of the details that is impossibly vague has to do with what is the status of the arms embargo after the agreement.

Our French allies aren't vague. They are opposed to lifting it, but we hint in background statements that we are going to do something to upgrade the Bosnian force. I don't think that is good enough. I think one of the most central features of a good agreement as opposed to a bad agreement is going to be whether Bosnia ends up with defensible borders and an army that can defend them. If that can't be done, then I think putting in 25,000 American troops as a 1-year Band-Aid isn't going to work. And the hope that in one administration document they believe after a year that this will become self-sustaining I think is an absolutely chimerical hope.

Mr. DELLUMS. Let me just ask one other question. As I understand it, the administration would seek a chapter 7 resolution from the United Nations, peace enforcement, as against chapter 6. From your perspective as a scholarly person, do you see any role for chapter 6 or chapter 7 resolutions in attempting to resolve regional conflicts once some diplomatic initiatives have been laid on the table? If a diplomatic initiative sets forth some kind of peace agreement, is there a role for chapter 6 and chapter 7 intervention into those situations?

I am now asking the broader question, because I would like to understand why—depending on your answer, I would like to understand why you don't see a chapter 6 or chapter 7 role for the international community participated in by the United States in Bosnia and why you would see it in some other place? Or is your position—I am trying to flesh out your position. Is your position that chapter 6, chapter 7 kinds of peacekeeping, peace enforcement functions serve no purpose in the world? And if that is the case, then I am able to position what you are saying and understand it and put it in context.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The classic case of a place where a peacekeeping force belongs is the Sinai. We have a peacekeeping force in Sinai. It has been there. And, by the way, it has been there for over a decade.

Mr. DELLUMS. That is chapter 6 classic peacekeeping.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, either way, it has the features that, No. 1, the two parties to the agreement really want the agreement to last; No. 2, the agreement is absolutely crystal clear, and there is no question, there is no ambiguity about violations; and No. 3, it basically rests not so much on the peacekeeping forces as it rests on the deterrent capability of the stronger party, in this case Israel.

I see most of those elements lacking in Bosnia. We have had cease-fire after cease-fire in Bosnia. One loses count of how many there have been. Those are peace agreements. They are unenforceable. Neither side really believes in them. Even to the extent they believe in them, the lines are so fuzzy, both geographically and po-

litically, that it is very often hard to tell who is violating them. And I think all of those are questions—obviously they could be answered in the affirmative, depending on how these negotiations come out. But I think it is a real mistake to write a blank check that we are going to put in 25,000 peacekeepers no matter what the nature of that agreement is. I think it is much more important to lay out some very fundamental principles that would be prerequisites to doing so.

Mr. DELLUMS. I don't think that needs to be in conflict. I think that could go hand in hand. I don't think there has to be an either or. I appreciate your generosity. I am going to move on. But you did not answer my inquiry regarding chapter 7. You mentioned chapter 6. But is it your position that chapter 7 peace enforcement serves no useful purpose, has no function, the United States should not engage in it? I think that is a real question.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think it is a real question, and maybe I disagree with the two colleagues to the right of me. I don't think it works if you are going to try to enforce equally on all parties. I think you end up, as I said in my statement, in the position of the British in Northern Ireland where you are at war with everybody.

We have peace enforcement. I don't know whether it is officially under chapter 7. We have peace enforcement in Korea. It has worked for more than 40 years. But it works because the United States is very clear on who we are defending against and who we are enforcing against. And if that is going to be the nature of our peacekeeping commitment, it would make a lot more sense, in my view, than saying we are going in there to stop everyone equally and that we are going to enforce this against the Bosnian Muslims, against the Croats, against the Serbs, and, by the way, against Zagreb and Belgrade as well. I mean, we really could be in a five-sided war.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses. You have been, I think, extremely helpful to us in the perspective you have given.

I find myself not at all clear in my thinking at this point as to whether or not there are circumstances under which we should become involved with ground forces in Bosnia and a peace enforcement role. Clearly, I think you have done an extraordinarily good job in focusing on the fact that if we are going to do it, there are lots and lots of questions that need to be answered that presently have been unanswered. And I think and hope that if the administration has anyone here who is listening, they will communicate that at least this Member of Congress, who might be willing to agree, cannot agree until some answers have been forthcoming.

It is extraordinarily important to me that we have a clear definition of where we are headed vis-a-vis an American responsibility or taking sides and for arming and training the Bosnian Muslims. There are enormous connotations to whether we do that or whether or not we are sending troops there on some other mission and for some other reason. And I think we must know from the administration what their choice is and the basis for that choice and where

they and Congress can then give deliberate thought to whether or not they have made the right choice, a choice which is one that is worthy of our accepting.

For us in the Congress, it is a very difficult situation. I am very loath to see American forces put onto the ground, but I have to be mindful there are some consequences, too, of our not doing so. Dr. Woodward has commented that this is a peace settlement that is an American peace settlement; it wouldn't exist but for American initiative and American strength and American prestige, American leadership. And many of us have thought that we were too late in exerting that leadership. Now that it has been exerted, what happens if we say, well, the game is not worth the candle?

It is an extraordinarily difficult situation for us to be in. I would like to hear your comments because I think it is very helpful, at least to this Member, as to if we do not, what are the connotations and the context of the perhaps an enlargement of the conflict within the Balkans?

Dr. Woodward, in your statement, you made references to unsettling and disturbing situations vis-a-vis Hungary and Bulgaria. We have the very unusual situation that we have the beginnings, it would appear, of some resolution of the problems between Greece and Macedonia. I would like to know what the connotations for that unraveling and for extension of the conflict throughout the Balkans are if we do go forward or if we do not, from any of you who have any observations there.

Ms. WOODWARD. Yes; I think I could go on at length, but let me just say briefly I think that the difficulty of this whole situation is the sort of collapse of states and the way people respond in a very insecure situation. So everyone is working short term on their own advantage without there being an overarching international stabilizing environment so that it doesn't go further. We are still there. And if we stop the fighting in Bosnia now, that is to say, not by going in with peace enforcement but with a political agreement, which I fully agree with Mr. Dellums everyone is ready for, we can then prevent the worst from going on, which is what we are worried about in the southern Balkans, because then we see a regional conflict, maybe even worse, that we have already committed ourselves to stopping for containment reasons.

For domestic reasons, in Hungary and Bulgaria, which, in fact, are partly linked to the instability and continuing trade disruptions as a result of the war and the embargo in the Balkans, both governments, now led of coalitions of former Communists and liberals, are using what has happened throughout the world—in Europe, excuse me, but also particularly in the former Communist countries in Eastern Europe to deflect attention from problems at home with supporting their own irredentist minorities elsewhere. The Bulgarians still do not accept that Macedonia is a nation and, therefore, have a right to a state. Behind this assassination attempt appears to be a lot of Bulgarian networks. The government itself has been raising new questions behind the scenes that most people don't see that threaten the stability of Macedonia, and that is feeding the potential collapse of that state when there is now this serious transition because Gligorov—he may not die, but he will not resume powers. The Hungarians 10 days ago supported even this

government, despite the fact that it up until now has not been as pro-Hungarian minority rights elsewhere as the previous Hungarian Government. Gyula Horn, the Prime Minister, 10 days ago supported openly, came out publicly in support of Hungarian minority demands within northern Serbia and Vojvodina for autonomy.

Now, the number of Hungarians is now down from 17 percent to 11 percent. But that, therefore, in other words, if the Croatian Government moves on eastern Slavonia militarily and Milosevic either finds pressure domestically to move or doesn't—I think he won't—he will then have an escalating situation on Vojvodina which will allow rightwing radical elements in Serbia to take advantage and start conflict. The same thing in the Macedonian case, if the Serbs continue to be preoccupied with ever more refugees settling in Vojvodina, the threat of war from Croatia, then it is very possible and most likely that the Albanian radicals who are still not happy in Kosovo with this arrangement to stay within Serbia, which we have specified, could easily take advantage of it to begin to pressure for independence, linking up with the Albanians and Macedonia because that linkage is much stronger.

In other words, the whole thing, by small steps more and more, but outsiders also getting involved, exactly what we saw in Bosnia, could literally bring war. And it is more likely now because of all the pieces of instability that we see, even in Greece, than it was 6 months ago. It won't happen if we stop the war.

Mr. BATEMAN [presiding]. I have been asked to assume the chair in the absence of the chairman, and the red light being on, I can't ask anything else and won't. But if there is anyone else who had a comment, we can take that before I call on Mr. Skelton.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Let me just say briefly I think one of the reasons why a peace is in our interest, very much so, is because the continuation of this war does risk its expansion. It isn't necessarily quite as simple as if it stops in Bosnia it is going to stop elsewhere. In fact, there is a certain danger that if it stops in Bosnia, some of the same military efforts can be directed somewhere else. But it is certainly in our interest to try to stop it overall.

Second, I agree very strongly with the comment you made earlier, Mr. Bateman, which is, if it appears as though a settlement is possible and the thing that prevents a settlement is an action by the Congress of the United States making it impossible for us to play the role that the President has said we should play, then I think it will be an enormous setback. But that, in my view, is all the more reason why the administration should be much more careful than it seems to me they have been about concluding that, whatever the answer is on the peace, whatever the peace is, the answer is 25,000 American troops.

It seems to me the more we are able to negotiate a real peace and the more it is true that the parties are actually prepared to have a peace, the less convincing it is that 25,000 troops should be there, it seems to me the more we should be relying on the ability of the Bosnians to defend themselves and to deter attacks and the ability of perhaps observers to ensure that violations are not taking place.

In Macedonia, where there is still so far a peace, we have, I believe it is, 2,500 lightly armed American observers who help—500,

excuse me, an even smaller number. And it really seems to me the wrong way to go into this is to say 25,000 American troops, that is the answer, now let's work out the details. It ought to be the other way around. Let's work out the details. Let's see what people are prepared to commit to and give, and then we will see what we will put in, and also let us not accept the proposition that if any peacekeepers go in, they have to be American peacekeepers. I repeat, there is a big difference. Americans become targets in the way that Norwegians and Malaysians and Pakistanis do not. And Americans, there is a great pressure on Americans to stay once they are there.

With all respect, Dr. Woodward has already talked about American credibility at stake, and we don't have a single peacekeeper on the ground. When we have 25,000 peacekeepers on the ground, the credibility argument is going to be a very valid argument no matter how bad it gets. So let's really think where we are going with Americans.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much.

Now, Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Because of the lack of time and because of the complexity of the issue, I find I may ask only two questions. I apologize to the two witnesses who will not be asked questions because I expect full and thorough answers. I will ask a question of General MacKenzie and Secretary Wolfowitz.

General MacKenzie, I want you to assume you are an American general that has been asked by the President of the United States to go into Bosnia with the troops allotted to you. I want you, General, to define the mission and the rules of engagement that you would require in order to fulfill this mission and to have a successful 1-year tour, which would be a peaceful tour.

Secretary Wolfowitz, I would ask you, you are the principal military adviser to the President, assume that, sir; regardless of your personal likes and dislikes, we are going to send ground troops in, is the assumption. And I want you to come forward with the objectives and the principles to be laid out for this purpose.

General MacKenzie.

General MACKENZIE. Sir, with all due respect, I should answer second. We get ourselves in too much trouble asking the generals to proceed first before I receive the political directions. So I will wait for the political direction here from the White House and then gladly respond to your question.

Mr. SKELTON. Not bad. Go ahead. [Laughter.]

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. You have left out an important detail, Congressman Skelton; that is, what is the agreement? Let me make some assumptions: that we have negotiated properly so that the Bosnians have a territory that is defensible, that represents not necessarily everything they would like but something where we can comfortably say to them this is a pretty good deal for you, you ought to stick with it, and we have agreement from our allies and the Russians that this arms embargo is going to come to an end. And I would say the mission of the American forces is to ensure particularly the safety of the Bosnian Government during the 1-year period that we are there. During that period we would be

training them, equipping them, and making it possible for them to defend themselves when they leave.

I would certainly not want a situation where we advertise to everybody that we are out of here in a year and nothing is going to be different at the end of that year, because I think that is just a formula for waiting until the Americans are gone and then starting the thing all over again. But that I think is a reasonable mission. Whether I need 25,000 troops for that or not would be an argument, but I suppose there is a certain safety in numbers.

I would tend on the whole to say their mission ought to be in the rear, in support of the Bosnians, who ought to have the principal responsibility for policing their own borders themselves, and that if there is observation required of those border areas, it had better be done by truly neutral troops than by heavily armed Americans.

Mr. SKELTON. General.

General MACKENZIE. I wouldn't be particularly happy with that direction, but I am assuming——

Mr. SKELTON. Pull the mike a little closer to you, please.

General MACKENZIE. I wouldn't be particularly happy with that agreement; however, I am a soldier responding to the Commander in Chief here present, so I do what I am told to do. And based on that agreement, it would be relatively simple because we have been talking here this afternoon about the Bosnian Government's ability to defend itself, and over the last month or so I think they have done a fairly good job. In fact, they have taken on some additional territory that they are now responsible for. So they have got themselves in fairly good shape.

I have said for years that Bosnia is infantry country. It is God-given to infantry, and the Bosnian Government outnumbers its adversaries significantly in infantry. And once they got them properly trained and equipped, they did a mighty fine job. So they are in a pretty good position to defend themselves.

However, if the coalition with Croatia falls apart, then naturally they are stuck in the middle of the sandwich again. So with that, there would be a requirement to bring in additional equipment to the Bosnian Army and to train them how to use it, which wouldn't take all that long.

In addition, one of the—I am loath to use the term "peacekeeping" because it has been so abused. But one of the responsibilities of the force between the belligerents, both in the Sinai and in eight other U.N. missions that I served in, was to maintain and enhance communications between the belligerents, and that can be done in all kinds of different ways, as simple as communications and radios on open frequencies and daily meetings and even bloody parties, anything to get these people together and have them talk and maintain communication and get them to know each other.

I mean, it is a little bit—there is a similarity with your own Civil War here. We are talking about general officers on all sides of the conflict that went to school with each other. These folks know each other. In fact, they are extremely close friends in some cases. It is a matter of getting them back under the same roof so they can talk to each other so when you do leave and many leave after you, this thing sticks.

So I think with that type of direction, it is really not a particularly difficult challenge. Rules of engagement, you can write rules of engagement in upper case letters and you can put it on two sides of an 8½ by 11 sheet of paper and cover it with plastic and hand it out to every one of your soldiers, which I have seen some nationalities try and do. But at some stage, the young corporal, the young lieutenant, has to make his decision on the ground in a split second. And you normally use minimum force, and everyone understands that.

In this particular case, with the mandate I am being handed, if you are siding with one side in the conflict and you are going to assist them in the defense of their borders, you don't need rules of engagement like that. You need to respond to any attack upon your position, and liberal interpretation of those rules of engagement means you can launch yourself and think deep. It is an American idea: Go deep after the targets.

There are no rules of engagement other than win when you are going in to take one side in the conflict.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you both very much.

Mr. BATEMAN. The next to question in the order in which, according to this list, they appeared in the committee room is Mr. Weldon, who would then be followed by Mr. Pickett.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for coming in today. I appreciate your testimony. You have helped to lay a foundation for us for tomorrow's hearings where we can get more involved in the specifics of what is being proposed here.

I can't help but reflect on a hearing I attended earlier this year with six of my colleagues as a part of the CSCE where we had Prime Minister Silajdzic in and he testified—and I would like, Mr. Chairman, without objection, to enter that testimony in the record at this point in time.

[The testimony follows:]

REMARKS BY
DR. HARIS SILAJDZIC
PRIME MINISTER
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Before
The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, 31 January 1995

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to appear before your Commission today under your new leadership. My government is grateful for the strong, consistent support that we have received from the U.S. Congress since our country's independence. In particular, we are grateful to your Commission for its constant vigilance in striving to ensure that the brutal aggression and atrocities committed against Bosnia and its people are both known and punished. We are also grateful to the entire Congress for its numerous votes to terminate the invalid and illegal arms embargo against our country. We are grateful for the passage of the law that terminated U.S. enforcement of the embargo. We are grateful for the passage of the laws that would enable our army to receive millions of dollars of vital military assistance from the United States upon termination of the embargo. And we are grateful to the Senators who, as one of their first acts in the new Congress, again sponsored legislation to end the embargo.

The crisis caused by Serbian aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina seems very complicated to many observers. However, its essence is not difficult to understand.

On one side is Serbian fascism, which is just a new form of communist totalitarianism. It is an expansionist fascism spreading from Serbia's borders, which Belgrade has decided are too small, through the conquest of Bosnian and Croatian territory.

On the other side is the legitimate Bosnian Government and people defending the integrity of their country and seeking to preserve its democratic character.

The fascist agenda of those who seek a Greater Serbia is to destroy Bosnia as an ethnically mixed community. But Bosnia never had any ethnically pure territories. No one could say: this piece of land is Serbian. In order to create such "ethnically pure" territories, the Serbian aggressor had to murder or expel non-Serbs, in particular Bosniaks and, to a lesser extent, Croats.

This could be achieved only by brutal methods, including the mass extermination of civilians. Fifty years after Auschwitz, concentration camps appeared in Bosnia. The whole world saw terrible scenes of those camps on its television screens.

The statistics of the war in Bosnia are staggering. More than 200,000 civilians have been killed, including more than 17,000 children. Over 400,000 people have been wounded. More than 2 million people have been expelled from their homes. And all of this has taken place in a small country, with a total population of only 4.3 million people).

War crimes and genocide in Bosnia continue even today. In Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica, Gorazde and Zepa, the Serbian aggressor continues to besiege over 600,000 people.

The hospitals, schools, and streets of these cities are constant artillery targets. People in these circumstances lack food, water and medicine. It sounds almost cynical that all these places have been declared "safe areas" and are under the so-called "protection" of the United Nations.

All the while, the world watches everything that has been happening on its television screens. It is, de facto, the public execution of a UN-member country and its people.

Can the international community do anything more than pass tens of resolutions on Bosnia that are not implemented? Can it do anything more than maintain an illegal and invalid arms embargo against a UN-member state under brutal attack? Can it do anything more than devise a Contact Group peace plan and allow it to languish for months on end with no hope of results?

The Contact Group and its Plan

Let me make clear that we are under no illusions about the Contact Group or its plan. The Group does not derive any strength from the authority of principle, justice, and order. Instead, *realpolitik* and pragmatism are the order of the day. Force, the one effective instrument of *realpolitik*, is not part of this order. The Contact Group is thus left with neither the authority of principle nor the leverage of force

That is why the Contact Group cannot take "no" for an answer. To do so would entail steps and measures that these governments are not prepared to undertake. This game -- a substitute for action -- could continue until the end of the Contact Group or until the last Bosnians are driven from their homes or killed.

The only beneficiaries of this process are the warlords in Belgrade and Pale, whose strategy of maintaining the status quo converges with the Contact Group's so-called "strategy of containment" of this conflict. The Serbian radicals know full well that containment, plus a "realistic approach" that takes into account the "realities on the ground," spell victory for them. All they have to do is to continue to say "no" in different ways. And, of course, the notion that giving Milosevic and Karadzic victory in Bosnia will serve the goal of containment is, of course, absurd. Is it not obscenely ironic that Western

governments are seeking to "contain" perpetrators of genocide by appeasing them, even as we mark the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz?

The Arms Embargo

Let me also make clear that we are also under no illusions about termination of the arms embargo. We, unlike some voices in Washington and Europe, understand that, in the absence of international will to confront Serbian aggression, ending the embargo offers the best chance for peace. For three years we have negotiated. We have signed one peace plan after another. We have endured delay after delay in action to end the embargo because yet another so-called "critical moment" in the negotiations had arrived. But why would the Serbs agree to any of these plans when they were being allowed to occupy seventy percent of Bosnia without consequences? The fact is that the Serbs have not paid any price for rejecting peace. Lifting the embargo is the only alternative for the diplomatic process and for our survival.

We are also under no illusions because we understand that, rather than Americanizing the war, ending the embargo would "Bosnianize" it. For the moment, because we cannot defend ourselves, the war is "Serbianized." We want our future to be put back into our own hands. We are not asking for U.S. ground troops to fight for us or with us. We only want to be able to defend ourselves. Furthermore, if the arms embargo is lifted, we are willing to agree to conditions on U.S. military assistance.

We understand that, while some countries have chosen to enforce this invalid embargo multilaterally, no country can escape the unilateral responsibility to oppose genocide and aggression.

We also understand that some countries may unilaterally decide to withdraw their United Nations troops from Bosnia. This decision is theirs to make, not ours. We will not prevent any UN troops from leaving. But we will work with countries that are willing to remain, to join, or even to increase their support for the mission. And we will work with the majority of non-governmental organizations that have decided to stay even if UNPROFOR forces withdraw.

We believe that the United States, as the leader of the free world, has the responsibility to work for solutions that are morally correct and consistent with international law. We understand that, if the United States leads by terminating the embargo, dozens of countries would follow suit immediately. Indeed, approximately one hundred UN-member states are already on record in support of Bosnia's inherent right to self-defense.

We must all understand that the embargo has resulted only in death and destruction and has helped the aggressor. We must all understand that those who argue that ending the embargo would lead the aggressor Serbian forces to overrun Bosnia fail to explain what is restraining the Serbs now. It is certainly not the hollow threat of pinprick

air strikes. We must also understand that these arguments are dangerously similar to those used to appease the Nazis half of century ago.

And we must understand that there is a fundamental flaw in the policy towards Bosnia pursued so far; it does not work. In order to change this course and chart a new one, we propose the following measures:

- That a meeting of the Contact Group be called at the Ministerial level.
- That a deadline be set for a definite and final answer from the Serbian side.
- That, if the Serbs accept the plan before the deadline, changes to the maps may be discussed, within the "51-49" percentage formula, for no longer than 30 days.
- That alterations of the map be made only by consensus and that, if consensus cannot be reached, the Contact Group map stands, as is.
- That, after this, negotiations about the constitutional arrangements, transitional arrangements, and international guarantees can be discussed.

We believe that this is an understandable and acceptable proposal. But the Contact Group must answer the question of what to do if the Pale Serbs reject the plan again.

In this case, our suggestions are:

That the measures contained in the Communiqué of the Ministerial meeting of the Contact Group issued on July 30, 1994, be reaffirmed. This means that measures envisioned in this Communiqué must be applied, including the tightening of economic sanctions, and the expansion and better protection of the safe areas - including by use of air-strikes. The communiqué provides for lifting the arms embargo as the last resort. In the absence of action by the international community to stop aggression and genocide in Bosnia, the recognition of the right of self-defense is the minimum that must be granted to the victims.

Finally, the Contact Group plan (including maps and ministerial communiqué) should be placed before the UN Security Council and adopted as a document of the Security Council.

Mr. WELDON. At that point in time at that hearing, he told us there were 220,000 civilians that had been killed, including more than 17,000 children. He talked about the extensive wounds, 400,000 people; 2 million people have been expelled from their homes—all this in a small country of less than 4.3 million people.

He went on to say:

> For 3 years, we have negotiated. We have signed one peace plan after another. We have endured delay after delay in action to end the embargo because yet another so-called critical moment in the negotiations has arrived.

Then later in his testimony he went on to say:

> We want our future to be put back into our own hands. We are not asking U.S. ground troops to fight for us or with us. We only want to be able to defend ourselves. Furthermore, if the arms embargo is lifted, we are willing to agree to preconditions on U.S. military assistance.

That was the Prime Minister speaking to Members of the Congress earlier this year. I think we should heed his advice in terms of his concerns.

Let me say that we haven't gotten to the cost. We will get into that issue tomorrow. At a time when this administration is asking us to cut defense spending to an all-time low, in fiscal year 1995 we will have spent in excess of $2.5 billion in funds for our so-called peacekeeping operations around the world. And if you look at what General Reimer recently said in a discussion of what the anticipated costs of this action will be, he expects it will be over $1 billion, and that figure has been supported by Secretary Perry. That has got to be a consideration—certainly not the top consideration, but it has got to be a consideration for this committee, if, in fact, we commit troops, how we are going to pay for it.

I note in your testimony, Dr. Woodward, that you specifically pointed out the possibility of our troops being based in Tuzla and mention that that is the one genuine case of multiethnic coexistence and moderate local leadership, which I agree with you on. I was interested to read in FBIS this morning that the mayor of Tuzla, who is probably one of the most respected leaders in that country, came out and said the peace plan will not succeed. In fact, Saleem Bezladjic in the Italian newspaper L'Espresso says "because Holbrooke's proposal would bring an apparent peace and not a permanent one." In fact, he goes on to say that "this is a false hope that we are creating for the countries in that region." And the reason I quote him is because you mentioned him in your testimony and his government there, which I agree with you on, as being one of the most stable in the region. So I do have concerns in that regard.

I am also concerned about neutrality, and that has been brought up repeatedly. Neutrality, especially in light of the comments made by Secretary Perry just last November:

> It would take hundreds of thousands of troops and probably significant casualties to impose the outcome we want—peace. That's a level of blood and treasure that is not commensurate with our national interests. Therefore, we're not about to enter the war as a combatant.

But that is precisely, in my opinion and in the opinion of many in this country, including Harry Summers, exactly what is going to occur.

Furthermore, Dr. Perry at his most recent meeting of NATO Defense Ministers said: "The U.S. is prepared to assist in the training and preparation of the Bosnian forces to achieve stability in that region," and went on to further state at that meeting that "we have estimated it would take perhaps 9 to 12 months to provide adequate training for the professionalization of the Bosnian Armed Forces." I hardly think that is going to be read as a neutral presence.

But I bring my one question to the table, because in the end we on this committee and Members of Congress have to decide whether we are going to support our President or not based on a very personal decision. The toughest decision I faced in the 9 years I have been here was whether or not to commit our troops to Desert Storm, and I know my colleagues anguished over that same decision. And many of us—and I will be doing that in the Balkans—this coming week will travel to the locations where we send our troops to maximize our support and our safety for their lives.

But in the end, we have to make that decision, and it comes down to a very fundamental decision. Would we send our children or our brothers and sisters into an operation of this kind? So I ask you, Dr. Woodward, putting aside all of the academic studies and all of the information that has been presented here today, would you vote to send your brother or sister or your son or daughter into this operation as it has currently been defined?

Ms. WOODWARD. I agree with you, Mr. Weldon, this would be a very difficult decision. My brother, daughter, sister, whatever, would be, however, in the U.S. Army by choice as a profession. We have a voluntary army. And the soldiers that I know on the ground have been really very proud of what they have been able to do in Bosnia thus far in a peacekeeping mandate, including the American soldiers I talked to in UNPRODEF in Macedonia. So my own view is, yes, depending, of course, on what they are going in to implement, and I think that the points you raise from both Prime Silajdzic and Mayor Bezladjic are very helpful in terms of identifying what we need to look for, namely, the idea of an engagement, troop deployment for which I would vote yes would be one which is a large package which I hear being developed now largely by the negotiating in team, but in part by the London Conference that Britain and France have called for next week on the operational side of this. It is a large package that has incorporated American soldiers into a large peacekeeping operation. They will not be separable targets the way I think my colleagues suggest that they will be. We know already that there will be other soldiers, for example, probably the Dutch, incorporated in their units.

Second, and most importantly, in terms of Mayor Bezladjic's concerns, it will be a peace plan that aims not to end all of the political conflicts over the constitution of Bosnia and what it will look like, but a package that aims to shift the fighting from borders, and maybe even the very, very small borders of the Bosnians without Croatian support would end having now, if we follow the alternative idea of arming and leaving it to a defense, but a conflict which would be shifted to elections, shifted to drawing borders for electoral districts, shifted to a reconstruction package for the entire region that would get people back earning a living and supporting

exactly what Mayor Bezladjic has been trying to do all along, and even Prime Minister Silajdzic, more recently since that speech that you heard him for the CSCE group, this summer, you may well remember, he resigned and then he was asked by Izetbegovic to revoke his resignation for the short term. Why did he resign? Because of a major quarrel within the government over demobilization of many troops, over revival of production because they are hurting badly, both in terms of armaments but food and other production. The Saudis aren't paying them what they were used to, and they need to revive themselves over trying to shift from military dominance in the government to civilian dominance, a reduction of the executive strength toward the parliament—all of the things that say that even Silajdzic himself has now decided that their goals can be better accomplished with a political and peaceful means than war and that if we send in not our forces to fight a war for them against hostile borders and for a smaller Bosnia, but to put this package of moving in the direction of reconstruction and rehabilitation, I think the Bosnian Government has the best chance of winning.

Mr. BATEMAN. The next on the list, I am corrected, is my colleague from Virginia, Mr. Sisisky.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank all of the panel for their wonderful testimony today. It certainly raised a lot of questions in my mind, and as a personal thing, I would say to Richard Perle that I believe you are not an isolationist, and I have heard you in forums for a number of years, in Europe, fighting this same battle of challenging the Europeans. And I have done the same thing in the North Atlantic Assembly to challenge the Europeans.

But I have come to the conclusion that if we believe in NATO and we believe in the American leadership in NATO, this is a decisive moment for NATO that we haven't mentioned today. I think our leadership perhaps is at stake. And I think the first question that I would ask, do you really believe that we have a national interest in solving the problem in the Balkans? Because if we do, then there is no question that we have to show the leadership. And why 25,000 troops? I think they have explained why they want 25,000. They want it at a division level where the American troops can protect American troops and do not have to depend on anybody else to defend them. The 5,000 would be in the air and at the ports and other places, as I understand.

But the other thing that I have learned in the European arena is that there is no simple answer to the problem. There are risks. I think we learned something in Somalia, and what we learned in this peacekeeping era—and I think Mr. Dellums really explained it right. When the Berlin Wall fell, then we had different missions, peacekeeping, peace enforcement. We didn't know what we were doing. We tried, I remember the amendments that I tried to get to have just a simple U.N. command and control, to teach the United Nations how to command. It failed, I think by five votes on the floor, and that is fine. But we are learning. And we learned in Somalia that we can't change the mission. We changed the mission. We went after somebody. And I think if we learn that lesson, then perhaps the risk may be worth it.

Now, I notice in the testimony by Mr. Wolfowitz, and I think Mr. Perle, too, concerning the lifting of the embargo. The mistake was made years ago when we said we would never put American troops, and we put the embargo in. And that was done, and that is fine. But I think if you believe in lifting the embargo, then you do believe in the American presence.

General MacKenzie, tell me if I am wrong. If we lifted the embargo, the British and the French said that they would leave. Is that a fair assumption, that they would leave? And if they left, then we committed ourselves to put American ground troops on the ground to protect the withdrawal? I believe that was part of the deal.

General MACKENZIE. That is correct.

Mr. SISISKY. And once we did that, then we Americanize the whole area. It was America then. So I don't really have a question, but I would just ask you, General, am I right? If we lifted the embargo, then we would Americanize it because we would have to have ground troops for the withdrawal?

General MACKENZIE. Absolutely, and you committed yourself to that, sir.

Mr. SISISKY. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BATEMAN. Next, Mr. Cunningham.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is always amazing to me to listen to bean counters talk about how we should employ troops and how we shouldn't. And I come at it more from the kids on the ground, the men and the women, I think like General MacKenzie does, on what is going to happen to them. Most of the bean counters have never had their donkey on the front line or do they have to pay for it. But yet it is nice to sit back and give analysis. And I come at it from a little different perspective.

First of all, the billions of dollars that this is going to cost, where are you going to—are you going to take it out of AmeriCorps? Are you going to take it out of children's nutrition? Where is it going to come from?

The administration has cut defense $177 billion, and because of the involvement in Somalia, the extension of it, it cost billions of dollars. We lost a lot of Rangers there, and I say that in lieu that we lost—and I didn't like our Marines in Lebanon having to sit there and the policy taking a pounding there either. But then we ended up running with our tails between our legs out of Somalia. We had to be guarded as we left Somalia.

And what would happen in Haiti today if we tried to pull out of Haiti? The good that we did, the long-term policy, not going to last, and I think we can stay there until, you know, the Moon goes away, and the same thing. And now we are talking about getting into Bosnia? It is Afghanistan with trees.

The effective ability of ground troops to stop these kinds of things is ridiculous. I don't know if you saw William Wallace, the movie about the Scots and where the English tried to—they thought that, well, the Irish were going to fight against the Scots, and you saw what happened in that. And Mr. Dellums says we—you know, there are no historians here or—not historians, but one that holds the expertise. But if you look at history, I have talked

to the Greeks and I have talked to the Russians. They support the Serbs. Why? Because the Serbs fought against the Nazis in World War II. The Croatians fought and the ethnic cleansing that went on against the Serbs rivaled Dachau. And they are not going to forget that.

The fundamentalist Muslims in Israel don't want peace. They want to do away with Israel. The leadership, not the people, the Croatian people or the Muslims, but the leadership wants power, both in the economy and religion. And I believe what General MacKenzie says, that they are going to stage and kill American troops and stage it. It is going to happen.

I gave my personal opinion and wrote articles of what was going to happen if you bombed. You are going to kill as many Muslims and Croatians as you possibly can. They are going to handcuff the peacekeepers to the thing. They are going to move their artillery in, and that is exactly what happened. You got a lot of people killed. And I guarantee you that is what is going to happen. You are going to limit the force of air power when you put those troops in there, because you can't hit the targets that you really want to.

Now, it is just amazing to me that we are even considering doing this. We say we want to balance the budget; we want to do a lot of things. France is the arms whore of the world. They sell—in any battle that I would ever fight in, I am looking at magic Matras. I am looking at arms going to, you know, anybody that wants to buy them. And they say that there is not enough forces. Why are we having to pay all the bills in this thing? It is a European problem, and let Europe pay for it. It doesn't mean that we can't take a leadership role. It doesn't mean we can't participate. But I'll be damned if I want to put 25,000 of our kids there, and the same thing happened in Vietnam where they put us in there and they wouldn't give us the wherewithal and the support, and the rules and regulations kept us from doing our job. The same thing as happened in Lebanon and the same thing that happened in Somalia.

For the administration to put us in such a lack of readiness—$200 billion below the bottoms-up review, and how are we going to pay for this? Are we going to take it out of DOD? Are you going to take more airplanes? Are you going to take Seawolf? Are you going to take comforts away from the military when you are $200 billion below the bottoms-up review? That is why I think that some of your testimony is flawed, because the kids who are going to be asked to do this are going to die. And, dammit, enough is enough.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BATEMAN. The next on the list is Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the whole panel for being here, but in particular I want to thank General MacKenzie. General, I hope I have not discredited you by quoting you so often, but in your testimony before this committee a couple of years ago, I was absolutely riveted by your total disgust with the situation there. And maybe I read you wrong, but I certainly understood you to say that we should not get involved.

Just today at lunchtime, I was telling an American three-star of your closing remarks about—and I am going to paraphrase—you basically have three serial killers. One has killed 15, one has killed

10, and one has killed 5. And you didn't see the wisdom of rushing to the defense of the guy who had only killed 5.

Do you still feel that way?

General MACKENZIE. That is a good question, sir. I have had a number of ethics experts tell me that that is an equivalency accusation of all three sides in the conflict. It wasn't meant so. I have stated in every presentation I have made—and they are in the hundreds now—that the majority of the blame rests on one side. But I am the only guy that walked down the street in Toronto and was embraced by a Serb who said, "General MacKenzie, God bless you for being objective." And I said, "Hold it just a second. You know, I do blame you for 60, 65 percent of what's going on over there." And he said, "We can live with that—65, we can live with that."

So it is merely my disgust with the way, based on what I have seen, the way it has been portrayed as a strictly black and white situation. I have said many times that the cease-fires that the Bosnian Government broke which I negotiated, I would have done the same thing in their position. It is just that they were threatening my mandate, our U.N. mandate at that moment in time. It wasn't our job within the United Nations to go back and assess what caused this thing to start. It was merely dealing with it moment to moment through a very, very confusing period. Where most peacekeeping missions from the United Nations received two to three mandates, it is now over 80 for Bosnia. And there have been some really despicable things done, like even the wording of the mandate changed to fit the resources rather than the other way around.

So, yes, I am still frustrated. I still think the Bosnian Government and its people are the primary victims. But I don't think that killing a lot of people and putting 400,000 folks on the road as refugees is the way to solve it.

Mr. TAYLOR. General, I thought I heard you say—correct me if I am wrong—that either you or your troops had responded to a massacre, apparently got there too late to do anything about it, but you were there in time to ask some of the perpetrators of the crime why they did it. If I recall, they said or you said for them that this makes up for what they did at the battle of—whatever. And then in doing some research, you discovered that that battle took place in about the year 1300.

Getting to the statement that we could send Americans in there—am I fairly correct in that paraphrase?

General MACKENZIE. Yes.

Mr. TAYLOR. Getting to the statement that we could send Americans in there in that, as Ms. Woodward says, they are all sick of this war, what are the chances that the Serbs just want a breather? And what are the chances that 1 year from now, 2 or 3 years from now they will just go right back at it as soon as the Americans leave? I mean, after all, Tito kept a relative peace for about 50 years. And almost as soon as he was gone, they made up for a battle that took place in the year 1300 or so.

We will hopefully have to vote on this. I think it is very important that Congress vote on this. I am curious if you still think that it would be foolish for the United States to get involved.

General MACKENZIE. Yes; I don't give Tito that much credit. I give communism the credit. When communism went, then the thing started to fall apart, sure.

It has taken 40-plus years to get the folks to sit around the table in the Middle East and start to live up to some of their promises. It has taken 30-plus in Northern Ireland. These things take time. They have done some really horrible things to each other, no matter who is to blame, and, therefore, you probably are going to need a military presence on the ground to create the conditions where they can start meeting again at the local level, not just in Helsinki and Geneva and Lisbon, but at the local level. And a peacekeeping force—and I am using that in its umbrella definition—provides that opportunity, but we did start doing that in Cyprus in 1965, and we are still there. And there has been a major intervention in the meantime in 1974 by Turkey.

So it is not something that happens overnight. And, quite frankly, I think your country and my country like to solve these things overnight. I don't think we have the endurance for the long long-term commitment which it is going to take. And to think that you can go in there for a year and then leave—I have heard Somalia mentioned here. Let me remind you that the U.N.-led coalition force that went into Somalia was a magnificent success. Magnificent success. Eradicated starvation, reestablished law and order. It was when—because you went with more than you needed. People laughed because the journalists were on the beach. Soldiers love that. If the journalists are there first, then that means the enemy has disappeared because you are going with more than you need. That is just fine.

It fell apart when the United Nations, with your participation within the Security Council, was incapable of taking over from the U.S.-led coalition force and you were asked to leave a brigade behind to give them some combat power. And you said, yes, we will do that, but we won't put it under U.N. command. And that was the beginning of the slippery slope.

But the coalition chapter 7 operation was a magnificent success and shouldn't be forgotten. If you are—I don't want to talk numbers, but if you are going to commit yourself to Bosnia, then go with more than you need.

Mr. TAYLOR. Which is?

General MACKENZIE. Damn the expense. I don't know yet, sir, because I don't know what the plan is.

This isn't a game I am playing. I mean, it could be to establish a fairly wide demilitarized zone. It could be just to man a cease-fire line. Right there I am talking about 5, 6, 700 hundred percentage difference in the number of soldiers you need. I don't know what Mr. Holbrooke is brokering over there.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, just one quick followup.

I will make my first trip to that part of the world this weekend. I have never seen it. Is it reasonable to expect that you could define a demilitarized zone in that part of the world? I have heard the terrain is such that that is just not feasible.

General MACKENZIE. Well, we did it in Vietnam. You know, I was there as part of Henry Kissinger's International Commission of Control, and Supervision Force after the Paris peace accord, and

we maintained separation of forces there—not terribly successfully, but we did it for about a year until all the prisoners were exchanged, et cetera. So, yes, you can do it, but it eats up troops. There is no doubt about it. Bosnia eats up troops. But, you know, as has been discussed I think by every witness here today, it depends where those borders are drawn. And, quite frankly, based on the negotiations I have had with all sides in the conflict, which used to start with the Battle of Kosovo in the 14th century every day, it is not going to be decided in the next couple of weeks where the lines on the map are. That is going to be a very long process.

I have a sickening feeling in the pit of my stomach that probably if these things unfold like they do in the U.N. peacekeeping operations, soldiers will be on the ground before the mandate has been fully put to print and fully agreed by all sides. Even though I know you have a promise from your President you won't do it until an implementable plan has been signed, I think troops will—because a lot of the troops, some of the troops will be converted from the U.N. troops that are on the ground right now. They will take off their blue berets and stay under a chapter 7 U.N. resolution.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BATEMAN. With that, we must move on to Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

For a moment, I would like to consider our actions in a broader context. If we look back through history, we see a propensity for controversy in this area to expand this largely here I think that World War I started, and it is not uninvolved in World War II. What are the odds that if we don't do something, this conflict will expand to Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey to the south and who knows where to the north? If it expanded there, clearly there is the real probability that our vital national interests would be at stake.

In this broader context where our national vital interests would like be at risk, is what is being proposed now what we ought to be doing, or is there something better that we should now be doing?

Mr. PERLE. Well, if I can take a crack at this, I believe that what we should now be doing is trying to fashion a settlement that can be defended by the participants in the settlement, a settlement that permits a viable Bosnia to emerge from the negotiating table, a Bosnia that the Bosnians themselves can defend. That I believe is the best hope for stability.

A settlement that depends on significant and sustained outside intervention is bound to be an unstable settlement, and I don't know how we withdraw from that situation.

General MacKenzie referred to Vietnam in passing. I would hate to see a settlement as unstable, as precarious, and as ephemeral as the Vietnam settlement for which Nobel Prizes were awarded, but with resulted not very long thereafter in the destruction of South Vietnam. And I would hate to think that we went into Bosnia to police for a short interval an arrangement that after our withdrawal would eventuate in the destruction of that state because it was unable to defend itself after our departure. So I think the emphasis should be put on the quality of the agreement, on the

stability of the agreement, on the viability of the state that emerges from it, and on the ability of that state to defend itself.

Mr. BARTLETT. Do you agree that Bosnia is fundamentally different from Somalia, that never in any likely contingency we would have our vital national interests at risk in Somalia? Do you agree that there are contingencies under which our vital national interests could be at risk in the Balkans, and that we need to do something that the only argument is what should we be doing?

Mr. PERLE. Yes; I believe that we do have important interests in Bosnia, and but for that reason, the right course for the United States was to end American participation in an embargo that had seemed to me guaranteed that the war would continue, because one side was left incapable of defending itself. And so what we have seen since that war broke out is Bosnia incapable of defending itself, attacked and dismembered by Serb forces. The Bosnians were unwilling ultimately to surrender what was left of their country, and the Serbs were not prepared for peace under those circumstances because they wanted more.

What has happened more recently is that the military balance has improved a little bit in favor of the Bosnians with help from NATO in the form of air strikes. And now you see a greater willingness on the part of the Serbs to come to an agreement because their military gains have put at risk and in some cases actually reversed.

The conclusion I draw from this is precisely the opposite of the conclusion that Dr. Woodward came to, which is that a balance of power is, in fact, vital to the stability of any long-term arrangement. Whatever the short-term intervention of the United States or others, it won't last in the long term unless there is a balance, unless it is a peace that can be defended. And that is why I worry greatly about our going in for a relatively short period of time and then leaving with the situation still potentially precarious, because I think the fighting will resume again.

While I agree with Congressman Dellums that the parties are tired, exhausted, tired of the killing, they will, I am afraid, find a second breath once there has been an interval of relative calm.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Ms. WOODWARD. Mr. Bartlett, I wonder if I could just add quickly, just in terms of your historical analogies, World War I occurred because outside powers became entangled in the local conflict taking sides.

Mr. BARTLETT. Which is what we are about to do.

Ms. WOODWARD. Which is what we are about to do. If we don't do this IFOR business, if we do what my colleagues are suggesting to support the Bosnian Government at war. And, second, World War II occurred when rightwing forces throughout central Europe began to use irredentist claims and political instability to further war. We are also, in the sense of the southern Balkans and what has not yet happened, likely to do that. Whereas, if we followed the strategy of going in impartially, stopping the war, finding ways to a constitutional and political and economic means to reknit Bosnia together, not military means, we have a chance of escaping history. But we have to do it the right way.

The United States can go in for 12 months as a part of a larger force, agree with our allies that we are only there for 12 months and they will stay longer in the way that, for example, the Swedes and the Nordics are perfectly happy to do because they recognize the consequences for Europe. We have agreed to it before, but we could do that. It doesn't have to collapse. But I do think the idea that somehow you have a balance of forces among three separate armies and call it one country isn't my notion of a country.

Mr. BARTLETT. I think the only argument—and my time is up—is that many doubt that we could, in fact, go in perceived to be neutral. I think that is the real question now, that nobody is going to believe we are neutral after our behavior for the past several months.

Thank you very much.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Can I just say, at least speaking for my own view, the goal is not to support the Bosnians in war. It is to support them in peace, but a peace that has got defensible borders and their ability to defend themselves. And that is a reasonable goal.

Mr. BATEMAN. The next to be recognized is Mr. McKeon.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have really learned a lot from this today. I really appreciate you being here on the panel. This is not an easy problem, as we can see.

I would like to follow on Mr. Weldon's question that Dr. Woodward was able to answer. I didn't hear from the other three. I have children of the age that would be going there and nephews of the age that would be going over there, and I would like to know what your opinion would be. Would you be willing or be comfortable with sending your own children over there at this time?

Mr. PERLE. Well, I think it depends on what it is they are sent there to do and the nature of the peace they are there to enforce or protect.

If what ends up being negotiated is a settlement in which Bosnia is reduced to an ethnically cleansed ghetto, then I would not want to see my son risk his life to defend that outcome, because I think it is a profoundly immoral outcome. So quite apart from the extent to which he would be in jeopardy, I wouldn't wish to see him associated with defending that kind of a settlement.

If what emerges is a country that has the potential to survive and if he is there for a brief period, among other things, to assist that government so that it can survive by developing its own ability to defend itself, then that seems to me a worthwhile mission. So everything depends on what it is they are there to do and what the settlement looks like. And we don't know yet.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I agree with everything Mr. Perle said. I would say that if my son or if I had to explain to American parents why their kids were there, I would hate to be in a position of saying they are there because we refuse to give other people the means to defend themselves and to fight instead. And it seems one of the perversities of this embargo, apart from the fact that it is immoral, is it keeps requiring international peacekeepers to do what the Bosnians are perfectly ready to do for themselves and should be allowed to do for themselves. And it is pretty hard for me to defend sending Americans, American kids, to fulfill that role.

On the other hand, I think if we are really talking about performing a role that really brings about a stable, enduring peace, not something that just erupts again in war as soon as the Americans leave, I think we are doing something that does contribute in the long run to peace in an absolutely critical part of the world, which is to say the continent of Europe, where if we can contain conflict at a lower level like this, there is much less chance that many, many more Americans will die in a much bigger war. That, it seems to me, is something that is worth taking the risk for. But it puts an enormous burden, I think, particularly on the administration to explain that this peacekeeping force is, No. 1, really essential to achieving that result, and, No. 2, actually is going to make the result better rather than worse.

Part of my concern is that it allows people to paper over problems instead of dealing with them, that it ties the hands of peace enforcers, particularly airpower, and that it actually will be one of the arguments once again why the arms embargo can't be lifted, because it would endanger the peacekeepers. All of that is really perverse.

Mr. McKEON. General MacKenzie, you indicated that we are already perceived over there as having taken sides and our troops would be targets. And I don't know how you protect them. You have indicated it would be easy to attack them.

General MACKENZIE. Yes; and I threw it out from a military perspective because, quite frankly, your troops are quite capable of defending themselves. There is not going to be mass slaughter over there. We are talking about incidents, as in Mogadishu, where, let's face it, in Mogadishu it wasn't just General Aideed killing your soldiers. The other warlords were killing them, too, and making it look like General Aideed because then you would go after General Aideed. I mean, it is the oldest trick in the book, and it works in Bosnia, too. But that is not one of the key reasons why. Your leadership and your NCO's and your officers have looked after your soldiers.

I would add to the comments that have been made, though, after eight—actually eight U.N. missions and a non-U.N. mission in Vietnam, I have yet to have proceeded on any of these missions knowing what my objective was.

Mr. McKEON. That is one thing that really scares me when you say—and I think history shows this—that we will have troops there before anything is decided, and then they will be the ones that are out there. And I think that is what we need to keep in mind, that that could be our sons or our daughters.

General MACKENZIE. This marvelous diplomatic initiative which you are heading up now internationally, the temptation will be for the whole thing to slow down after the troops get on the ground. The diplomats really do tend to disappear, and all the horsepower that has been expended to try and find a solution disappears.

With all due respect to Cyrus Vance, who brokered the initial UNPROFOR program mandate, I mean, it was a paragraph saying things like deployment locations, percentages of police force, percentages of local counsel, et cetera. All these things were technical issues to be worked out on the ground by the U.N. commander. Well, those technical issues were all the issues, and they will be,

I would suggest, under any agreement. It is going to take a lot of time to sort all this out. And if the soldiers can make a contribution by keeping the people away from each other's throats while that is going on, fine. But not to go in, deploy, and have the diplomatic full-court press sort of evaporate.

Mr. McKEON. Well, I have just heard so many times, as you talked today, the talk of going into other nations, and I remember the same discussions on Vietnam, the domino theory. We are just not using that word. But I had occasion to go with the chairman and other members of this committee earlier this year to Vietnam, and I remember when we landed, I made the comment, How could we possibly lose a war here? You know, as we were taxiing, I saw people out cultivating their fields with oxen. And one of the other member's comment was why would we want to fight a war here.

I think this is something we really need to keep in mind as we move forward in this.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you. And next on the list is Mr. Longley—excuse me, I am in error. It is Mr. Thornberry, then followed by Mr. Longley.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me follow up on the last comment. I guess we have talked around it today, and maybe we have got as good answers as exist. But, Mr. Perle, can you articulate for me what is the vital U.S. interests here that justify risking the lives of young American men and women?

Mr. PERLE. I am always a little uncomfortable with the word "vital" before the word "interest." Because if you take it literally, it suggests that the interests are of such a nature that our very survival depends on them, and I don't think that is the case in the Balkans, although I think we do have an interest—in fact, I think we have several interests there. One is in seeing this war brought to an end because the longer it goes on, the greater risk that it will spread, and it could spread in unpredictable ways involving a general Balkan war and perhaps drawing NATO allies in. That is always a danger.

I think we have an interest in resisting, by giving appropriate assistance, a situation where an independent state and member of the United Nations is attacked and dismembered in front of our eyes and done so in the most brutal imaginable way with death and destruction that sometimes has entailed something close to genocide. And for us to remain indifferent to that I think diminishes us, politically, morally. So I think we have an interest, if we can, in stopping that.

One way to do it is to permit the side that is the victim to defend itself, and that is why from its inception I have opposed the embargo that we have imposed.

I also think we have an interest in not allowing the perception to develop that we were indifferent because the victims of this aggression happened to be Muslims, or largely Muslims. Of all the ways in which this world could become an even more dangerous place, a holy war between the Islamic world and the non-Islamic world is among the most alarming. And there is no doubt the fact that the victims are Muslim are being exploited by radical Islamic

leaders who would like to create an insurmountable gulf between the world of Islam and the rest. And I think that is terribly dangerous.

So I think we have some important interests in bringing this to an honorable conclusion. An honorable conclusion means a peace that lasts and a peace that can be defended by the Bosnians themselves. To continue the dependency the embargo has contributed to will put this country, I think, in an impossible situation. Once we are there, all of the arguments that are now being made for why the price will be very high if we fail to go will be even more forceful if we leave at a moment when our leaving will lead to a collapse. So we could be there for a very long time, and I think it is far wiser to build a structure that can be defended by the Bosnians themselves.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, that is exactly one of my primary concerns. When Dr. Woodward says this is not a part of the world where equilibrium is generated from within, she seems to be saying something similar to what Dr. Kissinger said in a recent newspaper article, which is basically the only way Bosnia has been successfully governed is by some strong outside force, whether it was the Ottomans, the Hapsburgs, or Tito. And so I have got the concern of how do we ever see an end to this. Maybe U.S. troops go in for 12 months and everybody understands we are only going to stay there 12 months and then we are going to end. But I agree with you that I think we are going to hear the same sorts of arguments that we have heard here today: no vital U.S. leadership is at stake in NATO and we cannot afford to get out.

That is why, as important as U.S. credibility is, I think it is essential for us to think about these questions before we go in rather than after our troops are already there.

Ms. WOODWARD. I might say that Kissinger is fully right in that case, and there is now a new world out there of European integration that eventually will solve the problems of the Balkans if we can start that process with political normalization rather than war. Bosnia needs an overarching structure, but it doesn't need one that is dictatorial.

Mr. PERLE. Could I add one very small point? I think it is a mistake to think that American credibility can only be achieved by the dispatch of 25,000 American ground forces. There are things we can do better than anyone else. We can provide logistic support better than anyone else. In fact, there is really no one else who can do it. We can better provide logistic support to the Europeans than they can provide for themselves within Europe. We can provide intelligence better than anyone else, or at least intelligence of certain critical kinds.

There are other things that we can do better than anyone else, and there are things that others can do better than we. And an appropriate American role, an effective American role, an appropriate division of labor, that is what will lead to American credibility, not simply the notion that it is either 25,000 Americans or we lose our credibility. And I hope you will ferret out in your deliberations the origin of this notion that the appropriate American role is 25,000 Americans.

I haven't the slightest idea where it came from, but I think the number preceded any plan. And I think it goes back a year or more. And these things take on a life of their own if you are not careful. But whoever said that it had to be 25,000 Americans?

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Longley is next.

Mr. LONGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolfowitz, I was struck by your comment that our objective wasn't to support the Bosnians in war but to support them in peace, and it kind of parallels what Dr. Perle has also been saying or the theme that you seem to keep coming back to, which is that we need to be partial to the Bosnians, that we need to be rearming them or lifting the embargo or making it possible for them to arm themselves. And I am having a great deal of difficulty understanding why it is in our national interest to be partial to any one side in the conflict. Am I missing something or could you explain?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. It doesn't mean taking their side 100 percent or taking their side no matter how they define their objectives. But Bosnia is the victim of international aggression. It is the victim of horrible brutal crimes and ethnic cleansing, and it is a country that I think has a right to exist. For the reasons that Mr. Perle said, it is a country that in the Muslim—it is very important for our interests in the Muslim world that it have that right to exist. And I think, furthermore, it is very much in our interest to see that the kind of aggression that Milosevic and his colleagues have perpetrated is seen as not a winner in Europe, because if it is seen as a winner, there are a lot of other people who will continue it.

It is not that we have an unlimited commitment to the Bosnians, and let me say clearly I don't believe that it is in our interest to support them in controlling all of the territory of former Bosnia. In fact, if there is going to be a peace here—and let's say it; it is not terribly nice, but it is going to be based on partition. It is not going to be based on going to some—having the United Nations replace the Hapsburgs or the Ottomans or Tito and ruling all of Bosnia. It is basically partition. And as nice as it is to talk about a reintegration of Bosnia, it seems to me that is going to be a very long time in coming, and it is only going to come after they somewhat peacefully agree on the separation.

But within that separation, it is in our interest, I believe, to have the Bosnians be able to defend themselves, particularly because the alternative is there is going to be repeated pressure for the international community to defend them instead. And every time that comes up, the argument is going to be made American credibility is on the line if we don't go in there and do it.

Mr. LONGLEY. Given the fact that they appear to be currently on the offensive, in fact, it seems to me that any talk that there is a cease-fire is maybe largely a creation of the media as opposed to the reality of the battlefield. Given the fact that they appear to be on the offensive now, how can you justify adding more arms into an already violent situation? I mean, it seems to me—isn't it a question of degree? In other words, protecting their right to exist would seem to me to be separate and apart from the idea of building them up to be a separate political and military entity in an already overwhelmingly violent area.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, first of all, I think a critical objective of these peace negotiations ought to be to produce some borders that are reasonable that leave Bosnia with defensible borders and a viable territory, which I don't think, by the way, they have at the moment. It would be much better if that were negotiated than if it is achieved by conquest. But it is kind of ironic to me that, for the last 3 years, a major argument against giving them the right that they have under the U.N. Charter, the right of self-defense, has been withheld on the grounds that during the period in which they would be receiving this equipment, they would be vulnerable to an onslaught from the Serbs. Now it turns out that it is the Serbs who are worried about an onslaught from the Bosnians, and now the argument is being turned around: Well, we can't give them the means to defend themselves because they are too strong.

I think if we equip them—and I would like to see us participate in equipping them—it ought to be with some political conditions, and that includes to begin with a map that gives some reasonable description of what they can reasonably be entitled to. It also includes, I think, some conditions that we would be in a very good position to negotiate about how they deal with their own minorities, because there are Serbs still in Bosnia, 15 percent, there are Croats in Bosnia. There is a lot that we could ask for, I think, in return for that, and it would in itself contribute to stability. We deny ourselves a real instrument of influence over this government because the only arms they get come from people like the Iranians who don't put any conditions on it at all.

Mr. LONGLEY. I would like to shift gears, and, Mr. Chairman, with unanimous consent, I have one more question that may push my time a little bit. But, General MacKenzie, I visited Macedonia in April. I also served in Desert Storm, and given the discussions about the backdrop of Beirut and Somalia—in fact, two young men from my State were buried as a result of our action in Somalia, and I am very sensitive to the issue that you raise relative to the perception of the problems of casualties.

But in August, I also performed 10 days of voluntary duty with the NATO staff, and I was struck by the fact—and this is in distinction to the comments that have been made by Mr. Wolfowitz. I was struck by the fact that it appears to be the unanimous consent of the military officers involved that there is enough wrongdoing on all sides to go around, more than enough to go around, and, in fact, that many of the incidents that have take place in Sarajevo and elsewhere in terms of the more prominent violations of the cease-fire have, in fact, possibly been a result of Bosnian action as much as Serbian action.

Could you comment on that? In fact, I will give you one specific. I am advised that the French did a study——

Mr. BATEMAN. I think the gentleman takes the point, and in the interest of others, I think——

Mr. LONGLEY. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General MACKENZIE. I am often held up as the guy that said unequivocally that these things are going on, and if you read what I wrote and listen to what I said, in fact, there have been a significant number of incidents where there has been a lot of doubt as to who is responsible. The only empirical evidence that has alleg-

edly been provided are on the more recent incidents in Sarajevo where, according to friends in low places, there are some reports that say unequivocally that the various bombs did not come from the Serbian areas; therefore, by deduction, they came from somewhere else.

The problem is that people tend to jump on the bandwagon that, therefore, it was a matter of policy that the Bosnian Government did that or a matter of policy that the Bosnian Army did it. There are thugs, goons, drunks, and, most of all, black marketeers running around in that country that make a hell of a lot of money out of this war, and it is in their interest to keep the thing going. And a bomb here or there in Sarajevo does not necessarily have a political implication to it. It has a self-interest and selfish interest, depending on who fired it.

So even if some of this stuff was fired not from the Serb area—and it would appear that could well be the case—it doesn't necessarily mean it was a matter of Bosnian Government policy.

Is there enough blame to go around? Yes, there is a lot of blame to go around. That happens when a war starts. Even today, hearing about aggression, yes, there is aggression. When I left Bosnia in the summer of 1992, there were probably more Croatian regular troops—in fact, they were bragging about being on Mount Igman and taking my picture as I walked across the airfield—in Bosnia than there were Serb regular troops, because most of the Serb regular troops had taken their uniforms off because they were born in Bosnia and put Bosnian Army uniform patches up. So it got a little complicated to figure out who was who in the playlets that were going on around.

However, you know, the Bosnian Government, rightly or wrongly, had a flag flying in front of the United Nations, and there was a modest little force sitting in downtown Sarajevo that had the audacity—and it was a dumb mistake that I made. We should never have called ourselves UNPROFOR, because that was the name of the force in Croatia, protecting the people in the United Nations-protected area. So the expectations were that—it started with 16 and grew to 1,200 while I was there—the force was there to protect Sarajevo when it was there to actually run an airport. But that started the whole perception and developed the expectation that the United Nations was going to solve the problems of Bosnia. No way, and not even with the 29,000 they have now.

It has got to start at a conference table somewhere like your folks have been doing, quite successfully, and then the military gets its direction, and then it contributes to the process. It doesn't start at—that is the trouble. Generals have been trying to sort the thing out in downtown Sarajevo for the last 3 years.

Mr. LONGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Longley.

Mr. Tanner.

Mr. TANNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the panel and apologize for being late today. I do want to thank you all for being here.

This is a very, very difficult situation at best, particularly if we are called upon to cast a vote. And I assume that we will be. General MacKenzie just alluded to it. When you have as a given, at

least I think the perception of the American people as a given is that there are no "good guys," that this is basically a longstanding ethnic, religious, racial, whatever adjective you want to put to it, civil war in the Balkans. I am having trouble—and maybe you all can help. I think that it is absolutely imperative that before we commit ground troops that we have a definitive, realistic military mission, with some subsets under that about how the United Nations will interact with NATO as it applies to defining that military mission. Where will the political direction for the military operation emanate? Will it be from the United States, the United Nations, from NATO, from who? And how long will this policy direction be in place? And, finally, how do we define conditions for withdrawal? How do we define conditions to let people know on the front end when we have succeeded, when we have won?

I was in the Navy during the Vietnam war, and I have become convinced over time that this Nation can ill afford to send troops anywhere without the popular support of the American people to sustain ourselves to some conclusion. We never had that. We have had two instances, really incidents, in the post-cold war—I call it the gulf war syndrome—in which we were able to define a military mission, that is, kick Saddam out of Kuwait. We had a definite ending point. Some would argue whether or not we ended too soon. But there was a condition for our withdrawal that we could meet, and we had a realistic military mission. That worked very well in connection with the international community, I think we would all agree.

Then we come along in 1993 with Somalia. We go in with an ill-defined mission to keep people from starving or some other esoteric goodwill, I mean the noblest of purposes, but it really wasn't a well-defined military mission. We had some soldiers killed, and we came back.

I don't think we can continue to send to the rest of the world those kinds of messages. If we go and we have some reversals and we have some American soldiers, sailors, airmen, whatever, brought home in body bags, we can't afford to just then say, well, this was a mistake, come back home. It just, I think, sends the wrong message.

So how can you all help us, if you can? Dr. Woodward referred to it on page 4 of her testimony, Dr. Wolfowitz on page 5, Dr. Perle led off with it. How do we define a realistic, doable military mission before we go? How do we set the parameters of who will make the political policy decisions to give to the military commanders, United States, United Nations, NATO, who? And then how do we define when we have won or when we have succeeded in that mission that we charter ourselves?

Ms. WOODWARD. I would like to add a few things to what has already been said, besides the fact that I think as many of us have said in different ways from different perspectives, that we need to decide what our objective is before we go. Politically, it is not completely clear.

But I think in contrast to the other examples, there are two elements that I would care about in terms of your concerns. In terms of American support, if this were a contribution to a peacekeeping implementation force as opposed to going to war, we might have a

much easier time persuading them and also might be able to talk in terms that really have to do with American values. But that depends on that kind of an objective and, therefore, mandate.

The second issue that is different from these others is this really is a need for United States leadership, which we have already taken diplomatically this summer, but United States leadership with Europeans, with Russians, with some other Islamic countries to do what will truly be multinational. And our ability to leave early and our ability to do a good job depends on that much broader composition and emphasizing what really has to be the case, that these are largely nonmilitary functions, so it may well be soldiers are best designed to do part of it.

Therefore, the coordination with our allies, including Russia, which is happening just today, but, for example, the British and French as they are working out the operations on this right now, is really important.

Mr. PERLE. You made reference to the United Nations. I would hope the United Nations would not be involved. I think that can only complicate whatever command arrangements are ultimately put in place, and I have no confidence that with U.N. involvement we will be able to perform the mission.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would underscore I think the questions that you raised are fundamental questions. It seems to me that the point has to be made—and it is not made in a partisan spirit and it is not made in opposition trying to get a peace here—that the administration hasn't answered those questions. And yet it seems to be ready to make a decision to go ahead and send a peacekeeping force, and that is backwards. And it is Congress' role not to design a force, and it is not the role of four witnesses up here to design a force. It is the role of the administration to have a really solid set of answers to those questions before—not before they come and ask you, but before they make the decision themselves to use the force.

I think there is an analogy to the Desert Shield/Desert Storm experience that it is true, by the time the administration came up here with a request, apart from everything else, Congress would have dealt an enormous blow to the prestige and power of the United States if they had turned down the President. But the President had asked all those questions. He may not have liked the answers. I thought they were the right answers. He had asked them, and he had answers to them. And it seems to me that we went ahead right now—or we haven't gone ahead. We are sort of half one foot deeply in the water, but we seem to be going ahead with the idea that we are going to commit peacekeepers, and now, if General MacKenzie is right, we are actually going to start creeping them in before there is even an agreement without any of those questions being answered that you have raised and a few others that Mr. Perle and I and General MacKenzie have put. And I think that really is—this is not chicken and egg. This is cart and horse, and it is clear which is the horse and which is the cart. But the cart seems to be leading the parade. That is wrong.

General MACKENZIE. I would merely say that if there is clear political direction and the commander is satisfied with this mandate, it would set a record in my professional career. I really do think

that NATO has been slaving away on contingency planning for over the last year-and-a-half, and they have got a lot of plans over there, and they are just waiting to implement one of them.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Tanner.

Mr. Talent.

Mr. TALENT. I thank the chairman. I would like to thank the panel also. This is a decision I am struggling with very greatly, and I think you all have helped me today and your statements have helped me today. Perhaps I can tell you where I am coming from on this and then ask you some questions that will help me make the decisions, obviously coming from the frame of reference I have already developed.

In my view, it is improper to commit American troops in a combat role where they are likely to take casualties unless vital American interests have been defined and are present. I just think it is a wrong premise of foreign policy to go about doing that. So the question for me here is: Are there vital interests? I don't see that. I am laying this out because I am going to ask you a question. You can then help me in making up my mind. I am completely unconvinced that there are interests of that size and significance here. The ones I have heard identified are the possibility the war might spread to allies and sucks in Greece or Turkey. It hasn't happened in 4 years, and I think it is probably more likely to happen if we invest our prestige and get further involved than if we don't. And then the credibility with NATO, the only reason that our credibility is in danger is because we have been involved to this point. And if it is the wrong war at the wrong time, our credibility is going to be hurt a lot more if we have to leave later than if we draw back now. So I don't see a vital interest. You all may want to make a comment on that.

I say that to you in order to set forth this question: I do agree with Mr. Perle that there are interests, not perhaps of a significance to justify taking substantial American casualties, but there are interests. And so I guess the question I have for you is this: How likely in terms of—and my own approach is where there are interests, if the executive wants to pursue them with something less than putting Americans in at risk, that is within his discretion. That is how I saw Somalia. I think that is how I can justify Haiti, and I thought that Americans might be at risk there, and I think that is turning out to be better than I thought.

But the question I have for you is this: How likely is it that a peace will be agreed to that the parties involved feel enthusiastic enough about that if American troops were inserted there, they would not be in what I would call a combat role, more of a police role, which I would tend to view as within the President's discretion. And there are many instances of that. I mean, it would be costly, but how likely are we to have a peace like that as opposed to a peace, as Mr. Wolfowitz put it, that we would have to be enforcing on people who didn't want it, which seems to me we would have to take casualties.

I can't personally see any other scenario in which I could support using American troops, and so I guess I am asking you how likely it is in your opinion that something like that would happen. Or do you think it almost inevitable that if we put substantial troops in,

they will take fairly serious casualties, either enforcing an agreement on people who don't want it or supporting the Bosnians?

Mr. PERLE. I think you have put an absolutely crucial question, and I think the answer as to whether a peace can be arranged that is acceptable to the parties to the point where outside forces would come in with their consent and approval will depend on whether we resist the temptation to put undue pressure on the parties and bludgeon them into agreements that they would much rather not be party to but at that moment when they have pen in hand they feel obliged to sign, because with the passage of time, the underlying grievance will reassert itself. And I worry in this regard about the tendency in the negotiations to threaten the weaker party, to make concessions that they may make for tactical reasons but in the end resent so bitterly that there is a resumption of fighting or concessions that are not approved, broadly approved by the constituency that they represent. Already there are divisions as a product of the negotiating process, so there is very difficult work ahead in bringing these negotiations to a successful conclusion. And it mustn't be rushed.

Mr. TALENT. Would anybody else like to comment?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I guess there is a paradox. It seems to me the more necessary the peacekeepers are to making the thing work, the more likely it is that they are going to end up in hostilities. And the irony in the case of—take one of the most successful examples that I referred to earlier in the Sinai Desert. It is an agreement that would have worked without American peacekeepers. We are there as a kind of extra insurance policy, but it would have happened without us. That is the kind of situation which ironically—well, not so ironically, it is safe to put in peacekeepers.

But I think there is a bit of a temptation now because the problems are so difficult and the disagreements are so deep to say, well, don't worry about this issue, we will put in peacekeepers. And as General MacKenzie described in his own experience, it will be the soldiers on the ground who are supposed to negotiate the absolutely critical details about who runs which part of what city. It becomes a resort that allows people to duck problems and avoid problems instead of what I think has been over a very difficult period of decades in the Middle East, getting the parties themselves to confront the issues and make the compromises themselves.

Ms. WOODWARD. I fully agree with you that we should be sending in police-like forces rather than combat forces and think, therefore, your question is totally appropriate and right on. My own view is that there have been a number of moments in the last 12 months where we have been close to a political agreement. What always broke it down was that signals from the outside were coming that sustained contradictory expectations on the parties on the ground of what they could get, different on all sides.

If we have the opposite now, which I think we are beginning to get with this American initiative, where there is an agreement on the outside of what you want done, then the parties, in my view, as we said quite early on, as you heard, really are ready to shift to political conflict and economic conflict, not to war. They really are tired of it on all sides.

Serbs have been wanting this for more than 1½ years. Croatia is a problem, but we have leverage on them if we want to assert it, as long as we go along with Germany and get them on our side. And the Bosnian Government really cannot continue the war without the Croats and they are losing to the Croats. So everybody is in an interest to stop, so it does depend on the outside, and I think we have got that now.

The question then is: Can you get that in the course of the proximity talks from October 31 for 3 weeks? No; I think in that part I agree with everything that has preceded in response to you that there are a lot more issues than 3 weeks can handle. But I also don't think we will send in a NATO implementation force until the critical issues of where deployment occurs and an agreement on all sides, particularly the three governmental leaders, but also the leaders of the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs within Bosnia have been signed up to. It will then be winter. That is good because you can get people in when they are not being shot at. Then it is true that there will probably be a long period of time where people do as we have seen in the federation: fight about where the cantonal authority is, where the borders will be drawn, how you are going to draw up electoral lists, all of that.

But that actually can be done exactly the way the U.N. forces have been doing in sector southwest for the federation, with ever fewer troops, what they call dynamic peacekeeping. You take the observation posts. You make them smaller and smaller by day. You get joint patrols with the people on the ground that are police, not army. You have instead of a whole unit of British soldiers, Spanish soldiers, you have one or two. And they have been able to do that while you continue to debate over the political issues and you have a minimal force. I don't see why that is any danger to our forces, and at that point, we could leave and leave it to the Nordics and the Dutch and the French and so forth.

Mr. TALENT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to first associate myself with the questions put forth by my colleague, Congressman Tanner from Tennessee, in that it all comes back to defining what our political and military objectives are. It seems like it is redundant, but I don't think we can get anywhere until we define first for the American people how our national interest is served by placing peacekeepers there or placing our own men and women on the line with the full expectation that they will die. Let's make no mistake about it. If we send any of our men and women into that region of the world, with all the killing that is going on, I don't care what kind of assessment you can give me. It is a guarantee, the probability is too great. American soldiers are going to die. And American people have to feel comfortable that what we are doing there is preventing more American deaths by intervening at this stage than intervening when one of our allies gets dragged into it, as some, you know, historians and political analysts will say will happen if we don't get in. So it is sort of a question as to whether we address the problem now and in a context where we have our allies involved or whether we wait

until later and let us get dragged into a broader conflict that will involve our allies, Greece and Turkey and other allies as well.

The objective for me in our national interest is to keep American soldiers from getting killed, one way or another, and the question is how we best do that. It seems to me that peace will be secured, as everyone has said, by ensuring a balance of power within the region, and I don't think there is any agreement as to how to achieve the balance of power within the region.

So we are back full circle, and it is a real quandary, and I myself am going to be anxiously anticipating what kind of political agreement and settlement is achieved by the negotiators, because I think if the question is we want to help implement for our allies a political stability that is enduring, how do we do that and think that if they can't start off that way—in other words, if it is going to take our intervention to put an agreement into place, then it is going to take—it begs the question when we come out and withdraw our force from the picture, where does that leave—if it requires us to begin with, is what I am saying, then it begs the question when we pull out at some point certain—and if it is a year or whatever—who will fill the vacuum? And if the real issue here is if the Europeans see it as in their definite near-term national security to keep that area from spreading, then they should be the ones from the get-go that are the only ones involved. Because if it is going to take any more than them to secure this, then it is going to, it seems to me, lead to an interminable stay for us later on as Americans to be part of this, ensuring that this will take hold.

I also want to acknowledge what some of my colleagues have said. This has been a region of the world, as everyone who has had any introduction to it at all understands, that has been a history of war that goes back to the beginning of time. So the notion that we can sit on a peace just because they are tired now until it sort of takes hold and then withdraw ourselves and think that it is going to take hold after we leave, to me, I think contradicts the history of time which has told us that no matter how long periods have existed where there have not been any active engagement between the Bosnian Muslims and the Serbs or the Croats, whomever it is, that invariably you cannot erase the history of that region. And the history says that they will fight once again.

That was what I was most impressed with, with meeting with our soldiers when I went to Skopje, Macedonia, this summer, and that is that it is without a doubt predictable that this is an area that will never see, you know, real peace. It will almost be always an enforced peace. And I say let our allies who have the closest interest, national security interest involved be the ones to take this on.

I agree with what has been said that I don't think we ought to make it a question of American credibility about whether we are going to send 25,000 troops in or not. I think that it really assaults my sense of what it means to be an American to say that our credibility is somehow defined by whether we put up or shut up, so to speak, by putting American lives on the line. To me that just assaults my better sensibilities that we have to debase ourselves as a people that it would be defined by such, you know, crass militaristic terms as 25,000 soldiers or such and such.

Our credibility is defined by how we assist our allies in securing a peace that they have in their very interest, and I hope that we can do that, and, God, I hope we could just keep our soldiers out of there at every twist and turn in this conflict, because I don't see how, you know, this is going to get resolved militarily by a country that is halfway across the globe.

I am sorry. This is the first opportunity I have gotten to say anything on this, and——

The CHAIRMAN. You have done well.

Ms. WOODWARD. I wonder if I could just reassure you on one point, because Mr. Dellums put it very nicely at the beginning, because I agree with you fully. American power is still based, as it was in the cold war, on its military strength, and we still have those assets. I am not saying we should give them up. But there is a way in which that military power can be used differently now, and the classic idea of peacekeeping is that there is a period of time when people who have been at war need outsiders so that they can calm down, basically, and they can begin very, very slowly to trust each other again and the peacekeepers can leave. And it has worked many, many times over the last 40 years as this institution has developed, and I don't see any reason why we wouldn't be proud to be a part of that and learn how to use our military forces in different ways. After all, the Byzantine empire lasted a thousand years, and that was the Balkans. Not much fighting. The Ottoman empire lasted almost 500 years, and that was the Balkans. Not much fighting.

There are very important small points in that history where there was fighting, when the international system has collapsed and outsiders begin to play games. If we stop playing games and restore and get this part integrated into Europe, then there won't be war.

General MACKENZIE. Just two very short points, and I am really not arguing with myself here. I am not speaking from a military perspective now. But you have hijacked the peace process in Bosnia. I mean, it wasn't working particularly well over the last 3 years, and you hijacked it, and you have gone around with good leadership and got a whole bunch of people to sign on. And one of the conditions was that you would play in the force. So that is the reality that you have to deal with. And as far as, you know, getting in, doing the job, and getting out, I would just mention the fact that we went into the Golan and we went into Lebanon and on the various borders around Israel in 1948. We are still there. Officers from over 13 nations are serving there on a regular basis. We went into Kasmir at the same time, 1948. We are still there. And we went into Cyprus in 1965. We are still there. So these things take time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scarborough. But we have a vote on, probably a few votes, it looks like, but——

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I am just going to state the obvious. That is what I am good at, so I won't take too long.

The CHAIRMAN. You have the time.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Good. Thank you.

I want to echo Mr. Kennedy's comments and also Congressman Tanner's comments from earlier. I am deeply disturbed. Congress-

man Tanner talked about no clearly defined American interest, no mission, no goal before we would pull them out, and also the absence of American support. I believe that was what Cap Weinberger talked about in the mid-1980's as something we should go and we should follow in the coming years to escape some of the problems we had in Vietnam. And, General MacKenzie, I know you said that you went to Vietnam and I think seven or eight other U.N. engagements without having any idea what your mission was or what the stated political goals were. I don't find that compelling, compelling enough evidence to say, OK, well, let's go ahead and get entangled in Bosnia.

I would like to address this to Ms. Woodward. You have had some extremely thoughtful comments. I don't believe I agree with too many of them, but there is one thing I want to take you to task on here. You stated that we could escape history by, I believe you said, reknitting the fabric of Bosnia. And to me that sounds an awful lot like country building, country rebuilding. And we have seen that if you look at history that you are saying we can escape, that is not something that this country or any other power has been successful in doing in the past, especially in Bosnia.

Don't you think that your hope of escaping history and reknitting the fabric of Bosnia is a bit high minded and could in the end cost American lives?

Ms. WOODWARD. Yes, I think it is high minded, and I think part of the difficulty of the last 4 years is that a number of outside powers have been high minded about what they wanted to happen and, therefore, wouldn't allow—you know, there have been three previous peace plans, and they have all been rejected by some outsider, including the United States, saying this wasn't good enough. And I think it is time for us not to be high minded. So I appreciate your taking me to task about this.

I also think it is true we can't completely reverse history. But I do think we can avoid the mistakes of the past. We can avoid doing a World War I. We can avoid doing a World War II. It will take work, but I think it is in our interest to avoid it.

What I mean by reknitting Bosnia together is that, if you stop the flow of arms, if you start with a region-wide arms control regime—I don't mean to say eliminating armies, but in the way we have done in Europe—if you allow the space for the European reconstruction plan which is now being drawn up by the Commission and will be submitted to the EU Ministerial Council on October 30 for the whole region that will then begin to reincorporate Bosnia into the region, start knitting, by which I mean economic links, these war profiteers that General MacKenzie talked about, diverting their interests in war to their interests in peace—they are going to make money either way—and you can start—and people start electing their local governments and they begin to say we want somebody who—as they did in the Krajina 1½ years ago, actually, in Serbia—excuse me, in Croatia—that we are going to vote for the person who campaigns on peace rather than war. It is a slow process. General MacKenzie is absolutely right. But there is no reason why this war has to go on. You can allow the natural processes to develop, reknit Bosnia in that way, as long as the external context, the European plan, supported by, reinforced by

American leadership at the beginning, provides the conditions for that.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Could I just make one comment? I think it is important to remember there is at least one major danger that lurks in this, and that is we are apparently heading toward bringing in Russian peacekeepers, and I can imagine roles for Russian peacekeepers that might be very constructive. But if we bring in Russian peacekeepers and NATO peacekeepers, much less Americans, without an absolutely clear understanding not just about command arrangements, not just about rules of engagement, although those have to be clear, but more fundamentally a political understanding about how we are going to deal with the parties if there is a breakdown of the cease-fire, we could be setting ourselves up for the absolutely worst outcome, which is recreating some smaller version of the cold war in the Balkans. And I don't think it is a minor risk. I am not saying it is a certainty, but I think among the details the Congress really ought to inquire very deeply into is how are the Russians coming in, under what understandings. And as I say, it is not just now technical issues but even the broader political strategy.

There is too much difference of view on this issue to be very comfortable about putting the force of those two big powers side by side.

The CHAIRMAN. We have to break, but I want to recognize Mr. Dellums.

Mr. DELLUMS. Just one brief thing, Mr. Chairman. I would like to just make a comment about the notion that a number of my colleagues hold when they talk about the Balkans, that, well, these people have been fighting for thousands of years and they are going to keep on fighting. The point here is that in NATO, for example, the British, the Germans, the French, they fought for thousands of years. And by some intervention they are now allies.

I recognize that the notion of outlawing war as a way of solving the problems of nation states is a relatively new idea. I would also suggest that the challenge of the post-cold war world is where does the use of force and belligerence play a role in solving international problems. That is the struggling. And many of my colleagues, interestingly enough, have been more than willing in the context of the cold war to send American troops to fight and die ostensibly for democracy in the tens of thousands, even prepared to risk nuclear war. But in the context of the post-cold-war world where our effort is to look at the question of belligerency and force and try to move beyond that level of insanity as a way of solving problems, have a big-time problem looking at the United States playing the role of peacekeeper and risking the peace when we are more than willing to risk tens of thousands of lives and risking the war.

What Bosnia represents for us is an example of trying to play out that role, and you have got to take off the cold war hat and look at it in a brandnew context. And I think using new rhetoric with the same old mentality takes you to the exact same point.

The question is: Are we international leaders? Do we believe in democracy and human rights? Do we believe in a certain kind of integrity of nation states? And do we believe that we ought to be

moving beyond belligerency and war and violence as a way of solving the problem?

I would suggest to you that in the context of the post-cold-war world that is exactly what our challenge is, and to write off people as if they had been fighting for thousands of years is—I would like to believe that the human mentality has the capacity to advance. And if you don't believe that, then why do we have instruments of diplomacy? It is all bizarre and extreme. And why are we here? You have got to believe that the human condition can indeed advance, and I believe in the context of the Balkans that people can come together to solve their problems, and I think we have a responsibility to play some role in that. We need to define what that role is.

The CHAIRMAN. We had better break and go vote while we can and be right back, if you don't mind.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. We made it back after three votes instead of one, and we apologize for keeping you waiting.

We will recognize Mr. McHale.

Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will catch my breath. Both the chairman and I just jogged back. He ran at a faster pace than I did.

Let me thank the panel for their testimony and give you an assurance that it has had a profound effect upon the members of this committee with whom I discussed your testimony on the floor just a couple of moments ago.

In the interest of full disclosure, let me tell you that I have already reached the conclusion that the deployment of American ground forces would be a serious misjudgment with potentially tragic consequences. I think Mr. Wolfowitz captured it well, if I am not paraphrasing him unfairly. The difficulty here is that the decision to deploy preceded a thoughtful analysis of why it is that step should be taken. The decision was made, and now I sense diligent efforts to justify that predetermined decision.

I was in Bosnia about 6 weeks ago and had the opportunity to go to the field with both Croatian and Bosnian forces. And I came home with some fairly firm opinions. I brought to the situation an estimate of the current situation, an analysis of the current balance of power, by applying some very basic military principles. I looked at the mission; I looked at the potential enemy; I looked at troops, terrain, and time—an acronym that anybody coming out of a military background would recognize immediately.

I think the mission at this point is hopelessly unclear. It seems to be reactive in nature. Ms. Woodward spoke of the need for a police action. That would last, I think, for a very brief period of time, and as soon as some arti rounds came in, as soon as some mortar rounds came in, as soon as we lost a helicopter, what started out as a police action would quickly become a combatant environment.

Second, with regard to the enemy, who is the enemy? We are about to deploy forces into a region of potential combat where we have not identified the enemy. What kind of weaponry would that enemy have?

When I was there, I saw that this was a population that was almost universally armed. Will there be a disarmament process? Do

you realistically expect that people will turn in their weapons? And if not, how do we protect our soldiers from the likely use of those weapons?

I looked at the number of troops to be deployed, and it seems to be a wholly arbitrary figure, 25,000, a number I think picked out of the air and not carefully tailored to a well-defined mission. I looked at terrain where, inevitably, we will use helicopters because of the distances and the mountain passes.

There is a great deal of weaponry within that theater of operation that can easily shoot down a helicopter, and I fear that we will lose one or more helicopters if we deploy. And, lastly, the timing, why a 1-year period of time? That seems to be as arbitrary as the number of troops that have been defined. It is a convenient number for analytical purposes, but not really related to the strategic situation. What is going to be different a year from now when compared to the animosities as they existed 4 years ago or 4 decades ago?

I think the historic parallel—and I will conclude on this point and invite your comment. I think really the historic parallel is the deployment to Lebanon, where, with the best of intentions, we put over 240 marines on the bull's eye, where it was unlikely they could achieve a tactical or strategic purpose, and where more than 240 marines and sailors lost their lives.

I supported the gulf war because I believed that we had a national security interest that justified the potential loss of life. I supported the President's efforts in Haiti. I believe that in recent days we have finally brought some coherence to our Bosnian policy. And with the deployment of ground forces, I truly do fear that the President is about to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

With all of that, I would invite your comment. I try to apply, at least from my perspective, a somewhat thoughtful military analysis to the situation. I see little benefit from a deployment. I see high risk. I see the potential loss of life. And I see the parties finally, because of other efforts wisely undertaken by the administration, finally coming to a conclusion that peace is preferable to war.

With all those factors in front of you, I welcome your comments.

Mr. PERLE. Well, I agree very much with what you have had to say. I would only suggest that if this is the prevailing view in the Congress, then it is not too soon to begin working with the administration. I guess you will have an opportunity tomorrow when Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili come up to begin to collaborate on alternative American roles in the peace process in Bosnia that would enable us not to appear to be shrinking from responsibilities but, rather, doing things that are helpful and constructive but do not entail the risks that you have rightly identified.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. And I would say also that I think you have identified the basis of I think what ought to be real bipartisan consensus, that we have a policy that finally has started to work through a combination of decisive—well, I don't want to overstate it, but effective use of NATO force through the great improvement in the performance of the Bosnians on the ground and through very vigorous American diplomacy. That is what we ought to keep working on, and I think it is really bizarre that at that stage we are reintroducing the idea of peacekeepers when peacekeepers in

Bosnia have done more to get in the way than to help, I believe, with all respect to the very courageous actions a lot of them have taken and the terrible losses that General MacKenzie has described just for Canada alone. But that ought to give us further pause.

I think snatching defeat from the jaws of victory is a very good description of where the administration is heading, and I don't think—I mean, speaking as a Republican, I am not eager to deny them a victory if the victory advances American interests. I would much rather see them win the right way. But I think they are heading down a road that is going to be bad for everybody.

Mr. McHale. My question was presented in the context speaking as an American. I happen to be a Democrat, and I happen to think that the President has done a very fine job in recent months to bring coherence to a policy that, through two administrations, one Republican and one Democratic, had been terribly inconsistent, ad hoc. I think we finally got on track about 3 months ago, and this commitment which preceded that change on the battlefield is now about to be fulfilled after the facts have changed and the result of which can be, I think, the disruption of the true accomplishments that have been achieved within the past 3 months.

General MacKenzie. Sir, I would say that the military estimate that you and I have done comes to the same conclusion, that it is not a smart idea to deploy American troops on the ground in Bosnia. I will leave the political decisions to the politicians, but I fear that you might not have a lot of choice. It is a matter of how many and when and where and all that.

Ms. Woodward. And on the political side of things, I think one does have to ask what the consequences for the peace process will be if American troops are not there. If the Americans having objected to every previous peace plan now leading it, getting enormous participation on the part—not in terms just of political support but willingness to commit troops, willingness in the case of the French to go under American command and control, the whole package that we have now managed to put together over the last month then falls apart, I don't think we will get that again. So we should ask ourselves what the consequences are of not participating with troops on the ground and whether the lesser evil is to do exactly as you say, to get the administration to be absolutely clear before we go of how it is that we are participating and what the purpose is. To answer the military questions but not to take the political consequences I really do fear because I think that if we follow—if we don't participate militarily, then I really do worry about the thing escalating on the ground, and this will go on and on, and we will be back in the same situation we are in in a year's time.

If we follow what Paul Wolfowitz has just said over the last 3 months, our outcome is what President Tudjman has successfully been working toward since July 1990, which is the partition of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia. Milosevic, in fact, politically would prefer not to have that now. I would like to have us take advantage of that. But President Tudjman has won, and I don't think that is good for the Muslims.

Mr. McHale. I think the lesson of history is that warriors make lousy diplomats. If you want a diplomatic achievement, send an ambassador, don't send the Marines.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Kasich is next.

Mr. KASICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I wasn't here. I have this little matter called reconciliation. I never thought it would be so confusing, tough, and frustrating, Henry.

Anyway, I think that Mr. McHale made a number of interesting points. I today am not prepared to tell you what my position is, but I am very happy that the chairman has agreed to start looking at this.

To me, there are kind of a couple issues, and maybe the General is—is there a guarantee if we are there the violence is going to end, General?

General MACKENZIE. Not in these games, sir, no.

Mr. KASICH. Is there a guarantee—nobody is happy with that situation there right now; isn't that correct? Nobody is happy with it. They all would use circumstances to try to advance their own goals, wouldn't they?

General MACKENZIE. We are talking about the three sides, or five, depending on how you look at it, in the conflict?

Mr. KASICH. Yes.

General MACKENZIE. I would imagine the Croatians are fairly content.

Mr. KASICH. But that means somebody else is not content.

General MACKENZIE. Absolutely.

Mr. KASICH. I shouldn't say all sides, but depending on where they are at any particular point on the chessboard defines——

General MACKENZIE. Not all sides are——

Mr. KASICH [continuing]. Whether they are happy or not, right?

General MACKENZIE. No.

Mr. KASICH. So that means if somebody could use a circumstance to advance their goal, in other words, when you take the Israelis and the Egyptians and you talk about the peace that they made, I think we pretty well, both sides pretty well knew—and maybe Richard could weigh in. They pretty well knew where they wanted to end up. And, frankly, I think, Paul, you refer to it in your statement which I just glanced at. They knew what they wanted to achieve. They knew that nobody was going to get Taba, that somebody was going to get this and somebody was going to get that. So it was basically a matter of just patrolling more than it was deciding—is that not correct—as compared to this deal where people aren't in agreement with what—where the circumstances currently exist. Is that right, Paul?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think that is fundamentally right. I mean, the Egyptian-Israeli agreement I have referred to several times this afternoon as an example of where both parties really wanted the agreement to work. They needed a little bit of reassurance that the other party wasn't going to cheat on it. And that is what the peacekeepers provide, is that reassurance. But they can provide it because there is not a basic desire to cheat.

Mr. KASICH. So if the Israelis move the wrong way, the Egyptians weren't going to roll a division of tanks into that territory because somebody looked the wrong way; correct? I mean, there was, there is and currently exists a large element of we are happy with

this, as compared to what exists in the former Yugoslavia. Being a Croatian, I mean, I kind of watch a little of this thing. If the Croatians could get more, they would take it; correct? And the Serbians right now are beside themselves, and so if something would happen or some circumstance could happen that would allow the current arrangements to change, they would leap on it, wouldn't they?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think that is the real danger, yes.

Mr. KASICH. So how do you put people in the middle of something that isn't settled, how do we put your son in the middle of what isn't settled and tell your son or, general, tell your troops or tell you, you go over there and you settle a peace that no one has agreed upon? Is that a problem?

General MACKENZIE. I would presume it is even more of a problem based on my Bosnian experience, because I think people will sign up to plans, will put their signatures and probably maybe a little bit like the Security Council, occasionally, have no intention whatsoever of following up and implementing them.

Ms. WOODWARD. May I just add something?

Mr. KASICH. Yes, certainly.

Ms. WOODWARD. It is very interesting that when the cease-fire—you know, we took another day for the gas and electricity to flow, and then we had another couple of days of fighting in northwestern Bosnia. Now it really is beginning to take hold. And what happened, we see, is that all three sides immediately presented maps to the United Nations because they knew we were now at the next stage.

There is also something to be said for where the confrontation lines are now within Bosnia as natural defense lines that are much more easily patrollable by the United Nations.

I agree with you fully on the gist of your comments that it is not going to be easy and that it has to be settled before one goes in. But it is not at all clear to me that we aren't really in a sense at that point now, particularly in the psychological mind of——

Mr. KASICH. Well, then answer this to me. You know, you just think you ought to be sitting up all night just learning things, I guess, and one night I happened to be at home and "Nightline" came on, and Dave Marash gave a report of which I caught a snippet. And he said that in Serbia, they would view NATO peacekeepers—this put a chill through my—I wanted to call Richard right then because he and I had been discussing this. It put a chill up my spine, that NATO peacekeepers in Serbian territory would be viewed as occupational troops.

Why would they say that?

Ms. WOODWARD. But it is also the case that the main reason Milosevic is now where he is in terms of supporting a peaceful settlement is he knows that his largest domestic constituency, his greatest support at home is from people who know that he has, in their view, prevented war from coming to Serbia. It is just like the citizens of Zagreb. They can talk war, but they don't want to fight it. And it is the same thing about the Serbs in Serbia. They have had enough of this. They want to leave, the Bosnia Serbs——

Mr. KASICH. Well, I tell you——

Ms. WOODWARD. And so what their view of this——

Mr. KASICH. I mean, how can you—600 years, I mean, they are still—I mean, I heard Karadzic giving this—he finally, in an interview with David Frost, he finally exploded and said, Don't you understand what they did to us? Don't you understand what they did to us? I mean, this wasn't like, well, you know, let's have a cup of coffee here.

David Frost finally got to the core, and he said to him, This is payback time for 40 years ago or 50 years ago, and that is him. You talk to his grandfather, that is payback time for 200 years ago. I mean, how can you with confidence say that they don't want any more fighting?

Ms. WOODWARD. Well, I suppose in part because I heard the language yesterday at the demonstration on The Mall, and it was very, very peaceful. And I also know that the Serbs haven't been flooding in to help the Bosnian Serbs in the defeats over the last month.

Mr. KASICH. But that is this week, this month. I haven't made up my mind. I talked to Newt, the Speaker, about this, and I have told, you know, given him my advice on it, and I begged—didn't have to. Floyd was a step ahead of me. But I said we have got to start talking about this. This is a kind of fait accompli, I am afraid.

Let me ask you this—it is not a fait accompli. It is not a fait accompli, but it is getting very close to it.

Let me ask you this: Say we don't go, does that hurt America? Does that hurt NATO? Paul? I mean, can we say we will go in the air. We have some people over there in Macedonia. We will do some other training. But we are not going to put anybody on the ground. Does that hurt NATO? Does that hurt the U.S. reputation in the world?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think it depends on what point we are talking about. I would have to say I think all the skepticism you have expressed, if we get to the point where we put together a peace agreement and everybody is committed to playing a role and the President has committed us to playing a role and then we don't go because the Congress says no, and then everybody else pulls out and the thing falls apart, I think there are very, very bad consequences. But I think that means——

Mr. KASICH. If it is a peace there, what are the consequences? If they are all signed up to a peace, what are the consequences of us not patrolling a peace?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, that comes back to where we are right now. Right now there is no reason to say that we have to go in order to make it work. I am not sure why peacekeepers on the ground are essential to making it work, and I go back to what Congressman McHale said. There is a strategy that seems to be working, which is negotiating under the pressure of NATO air power and Bosnian and Croatian ground power. And that is the combination we ought to keep at and not bring in peacekeepers, which is the thing—and if you want to be bipartisan, it was the Bush administration that first supported the introduction of peacekeepers——

Mr. KASICH Listen, we don't care——

Mr. WOLFOWITZ [continuing]. And they have been in the way for 3 years——

Mr. KASICH [continuing]. About that issue. That is the least of our concern.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ [continuing]. At very real cost to the peacekeepers themselves and to any effective policy. They have been the hostages that have dominated Western policy, and finally, as General Fogleman said just the other day in the Wall Street Journal, we could finally have an effective bombing campaign because the peacekeepers were out of the way.

Why are we putting them back in the way? It makes no sense at all. And I think, in fact, it really—I think it interferes with constructing a settlement that will last and have stability to it.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, one last question, and I appreciate your patience with me here. One last question about geopolitical significance, a pretty big statement there from a mailman's son, I guess, but, look, we are the world's last superpower. Whether we go or not isn't going to really affect the geopolitical balance in this world, is it? We will remain the world's only superpower. And isn't it the ability to project power, isn't that which establishes you—you know, the Russians didn't participate in anything for 40 or 50 years, only in and out on a rogue basis. But guess what? Every major decision that was determined in this world involved the Russians, didn't it?

So let's just assume under the worst-case scenario we pull the rug out from under the President, we say we don't think he has a well-defined policy; we tell NATO we will go in the air, but we won't go on the ground. Is America's ability to have credibility and to be viewed in a strong geopolitical position undermined by a decision not to participate?

Mr. PERLE. I am not sure you have to face that issue, because there is still time to say to the President we don't want to pull the rug out from under you, so kindly don't identify that rug yet until we have had a chance to talk about it. And maybe we can persuade you that there are other roles we can play, roles other than sending 20,000 or 25,000 American ground forces, roles that are honorable and roles that manifest our involvement and our leadership.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, maybe these folks this week could give you a recommendation that they would make in terms of roles and approaches, and maybe you two gentlemen ought to do an op-ed piece in the Washington Post or in the New York Times that the President will see that will indicate exactly what you are driving at, Mr. Perle. I think it is very helpful.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Kasich.

Mr. Geren.

Mr. GEREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be quick. I appreciate the indulgence of this panel spending all day here and then coming back after the vote.

General MacKenzie, I remember when you spoke to our committee—I don't know if it was a year ago or a couple years ago, but you described the participants in the conflict in Bosnia, and you said something to the effect of to put yourself in the role of the combatants there, imagine that you left your home one morning and kissed your wife and children goodbye and came back and found them all slaughtered, how would you spend the rest of your

life? And that has really stuck with me as I reflect on Bosnia and the chances of a meaningful peace.

Listening to Ms. Woodward, she thinks that they are to the point where everyone truly wants peace. They are broken, or however you want to describe it. They are psychologically to the point where they are ready to make peace. Ms. Woodward obviously thinks that is the case. I think that is what has allowed there to be progress, if there has been, in the Middle East. They finally have grown tired of it. They have bled themselves to the point where they are unwilling to bleed anymore.

Do you believe they are there in Bosnia now? Are they to the point where they want peace or are they just tired?

General MACKENZIE. I think there is a significant desire for peace, but where we might differ—and I am not sure—not together, not a multiethnic type of peace, not within the borders recognized on April 6, 1992. Based on my experience in other theaters, there is some healing time required, and it is probably a generation or two, and that means a significant number of folks of different ethnic origin have to live separated, perhaps within the same country along the lines that your negotiators are pursuing, but not necessarily—as described to me when I arrived in Sarajevo in the summer of 1992, with tears in their eyes, they would describe how they lived happily on various floors of apartment buildings with Serb, Muslim, Croat, et cetera, and obviously it happened and obviously it worked. But the veneer must have been very thin because they have done some really terrible things to each other.

So to answer your question honestly, I don't think in my lifetime, as a multiethnic state—although the Bosnian state will be multiethnic, but it won't have anywhere near the percentages of Serbs and Croats that it had before the conflict.

Mr. GEREN. Let me ask just a quick question; if any member of the panel would like to comment on it, please do so. This Russian issue, Russia is not a member of NATO. Russia has different interests than we do. I guess if there is any party to the agreement that truly can claim to be unbiased, it would be us, and the Russians have a longstanding bias in this conflict.

If you all could just raise some of the issues that we need to bear in mind as we ponder the possible Russian role in any type of peacekeeping effort, I think that would be helpful.

Mr. PERLE. I would be very wary of the argument that this is an opportunity, that it is an opportunity to demonstrate that we and the Russians can work together. I think we should be looking for ways that we can work with the Russians, but this is a very stern test. It would require quite extraordinary restraint on the part of the Russians, given their sympathy for one side, for the Serb side. And so I would pass up this intriguing opportunity and look for another less volatile situation and less dangerous one.

Mr. GEREN. Is this relationship with the Serbs that the Russians have, is that on a leader-to-leader, government-to-government, or do you think it is something that is felt down in the troops? So if you had Russian troops on the ground there, are there sympathies there that actually are felt by your average Russian soldier? Is it something that has really caught in their sense of national pride or whatever?

Mr. PERLE. I am reluctant to answer that because I don't have any direct experience of it, but others might.

Ms. WOODWARD. I would be happy to answer it. The Russian role is not historically one of friendship with the Serbs. They have abandoned them as often as they have not abandoned them, and everyone knows that it is just that they are the only major power that has both been given the role by the contact group and the Americans before that to be the interlocutor with the Serbs. And they are the only ones who, among the major powers, the Serbs think because of Eastern orthodoxy but even more importantly the problem that the Russians now have with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Russians, outsider Russians, parallel problems that the Serbs have or perceive to have in former Yugoslavia, that they think they might understand their situation more. So that there has been a kind of mutual understanding of, in a sense, using each other, the Serbs thinking that the Russians were the only ones who might listen to them and the Russians saying that, if we play this role as interlocutor with the Serbs for the West, the West will give us some goodies. They got to Malta at the G–7 meetings for this and so forth. And so it is really the Russians are playing a role in order to be treated as a major power diplomatically, not because of some real friendship with the Serbs.

If you look then, for example, at the embassies, the Russian Embassy to Belgrade has been relatively supportive of the Serbs. But the Russian Embassy to Croatia has actually taken the Croatian side on many issues and been very critical of the Serbs, both in Croatia and generally. So you get a lot of variety. This penetrates down to the soldiers and the diplomats on the ground whom I have met in many different contexts.

The one thing I think I would add to what Richard has said—and certainly Paul Wolfowitz raised the question as well earlier—it is a very good question you are asking. It is important to think about it. I am not sure if we are not further down the line than we are acknowledging by our question. But, more importantly, the consequence of not giving Russia a role in this, it should be well designed, but giving Russia a role in whatever kind of implementation force does go in, whether the Americans do or not, is internal—is feeding the internal civilization. What happens with the elections in December, how the patriotic forces and Lebed and his whole group begin to get more support at home in the parliament and in the electorate because of being rejected in the Balkans, that is really what we have to worry about. Because our notion of incorporating Russia into the West in the way that we did with Germany after World War II—and I think that is the right policy—depends largely not on resources that we could commit up front but supporting the domestic process in the terms of liberalization, democratization, Westernization. And so that is really the effect on Russia, not so much how it plays itself out on the ground but whether our rejection of them in this case feeds the wrong forces at home.

Mr. PERLE. This is one very, I think, troubling cross-current here, and that is, there are some Russians who believe that the presence of Russians on the territory of the now independent republics of the former Soviet Union constitute a justification for

Russian intervention in those republics. So the fact that there are ethnic Russians in the Balkans is seen by some Russians as the basis on which Russia has rights in the Balkans that are not consistent with the notion of those countries as sovereign independent states. And there is something rather parallel that in the former Yugoslavia, the belief that because there are Serbs on the territory of what became a non-Serb-dominated state, Serbia had certain rights with respect to that. It is a very dangerous precedent, in my view, and will be invoked in the Russian case by nationalists who wish to reestablish something that would look rather like the old Soviet Union.

General MACKENZIE. I would just say that on the ground, since the Russians have been with UNPROFOR, they have been under Canadian and Belgian and French and then British command, thank God we had them, compared to some of the units that were serving with UNPROFOR. They were probably in the top 50 percent, and we needed them.

They were branded pro-Serbian when Michael Rose brought them in to put the cordon around Sarajevo when the Serbs pulled back, and they all gave the Serb salute when they came into town. Every other one of the 32 nations in UNPROFOR gave the Serb salute to the Serbs and the Bosnian salute to the Bosnians when you cross the line. It is called being impartial. But as far as I am concerned, they were pretty good troops and did what they were told.

Mr. GEREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Dellums.

Mr. DELLUMS. General MacKenzie, the efficacy of lifting the arms embargo has been alluded to on several occasions this afternoon, and I would like you to respond to the question of whether you think that that is an efficacious effort.

General MACKENZIE. I don't want to appear flippant, sir, but the idea of pumping more arms into Bosnia and creating more killing and more refugees just doesn't seem like the way to go. I consider the arms embargo one of the great myths of the 20th century. You tell me how Croatia, when on its offensive in the Krajina and how the Croatian and Bosnian coalition have done so well over the last couple of months, and even just watching pictures on television where those weapons came from. It wasn't some fairy's wand that waved and they materialized. They came in through an arms embargo. You can drive a truck through. There is plenty of money around. There is all kinds of Eastern European weapons that are available, and they are being brought in.

The Croatians benefited more than the Bosnians did because they took a surcharge as the stuff was coming through their country. You know, you want 10 of these, you get 8 and we keep 2. I mean, I think it was the economists who said 2 billion dollars worth of arms went into Bosnia over the last 1½ years. It is a significant arms trade—not all the things they would like, absolutely, and in the balance on the battlefield, they don't have as much as the other folks have. The Serbs started with a tremendous advantage because they inherited, if that is the right term, a lot of the heavy equipment from the Yugoslavian National Army. I myself did some weapon exchanges in Sarajevo as part of the payment for

people being able to withdraw without being ambushed and that type of thing. But it was in relatively minor amounts. But not what has been happening for the last 1½ years. Lots of arms. I just don't think we need any more.

And if you don't mind me saying, it is a little naive to think—and the air strikes, that is why I was a little upset when they started attacking away from the safe havens—to think that when you in the States think that things are just about balanced and the playing field is level, that you will ring a bell in Washington and it is all going to stop. As soon as you give one side an advantage in that conflict, it is my understanding that they are going to take advantage of it. I know I would, because this is our moment in history. This is our day, and now we have got an advantage, and we are going to go hell for leather.

I don't think probably the administration was very happy with some of the offensive action that has been taken over the last few weeks in Croatia and Bosnia, but I don't think you had the ability to stop it.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you. Just one last question. Your latter comments about bombing occasions this question. Professor Wolfowitz, perhaps I can accept the notion that you can bomb people to the peace table. But I am not sure I can accept the notion that you can bomb them into a peace plan. And, third, I am not sure that I can understand how you can use air bombings to implement a peace plan. So that is where you lose me when you talk about dropping bombs and that we ought to continue with this initiative of encouraging Croatia to fight and to continue this air campaign.

Help me understand how you enforce or you implement a peace plan through aerial bombings. Maybe you can persuade people to come to the table, and maybe one can argue that this bombing might move people to the point where they say let's end that, let's get to the table. Maybe you can make that argument. But how do you use bombing to actually bring about a peace plan, and how do you use bombing to actually implement a peace plan? That I have great difficulty understanding.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, let me say, I am not a great enthusiast for bombing. I think the much more effective thing is really what happens on the ground when the Bosnians and the Croatians can take care of themselves, and I think one needs some understanding of the limits beyond which we will not support them. But I think if you had an agreement that was a viable agreement, I do believe the threat of bombing is actually much more effective than the reality of it. And I think if people felt that there were some clear lines and if they cross those lines there are some clear consequences in terms of the use of airpower, I think it could be effective as a deterrent.

As I say, I think the most effective thing is when people can defend themselves on the ground, and that is what I would really aim at, with as little dependence on outside forces as possible. But I think one has to say that, looking at it in terms of what has happened in the last 2 months, it does seem that that bombing had an effect in changing the Serbs' mind about which way things were going. Most of all, what you really want to do is give them the per-

ception that it is a lot better to make an agreement now on reasonable terms than to let events continue to take a course that will go worse for them. But I don't think you bomb people into submission. I don't believe in that.

Mr. DELLUMS. Very last question, Mr. Chairman, and I alluded to it during the break. I will direct it to Ms. Woodward.

As I said before, the administration points out that the predicate for this whole situation is a "implementable peace plan," "strong peace plan," "agreeable peace plan." Several adjectives have been used. The obvious question that it conjured up for me was: If it is such a strong peace plan, why did you go chapter 7 as opposed to chapter 6, which is traditional peacekeeping, blue berets, white uniforms, light armor?

The response was this is a rough neighborhood. The second response was you have a history of violence and instability and you have a great lack of trust. Therefore, we need to go in with a peace enforcement effort.

I also think that—and maybe I am wrong, but just my speculation—they also could reach to NATO through chapter 7 as opposed to chapter 6 because, Mr. Chairman, very interesting criticism in this body has been command and control, U.N. forces, Third World countries, and all that that conjures up. So maybe when the administration said, no, if we are going to do peacekeeping—because we blew it in Somalia. That was our great first test case of playing the role of peacekeeper in the post-cold-war world, and we blew that moment. We started off brilliantly, as the General pointed out. We shifted. We went after Aideed. We made it military. We got off target and things went haywire, and it became very difficult to sell to the Congress and the American people the notion of peacekeeping because we raised the question of incompetence, lack of organization, U.N. weakness. We beat that drum very heavily. So maybe the response for chapter 7 was now NATO, you don't have those criticisms.

The second criticism was, well, you put troops out there in harm's way. They came back and said no. What is the term they used? We are going to be the baddest—what is it, the baddest dog in the—the meanest dog in the area. So you handled that criticism with a U.S. division rounded out, a French division rounded out, and a British division. You had three divisions there. And as I understand, the Russians were prepared to go in with another division, come in under NATO command, under General Jawan's command, which staggers the imagination when you consider moving beyond the Cold War what the implications of all that was. And I think the fly in the ointment was when they found out that they had to pay for it themselves. And the political structure over the military structure would not necessarily include them to have some kind of veto capability. So I am not sure that it was where you were, Mr. Perle. I think their agenda was a much broader one.

Nevertheless, I would like you, Ms. Woodward, to comment about this chapter 6, chapter 7 business and whether or not the administration may be in real terms just facing the pragmatic reality that if you are going to sell it in this body, you can't have the criticism of NATO—of U.N. command and control, you can't have the argument of weakness because people will raise the Somalia issue, et

cetera. And, therefore, maybe this is the only pragmatic way that you can move peacekeeping down the road as we go further into this post-cold-war world. I don't know. I would like you to comment.

Ms. WOODWARD. My own view is that it does have to do with the political issues that you have raised, and I would add one more, which is that the main criticism on this side of the Atlantic, in lots of different circles of the U.N. operation on the ground, was somehow that it wasn't robust enough. And that is really a misunderstanding of what was going on on the ground. The robustness was that the people who were criticizing the United Nations were criticizing it for not doing things they wanted doing but were not in the mandate of the U.N. forces.

So then we get back to the issue of the mandate. What is it that you want to accomplish? And that is what should define whether it is 6 or 7. Chapter 7 simply means not peace enforcement, where 6 is peacekeeping, 7 is peace enforcement. That is not the case. Chapter 7 is no consent because of the interests of international peace and security. And so let's be clear. You can be enforcing, you can be robust in maintaining your mandate under 6 if you want, and you can have——

Mr. DELLUMS. So we have that flexibility.

Ms. WOODWARD. You have that flexibility. You can do whatever force package you want, but you do it under rules of impartiality and consent. And the peace agreement itself may be sufficient to give consent.

So when we say chapter 7, we may want to do that, as you say, as a kind of political cover in town, but let's recognize that what we are also doing with chapter 7 is not admitting that what we are doing is going in in a combat operation, that is to say, assuming not consent. And if that is the case, let's be up front about what it is that we are doing.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all of you for your endurance.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have served well beyond your time, and we apologize for keeping you so long. But you have contributed a whole lot to our discussion and our thinking, and we appreciate it.

Thank you very much. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:22 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. GROUND FORCES TO BOSNIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 18, 1995.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd D. Spence (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will please come to order. Good morning.

I want to welcome our distinguished witnesses to this morning's hearing. We followed, with interest, your testimony before the Senate yesterday and look forward to continuing the dialogue this morning.

Today's hearing is the second that the House National Security Committee has held in an effort to begin assessing the administration's plan to deploy American ground troops to Bosnia to enforce a peace agreement, if there is a peace agreement.

Quite obviously, a fundamental test of any foreign policy initiative is whether or not it advances America's national security interests. I believe that the employment of American military forces into a conflict abroad, whether into a declared war or a dangerous gray world of peacemaking ought to meet a very high standard of consistency with defined national interest.

In the case of Bosnia, the burden of proof has not been satisfied. Moral interest and concerns are unquestionably evident in the debate over Bosnia due to the appalling scale of human suffering and the brutal nature of the conflict. But what are our national interests in Bosnia? And if we have national interests, are they at stake?

Does the balance of power within the Balkans itself affect our national interest? Or if that balance threatens more clearly defined interests in a broader geographical area.

In and of itself, it is difficult to understand how a greater Serbia versus a greater Croatia is truly a matter of vital national interest to us. While the implications of a wider Balkan war might well affect more clearly defined national interest, the long running fear of an expanded conflict has not materialized. According, the real political argument to justify intervention in the Balkans by up to 25,000 U.S. ground troops for at least 1 year and probably much longer is not evident for me.

More specifically, there are many unanswered questions relative to the proposed military operation itself that we need to address. For instance, will the military operation be characterized by clearly defined political objectives? If so, how will this critical linkage be maintained over the course of a lengthy deployment?

How will the mission creep that came to characterize our efforts in Somalia, in this far more complex political, ethnic and religious conflict in Bosnia? How will meaningful exit criteria be defined prior to any operation? How will assessments of these criteria be made during the operation and who will decide when the criteria have been satisfied? How will active and reserve force readiness across the entire force be impacted by a protracted peacekeeping deployment of front line combat troops? The list goes on and on.

I am particularly troubled by the seemingly arbitrary nature of the administration's decision making on the size of a likely American ground component and the duration of its stay in Bosnia. During the early days of this administration, United States military planners identified a force of up to 100,000 as necessary to effectively and safely execute a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. Half of that force was to come from the United States.

This staggering and controversial figure was quickly reduced because, quite frankly, it was politically untenable; 25,000 United States ground troops may be enough to address the Bosnian peacemaking and peacekeeping requirements, but anything other than cautious military planning is inappropriate in any such decision making.

Nobody wants to see a repeat of the confused decision making process that preceded the tragic October weekend in Mogadishu 2 years ago. Moreover, not too long ago the administration vehemently argued against any congressionally imposed deadline for the withdrawal of United States troops from Somalia, if you remember. We were told then that the United States troops were critical to the operation and that sending such an explicit signal of our intention to withdraw would undermine the broader peacekeeping effort, as well as potentially endanger United States troops.

Yet now, in the case of the impending Bosnia deployment, while the administration is arguing that the presence of United States ground troops is critical to effective peacekeeping, they are now saying that United States forces will be pulled out within 1 year. How does announcing this arbitrary time line in advance not undermine the administration's very arguments for the presence of ground troops? And why do statements that the United States' role in Bosnia will last only 1 year not pose a real risk of turning Americans into targets for one or more of the warring factions?

In my mind, the more discussion there is on the administration proposal, the longer the list of troubling questions grows and detailed answers, at least to date, are scarce. It may be that the warring factions in Bosnia will save us from the hurried deployment of our troops into a dangerous and unstable conflict, at least long enough for the hearings of these and others to explore the complex issues that confront the administration, the Congress and the American people.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Spence follows:]

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN FLOYD D. SPENCE
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
BOSNIA HEARING

18 October 1995

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Quite obviously a fundamental test of any foreign policy initiative is whether or not it advances America's national security interests. I believe that the employment of American military forces into conflict abroad, whether into a declared war or the dangerous "grey world" of peace-making, ought to meet a very high standard of consistency with defined national interests. In the case of Bosnia, the burden of proof has not been satisfied.

Moral interests and concerns are unquestionably evident in the

debate over Bosnia due to the appalling scale of human suffering and the brutal nature of the conflict. But what are our national interests in Bosnia? And if we have national interests, are they at stake? Does the balance of power within the Balkans itself affect our national interests? Or only if that balance threatens more clearly defined interests in a broader geographical area? In and of itself, it is difficult to understand how a Greater Serbia versus a Greater Croatia is truly a matter of vital national interest.

While the implications of a wider Balkan war might well affect more clearly defined national interests, the long-running fear of an expanded conflict have not materialized. Accordingly, the "realpolitik" argument to justify intervention in the Balkans by up to 25,000 US ground troops for at least a year -- and probably much longer -- is not evident to me.

More specifically, there are many unanswered questions relative to the proposed military operation itself that we need to address. For instance;

- Will the military operation be characterized by clearly defined political objectives? If so, how will this critical linkage

be maintained over the course of a lengthy deployment?

- How will the "mission creep" that came to characterize our efforts in Somalia be prevented in this far more complex political, ethnic, and religious conflict in Bosnia?
- How will meaningful exit criteria be defined prior to any operation? How will assessments of these criteria be made during the operation and who will decide when the criteria have been satisfied?
- How will active and reserve force readiness across the entire force be impacted by a protracted peacekeeping deployment of front-line combat troops?
- And the list goes on and on...

I am particularly troubled by the seemingly arbitrary nature of the Administration's decision-making on the size of the likely American ground component and the duration of its stay in Bosnia. During the early days of this Administration, US military planners identified a force of up to 100,000 as necessary to effectively and safely execute a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. Half of that force was to come from the United States. This staggering and

controversial figure was quickly reduced because, quite frankly, it was politically untenable. 25,000 US ground troops may be enough to address the Bosnian peacemaking and peacekeeping requirement, but anything other than cautious military planning is inappropriate in any such decision-making. Nobody wants to see a repeat of the confused decision-making process that preceded that tragic October weekend in Mogadishu two years ago.

Moreover, not too long ago the Administration vehemently argued against any congressionally-imposed deadline for the withdrawal of US troops from Somalia. We were told then that US troops were critical to the operation and that sending such an explicit signal of our intention to withdrawal would undermine the broader peacekeeping efforts, as well as potentially endanger US troops.

Yet now, in the case of the impending Bosnia deployment, while the Administration is arguing that the presence of US ground troops is critical to effective peacekeeping, they are announcing that US forces will be pulled out within a year. How does announcing this arbitrary time-line in advance not undermine the

Administration's very arguments for the presence of ground troops? And why do statements that the US ground role in Bosnia will last only a year not pose a real risk of turning Americans into targets for one or more of the warring factions?

In my mind, the more discussion there is on the Administration's proposals, the longer the list of troubling questions grows. And detailed answers, at least to date, are scarce. It may be that the warring factions in Bosnia will save us from the hurried deployment of US troops into a dangerous and unstable conflict -- at least long enough for hearings like these to explore the complex issues that confront the Administration, the Congress, and the American people.

Before recognizing our witnesses, let me first recognize my distinguished colleague and Ranking Member, Mr. Dellums for any comments he might like to make at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Before recognizing our witnesses, let me first recognize my distinguished colleague and ranking member, Mr. Dellums, for any comments he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, and our distinguished witnesses.

I join with you in welcoming Secretary of Defense Perry, Secretary of State Christopher, and General Shalikashvili, the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the committee inquiry on the diplomatic and military situation in Bosnia. I look forward to their testimony on the administration plan to address these important developments.

Mr. Chairman, as you and I observed yesterday when we heard from outside witnesses on this topic, we live in a time of transition, one in which the United States must determine and implement a new strategy that will govern its role in world affairs. What are our responsibilities in eliminating regional instabilities, cross-border or civil warfare, genocidal ethnic violence, massive human rights abuses or starvation? How do we best achieve these goals if we adopt them as part of our national strategy? What role does peacekeeping play in meeting these responsibilities?

In considering whether or not to deploy United States forces in Bosnia to help enforce a peace, we are presented immediately with another question. Having engineered a cease-fire and a possibility of a peace agreement, what are the U.S. responsibilities to help keep that peace and implement that agreement? What would be the impact on our NATO alliance and our diplomacy generally if we were not to participate with troops on the ground?

We need to hear from our witnesses today on what U.S. national security interests have caused us to become so deeply engaged diplomatically in seeking to end the Balkan conflict. And we need to understand why these interests might compel the United States to commit the well-being of our troops and the National Treasury required to support them to this cause.

I am confident that many members will also want to hear, especially from Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili, as to how this deployment affects our ability to meet the postulated requirement to be prepared to respond to the two near simultaneous regional contingencies that are contemplated in the bottom-up review. I recall that the bottom-up review especially contemplated such deployments and determined that field troops for such a contingency was within the ambit of our ability.

I believe that the new era, the so-called post-cold-war era, requires that the United States give active consideration as to how we can effectively support peace operations. As one who has advanced the view that nations should seek to avoid the resort to violence to achieve their national objectives, I find that I have been compelled to understand the differences between the use of military force on the one hand and the use of military forces to help parties cease or avoid war on the other hand.

I believe that we must explore whether and how our highly organized, very large and obviously capable military force can appropriately help to achieve our national security goals through peacekeeping missions, such as the one under consideration here, fit those criteria.

I look forward to hearing the administration's views on this issue in the context of the Bosnian developments.

Some would argue that the use of military troops is the wrong method of achieving peacekeeping. I certainly share the view that finding nonmilitary mechanisms to provide confidence sufficient to allow warring parties to cease their conflicts is an urgent and desirable goal. In the context of the Balkans, we need to know whether meaningful peace can be brought without military forces and without U.S. military forces, in particular, being deployed with the consent of the belligerents.

We need to consider whether the plans under consideration for deployment would be insufficiently robust or excessive to the mission. This question requires careful understanding of the diplomacy, the agreement reached by the parties. As we heard, Mr. Chairman, yesterday from our witnesses throughout the hearing, the mandate under which the implementation force would operate.

In this regard, it would be critical to know whether our forces will operate under a mandate of neutral involvement as peacekeepers or peace enforcers on the side of the Bosnian Government forces. This is an important consideration.

If it is the former, I would be very concerned at potential United States plans to train Bosnian troops would deprive our forces of the neutrality critical to such a mission, thereby threatening their well-being and debilitating their ability to function effectively in a peacekeeping role.

There are many more issues to consider, such as the possible participation of the Russian troops and how that will aid or hinder the diplomacy, operational command and control between forces in different sectors, and the appropriate duration or the end state of our involvement, to name just a few that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks. It is the answers to these questions and many other questions regarding both the diplomacy and the military plans that should inform our respective decisions.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the contribution that Secretaries Perry and Christopher along with General Shalikashvili will make to this committee's effort to come to a fuller understanding of this dynamic and complex event. I look forward to their testimony, and I appreciate your generosity. I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Dellums.

Again, I want to welcome our distinguished guests and visitors this morning. First, without objection, the witnesses prepared statements and any supporting materials will be submitted for the record. Second, as I did yesterday, let me once again urge my colleagues to be considerate in their use of time. Our witnesses need to leave the room by noon, and I would hope to maximize the opportunity for as many members as possible to ask questions. Accordingly, we will proceed under the 5-minute rule.

Mr. Secretary, you may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is not often that I am invited to appear before this committee and I want to particularly thank you for the privilege of appearing today as we begin to explore this very important subject of the implementation force in Bosnia.

We are at a very critical moment in our efforts to achieve peace in the former Yugoslavia. As the result of American leadership we have made very significant and important progress. For the first time in the 2½ years that I have been in office really, and the first time in 4 years, we now have a significant opportunity to achieve peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

If we are to succeed, continued American leadership is absolutely essential. Our ability, of course, to sustain that leadership depends on our working closely with the Congress. It also depends upon our obtaining the understanding and support of the American people. That, of course, is why Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, and I are grateful for the opportunity to be here today.

It is important to step back just a moment and see how far we have come in just the last few months. As recently as last July the Bosnian Serb forces had overrun two United Nations declared safe areas, Srebrenica and Zepa, expelled and murdered some of the inhabitants, and were generally defying the international community.

At that time, the time of those tragic events, we faced a very stark choice. The international community either could have taken firm steps to fulfill its mission, or it could have stood by and watched the mission collapse. If we had not acted as we did, our NATO allies and other troop contributors almost certainly would have been forced to pull out, leaving behind an even greater humanitarian tragedy. And if that had happened, Mr. Chairman and members, we might be here today discussing quite a different and much less satisfactory option, and that is the need to send troops into Bosnia not to support peace but rather to rescue and extricate our NATO allies from a failed mission.

Under President Clinton's leadership, the situation has been fundamentally changed in the last 4 months or so. In last July's London conference, we convinced our allies to take firm measures including the use of decisive airpower if necessary in order to protect the remaining safe areas. Only a short time after the Bosnian Serbs attacked the Sarajevo marketplace, killing 36 more people, NATO launched a 2-week air campaign to make it clear that further violations of the safe areas would not be tolerated and, if I may stress that NATO stands ready to repeat that campaign if necessary.

In August, the President launched a new diplomatic initiative and after weeks of shuttle diplomacy, after the tragic death of three brave American negotiators, we have taken dramatic steps along the path that the President laid out in early August.

In September, as you know, the parties agreed to preserve the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its present borders and with a single international personality. They also agreed to a set of constitutional principles and a federal structure, including a Presidency, a Parliament, and a constitutional court for Bosnia and

Herzegovina. Parties also committed to free elections and to the protection of human rights.

Then just about 2 weeks ago, on October 5, the parties agreed to a Bosnia-wide cease-fire to be followed by proximity peace talks and ultimately a peace conference. I am glad to say that despite its initial imperfections, the cease-fire does seem to be taking hold. The estimate yesterday was that 95 percent of the country is in a cease-fire mode.

This has opened the way fcr a land route to Gorazde, the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Bosnia and the restoration of utilities in Sarajevo. Sarajevo, of course, is so symbolic to all of us and it is very satisfying to see that there has been a real turn around in the quality of life for the beleaguered people of Sarajevo. They are now able to buy food and fuel at rapidly diminishing prices. The streets are now illuminated by the lights of the city rather than by the flash of artillery from the surrounding hills.

Mr. Chairman and members, I can announce this morning that the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia will come to the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside of Dayton, OH, to start the proximity peace talks on October 31. That site provides us, we believe, with a very optimum set of facilities for the three delegations and for the members of the contact group who will be there to try to facilitate the discussions. The site also affords the kind of privacy that is necessary, we believe, to conduct a successful negotiation. As Secretary of State, let me express my gratitude to the Air Force for providing this fine facility and the necessary support.

The parties, when they meet at Wright-Patterson, will have an immensely difficult set of issues to resolve, issues involving territory, elections, constitutional arrangements, and the return of refugees. I plan to open these talks on October 31 and our negotiating team there will be led by Assistant Secretary Dick Holbrooke.

We are determined to do everything we can to help the parties overcome the formidable obstacles that they will certainly face. We want to see them succeed in this endeavor.

At the same time, Mr. Chairman and members, I want to stress that we should not put the cart before the horse. We certainly cannot take it for granted that a settlement will be achieved there. Before we get ready to implement a settlement, before we understand what will be really required for implementation, we must first get the parties to agree and see the shape of the peace agreement. The parties certainly have a considerable distance to go on some very tough issues.

We have a vital interest in their achieving peace and sustaining progress toward peace in this very volatile region of Europe. Americans will remember that twice in this century we have had to send our forces across the Atlantic in large numbers to fight wars that began in Central Europe. Today, after a century of cold and hot war, there is an opportunity to build an integrated and undivided Europe. But we must never forget that Sarajevo was once the spark that ignited the entire continent and required great sacrifice by the United States.

We can prevent that from happening again. We can stop this conflict before it spreads beyond the former Yugoslavia. We can stop it before it threatens progress and stability across Europe and

before it threatens our treaty allies in southern Europe. If we want to stop the killing, if we want to end the worst conflict that has taken place in Europe since World War II, then we must follow through on the strategy that we launched in July and August.

Let me say again that I believe we have the best chance in four years to achieve peace in the former Yugoslavia. Future generations will neither forgive or understand if we turn our backs on this unusual opportunity for peace. America simply must continue to lead.

We have this opportunity today because American exerted determined leadership on behalf of peace. Had we not been prepared to lead, commencing in July and August, we could not possibly have made it this far. If we do not continue to lead, I seriously doubt if progress will continue.

As we weigh these matters, I think it is fundamental to recognize that there will be no peace agreement in Bosnia without the participation of the United States and NATO in the implementation of the peace agreement. The Bosnian Government has made it clear to us very directly and over a long period of time that they will not sign a peace agreement unless there is a commitment by the United States and NATO to help implement it. And certainly the Bosnian Government has good reason to ask for international safeguards, after being the subject of a long and brutal aggression and after three years of broken promises, many of them.

Only NATO can provide the robust forces and the effective command and control which are necessary to deter or prevent the parties from breaking away from their commitments. If we ask NATO to ask and implement the peace we might achieve in Bosnia, the United States cannot fail to contribute troops to that endeavor. We are the bedrock of NATO's strength and force. We cannot say to our allies look, we have come this far together, now you are on your own. That would mean abdicating our leadership of the alliance. It would really imperil NATO in the future and it would imperil the stability of Europe.

It is, of course, true that the risks and costs of this operation must be shared by our allies, and indeed it is worth remembering that Great Britain and France have already borne the bulk of the casualties among the international troops in Bosnia. I pay tribute to their valor, but it is clear to me that this is not a purely European problem and certainly it cannot be solved by the Europeans on their own. They have shown that.

We have learned again in the last few weeks that if the United States does not lead no nation or group has the resolve or the vision or the strength to provide the leadership in our place.

Now some still believe that the best way to implement a lasting peace would be for the international community simply to lift the arms embargo and walk away after a peace agreement has been reached. Such a course would prolong the bloodshed and jeopardize all the progress we have made toward peace just at the moment when we may have a wonderful chance to realize it.

It would certainly be inconsistent for us to walk away, inconsistent with the wishes of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would subject them to another winter of hiding in cellars and mourning in cemeteries.

If and when the peace settlement is reached, Mr. Chairman and members, the United Nations peacekeeping mission will come to an end in Bosnia. As my colleagues will mention to you, many of the forces there of course would be moved over into a NATO force. But the U.N. mission itself will come to an end when a peace agreement is reached. At that point, and only at that point, a NATO-led international force would move in to implement the agreement.

This, of course, is a very complicated mission and it will not be risk free, but one thing I can assure you is that the President does not intend to put American troops into a situation where there is no peace to keep. The force we send in would have a limited mission and would remain for a limited period of time, approximately a year.

As my colleagues will discuss in much more detail, the implementation force will be run by NATO command and control. There will be no United Nations dual key. Some non-NATO countries may participate. Russia may find a way to participate, and I think that would be desirable if you can work it out under circumstances where we do not erode, in any way, the importance of NATO command and control.

Our military efforts must be accompanied by reconstruction efforts so that the peace will endure. The European Union has fortunately volunteered to take the lead in reconstruction efforts but no doubt the United States contribution will be essential here as well. In addition, the international community, working through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, will help to organize elections in Bosnia and to ensure that they are free and fair.

I also want to emphasize, as the President said over the weekend in Connecticut, we will continue our strong support for the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal. We will not accept any agreement that could undermine the War Crimes Tribunal.

Mr. Chairman, we are committed to working very closely with you and members of your committee on every aspect of our involvement in Bosnia. Congress is asking the right questions, and we will continue to try to answer them. Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, and I by the end of today will have testified four times in a 36-hour period.

Let me reiterate what I said yesterday, Mr. Chairman and members. While maintaining the President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief, we would welcome and encourage congressional authorization of such a mission, and U.S. participation in it at the appropriate time.

In the end, it is vital that the administration, Congress, and above all the American people find common ground on the need for American leadership. We must do so for the sake of the common goal of peace in Bosnia, the former Yugoslavia as a whole, as well as our shared commitment to the importance of security in Europe.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Christopher follows:]

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Wednesday
October 18, 1995

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are at a critical point in our efforts to achieve peace in the former Yugoslavia. As a result of American leadership, we have made important progress. For the first time in four years, we have a real chance to reach a peaceful settlement.

If we are to succeed, continued American leadership will be essential. Our ability to sustain that leadership depends on our working closely with the Congress. It equally depends on gaining the support and understanding of the American people. That is why I am pleased to appear before you and the Committee with my colleagues Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili.

It is important to recall how far we have come in just the last few months. As recently as last July, Bosnian Serb forces had overrun two UN-declared safe areas, murdering or expelling their inhabitants, and defying the international community.

Then, we faced a stark choice. The international community could either take firm steps to fulfill its mission, or it could watch the mission collapse. If we had not acted, our NATO allies and other troop contributors might have been forced to pull out, leaving behind a humanitarian catastrophe. Today, we might be here discussing the need to send troops to Bosnia, not to support peace, but to extract peacekeepers from a failed mission.

Under President Clinton's leadership, the situation has been fundamentally changed. First, at last July's London Conference, we convinced our allies to take firm measures, including the use of decisive air power, to protect the remaining safe areas. After the Bosnian Serbs attacked the Sarajevo marketplace, NATO launched a two-week air campaign to make clear that further violations would not be tolerated. NATO stands ready to resume that campaign should it become necessary.

Second, in August, the President launched a new American diplomatic initiative. After weeks of shuttle diplomacy, and despite the loss of three brave American negotiators, we have taken dramatic steps on the path the President laid out.

In September, the parties agreed to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina within its present borders and with a single international personality. The parties agreed to constitutional principles and a federal structure, including a presidency, a parliament, and a constitutional court. They also committed to free elections and the protection of human rights.

On October 5, the parties agreed to a Bosnia-wide cease-fire, to be followed by proximity peace talks and eventually a peace conference. Despite its imperfections, the cease-fire is taking hold. This has opened the way for a land route to Gorazde, the delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia, and the restoration of utilities to Sarajevo. There has been a remarkable turnaround in the quality of life for the people of Sarajevo. The price of food and fuel has dramatically declined. Streets are now illuminated by the lights of the city, not by the flash of artillery firing from the hills.

On October 31, the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia will come to the United States to start the proximity peace talks. They will have an immensely difficult set of issues to resolve, concerning territory, elections, constitutional arrangements, and the return of refugees. I plan to open these talks and our negotiating team at the site will be led by Ambassador Dick Holbrooke. We are determined to help the parties overcome the obstacles they face, and to reach an agreement that would make possible a formal peace conference and ultimately the implementation of a settlement.

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, I want to stress that we cannot put the cart before the horse. We cannot take it for granted that a settlement will be achieved. Before we are ready to implement a settlement, before we know precisely what that will require from us, we must first get the parties to agree to peace. They still have a considerable distance to go.

We have a vital interest in sustaining progress toward peace in this volatile region of Europe. The American people remember that twice in this century we have had to send our soldiers across the Atlantic to fight in wars that began in Central Europe. Today, after a century of hot and cold war, there is an opportunity to build an undivided Europe at peace. But we must remember, Sarajevo was once the spark that ignited an entire continent. We can prevent that from happening again. We can help stop this conflict before it spreads beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia, threatening progress toward peace and stability across Europe.

If we want the killing to stop, if we want to end the worst conflict in Europe since World War II, then we must follow through on the strategy that brought us to this point. Let me say again that this is our best chance in four years to achieve peace in the former Yugoslavia. Future generations would neither understand nor forgive us if we carelessly turned our backs on this opportunity. America must continue to lead.

We have this opportunity because America <u>has</u> exerted determined leadership on behalf of peace. Had we not been prepared to do so, we could not possibly have made it this far. Unless we are willing to continue to lead, I seriously doubt if peace can be achieved.

There will not be a peace settlement in Bosnia unless NATO, and the United States in particular, take the lead in its implementation. The Bosnian government has said directly that it will not sign a peace agreement without a commitment by the United States and NATO to help implement it. The Bosnian government has good reason to ask for international safeguards after years of brutal fighting and dozens of broken agreements. Only NATO can provide the robust forces and the effective command and control needed to deter or prevent the parties from backing away from their commitments.

If we ask NATO to act in Bosnia, we cannot fail to contribute troops to the mission. The United States is the bedrock of NATO's strength and resolve. We cannot say to our allies: "we have come this far together but now you are on your own." That would mean abdicating our leadership of the Alliance. It would imperil the future of NATO and thus the stability of Europe.

The costs and risks of our participation in a NATO mission should certainly be shared by our allies. Indeed, our allies, especially France and Britain, have already borne the bulk of the casualties among international troops in Bosnia. I pay tribute to their valor. But this is not a purely European problem that the Europeans can solve on their own. In the last few weeks, we have seen once again that if the United States does not lead, no nation or group of nations has the strength or vision to replace us.

Some still believe that the best way to implement a lasting peace in Bosnia would be to have the international community lift the arms embargo and walk away. Such a course would prolong the bloodshed and jeopardize all the progress we have made in pursuit of peace, at a moment when peace is finally within reach. It would make it impossible to put into place the institutions of a single Bosnian state, inevitably consigning Bosnia to partition. It would be inconsistent with what the government of Bosnia itself wants. It would subject the Bosnian people to another winter of hiding in cellars and mourning in cemeteries.

If and when a final peace settlement is reached, Mr. Chairman and members, the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia will come to an end. At that point, and only at that point, a NATO-led international force would move in to implement the agreement. Under any circumstances, this will be a complicated mission and it will not be risk-free. But let me assure you that the President will <u>not</u> put our troops in a situation where there is no peace to keep. The force would have a limited mission, and remain for a limited period of time -- approximately one year.

As my colleagues will discuss in greater detail, the implementation force will be run by the NATO command and control structure. There will be no "dual key." Some non-NATO countries may also participate. Russia, for example, can make an important contribution. We are working with Russia to identify an appropriate role, consistent with the principles I have outlined.

Military implementation will be accompanied by humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, so that peace will endure. The European Union will take the lead in reconstruction, but our contribution will also be vital. In addition, the international community, working through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, will help organize elections in Bosnia to ensure they are free and fair. Let me also emphasize, as the President made clear over the weekend, that the United States will continue our strong support for the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal. We will not accept an agreement that undermines its effectiveness.

Mr. Chairman, we are committed to working closely with you on every aspect of our involvement in Bosnia. The Congress is asking the right questions and we will continue to answer them. Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili and I are testifying on the Hill four times this week alone.

In the end, it is vital that the Administration, the Congress, and most important, the American people, find common ground on the need for American leadership. We must do so for the sake of our common goal of peace in the former Yugoslavia, and our shared commitment to security in Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. PERRY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The war in Bosnia has been going on for more than 3½ years with more than 200,000 people killed and with unspeakable atrocities committed. Now we have a real opportunity to end this tragic war. This opportunity is the result of an energetic and creative American diplomatic initiative. It is also the result of a very effective application of NATO airpower.

The peace settlement, if realized, will finally bring some relief to the suffering of Bosnians. But peace in Bosnia is not just about stopping the killing in Bosnia. Peace in Bosnia affects vital national security interests of the United States. By stopping the war before it spreads into a wider Balkan war. By maintaining the strength and the credibility of NATO. And more generally, by maintaining security and stability in Europe.

This peace agreement will call for a peace implementation force which we call by the acronym of IFOR. It will call for IFOR to be under NATO command and control. No other institution is capable of directing such a large and complex military operation. NATO, on the other hand, has for decades developed the command and control, the doctrine, the organization, and the training to conduct precisely such multinational complex military operations.

If this is a NATO operation, in my judgment the United States must participate. The United States leadership in NATO, indeed its role in Europe, is very much at stake. We have said now for 2½ years that there would be no commitment of U.S. military forces without a peace agreement. But I also now say there will be no peace agreement without a commitment of U.S. military forces.

This peace implementation involves both military and civil tasks. The civil task of economic reconstruction, refugee resettling, arms control, elections will be conducted by other organizations.

I am going to talk today about IFOR. IFOR is responsible only for implementing the military tasks of the peace implementation. IFOR will be established and directed by the North Atlantic Council of NATO. It will be under the overall command and control of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Gen. George Joulwan, and it will be under the operating command both for NATO and non-NATO members of Adm. Leighton Smith, who is the commander in chief of the southern forces of NATO.

General Shali will describe more specifically the military tasks involved in carrying out this peace implementation task and what military force structure is necessary to achieve these tasks.

In considering the size of the force we took into account a threat assessment. We do not expect IFOR to be engaged by an organized army. We are going in there only after a peace agreement has been made, after all of the warring parties have agreed to a peace settlement. But after almost four years of conflict, we understand that hatreds have been fanned in that region.

We also recognize that there is a lack of central control for some of the irregular units, military units in Bosnia. Therefore it is clear that the peace implementation will not be easy and IFOR will not be risk-free. As we put this force together then our task is, very

clearly, what can we do, how can we structure this force to minimize that risk?

The brief answer to that is we will put together a powerful military force capable of intimidating the opposition. The force will be large. In our initial consideration, we had to choose between putting in a small force and adding to it if necessary, if contingencies develop, beyond the minimum. Or putting in a large force and subtracting from it if the forces were not necessary. We chose the latter alternative.

That is the same alternative we chose in Haiti. We put in a large force and we drew down, we withdrew the forces when we found it was not necessary. We have chosen the same option here.

Second, the force will be heavily armed, including tanks and armored personnel carriers. Third, there will be a robust rules of engagement. If any of our forces are attacked, they will have the authority to respond, respond decisively, and respond immediately. They will have the authority to come down with a large hammer if anybody attacks them. In effect, this NATO force in Bosnia will be the biggest, the toughest, and the meanest dog in town.

I would like to sum up my points by noting that the U.S. has vital political, economic, and security interests in Europe. Without question the war in Bosnia threatens these vital interests. Therefore, U.S. vital security interests are served by stopping the war.

Now we have an opportunity to do that. But realizing that opportunity will require the participation of U.S. military forces. We will take every action to minimize the risk of those forces, but participation in IFOR will not be without cost and risk. In my judgment, however, allowing the war to continue will entail even greater costs and risk.

This is not a risk-free world that we live on. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Perry follows:]

Testimony before the House Committee on National Security and the House Committee on International Relations by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John M. Shalikashvili 18 October 1995

The security of the United States is inextricably intertwined with the security of Europe. We know this from the harsh lessons of experience. We have learned that when the United States turns its back on European instability, in the long run we are forced to return at much greater price.

Therefore, after World War II we made the conscious decision to stay directly involved in European security. We have re-examined the importance of that commitment in the post-Cold War era, and two administrations--Republican and Democrat--have decided that our political, economic, and security interests require us to stay involved.

The security and stability of Europe is a vital national interest for the United States, and the primary vehicle for achieving that security and stability is NATO, the most successful alliance in history. That security and stability is threatened by the prospect that the conflict in Bosnia could become a much wider war in the Balkans, potentially involving our NATO allies. A peace settlement in Bosnia is now within reach that will allow us to avoid the dangerous spread of this conflict. But that settlement will not take place without a NATO implementation force (IFOR). And NATO cannot undertake this role without US participation, because the engine of NATO is US leadership.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) decision of September 29, 1995, tasked SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe) to develop, as a matter of urgency, a concept of operations for the conduct of a NATO-led operation to implement the military aspects of a peace agreement among the parties in the former Yugoslavia. The NAC approved SACEUR's Concept of Operations for the NATO-led peace implementation force on October 11, 1995. This concept of operations is based on the expectation that the parties will commit to recognize and observe national existing borders and withdraw all forces into their respective territories on the basis of an agreed map.

On this basis, when directed by the North Atlantic Council, SACEUR is to assume overall authority for the operation, designating CINCSOUTH as the commander in theater of an Implementation Force (IFOR) consisting of NATO and non-NATO forces. We expect the NAC to direct the beginning of implementation promptly after the signing of the peace agreement, in order to

maximize the chances it will be effectively implemented and to prevent a deterioration into renewed fighting. A decision to begin implementation will be based on a clear indication that the parties intend to honor their committments under the agreement, although we recognize that irregular forces not under the parties' control may pose problems of compliance. Our demonstrated willingness and ability to react will be critical in deterring or preventing violations. CINCSOUTH is to complete the military tasks in theater associated with the peace agreement, under rules of engagement to be decided by NATO, and to be prepared to control and secure the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia that are not transferred to the IFOR. The IFOR will be prepared to assist in the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers (UNCRO) in Eastern Slavonia, should that prove necessary.

The objective of the implementation force will be to ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace plan. The force's main task will be to oversee the withdrawal of the Federation and Bosnian Serb forces to their respective territories within an agreed period as laid out in the settlement. The force will deploy and operate predominantly in Federation territory, but will be prepared to operate throughout Bosnia. The implementation force will do whatever is necessary, including the use of force, to assure its own security and freedom of movement. Once the warring parties have moved to their designated areas, the IFOR will monitor a narrow zone of separation along the internal borders between the Bosnian Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic.

The IFOR mission will not include reconstruction, resettlement, humanitarian relief, election monitoring, and other non-security efforts that will need to be undertaken in Bosnia. However, there will need to be close liaison between the IFOR commander and the entities charged with the civilian elements of peace implementation.

The force will be led by NATO, under NATO command and control, with NATO rules of engagement. Although the details of the rules of engagement have not been established, the ROE must ensure that NATO forces have an inherent right to self defense and the necessary authority to implement the agreement. There will be no dual key arrangement with the United Nations or any other political oversight authority. UNPROFOR's authority would end when NATO assumes control of the IFOR in the theater. The UN will have no on-going role or involvement in the IFOR, although we will welcome a grant of authority under Chapter VII of the UN charter through a UN Security Council Resolution, if appropriate.

The Rapid Reaction Force and other elements of the UNPROFOR judged to be capable of making a contribution to the peace implementation process will be

invited to become elements of the IFOR under NATO control. Other UNPROFOR units in Bosnia will be withdrawn.

The size of IFOR has not yet been determined. It will be worked out in the detailed operational plan currently being developed by NATO military authorities. Initial planning estimates call for approximately 60,000 ground troops, including combat and combat support personnel. It is our judgment that implementation can only be assured with an adequate force on the ground; air power alone would not be sufficient. The US contribution is still under discussion, but it is likely to be about a division. This will mean about 20,000 U.S. troops on the ground in Bosnia. Other US troops would participate in air, naval, and logistics support activities in the surrounding area.

The implementation force will complete its mission in a period not to exceed 12 months. We believe this will be more than adequate to accomplish the needed tasks that will allow the peace to become self-sustaining.
As we did in Haiti, we anticipate the IFOR will go in heavy and, if successful, would begin drawing down significantly far in advance of the final exit date.

The primary threat to stability and security in the former Yugoslavia has been the preponderent power of the Bosnian Serb Army, especially in heavy weapons. To ensure the durability of the peace agreement, we must redress this imbalance. Our preferred approach would be for the parties to agree to arms control measures under which the Bosnian Serbs would reduce the number of their heavy weapons. In addition to any arms control agreement, we are prepared to assist in helping to create stability through an effort to equip and train Federation armed forces to improve their self-defense capabilties. We will limit those efforts to the minimum necessary to create a balance of forces, without stimulating an arms race. This effort will be separate from the IFOR and will not not involve IFOR troops.

The precise cost to the United States for the IFOR will depend on the size of the American force involved and other details not yet worked out, but initial estimates are in the range of $1-1.5 billion. Apart from normal cost sharing for common NATO infrastructure used in the operation, we will not pay the costs of other troop contributing states. We will seek assistance from countries who do not contribute troops to the force to assist in financing for the massive economic reconstruction effort that will be needed for this war-torn region.

NATO's military authorities are in the process of requesting forces for the IFOR from the member states. We expect contributions from most NATO nations including very substantial contributions from the UK and France. Non-NATO

nations will also participate, as long as they can provide troops and equipment that can perform a function for IFOR and meet minimum criteria for military effectiveness, and can fund their own participation. We have not concluded discussions with other potential non-NATO participants; neither can we say with certainty to what level of participation each country will commit itself. Non-NATO countries will participate under the operational control of the IFOR commander. The military forces of certain PFP countries have already shown in various partnership exercises an ability to work closely with alliance forces.

We see many advantages to having the Russian military participate in the implementation force. If we can find an acceptable way to integrate them into the force, without sacrificing essential unity of command it would help share the burden -- and it would also demonstrate that NATO and Russia can work cooperatively on a key European security question. On October 8, 1995, Secretary Perry met with Russian Minister of Defense Grachev in Geneva to consult on this question. The meeting made some progress, particularly on modalities for further discussion. Russia has sent a three-star general to SHAPE Headquarters to discuss possible arrangements for Russian troop participation, and a team led by Deputy Secretary Talbott is discussing this issue with Russian authorities as we speak.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, we believe that if a peace agreement is reached, it is essential that the United States and its NATO allies, along with our international partners, be prepared to sustain that negotiated peace. As the alliance responsible for peace and security in Europe, NATO can do no less. As the leader of NATO, the United States must lead and shape this effort--an action necessary to protect vital national interests.

The CHAIRMAN. General.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General SHALIKASHVILI. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, members of this committee.

I just returned from a trip to Sarajevo, to Zagreb, and to our forces in Italy. And I would like to update you on the status of planning as it stands today for the implementation force.

On September 29, NATO tasked the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, American Gen. George Joulwan, to develop a concept for a NATO-led operation implementing the military aspects of a peace agreement for Bosnia. This concept addresses as well the withdrawal as well of this UNPROFOR forces which do not choose to stay in Bosnia as part of the NATO-led implementation force.

On October 11, just a few days ago, NATO approved General Joulwan's concept and tasked him as a matter of urgency to develop a detailed plan. Such planning is currently ongoing and should be completed soon. Once completed, the plan will require approval by the President, of course, and by the North Atlantic Council.

The implementation force will do all that is necessary, including the use of force, to ensure its own security and its own freedom of movement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. The force will also have the military capability and the authority to accomplish its mission and its associated military tasks.

Its main task will be to ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace plan, to date identified as overseeing the withdrawal of Federation Bosnian Serb forces to their respective territories, and once the warring factions have withdrawn to their designated territories, to monitor a narrow zone of separation between the Bosnian Federation and the Bosnian Serb area.

Shown on the next chart here are three essential conditions for U.S. participation, concepts that are fully imbedded in the NATO plan now being finalized. NATO must be in charge. The diagram on the right of the chart shows clearly this single NATO chain of command. There must be no dual key arrangements. The implementation force must operate under robust NATO rules of engagement that must ensure that the force can protect itself and that it can get the job done. Non-NATO forces which choose to participate will also participate under these same conditions.

Since this operation will not be without risk, as mentioned by Secretary Perry, the ability to use appropriate force for self-protection in response to a hostile act or a hostile intent will be a key part of the rules of engagement, as will be the ability to use appropriate force to get the job done. But self-protection depends not only on the right rules of engagement, but as Secretary Perry made clear, it depends as well on the force being large enough and properly equipped to deal with the unexpected. Of course, the force will also have proper reaction forces and mobile reserves, as well as be able to call on NATO's existing ground and sea-based airpower.

Nevertheless, we must be prepared that, despite all precautionary measures which we will take, we could very well suffer casualties.

The operation itself will consist of five phases. The preparation phase is, of course, currently ongoing. In addition to the completion of necessary planning, this phase could very well include pre-positioning of selected communications, headquarters, port opening, and support personnel.

Following a decision by the President and the North Atlantic Council, forces will enter very rapidly. This will be the beginning of the entry phase. Within hours of the decision, NATO will assume control of all military operations and all dual key arrangements will cease. NATO rules of engagement will go into effect at this point.

As in Haiti, and as outlined by Secretary Perry, we prefer to go in initially very heavy. But as in Haiti, we expect that sometimes during the end of the implementation phase or during the transition to peace phase conditions will allow a gradual reduction of implementation forces.

How soon and how deep such reductions can be made will, of course, depend on the situation as it will unfold. While we expect such a measured drawdown, we will ensure that we maintain a capable, balanced force right up until the very end.

The final size of the force is, of course, yet to be determined. It will be worked out in detail during the formulation of the plan now being finalized by NATO. However, NATO's initial planning envisions approximately 60,000 troops to be located in Bosnia. Subject to final planning and approval by the President the United States contribution is envisioned to center around a division, approximately 20,000 troops in Bosnia, with others participating in air, naval, and logistic support activities going on in surrounding areas. Such a U.S. deployment would most likely require reserve call up of approximately 2,000 to 3,000 personnel.

NATO's plan will call for the implementation force to complete its mission in 12 months and to withdraw. Subject to the approval of the plan by the President, the cost of the U.S. part of the operation will be approximately $1.5 billion for this 12 month period.

While the President, of course, has not yet made a force commitment, we have been anticipating a possible requirement for operations in Bosnia for a considerable period of time. For some months now, U.S. ground forces which might participate in the implementation force have participated in a most detailed textbook training program specifically tailored to the circumstances that the implementation force would most likely encounter.

These exercises have and will continue to include everything from specific training events focusing on such things as rules of engagement, dealing with local paramilitary forces, avoidance of landmines, to deployment and employment drills. They have consisted of field exercises at our instrumented combined maneuver range in Germany to computer simulation exercises involving all senior leaders.

In short, if committed, America's troops will be very, very well trained for this specific mission.

Our exit strategy is based upon our goal of a sustainable peace settlement. In the past, the primary threat to the stability and security in the former Yugoslavia has been the preponderant power of the Bosnia Serb forces, especially in heavy weapons. To ensure

the durability of the peace agreement, we must redress this imbalance.

Our preferred approach is for the parties to agree to arms control measures under which the Bosnian Serbs would reduce their number of the heavy weapons. However, after necessary surveys and if necessary we will be prepared to assist in creating stability through an effort to equip and train Federation forces to improve their defensive capabilities. We will limit those efforts to the minimum necessary without stimulating an arms race.

This will be accomplished by other than IFOR troops. It will be completed in less than a year. And IFOR will withdraw within 1 year thereafter.

Mr. Chairman, that summarizes the current status of planning for the implementation force. With that, Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, and I are prepared to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, gentleman. If I might just lead off, I will not even get into the questions of national interest and these kind of things.

Yesterday we had some outside witnesses before the committee and one of them was former Canadian General MacKenzie, who is a former U.N. commander in Bosnia. He gave us some advice. He said do not touch it with a 10-foot pole. And he elaborated.

He said if you are going to be a peacekeeper you cannot be looked upon as the enemy and you are looked upon as the enemy by one side, at least, in this conflict because you have taken sides. Rightly or wrongly, you have done it with air strikes and now we propose to even equip and train one side and not both sides in the conflict. So it goes back to the cardinal rule of peacekeeping of making no enemies and taking no sides. We have already done that.

I thought we learned a lesson in Somalia and everyone confessed the mistake we had made when we let the mission change from one of peacekeeping into peacemaking, and we took sides in Somalia and then you see what happened. It blew up in our face because we were the enemy, we were attacked, and we had to leave.

I have that question here. We have, to the credit of this administration and to our negotiators, we have helped to broker this peace agreement if it ever comes about. But rightly or wrongly, even though we took sides, the air strikes helped to bring these warring parties to the table.

And so my question is, as General MacKenzie said, why not let somebody else do the peacekeeping? He even suggested British, French, and even Canadians, anybody else except the United States, because we are looked upon as the enemy by at least one side, so we cannot serve in a role of being a peacekeeper because of that history. So that is my question.

Why not let others carry the ball the rest of the way? We have got them to this place now, and why not let others do the rest of the job? Whoever would like to answer that for me.

Secretary PERRY. I will take a pass at that and maybe Secretary Christopher and General Shali would like to add.

General MacKenzie's suggestion is basically let George do it, and that is always a very appealing and very seductive proposal for any difficult task. Another way of posing his suggestion is let the Brit-

ish, French, and the Dutch form a multinational European coalition to go in and keep the peace.

Mr. Chairman, I suggest we have been there. We have been there for the last 3½ years. General MacKenzie is one of the commanders of that formation. We have seen the results of that process. I would not propose to repeat that. Maybe Secretary Christopher would like to add.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. With all respect to General MacKenzie, I simply do not agree with his analysis of the situation. If we have learned anything in the last four years, it is very unlikely that the Europeans are going to be able to resolve this problem. The initiative the President launched this past summer was because of enormous frustration over a problem that was not being resolved.

I also disagree with him with respect to the reputation of the United States. I think we have a very good reputation among the parties. The reason we are making progress toward peace is that the United States is trusted. I think that we can be effective in the role that we would save for ourself in peace implementation precisely because the United States is trusted.

We are trusted in part because we are very powerful and I think it would be very unlikely that anybody would want to take on the kind of forces the United States would have there. So with all respect, I think that General MacKenzie did not advise this committee wisely.

The CHAIRMAN. I still ask the question of how we can be neutral as peacekeepers when we have taken sides and are looked upon as the enemy. I repeat, it was a different situation up until now. It was true that the other nations could not operate in this area before because we had no peace agreement. We are presuming now that we will have a peace agreement. And after that is when I propose that others do that peacekeeping task, as we have done in other areas before. Let the United Nations do their work there. That is what they are cut out to do. We have done our part now.

As I said, the administration has done a good job in helping to broker this peace agreement and our air power has brought them to the table. Let us let somebody else carry the load the rest of the way.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, there is really a fundamental misunderstanding in the point that you have just made, if you will permit me. There will not be any peace agreement unless the United States agrees to implement it. The Bosnian Government simply will not sign a peace agreement unless NATO and the United States are committed to implement it. They have told us that from the very time I came into this office and as recently as last week.

So we should not fool ourselves that somehow there is going to be a peace agreement here and somebody else will implement it. It will not happen.

Now when we go about implementing, we intend to be evenhanded. I think the parties will respect our evenhandedness. The role that General Shalikashvili has described there, the separation of forces, carrying out the military plan, is one that we will carry out with fine evenhandedness. But if either party, any of the parties, violate the agreement then they can be sure that if the United

States is involved there that they will have to pay very heavy costs for that.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to carry this any further because it is just kind of twisted reasoning to think that we are going to have force this on the sides, that they cannot agree to peace because of the situation on the ground among themselves, that this now is how we are going to do it. Divide up the responsibilities and the parties will have their part of the territory and all the rest.

That is what they are agreeing on, not because we force them to do it. That is not peace if we have to do that.

Mr. Dellums.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Given the fact that our witnesses have a limited time with us and I have had the opportunity to frame the discussion as I see it and to raise the issues that I think are important to answer as we go about making an informed judgment about this matter, I would reserve my time in the interest of allowing the more junior members to have access to the witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Montgomery.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have great respect for our three witnesses today. They are capable and have certainly given their service to this country. I am uncomfortable with the Bosnian mission. It is very dangerous for Americans and no one can be sure of the conclusion.

This is not my question, but I want to make this point and then I will have a question. It is rather strange the way I put this this morning, but you know we have this total force now and if you do put American forces in Bosnia, you should use the total force. By that, use the National Guard and Reserves. Do not exclude them like some of them were during the Iraqi operation. Use the combat arm and use the National Guard and Reserve.

I see the Secretary and the General are nodding. That is what you plan to do?

Secretary PERRY. We are a total force. We do not go into any major operations without Reserves and Guards.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. But use your combat arm, such as the infantry, artillery, and armored. Do not exclude them like they were mainly during the Iraqi war.

My question is I would argue that the War Powers provision of article 1 section 8 of the U.S. Constitution requires prior authorization of the U.S. deployment for a peacekeeping operation such as this. In other words, when President Bush came before the Congress he got permission through the War Powers Act from Congress that this operation could take place.

I know that was an operation of movement into another country. Are you sure you can do this operation without getting Congress to give you approval under the War Powers Act?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Congressman, as I said earlier, without giving up any of the President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief, we would welcome and encourage the Congress at the right time to provide authorization and we will comply with the War Powers Act as we go about any activities here.

It is certainly true, Mr. Montgomery, that the congressional power of the purse will be a very potent aspect of this, and ulti-

mately Congress will have to appropriate the necessary funds. But I think it is also very important to preserve the President's power to act as Commander in Chief because at some moments he may have to act very swiftly in that regard.

But we will comply with the War Powers Act and, as I say, we welcome and encourage congressional authorization at the right time.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. As I recall the War Powers Act, the President can put troops on the ground but after a certain time he has to remove them unless he gets congressional approval. How do you answer that?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Congressman, I answer that by saying that we will comply with the provisions of the War Powers Act, as we have in the past. As I say, at the right time we would welcome and encourage congressional authorization which would provide the provision that you are referring to. I am sure that Congress will address this problem as we move through it.

I can only repeat what I have said before. We will comply with the act and we encourage and welcome any resolution that the Congress might take which would authorize this mission.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. My time has not expired, but if in 60 days you have these Americans there, some of them are going to get hurt. It is going to be awful hard, but right now most of us probably would vote against this mission anyway if you come back and ask that we implement the War Powers Act.

If we implement it, then you would have to get Americans out of there. You will not have a year. You are going to have less than 60 days.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Congressman, your question seems to presume that we have a peace agreement, that there has been an appropriate U.N. resolution, that NATO has acted. We have a number of things that need to be done. This implementation is not likely to take place tomorrow.

I wish I could tell you we are going to reach a peace agreement swiftly, but I cannot tell you that. It is very complex negotiations, so let us take this matter sequentially.

We are here to cooperate with the Congress, Congressman. We are not here to try to thwart the will of Congress. We want to work with you on this problem because we know at the end of the day that you have the power of the purse, which is very significant, and we also will comply with all of the existing laws of the republic. Of course we do that. The reason we have come here is to find a proper basis to consult, to gain your support if we can.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I have been around here a long time. I doubt if we would cut the purse strings off to Americans over there on the ground. We never have done that before. But I am still concerned about the War Powers Act and putting these Americans on the ground.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our very distinguished witnesses. We are genuinely pleased to have you here in order that we can have a meaningful discussion of this very, very troubling decision that the United States of America has

to make, and which I think we have needed more consultation and discussions prior to this point than we have had.

This is not what really my note said I should be asking about, but Secretary Christopher I have sat here in some almost amazement to hear you say that this administration apparently is endorsing the War Powers Act, because my recollection is from Nixon until now no President has ever conceded the constitutionality of the War Powers Act. And I tended to agree with them through the years.

Now you are saying that yes, we will comply with it.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. We have always honored the provisions without conceding the constitutionality of it, Congressman. We have filed the necessary reports under the War Powers Act, but each time we filed them——

Mr. BATEMAN. You will retain the concept that we are not constitutionally bound to do this?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. We will always reserve, as I did in my answers, the constitutional power of the President.

Mr. BATEMAN. Let me get on to the more immediate concerns. It is said in the press this morning that our NATO allies have the capability to do militarily that which needs to be done. It is said, however, that there has to be an American role and participation if there is going to be a peace agreement, and certainly I concede that that is just inevitable and, inevitably and very appropriately, something that we must be significantly engaged in.

But if we are going to provide the larger portion of the logistical support, if we are going to supply certain elements of the intelligence requirements which we are uniquely qualified and in a position to provide, if we have provided the leadership and the credibility which brought the parties to a successful peace agreement I find it difficult to understand why we, in addition to these other very major roles that we play, have to put 20,000 or 25,000 troops on the ground. Especially in the context where there is some genuine concern that, having brought about the peace through American insistence on the use of air power, and where we may legitimately be described as an enemy, that our troops are more likely to be targets than other peacekeeping troops who are sent on the mission.

I do not fear so much that if we send 20,000 or 25,000 American troops over there, that anyone is going to launch a direct, overt attack on some significant component of that force. But the MP who is out there doing the things which they will be required to do, the engineers who are cleaning up areas that have been mined may become very ripe targets for very single, isolated, but nonetheless lethal affronts to our soldiers.

And then what do we do and who do we attack with all of that massive, robust force and being the meanest dog? Who does the meanest dog attack? I am afraid that there are very significant problems with where we are going here.

I do not believe that the United States can withdraw without responsibility. If anything, I would have been one who applauded our assuming more responsibility a lot earlier. I would even suggest that we never got around to that responsibility.

This goes back to the previous administration as well as this one. We never got around to it until we found ourselves entrapped in a promise that we would send forces to extricate the UNPROFOR forces if they had to withdraw. And only under the threat that we were about to have to do that did we really get that fully engaged to where we now have produced, we hope, the context within which an agreement may arise.

I hope that what I see here as the methodology for planning and ultimately coming to a program is something that we will be consulted on, that we will know more about as we go through because this is more about a plan to come up with a plan than it is a plan.

I am also very, very concerned about the indications that we have said this is an operation that must cease in a year. I think it has all of the difficulties that led the administration to say that you should not put a time limit on Somalia, you should not put time limits on Haiti and other operations. I think it invites all of the evils that you said we should not set time limits in those circumstances that I think are inherently here, if not in a more aggravated sign.

I am sorry to have taken so much time. If you have any comments, I would be happy to receive them.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Mr. Bateman, first on the point that you raised that there are still unanswered questions. There certainly are. Neither the peace agreement is yet complete, so we do not know yet all the aspects of what might be required for the implementation of the peace plan.

Second, because the peace agreement has not been reached, the military plan for the IFOR cannot be finalized. But we thought it would be prudent to come and begin this process of discussing this with you now, instead of waiting until we had all the answers.

As far as the point is concerned whether the Europeans have the military capabilities to implement this plan, I answered that question yesterday but in a very narrow sense. Tank for tank or armored personnel carrier for armored personnel carrier, they have the capability. But yet when you look at whether they really, in totality, have the capability you only have to look at what is ongoing right now. Because it takes more than just the military hardware to do the job. It takes the organizational capability, the political influence and the political leadership. In that sense, I believe it is absolutely essential that America participate if this operation is to be successful.

As to the size of America's force, part of that force, I have argued from the beginning that the force size should be determined not only by a specific task that might have to be accomplished, but as much if not more so by the requisite size so that force can properly defend itself if something unexpected were to occur.

I am very leery about saying let us just send a brigade and attach it to some larger unit, knowing that that brigade might not have the balance, all the capabilities it would need to properly protect itself. So I have argued from the very beginning whether it is, as we had talked before, helping to withdraw someone or now, to help implement a peace agreement, America's part of that operation must be big enough and balanced enough and robust enough

that no matter what the unexpected might be we will have the capability to protect ourselves properly.

As far as the 1 year period is concerned, as I looked at the military tasks that we now see that this force will have to accomplish, and as we look at how long it would take to ensure that the Bosnian forces would have the ability to properly protect themselves, it looked like and it continues to look like those tasks can be completed in 1 year. And so I had recommended to Secretary Perry that we plan on withdrawing that force in 1 year.

What happens otherwise is that you stay longer, that you take on new missions, mission creep starts, and all of the things that we have discussed here as ill advised. We have tried, on two occasions now, to set a specific time line. First in Rwanda, and we met the time line and left even ahead of it. The second time was in Haiti. We set a very specific time line and we are very much on schedule and intend to leave when that deadline comes.

We think this is the more prudent way to go in this particular operation here. That is why I, for one, recommended the 1 year time.

Secretary PERRY. This is an important management principle, setting goals, and sticking with them. I think the example in Haiti is the clearest example of the success of doing that, where we had a definite goal in bringing down the size of our forces from 20,000 to 2,000, to turning it over to the United Nations on a specific date. We had that set up many, many months in advance, almost a year in advance, and we stuck to that schedule.

The alternative to not having that, as General Shali has said, is that everybody brings in other missions and other programs and the expense goes up, the risk goes up. We are much better having a fixed objective and sticking with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Schroeder, the gentlelady from Colorado.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for being here.

I must say I feel a little better having heard the initial questions because I think some of them came from this morning's headline, and I take it we have heard a softening of that headline. But it says "President not bound on Hill by deploying troops, Christopher says."

I think all of us feel that from history we have learned one thing, that troops are national troops and should never be deployed without a national consensus, that they are not personal troops of the President and you put them out there and then try and demand everybody support them because of where they are. So I was pleased to hear you say this is not the final briefing, this is a beginning and this is a process and we will learn.

Some of the questions, though, that I have as I have listened to this is there is some haunting similarities to things that we have been through in recent years. And that is when I hear you say that probably one of the most difficult things or one of the most critical things our forces would be subjected to would be irregular paramilitary type forces. In other words, kind of like the warlord forces or whatever that we saw in Somalia.

I guess my first question is then, if these are people who are not at the table, and we obviously cannot find any way to bring them

to the table and bind them at the peace process, why does it not make more sense for the parties to the peace process to be policing together in these zones against these paramilitary types. Because clearly they have got to establish control over them or when we leave, no matter what the deadline, there is the chance that they can come back and take control again, as we saw in Somalia.

So I think that whole paramilitary irregular force that is out there, and is such a large force in this area, is a deep concern. And I think we have also learned from history putting Americans in there, one thing we often do is we unify all the polarized forces to finally come together against us, that we are the one that they can all unify around because we are the 2-ton gorilla.

Now I know we have to play a part, but can we do supplies, can we do logistics, can we do those types of things? Is there any way to get the parties to the agreement to police their agreement, since their prior agreements have not gone very well with British and French and outside troops trying to do it? How do you best get paramilitary forces under control? I think it is a challenge to the whole Western World we have not figured out.

And I guess the final thing that keeps going through my mind through all of this is where is Russia, where is Russia, where is Russia? And where is Russia going to be when we end up with this final agreement? Will they be unhappy? Will they be stirring up trouble? Who could be feeding these paramilitary groups to cause more trouble because we have gotten the United States lured in?

So I think our great fear is the quagmire fear of are we getting lured in. The great fear that everybody would always love to have us in because we can blast our way out if we do get in. But that is not what we want in this type of situation.

So how do we best get an agreement that will finally bring peace, when we have had so many failed agreements in that region that have not brought peace but have brought false hopes over and over again? Thank you, again.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mrs. Schroeder, let me begin and my colleagues will no doubt want to add.

One thing that headline writers do not do for you is to put in the qualifications. The headline in the Washington Post today, of course, is a very considerable overstatement. In my testimony yesterday I made it clear that I recognized the power of the purse. Indeed, Senator Byrd and I had quite a colloquy on that.

But one point I would like to make and that is I think you would want the President to maintain the constitutional power to deploy American troops, even if you did take a general position against it. Let me give you this hypothetical. Suppose Congress took a general position against the deployment of American troops in Bosnia. But a time came when there were 10 Americans who were trapped and in great danger in some city near the border of Bosnia. I think you would all want the President to be able to deploy our forces in a way to rescue those Americans or to save those American lives.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. And Mr. Secretary, I think that the War Powers Act makes that exemption clearly on the emergency basis and short-term basis. So I think that Congress would totally agree for that. It is the long-term one that we are concerned about.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. The Washington Post did not bother to make that exemption this morning and it was misleading. That is the example I gave yesterday. The rescue of Americans I think is something that the President always has to be able to do, even if Congress has taken a general position to the contrary.

On a second part of your question, as to whether or not the parties cannot somehow undertake the implementation themselves, you know there is a great struggle here to avoid U.S. involvement, and I think we all understand that that would be preferable. But the experience of the parties over a long period of time, certainly the last 4 years and maybe the last 400 years, is that they are going to need some help as they go about the first steps of implementation.

We think that it is essential that NATO forces, not just the United States, provide the separation of forces, monitor the first steps toward the implementation of the peace agreement.

You say it has never worked in the past, but there has not been a peace agreement between these three parties. We have had cease-fires in the past, but what is different about this cease fire is that it is coupled to a peace agreement. So it is our best judgment, after thinking about it for a long time—and obviously, it is not our preferred option to use American troops, but because the parties insist on it, because the circumstances require it, we think this is the soundest plan to try to achieve a peace in that most beleaguered area.

Secretary PERRY. Congressman Schroeder, I want to comment on the point relative to the opposition of the threat that the forces might face. I testified yesterday and testified again today I do not expect the forces there to be opposed by an organized army. But in Bosnia, as in Haiti, it is quite possible that there will be some people with arms that will not accept the agreement and will therefore, in one way or another, try to harass the peacekeeping force.

As in Haiti, our best defense against that is to have well-armed, well-trained troops with robust rules of engagement. That happened to us two times in Haiti and both times we came down very quickly and very decisively. We have not had problems like that in Haiti in the months since then. It is not risk free, but we can protect ourselves against it as well as possible by the way we arm and train troops and the kind of rules of engagement we give them.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hefley.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I had a question on Russia.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. On Russia? I am very glad to talk about the situation with respect to Russia, Mrs. Schroeder, because it is something that ought to be a concern to all of us.

First, let me say that Russia has been cooperating with us in this effort to try to achieve a peace agreement. They have been working as a member of the contact group and, in the recent negotiations between the three Presidents and with the three Presidents, Russia has had a Deputy Foreign Minister involved at all stages. So I think it is important to try to include them if possible.

Now with respect to their involvement in the implementation force, I also think it would be desirable if we can find an appropriate role for Russia, so they do not feel excluded, so they do not feel that the West has turned their back on them. But that role

must not be one that erodes or in any way militates against the command and control arrangements.

In other words, IFOR must be under the command and control of the NATO forces and it is going to take some rather skillful work in order to find a role for Russia that does not, in some way, erode the necessary command and control of NATO. But there are many functions in connection with implementation relating to other issues, other matters such as perhaps reconstruction or dealing with refugees. There are other aspects of the matter that perhaps Russia will have a satisfying role in this.

That is our preference, but we would not want it to be a role that would erode the command and control structure.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hefley.

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the panel for sharing with us, because I think it is time we had some sharing up here, particularly after the headlines this morning that basically—and believe me, we all understand, Mr. Christopher, very well what headline writers do to people. So we understand that, but when we read a headline that basically says we do not care what the Congress thinks, we are going to do what we want to do anyway, it does get some backs up here. So it is important that you be here and visit with us.

I think what we have had here today is more a statement of feelings from the people up here than questions of you, in some respect, but I think that is important, too. I think you need to know that feelings run very strongly up here. If you put it to a vote of this committee right now, I think the idea of sending our troops over there would go down very substantially. So I think you have a selling job to do.

Some months ago General Powell sat where you are sitting and we were talking about this subject, and his advice to us was to keep the ground troops out of there, if I remember correctly. To keep the ground troops out because we are going to get shot at by everybody. That we are not talking here about just a simple civil war, we are talking about centuries old hatreds, and that it is very difficult to know who the good guys and the bad guys are, and that seems to change at any given time. And that we are going to be the target of all sides.

You know much better than we do about the atrocities that have been going on there, and the idea that we can imagine that our young people are not going to be the targets is hard to imagine.

I think you have a selling job to do when it comes to the point of whether or not this is our responsibility. It is a horrible thing. We all recognize it is a horrible thing. But it is our responsibility? Can we run in and solve all of the horrible things in the world?

And since it is a centuries old problem, what happens, we enforce that neutral 20 kilometer area. We get some measure of peace there for a year. But what happens when we move out? Does that just wipe away all of the hatreds that have been there? Or does it happen again?

Then I guess my criteria, in trying to decide on things like this, is whether or not I could go to a family of someone, a young person who has come home in a body bag, and explain to that family how this young American has done a great thing for his country, to give

his life in this way. And I have to tell you, at this point, I could not do that very well. You have to help us with that if you want support for us to do that. You have to help us know why this is so crucial to American interests that we can explain to families that your child his or her life for a wonderful cause.

Then, of course, I think Mr. Perry it comes to the question of how we are going to pay for it. We have been struggling with your budget up here, trying to come up with enough funds to provide for a strong national defense of this country. And this is going to be $1.5 billion extra. We do not have that, I do not think, in the defense budget. I do not think we can reach into the defense budget and get it in a reasonable way, in a way that this committee is satisfied.

So is there a possibility that we could pay for it by taking it from the AmeriCorps program or some of the other pet programs of the Clinton administration? You do have to make some hard choices when you do not have unlimited revenues. So where are those hard choices going to come and how are we going to pay for this thing? I will stop at that point, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary PERRY. Let me make two comments on several of the points made by Congressman Hefley. General Powell's advice to keep our ground troops out of Bosnia has also been my advice for the last 2½ years, and it still is my advice relative to sending ground troops in as combatants in a war.

My advice has always been qualified, though, on the base that if we can get a peace agreement, then I have been prepared and am still prepared to send U.S. ground forces in there to effect it. If we can get a real peace agreement. We do not have that yet. We are having this discussion here on the prospect that we are going to get such an agreement.

Now how to pay for this, we estimate it is about $1.5 billion. That estimate is premature also. That can go up and down as we get the details of this plan defined. It would have to be a supplemental appropriation. We would have to come to the Congress with a request for supplemental appropriation.

What are the source of funds for that supplemental appropriation? At the time that we would bring this request for supplemental, I would be prepared to recommend a source of funds. I cannot do that, of course, until I know what the 1996 defense budget is, which we do not yet have. But at such time as we have a 1996 defense budget, I would be prepared to recommend a source of funds for this program.

General SHALIKASHVILI. I think it is important that I also tell you that, as Secretary Perry and as General Powell, I have argued against the involvement of American ground troops in the absence of a peace agreement, under UNPROFOR. And I hope that at least within the inner circles of the Government, I have been the strongest voice arguing against that.

But even when I was Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and General Powell sat in the seat that I now occupy, we were working then on a plan for the potential implementation of a peace, should that have been possible. So this notion of America's potential involvement in the implementation of a peace plan is an exception to the notion that America's ground forces should not be involved

on the ground. It goes back to the time when I was Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and General Powell occupied my seat.

I think that has been one of the two exceptions that we have always very openly discussed before. One being to help implement a peace agreement should all warring factions, in fact, sign up and wish to have a peace. And the second one was that if everything went wrong, to help withdraw UNPROFOR. So I just say that this is not a new notion.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much. I welcome our distinguished panel. We do appreciate your being with us today. I first would like to tell you that I respect the President's role as Commander in Chief. I understand our duty as a Congress under the Constitution, and I want to work with you and be of help in this very difficult task that this administration has before it.

But first there are several issues that are yet unclear. Let me point them out, if I may. The first, of course, the terms of the agreement. You do not know yet, but what that states makes a great deal of difference.

The second, what is our clear-cut mission with our forces there? The third, what is the end state? In other words, what constitutes success.

And the fourth deals with the rules of engagement. General Shalikashvili pointed out, this is not risk free. There will be mines. There will be boobytraps. And there will be rogue units that may think it important to go out and shoot at a couple of Americans. Do these rules of engagement allow us to pursue them, and if we capture them, not turn them loose in 5 days? The bottom line for this, of course, as has been pointed out, is the safety of our troops as they do this very difficult mission.

On top of all of this, I think this administration needs not just to talk with us here in Congress. We stand in the shoes of some 500,000 people back home in Jefferson City and Lexington, Peculiar and Waynesville, and Ozark and many other small towns and communities, and large cities across the Nation. I think this administration needs to explain to the American people the importance of what you propose should this peace treaty come to pass.

Secretary Christopher, I will give you this opportunity and I will ask you not just to again go over it in detail, but explain to those mothers and daddies, and aunts and uncles, and grandparents why it is important for their young people to participate in uniform as it would be in the interest of the United States of America. I ask you to do that now, sir.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, Congressman Skelton. I welcome the opportunity to talk about this issue because this is the beginning of a process. We are here recognizing the constitutional responsibilities of the Congress. Our Founding Fathers built a certain amount of tension into our Constitution between the executive branch with the President as Commander in Chief and the Congress as having its powers with respect to the purse as well as other important powers. So we are working together and Congress represents the views of the American people in a way that we must convince you by way of convincing the American people.

Now what I would say to a mother in that situation is that I would recall that twice before this century the United States has had to send not a limited number of troops, but an almost unlimited number of troops to take part in a war that started from Central Europe, once from the very city that we are talking about here now. We have an opportunity to avoid being put in that situation again.

But I think the fact that twice we have gone to war in Europe and lost thousands and thousands of men is an indication of the importance that Europe has for the United States. Europe is of vital interest to the United States militarily, economically, politically. And something that threatens the peace and stability of Europe ends up threatening the peace and stability of the United States as well.

So I would say that we are making an investment in putting the troops into a situation of peacekeeping that will avoid the broader conflict in Europe and can avoid a commitment of a much larger number of troops. We have an opportunity to achieve a peace, but it can be achieved only if the United States is involved in the way that we are describing here.

This is important, but it is a modest commitment compared to the commitment we made both in World War I and World War II. It is to avoid that kind of a situation where the war spreads beyond Bosnia, beyond the former Yugoslavia, and we are drawn in, not to a peacekeeping effort but to a major effort because of the threat to our treaty partners in, for example, Greece and Turkey, and because of the threat to the stability of Europe.

So one would say to a mother—and there is no adequate explanation if you are doing it after the fact—but in advance you would say that the President as Commander in Chief, supported by the Congress, and that ultimately certainly would be necessary, has concluded that it is in the American national interest to take this step. We will do everything we can to minimize the number of casualties, and we have had very good fortune in that regard. For example, in Haiti we tried to conduct it in that way. But it is in the American national interest to avoid this conflict from spreading beyond Yugoslavia and putting us in a situation where we would have to put in not 20,000 troops but maybe ten times that many.

Secretary PERRY. Congressman Skelton, I would only add to the point that Secretary Christopher made. Stopping in the war, which is the opportunity we have now, will entail putting in U.S. troops and the risks that go with that. The only reason we should be willing to take those risks is because we believe continuing the war entails greater risks to the United States. In other words, we do not have a choice between taking the risk and no risk. We have a choice between two different qualities of risk.

It is my judgment, and Secretary Christopher's and General Shalikashvili's judgment that the risk of the war continuing, to the United States, is greater. The issue of this war spreading is not an academic issue. The potential of a war between Croatia and Serbia has been hanging over our heads for the whole 3½ years of this war. The potential of the war spreading to Macedonia, to Albania, has been hanging over our heads. If it spreads to Macedonia and Albania, then it threatens Greece as well.

So these are the concerns, and they are not academic concerns.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Buyer.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Christopher, if I were that father, you did not make a very convincing case to me. You had that opportunity to tell that father, and Ike Skelton who has a son who is a decorated veteran of the gulf war. I do not know what Ike's opinion is; you would have to ask him. I think you have a lot more work ahead of you.

There is a history with us. I recall 2½ years ago when you brought all the Members of the Congress in, yourself and Les Aspin and Colin Powell and the chairman, Lee Hamilton, you jammed us all into a committee room for this big announcement. The big announcement was, the President of—this was on a Thursday. The big announcement was that the President of the United States has made a decision. What you said to me was, the decision was that no other country is taking the lead, therefore, the United States shall take the lead, and we have a three-pronged plan. The three-pronged plan is that we will have strategic air strikes against Serbian artillery positions, we will embargo all ports by air, land, and sea, and we will deploy United States ground troops to Yugoslavia.

You then depart and go off to Europe. Tuesday, the President then makes an announcement to the country. What he says to the country is, Europe should take the lead. Wow! Thank God for a memory.

Over that time period Europe then takes the lead. Secretary Perry just advises us, oh, we should not let Europe take the lead because it has been a failure. Well, while Europe was there in their efforts to take the lead they were not backed up. Even at their request, they were not backed up with allied air support when it was asked. Oh, we had some intermittent but it never came through with the power that it did most recently.

The Congress getting impatient, not only the House but the Senate overwhelmingly passes a resolution to lift the arms embargo. You made tactful diplomatic noise—appropriate. But it sends a tremendous message to Europe, who can be a quarrelsome bunch. The message—Europe receives that message and says, oh my gosh, the United States they do not realize what they are doing. We cannot let arms just flow into this part of the world. The United States just does not understand.

So then we come behind the new plan and we call these robust rules. The chairman and I and Sol Ortiz went over in August and met with the NATO command and we talked about, if you are going to move forward in those robust rules, you lose your protection of neutrality if you are going to declare sides, and we have a fear. The fear is that if we make these attacks, what about the Croats and the Muslims who have just had a successful offensive, will they take advantage and do another offensive? Oh, no, no, no, we do not think that will happen. Ha. It happened. The battle lines are redrawn again on the ground.

So when the chairman opened up this hearing with that question of, how can you say, Secretary Perry, or qualify—I qualify is what you just said. I qualify that I will not put combat troops on the ground. But I will put U.S. troops on the ground in a nonpermissive environment. Oh, a nonpermissive environment. OK. If a per-

missive environment is when there are no combatants, but a semipermissive environment is when there are good guys and bad guys present. Oh, then let us not tell America that there are combat troops on the ground. Let us say that they are peacemakers. Oh, OK.

So what you are then telling that father back home is that when your son is on the ground and they have got all these AK–47's around there, when that AK–47 is pointing at you, you are that peacemaker. When he drops his weapon you go over there and all of the sudden you take it from him; he drops the weapon. Now you are the peace enforcer. Then after you secure the environment, then you are a peacekeeper. And when the mission is over he gets to go home as a humanitarian. Not as a war hero because it was not a war. It was a peace effort.

So we are playing with some words here, but real lives are at stake. So when the chairman opened up, I was not satisfied with the answer, because how do you maintain the protection of neutrality in an effort to maintain a peace in a region of the world where there is no peace?

Last, I am baffled—baffled that we can stay, we will maintain our neutrality while at the same time we will have an arms control agreement and we will arm the Muslims at a time when the Russians are the ones who are arming both sides to the conflict.

So I will be quiet and, please, if you do not give the detailed answers I am coming back. Go ahead, Secretary Perry.

Secretary PERRY. I just do not have the same reading of history that you have, and I do not know which one of the disagreements to start in at. I disagree with almost everything that you said.

Mr. BUYER. I suppose that is why you have that position. Would you answer the one in particular about the chairman's question that you would not answer on neutrality?

Secretary PERRY. Be more specific on the question. What was the question?

Mr. BUYER. The perspective was is that you said that, for the longest time you have maintained that you would not send combat troops to Bosnia.

Secretary PERRY. I never maintained that. I am happy to have a chance to answer that. I have maintained consistently that we would not send U.S. ground troops as combatants in a war. That is very, very different from saying we would not send combat troops in. We would not send U.S. troops as combatants. That is not a play on words. That is a fundamental difference. We do not want to have our troops involved in a war in Bosnia.

Mr. BUYER. But you are willing to send—I want to be right on the record. You want to send combat troops to Bosnia; that is correct, on the ground?

Secretary PERRY. That is what I have so testified. I have said it has risk associated with it. And I have also said the risk of not stopping the war would be greater to the United States.

Mr. BUYER. Would you agree that those combat troops that you are willing to send to Bosnia are losing the protection of neutrality given that we have chosen sides in the conflict?

Secretary PERRY. No, I would not concede that.

Mr. BUYER. You would not concede that.

Secretary PERRY. Why do you say we have chosen sides?

Mr. BUYER. Then let me ask you this question, and Mr. Christopher since he has to deal with diplomacy. May I ask a followup and then I will——

The CHAIRMAN. We have got to go vote. We had better recess for a few minutes and we will run right back.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sisisky.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being here this morning.

I have learned over the years one thing, that there is no simple answer to this problem. If I have learned anything, I am convinced that that is the thing. I have been to enough European meetings where we have debated this issue of Bosnia. We kept telling the Europeans to do it and we will back them up; and that is fine. It is easy for us to say. But the one thing that got to me was that there was a void in leadership and the Europeans needed American leadership. I am absolutely convinced that is what they needed.

I am just going to follow up a little bit on the national interest. That is where we have been lacking. Just to follow up on Mr. Skelton. It is the President of the United States that has got to define to the American public the national interest. I do not know how to do it, but to me that is what is going to have to be done.

Now one of the questions I have and I want to be sure, and you have explained it, Secretary Christopher. But how important to the settlement is the presence of American troops? In other words, we are going to be meeting at Ohio and I want to know how important it is to the participants in there for the American troops. I think the other thing that is at stake that a lot of us miss is the future of NATO. I think, in my opinion, that if we do not have an American presence that NATO will be weakened to a point that we will all be very sorry about.

Now another question came up about the cost. Obviously, that is a big concern. But what about the cost if we do not do anything and the war spreads; $1 billion or $1.5 billion would be small amounts of money compared to—in my opinion. I would like to hear your comment of what would happen there.

But basically, I think what is happening now with the fall of the Berlin Wall is that we have different missions. It was easy when we knew who the enemy was. I think we are learning a lot in peacekeeping and peacemaking and peace enforcement. We certainly learned a lot in Somalia with mission creep, and I think we have learned that lesson in Haiti where we did not let the mission creep any. But to me that is going to be the future.

And the future is that the United States is going to have to lead all over the world whether we like it or not. I know that is a very difficult thing to explain to the American public. It is difficult for me to explain to my wife because we have an 18-year-old grandson. So it is difficult.

But I want to say one more thing before the light goes on. Yesterday to the witnesses who were opposed to the presence of American troops I asked a very simple question; were you in favor of lifting the embargo? And they said, yes, we were in favor of lifting the embargo. Then I asked General MacKenzie, am I correct in saying

that if we lift the embargo that the Brits and the French would pull out of there? He said, yes. And it would take about 50,000 American troops to protect them in their withdrawal? And he says, yes. So it is hard for me to realize, those who were in favor of lifting the embargo now are not in favor of the other thing.

I have listed enough questions, so if you would like to answer now I would appreciate it.

Secretary PERRY. I will make a quick comment on some of those points and I am sure Secretary Christopher would like to comment.

Lifting the embargo without question would have led to the pullout of the U.N. forces, would have led to the requirement for NATO to assist in that. Therefore, a major commitment of U.S. troops with all of the costs, all of the risks we are talking about but with no benefit at the other end.

On your point on cost I think is exactly right. If this war spreads the ultimate cost to the United States is going to be much greater than what we are talking about here, not to mention risk. I cannot envision a NATO operation of this sort without U.S. participation. The NATO supreme allied commander is an American general. The commander of CINCSOUTH is an American admiral. We are the leader of NATO. If NATO were to embark on a major operation without U.S. participation it would be the beginning of the end of the most important security institution we have.

I would like to turn it over to Secretary Christopher in particular on the peace agreement question.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Congressman, it is clear to me from talking with all the parties at the highest levels that they will insist on United States involvement in implementation before they sign a peace agreement. I think that is an absolute condition. If we want to walk away from it, I think they will walk away from it as well.

This is a situation that you very correctly characterize as being a situation where the United States must lead. We really have two alternatives. If we lead, we may possibly get a peace agreement. I think the chances are the best we have had in 4 years. It is not a sure thing. But if we do not lead, if we do not go forward, the situation will soon unravel and we will be putting in troops to really confirm, to seal the defeat but putting in troops to extricate the allied troops who are there.

I know there are a great many veterans on this committee as properly so, and I think it gives you an unusual sense of concern about putting American troops. Believe me, the three of us at the table regard it as a very solemn responsibility to recommend the putting of American troops into a situation of danger. We do it only because we think that the alternative is considerably worse.

But there are risks in the situation that are not taken entirely by our Armed Forces. I think it is useful to remember the number of State Department officials and other Government officials who have lost their lives in the course of this. I talked with Mrs. Frazier the morning after Bob Frazier was killed really as a consequence of the war. Her position was clear: that Bob died preventing a broader war, or helping to prevent a broader war. That is a noble undertaking and that is what the people would be doing here.

So it is a shared responsibility; one that we take very, very heavily on our shoulders in making this kind of a recommendation. We want to work with the Congress to work our way through this problem. As I say, this is the beginning of a process in which we look forward to working with you, not on the technicalities as to whether or not we are acting consistently with the War Powers Act or conceding its constitutionality, not on technical issues as that, but on the fundamental issues as to whether or not American troops are justified in being put into this situation of danger. That is a very big issue and we look forward to working with you on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cunningham.

STATEMENT OF HON. RANDY "DUKE" CUNNINGHAM, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ike Skelton told me I could not lose my temper to express the issues, but let me say that I feel passionately what the President is attempting to do is wrong. Let me go through some of the reasons why for the panel members. I thank you for trying to clear up some of the issues. I think Mr. Dellums framed the questions very well and I appreciate that also.

I think first of all you have to have a believable goal; something that people can believe in. I look at history and it is just not there. And the second is the cost, not only in dollars, but lives; not only Americans, but Bosnians, Croatians, Muslims, and Serbs.

Let us look at the cost. It is going to cost us billions of dollars. You are going to come to Congress for an emergency supplemental. That is going to take offsets at a time when we are trying to balance the budget. Are you going to take it out of Davis-Bacon? Are you going to take it out of education? The popular one now is to say that Republicans are cutting—are you going to cut it from Medicare? Or are you going to take it out of DOD?

At a time when the President has devastated national security and testimony, even yourselves saying that readiness is paper thin. Can we go to war? Yes, but it is thin. I have sheets from the CINC's and articles saying just how thin that is and we have devastated our military readiness.

I look at $200 billion below the Bottom-Up Review and you are going to come back and ask for an offset out of military funding and DOD again and again and again. Yet the liberal left still tries to go after defense, General. I look at General Reimer's statements and Krulac and Borda and Fogleman, and I look at the cost of DOD and our readiness is the lowest level since World War I, and the costs are not there.

I take a look at the next question of a believable goal and I look at history. We testified the extension of Somalia was going to cost billions of dollars, and a policy that was changed cost the lives of over 18 Rangers. Then we had to pull out of there with our tails between our legs under guard in little Somalia. I have got news for you, General Aideed is still there existing.

We were told in Haiti that a multinational force was going to invade Haiti. There was not any national force there until day three. The United States did it. And the billions of dollars that we are pouring into there, and what do you think would happen with

Aristide today if the United States pulled out, what kind of lasting effect? Very limited.

I look at the English in Northern Ireland, and Russian in Afghanistan, and Bosnia in Afghanistan, and 37 divisions tried to control this area in World War II. They could not do it and we cannot do it with 25,000 troops. You said the United Nations and NATO would pick up, but historically the United States has paid the lion's share even of that. And when we are trying to balance a budget, we cannot do it.

You are going to get U.S. men and women killed. It is going to cost us billions. I predict Saddam Hussein will make a move within the first year and I think also North Korea will become active. I think that is the result. I think Turkey will expand, go through its expansionism in Greece.

Now Mr. Farrakhan had a march in this capital just a day or two ago. We kill more African-Americans in one month than all the history in Bosnia. Maybe we need to put the troops here to solve our own internal problems instead of spending valuable resources.

You are going to limit the air power if you add troops in there from the targets. General MacKenzie testified what is going to happen, and I take heed in that. The Russians and the Greeks, talk to them. I have talked to the Greeks, they support the Serbs as do the Russians because they fought with them in World War II. The Croatians fought, again, with Nazi Germany. What will they pay? Mrs. Schroeder, I believe brought up the question on, Is Russia going to still supply arms as they are continuing to do?

I would say to my friends that are testifying, we are looking at an election year. We have a President that does not do anything without looking at a poll. What is going to happen when we lose 100 or 200 or 300? The same thing in Vietnam that left a lot of us there without the support, without the wherewithal, without the determination to continue through with the men and women that are left there. I think that is wrong.

It is not a question about freedom in that portion of the world, if you look at history. It is about fundamentalism. It is about power. It is about economic power. It is about religious power and political power. Until we start looking at it in that degree, you are not going to accomplish a damn thing. I would say kindly that this is foolhardy.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Ortiz.

Secretary PERRY. Mr. Chairman, I feel compelled to comment on one point.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean an answer? Go ahead.

Secretary PERRY. I will make it very brief. It is not true that we have devastated our military readiness and that the military readiness is at the lowest point since the World War, and I do not want the American public or any potential adversaries to believe that that is true. It is simply not true. The readiness of the U.S. military forces today——

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. The Secretary better check with his own generals.

Secretary PERRY. May I finish? The readiness of U.S. forces today is at a high level. I get this from detailed reports every month. I

visit our bases. I talk with our troops. I get reports from our chiefs and I get reports from our commanders in chief. The military readiness of U.S. forces today is high.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. You are wrong, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to echo what was said by my good friend, Ike Skelton. I want to be of help. I want to do what is right, and I respect the three witnesses that we have this morning.

One of my questions has to do with the talks in Ohio. I know that you will have a plan that is ready to be implemented in case the President decides to carry out what you would like to do or you get the support of the Congress. Are you going to wait until the talks in Ohio are over with or are you going to begin to implement the plan as you have it now?

Secretary PERRY. The costs which we presented today are only based on estimates. The plan will have to be refined when we actually get a peace agreement, when NATO finishes its plans. In many ways, this hearing is premature because we do not have the peace treaty, we do not have the detailed plan yet. But we thought it was important to begin early in discussions with Congress and the public so you know what status of our thinking. We are doing planning, contingency planning based on an assumption of what the peace plan is going to be. But these troop levels and dollar figures are certainly subject to change as we get more detailed information.

Mr. ORTIZ. If our troops were to go there what kind of sophisticated weapons do you think that they will be faced with? I know that they shot one of our planes. We hate to see troops on the ground, but what kind of sophisticated weapons do you think we will be faced with? And by whom? I mean, what faction do we anticipate will give us more troubles than others?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I think that it is fair to say that the weapons systems that are in the hands of the warring factions there range from the normal Soviet-made mechanized and armored type of equipment to missiles systems whose capability we have seen.

On the other hand, unlike the UNPROFOR that is in there now, the NATO force that is contemplated to go in will be equipped with all the most modern equipment that NATO forces and NATO nations possess. In the case of the United States, it is the tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles and the other weapons systems that you would find throughout a mechanized or armored division. And the air capability that NATO will retain there retains the very latest defensive and offensive capabilities that we in the United States and our NATO allies possess.

I think that the threat that we will face is not from an organized major attack, but rather from small groups who either have gotten caught up in some disagreement with another warring faction or have not, for local reasons, wish to comply with a particular provision of the peace plan. It is not our expectation, however, that we will be facing the organized threat that we now often see today when there is no peace agreement. I go back to again that our

entry into the country is based on the agreement by all warring factions to a peace agreement and their willingness to in fact abide by that agreement.

Mr. ORTIZ. I just have one more question, Mr. Chairman, and that has to do with the additional $250 million in aid package. How is that going to be divided? Who is going to be working on that assistance? Is it going to be divided among the warriors, the different factions in the country? Maybe if you can elaborate a little bit on that.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. The reconstruction planning is at a very early stage and there is no detailed plan with respect to the reconstruction. Indeed, if we are fortunate enough to get a peace agreement I am sure there will be some kind of a major conference at which people who would be participating in the reconstruction plan would be involved. The country has been devastated, as you know, and I am sure that the reconstruction is necessary throughout all areas of the country. The donors would probably come from countries that might want to assist in the reconstruction of various different parts of the country.

So I would have to say to you that those plans are really in their infancy. The United States has simply announced a target figure in the range of $250 to $500 million, but this all remains to be worked out. It would have to be done, of course, through our aid programs, through programs that could be the most efficient there. And as I say, the European Union has volunteered to take the lead in this and we are delighted for them to have the lead in this reconstruction effort.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Fowler. We have to leave at 12 o'clock. We have got about 5 minutes, and Mrs. Fowler is recognized.

Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you. First I just want to say, I think we are a long way from getting to any peace agreement, when I read that the Croatians are moving troops in order to maybe retake eastern Slovenia. We have got fighting currently going on with a cease-fire in place. So I think we have got a long way to go. But I am very concerned that unfortunately over 1 year ago President Clinton made a very ill-conceived commitment to putting United States ground forces in Bosnia once there was some sort of peace agreement. We seem now to be going down that path irregardless of the wisdom of that commitment or not.

Secretary Christopher, you say in your statement here that if we do not contribute troops to this mission then it is going to imperil the future of NATO and the stability of Europe. Yet at the same time General Shalikashvili is making it very clear that our European allies do have if you mark them tank for tank, battalion for battalion, the forces and equipment to be on the ground there. When you compare what they have been doing recently to what they could do, I think it is apples to oranges. The European allies have been operating under U.N. rules, not NATO rules of engagement. So I do not think there is any valid comparison between what they have been doing and what they could do.

My question is, why could we not get a little creative there and—this would deter from what the President committed—be involved but not on the ground? Continue our U.S. involvement in this but

limit it to air strikes, from the sea, intelligence support, other types of support, but let our European allies be the forces on the ground. Why can we not participate in a NATO operation in that manner versus the manner towards which we seem to be rushing down and that no one seems to think is the right way to go except a promise was made a year ago? I would love some answer on that because how would that imperil the future of NATO if we just restructured our way in which we participate in it?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Congresswoman Fowler, the short answer is that what you are suggesting will not work. It will not work for two main reasons. That is, the parties themselves will not agree to settle this matter unless we agree to participate in implementation. By we I mean the United States.

Mrs. FOWLER. But does that mean on the ground? Have they said we have to be on the ground?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Yes; it means that we have to be on the ground. I urge you to talk to them. They are frequently around. Prime Minister Zilotic is here. Ask him any day and he will give you the same answer.

Second, although our European allies may theoretically have the capacity to perform this mission, they are not going to do it without the United States' involvement. This will be a NATO endeavor, and if the United States as the leader of NATO is not prepared to put in ground troops, I can assure you that our European allies will not be involved in that task. We have had great difficulty over the last couple of years because we have been unprepared to put troops into a combat situation. That was the right decision.

But I just tell you, fundamentally that your proposal to let George do it, will not work.

Mrs. FOWLER. I am not saying, let George do it. We do put lives at risk. As we saw, we had a plane shot down. But we put fewer. I am totally opposed to putting these ground troops in from the United States. I think the comparison that has been made several times today to Haiti borders on the absurd because the situation in Haiti, there is no comparison to what we are going into in Bosnia. I think a more valid comparison, one that was made yesterday, is to the debacle we got into in Lebanon back in the early 1980's. That is what you are looking at happening here.

In the minute or time that I have got remaining, I promised Mr. Kasich that I will let him——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kasich.

Mr. KASICH. I just wanted to say to Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, and the General, but particularly to the civilian leaders, I do not think you can get the votes for this. I do not think the case has been made.

Yesterday, one of our witnesses indicated that it was not too late to have the administration work with the Congress to figure out what options are available so that we do not get out there—you get out on a limb and you get sawed off and everybody gets hurt. I really believe that the President needs to understand, if you do not have the votes because the case had not been made—and you can see from the reaction you are getting here, you do not have the votes.

So rather than moving forward thinking you can jam this thing through, in my judgment, you need to come back up here and say, what in fact can we do? You would probably get support for continued air cover. You may get support for training. But I do not think you are going to get this through. You are going to get a fight going between the administration and the Congress. You are moving too fast. You keep moving this fast, you are not going to get it. I do not think you are going to be able to at the final, 11th hour be able to, OK, we will squeeze through with 218. I do not see it.

I am not even arguing whether you are right or whether you are wrong. I am telling you, the case has not been made. Nobody does understand it, and my advice to you, not as a Republican but as somebody concerned that we have effective foreign policy is, you have got to go back to the drawing board. You have got to think about it and you have got to get the Speaker and Senator Dole down there, and Floyd Spence down there, and his Senate counterpart and you have got to work this thing over. We are not there yet, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dellums.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that we are coming to a close and I would just like to make a couple of observations as the ranking minority member.

First, I think that this hearing points out very dramatically and eloquently the complexities and the challenges that are very real as we find ourselves in the context of the post-cold-war world. As I indicated in my opening remarks, this is a period of transition. It is interesting that when yesterday's hawks sound like doves and yesterday's doves sound like hawks, then it is very clear that the world is profoundly different, and it requires that we approach it with a different mentality.

For example, I am one who came here as a significant advocate of peace and have always opposed the deployment of troops and the use of force in solving problems where I thought that diplomacy and political solutions was a superior idea. I am now being confronted with the notion of using force and troops to wage for peace, and I have always been opposed to the use of force in using troops to wage war. So therein lies an important complexity.

The question of whether or not at the end of the day military troops are the appropriate personnel, by virtue of how they have been trained, to be peacekeepers is a significant question. The pragmatic issue is, is the use of troops as we move into the 21st century a pragmatic next step as we moved toward that down the line view of the role of the peacekeeper being a nonmilitarily trained person.

But I find it fascinating as I listen here that the argument was, we do not want American troops under U.N. command. Big criticism. So then the proposal says, we will move beyond that. There will be no dual key. We will go NATO; General Joulwan, American general. Same critics, same criticism. You cannot win. The same people that said in another peacekeeping effort our forces were too light and too small, you come back and say, we are going to be the meanest dog in town. The same critics, the same forces, Challenge: you cannot win.

So I know that consistency is not necessarily all it is trumped up to be. But it seems to me that we ought to try to approach this matter with a level of intellectual honesty and seriousness that allows us to understand that there are some significant questions here that we need to be dealing with.

As I listen to my colleagues on this side of the aisle where I am the ranking member, it is very, Mr. Secretaries and General, that there is no consensus over here. I think that is because we have not thought our way through clearly. I keep saying over and over again that there are no post-cold-war experts. That we are all trying to find our way here. Some of us are having great difficulty unthinking the cold war so we bring that mentality to this situation. There are no examples.

There are no paradigms for what it is we are trying to do. But it creates interesting dilemmas, interesting conflicts, interesting contradictions, and interesting complexities and challenges. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will have the witnesses back here on several occasions as we attempt to stimulate this dialogue and stimulate our thinking because this is an important step that we take in terms of the role that America must play in the context of the post-cold-war world.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. Again, I apologize for keeping you over the bewitching hour of 12 o'clock, but hopefully you can make your next engagement. We appreciate your contribution to the hearing. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES TO BOSNIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
Washington, DC, Thursday, November 2, 1995.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:16 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd Spence (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will please come to order.

Other members are finishing voting and are coming back from other meetings, so we will have better attendance in a few minutes hopefully. But I will go ahead and get started.

Yesterday, Proximity Peace Talks began in Dayton, OH, between the leaders of the warring factions in Bosnia. These talks may result in up to 25,000 American ground troops being deployed in that troubled region. As part of the committee's ongoing exploration of the Bosnian situation, today's hearings will look at the complex ethnic, political, and military environment in which these American men and women may find themselves.

This morning, we received the assessments of our intelligence agencies of the current situation on the ground in Bosnia and former Yugoslavia. This afternoon we continue in a similar vein in open session where we will hear testimony from a panel of distinguished experts who have substantial knowledge of the region: The Honorable Warren Zimmerman, the last United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia; retired Gen. Charles Boyd, the former Deputy Commander in Chief of United States European Command; retired Lt. Gen. Marvin Covault, former Chief of Staff of NATO Air South, the command that has responsibility in the Balkan area; and Dr. James Schear, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

I hope our witnesses will shed some light on a number of aspects of this complex and dangerous mission. First, we seek their insights on the Bosnian political leaders and their agendas, and whether these leaders are willing to compromise their long-held strategic goals in search of a true and lasting peace.

Second, we need to understand the current military balance in Bosnia and in the region. Not only in regard to the regular forces of the warring parties, but those irregular and uncontrolled elements that might well seek to target American peacekeepers.

Third, we seek more detailed knowledge about the region around the Bosnia city of Tuzla, where United States troops reportedly are to be deployed.

Finally, we are concerned about the true solidarity of purpose among the nations that are participating in a peace enforcement mission with us. They have very serious national security concerns in the Balkans that we need to understand better.

Gentlemen, I thank you for agreeing to appear before us. And I look forward to your testimony.

And since Mr. Dellums is not here at this time, we can go ahead and proceed.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dellums follows:]

OPENING COMMENTS
HONORABLE RONALD V. DELLUMS
HNSC HEARING ON THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA
NOVEMBER 2, 1995

Mr. Chairman,

I join with you in welcoming today's witnesses to the Committee inquiry into the current situation in Bosnia. Ambassador Warren Zimmerman, General Charles Boyd, Lt. General Marvin Covault and Dr. James Schear each bring direct knowledge of the history, events and current circumstances in the former Yugoslavia, and I very much look forward to hearing their insights concerning these issues.

I congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, for setting out to hold several hearings over the course of the next few weeks. This should enable the Committee to have an opportunity – such as the one we should have here today – to prepare ourselves to consider many of the issues that will ultimately have to inform our judgment concerning any possible peace agreement reached among the parties in Ohio, and what the proper United States participation in implementing any such peace agreement would be.

As I cautioned my colleagues when we heard previously from both the administration and outside witnesses, coming to judgments early would be a mistake. Making a determination as to what the United States should do in implementing an agreement before we know its contours would be both premature and potentially tragic. But, preparing ourselves to make an assessment of the terms of such an agreement, and any implementation strategy that would include U.S. participants, is the right thing to do. It is my hope that today's witnesses, with their experience in the region, can help us to further that process of inquiry.

Many of our colleagues question whether or not these parties are truly motivated to enter a peace agreement. In that regard, it will be helpful to know why it is that now they have come to the table. What combination of events on the battlefield, in the region's economy, or in the political alignments, in each of your view, has brought the Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian presidents to the

United States for these talks? And why, after appearing to some to have helped prosecute a military effort against the Serbian forces, would the United States be perceived as a credible peace broker — and an honest peacekeeper?

If a successful peace is to be brokered and given the generations of conflict and the greatly complicated geographic distribution of the various ethnic groups, what are the elements that may be required to stabilize the region and end the conflict? What should we avoid in order not to dash the hopes raised by this peace conference?

What combination of economic, political a cultural actions might be required, in your views, make that a durable peace — if a cold one at first?

How do you think that local political leaders will respond to the initiative in Ohio? Are the three presidents following or leading their respective communities to the peace table? What of detractors from their decision to participate in the process?

What are your views concerning the role of the

European community and, separately, Russia in concluding the diplomacy? And of their respective roles in enforcing any possible agreement?

These and numerous other questions will occupy us during the weeks to come. I was pleased this morning to hear that the talks have "gotten off to a good start;" and I was sobered to hear, again, that difficult and intractable issues remain that divide the parties. Knowing your views as to the potential for success, and of the potential importance of a successful agreement, will be very useful to my effort to support the most efficacious approach to ending the bloodshed, ending it before it spreads and ending it in a manner best calculated to reach a durable peace.

As I noted earlier, Mr. Chairman: Making a determination as to what the United States should do in implementing an agreement before we know its contours would be both premature and potentially tragic.

The CHAIRMAN. And why don't we go from my left to right. And, Dr. Zimmerman, Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF WARREN ZIMMERMAN, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. ZIMMERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I was asked to give an overview, and I would like to do so by asking three questions and then trying to answer them.

The first is, what kind of a conflict have we been dealing with in Bosnia? The second is, what is the U.S. interest there? And the third is, what should we be doing now?

First of all, what kind of a conflict has it been? Of course, it has many elements of a civil war, because Bosnians are fighting Bosnians. But I think the more important aspect of it is that it is a war of aggression.

The war began when Serbian irregulars crossed the Drina River, the border of Serbia and Bosnia, on April 6, 1992, attacked and shot up a number of Muslim towns on the river. This was the beginning of the ethnic cleansing.

It was the beginning of the massacre of Bosnian civilians, and it was the beginning of the concentration camps which were discovered later in August which stemmed from this time. These were Serbs from Serbia, they were not Bosnian Serbs.

The second point about the aggressive nature of the war is that the Yugoslav Army was always directly involved. The Yugoslav Army has its headquarters in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, and by the beginning of the Bosnian war, the Yugoslav Army was to all intents and purposes, a Serbian Army only. It broke up into a Bosnian Army, about a third of it became a Bosnian Army in May, 1992, just after the war had begun, but it was still effectively a Yugoslavian Army, with training and equipment supplied by the Yugoslav Army.

General Mladic was the Yugoslav Army general who never abandoned his ties to Belgrade, and all through the war the Bosnian-Serb Army was supplied in terms of equipment and fuel by Belgrade. So that was the second reason why this is, in my view, a war of aggression.

The third reason is that there was a very long-term strategy worked out by the Bosnian-Serb leader, Dr. Karadzic, and by Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia. It was a strategy that copied very closely what was done in Croatia the year before, and it involved breaking off parts of Bosnia into Serbian autonomous areas, defending them with Yugoslav Army support, giving them arms on behalf of the Yugoslav Army, and ultimately renouncing the political authority of the Sarajevo Government and setting up their own political institutions, including a parliament and a government. None of this would have been possible without the participation of Serbia, because it needed that element of force which the Yugoslav Army provided.

So we are dealing with a war of aggression, and I think one need go no farther than looking at the newspapers over the last couple of weeks about the atrocities in Srebrenica, to understand that this is something that isn't just a Bosnian-Serb thing. General Mladic

was there, as the young men from Srebrenica were taken off and executed.

The second point I wanted to touch on is what's the American interest in Bosnia? Of course, there was a traditional interest during the cold war that had to do with denying Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union, to denying the Adriatic to the Soviet Union. That interest has of course gone away, but Bosnia and the region in general still remain important to United States interests.

I don't think anybody could say we have a vital interest there, but we certainly have an important interest there. The former Yugoslavia touches on two NATO allies. It acts as an obstacle to communication between Western Europe and a third NATO ally, Turkey. It has been, for many years, a hotbed of instability, and that of course is not only a problem for Europe, but a problem for the United States as well.

Second, we are engaged in Bosnia, and we were engaged even before the air strikes of last August. And once we are engaged in an area, our credibility, our credibility becomes a part of the equation. And our credibility is definitely a part there.

If we were not prepared to step up to our responsibilities as we define them, then other potential dictators in other countries would draw some conclusions about that. I don't argue that there is a straight-line cause and effect relationship, but I think you can be sure that the leaders of North Korea and the leader of Iraq and many others are watching the United States to see how much resolution and will it is prepared to show in Bosnia.

And finally, and maybe most important, I think we have a moral interest, which is very important. And it has two main elements. The first is that the Bosnian Government, with all its faults and deficiencies, and there are many of them, has consistently wanted to maintain a multiethnic community in Bosnia. It has been the Serbian elements of Bosnia, and to some degree the Croatian elements of Bosnia, plus their metropolis in Serbia and Croatia, that have wanted to create a kind of an ethnic apartheid, to have the different peoples of Bosnia live separately from one another. That has never been the policy of President Izetbegovic and the Bosnian Government, and he has appealed to us to help him to the extent we can and to the extent at this late stage it is possible to preserve a multiethnic environment there.

And as a country which is itself a very successful multiethnic country, it seems to me that that appeal is extremely important.

Second moral element is again the degree to which the Serbian side has indulged in atrocities, beyond any point ever seen in Europe since World War II. It used to be possible, although I think wrong, to make an argument of moral equivalency, that all sides are equally to blame. You can't make that argument anymore, not after the evidence of Srebrenica, which is not even unique. It is a typical example of state-supported executions. And with that in front of us, it does seem to me that we have an obligation to react in some form or another.

Now, finally, what kind of form should we react in? I have been, since I left the Government in 1994, a critic of the Clinton administration for not being tough enough on Bosnia. I think what was

done in August, the air strikes against Serbian installations, was the right thing to do.

One could wish it had been done 3 years ago. I think many lives would have been saved if it had been done under the Bush administration. But I think it was right for the Clinton administration to do it, and I think nobody should be under any delusion about its effect.

I don't think we would be having any kind of meeting at Wright Patterson Air Force Base unless there had been a very strong use of NATO air power against the Serbian side. The war would almost certainly have dragged on and on with continuing and mounting casualties. Air power was absolutely crucial, helped enormously, of course, by the change in the balance of forces caused by the Croatian victory in the Krajina area of Croatia. The air power was extremely important.

I think we were also right to seize that opportunity to push the negotiations. Nobody is going to be very proud of an agreement if it is reached. It isn't going to be fair. It is certainly not going to be fair to the Bosnian Government side. But at this late stage, it is probably the best that can be achieved, and my personal view is that it will be achieved. Because I think the same factors that operated on the parties to agree to a cease-fire will operate on the parties to reach an agreement.

So finally, if there is an agreement, should we follow through on the commitment that the Clinton administration has made to put American peacekeepers there to monitor and to help enforce that agreement? Obviously, it is very hard to make a decision like that in a vacuum, since we don't have an agreement and therefore we don't know what kind of an agreement it is going to be, if it is achieved. And it is still, I guess, a little bit unclear what the force dispositions would be in Bosnia.

With those caveats, I nevertheless feel very strongly that the United States has to be there. We have to put our forces there, and for a very simple reason; because if we don't put our forces there, the agreement is almost sure to collapse.

America commands tremendous respect in the Balkans, and it commands tremendous respect by all three sides in the war. Perhaps by no side more than by the Serbs, who are of course the party we most want to influence by having our force there, since they are very difficult to influence in any other way.

If the agreement collapses because we are not there, the prospect is for more fighting, more casualties, and a situation which is probably not going to work to the benefit of the Bosnian Muslims, although that is a debatable point. In any case, I don't think there is any possibility the situation could be any better than it will be if we have a peacekeeping force there and if it has American troops in it.

It is very difficult to make projections about risk. My own view is that it would be most unlikely for any of the three sides to make a decision at the top to challenge militarily the NATO forces. Of course, there may be rogue elements and all the rest, but I don't see any reason why any of those three sides would challenge the American forces. That means of course we are going to have casual-

ties. Nobody can prevent that. But my guess is that the casualties will be relatively limited.

Finally, if we don't do it, it does seem to me that we have made one of the major foreign policy mistakes that I can remember over the last couple of decades. We will have failed to make the last step in a procession which at least gives a chance of peace in an area which is important to us. And I think that would be a tragedy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

We have a vote on, and if it is all right with you if we can go ahead and vote and come back so we won't have to interrupt your statement.

We will vote and come right back.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will please come to order.

Dr. Schear, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF JAMES A. SCHEAR, RESIDENT ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Mr. SCHEAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Incidentally, the prepared statements will be submitted for the record without objection.

Mr. SCHEAR. Thank you very much. I do appreciate that.

And I appreciate your kind invitation to appear before this committee today to discuss current developments in the Bosnian conflict and the prospects for achieving a durable peace settlement.

I would like to just briefly touch upon some of the high points in my more lengthy prepared text. I would like to say at the outset that I am appearing here today in a purely personal capacity, and thus my viewpoints and opinions ought not to be attributed to the Carnegie Endowment, its management or trustees.

During the past 3½ years, the war in Bosnia has taken a number of decisive turns. I believe that we are really approaching one of those hairpin turns today. The problem is we can't see as yet what lies around the bend. Some of the signs are encouraging. Sarajevo and other cities in Bosnia are safer today than they have been in a long time. A cease-fire, although fragile, is now in place throughout the country, and we finally have a peace process under way that has some discernible momentum that enjoys widespread international support and benefits from the clear leadership of the only country that can provide it at present, namely the United States.

It is notable, in my view, that all the parties in the Bosnian conflict have strong, indeed overwhelming incentives to cooperate with the United States at this point. On the other hand, I think we have to acknowledge some serious downside risks. If we do not achieve a peace settlement soon, I believe that the most likely path of events would be another major escalation in the fighting, leading to the carving up of the country between Croatia and Serbia.

I would also add that the bridges behind us have been burned. We cannot retreat to the status quo of a few months ago. That is to say, a smoldering civil war characterized by military stalemate and a beleaguered U.N. peacekeeping force that is abused and humiliated by all the parties in the war.

Mr. Chairman, the buildup to our current situation began last spring with a series of violent and rapid events that threatened to blow this war wide open. In early May, the Croatians seized large areas of Serb-held territory in western Slovenia, expelling several thousand Serbs into Bosnia.

In late May, the United Nations authorized NATO bombing of several ammunition depots near Pale, which triggered a frenzy of hostage taking by the Bosnian Serbs, and a decision on the part of UNPROFOR's major troop contributors to dispatch a rapid reaction force to Bosnia.

Then in July, just prior to the initial deployment of that reaction force, the Bosnian Serbs overran the towns of Srebrenica and then Zepa, expelling thousands of civilians, and in all likelihood, massacring large numbers of Muslim men and boys.

In August, the Croatians launched a full-scale offensive against Serbian Krajina, reintegrating those territories within Croatia, but not the Serb communities located upon them, as over 150,000 Serb civilians fled into Bosnia and Serbia.

Finally, in late August and early September, in the wake of yet another marketplace attack in Sarajevo, NATO intervened with a 2-week bombing campaign and the Croats and Muslims launched a major military attack toward Banja Luka in the north, seizing large tracts of territory from the Serbs in doing so.

Where has all this led? First and foremost, the Croats, both in Bosnia and Croatia, are suddenly a major force in Bosnia and we have to reckon with that. They are firmly in control of the southern and most western portions of the country. Their assertiveness has forced the Serbs to back off in overextended positions.

How badly the Bosnian Serbs have been hurt by the combined impact of the Croatian advance and NATO bombs is hard to say. The Serbs did not put up much of a fight to keep the Krajina or for that matter areas in western Herzegovina which were slated to go to the Bosnian Federation under the contact group plan. Thus, in my estimation, the Serb backtracking to date is not necessarily a good indication of their willingness or ability to hold on to territories that they regard as vital.

The rise of Croatian power has also put the Bosnian Government in quandary. To carry on the war for much longer may be to invite the Croats to become the dominant party in this shaky Croat Federation. Already Croatian incentives to cooperate with the Bosnian Government have slackened noticeably and now that the Krajina has fallen, the Croats, to put it bluntly, no longer need the Muslims to help them deal with their Serb problem.

Another consequence of recent developments is a grave crisis of refugees, especially on the Serb side, and the full implications of this crisis are still very unclear. In recent months, nearly half a million Serb civilians, along with substantial numbers of Muslims and Croats, have been uprooted in this seemingly endless pattern of cleansing, counter-cleansing and atrocities, and displaced people wherever they are located tend to be armed, angry, and politically polarizing within their own ethnic communities. It is a sad factor that one sees in places like sector east as well as in Sarajevo.

Third, the United Nations is a spent force in the contested parts of Bosnia. Even before it authorized NATO's bombing raids of last

May, I believe that UNPROFOR had lost consent of Serbs to operate in or near to areas under its control. As an organization, UNPROFOR has been plagued by numerous and well-understood problems, and it has been very difficult to marry up a credible use of force with its concept of operations.

Nonetheless, its peacekeeping efforts in the Bosnian Federation context did help to contain the conflict and apply indirect pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, which in part has helped to produce this current diplomatic opening, but it has at the same time eroded the consent of the Serbs to UNPROFOR's continued presence without the threats of massive NATO airstrikes. As a consequence, UNPROFOR won't be around to pick up the pieces if the current diplomatic effort fails.

The fourth and final consequence of recent developments in this conflict is a window of opportunity for peace negotiations has finally opened. I want to applaud the Clinton administration for seizing the initiative on Bosnia. I also agree with the quality of realism that one sees in the substance of its diplomacy. The plain truth is we face no easy options on Bosnia. Either it will exist as a loose union of two and possibly three substate entities, regrettably based on ethnicity, or it will be carved up and annexed by its larger neighbors.

I do not believe that a fully unified strong state can be established within its prewar Republican boundaries within the former Yugoslavia through the force of arms. That is a longer argument than I make in the prepared text.

If a breakthrough in the current round of talks is achieved, I firmly believe that the United States ought to commit itself to doing its share to implement the resulting peace agreement. To bail out on our NATO allies at this point would exact a severe cost in terms of our leadership role in Europe and beyond.

That said, I must tell you I have some misgivings about the way in which the administration has initially characterized the NATO-led implementation force, or IFOR. Secretary of Defense Perry and our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili, have described a mission for IFOR that looks very much like a muscular version of classical peacekeeping, separate the warring factions and then interpose a presence between them in order to maintain a cease-fire. I think that is fine, a very good mission as far as it goes, but I do think the administration needs to say now up front that the range of potential tasks for IFOR is going to be broader than simply patroling a no-man's-land. If we tailor the job too narrowly at this stage, we are going to get stuck on the horns of a huge debate over mission creep in 3 or 4 months from now.

What are the other missions?

One clearly is weapons control. Given the damage inflicted by heavy weapons during this conflict everyone expects that a settlement would provide for some measure of arms control, and yet the administration says this job is a civilian task outside IFOR's sphere of responsibility.

I respectfully would disagree with its judgment on that. I think only military units have the equipment, expertise, and manpower to oversee that job, and that giving the job to civilian contractors, even skilled ones, working outside NATO's chain of command

seems to be a way, in my view, to invite trouble and controversy later on.

I do appreciate the fact that after Somalia, our military has good reason to be leery of anything that looks like coercive disarmament. But Bosnia is not Somalia. General Aideed gained prestige and outside support by defying the United States. In Bosnia, with Serbia and Russia on board of the settlement, defiance of the United States will pay no dividends. We have substantial leverage to induce the Serbs to comply with the weapons-related aspects of the agreement. If they stonewall us and if the deal falls through, the option of arming and training the Bosnian Federation is always there; but let's not play that card until we have tried arms control first.

Another mission is supervising the demobilization of paramilitary organizations. I know that the Pentagon is skeptical of large-scale demilitarization programs, and I appreciate the point of view. Bosnia clearly cannot be cleansed of every militia fighter who sneaks back to his farm and buries his weapon. On the other hand, if IFOR does not adopt some kind of demobilization procedure, it will have no basis under the agreement for challenging the retention of these units for civil policing activity.

I think we would do well here to heed the lesson of Croatia, when the United Nations deployed there in 1992 to implement the so-called Vance plan and found that Serb paramilitary personnel and weapons in many cases simply cascaded into the local police forces. This loophole has to be closed.

Still another mission is assisting the transition back to civilian modes of law enforcement. When the Muslims and Croats, for example, stopped their fighting in 1994, the withdrawal of their respective military units created a public security vacuum that bandits or criminals were quick to fill. U.N. peacekeepers, mainly the British First Battalion, have little choice but to take control of dozens of road checkpoints previously manned by the factions and then transfer responsibility over to joint teams of Croat and Muslim cantonal police. I do believe IFOR will face similar pressures.

Let me stress that it is painstaking work to put cops back on the beat in exhausted war-torn societies. Police personnel must be recruited, trained, and equipped, their ranks culled of war criminals and their senior officers placed firmly under legitimate civilian authority. I think this will be a hard process in Bosnia.

There are also other jobs such as monitoring Bosnia's international boundaries where I think IFOR will have to perform some functions, and in the protection of numerous civil affairs functions ranging from electoral assistance to human rights monitoring, grassroots mediation, the return of the refugees, a very sensitive task, and in these areas IFOR may end up serving as a kind of all-purpose protector, transportation provider, and logistics provider.

I want to stress that none of these jobs are glamorous or particularly suited to soldiers. Some will be risky; most will take longer than a year to perform; but all are going to weigh heavily in the outcome of the operation if we get a peace agreement, and I do believe that we need a clear understanding within our own country and with our NATO allies about these jobs and who is going to perform them.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I wish the administration every success in Dayton, OH, and hope that it will be the starting point for a candid discussion between the administration and Congress on this important step of the prospect of bringing peace to Bosnia. At the same time I hope we won't understate the magnitude of the jobs to be done, for to do so I think is to invite trouble down the road.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Covault.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MARVIN COVAULT, U.S. ARMY (RET.), FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF, NATO AIR FORCES SOUTH

General COVAULT. Thank you for asking me here today, Mr. Chairman. I sincerely hope that I can be helpful. I have retired from the military, represent no one except my neighbors, have no agenda. What I might be able to bring this afternoon in terms of credibility and credentials is having been the Chief of Staff at Allied Forces Southern Europe Subordinate Headquarters of NATO over the last 2 years.

I was probably closer to the planning efforts than most anyone else over that significant period of time. While I was there, we planned and executed all of the air operations, NATO air operations under the operations plan, Deny Flight. That transitioned from air denial into close air support into offensive air operations. We took the maritime operations and put it under a firm NATO WEU command and control apparatus and went from counting ships and observing to probably the most successful maritime embargo in history. I was there for that planning and that execution and that transition.

But probably more related to the issues today is the ground planning, and I was there when we began to build the plan for Vance-Owen and transitioned through a number of peace plan initiatives and up through planning for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces, so I am fairly knowledgeable with the aspects of that plan and the thinking that went into it.

Let me go to the bottom line and enumerate a few conclusions that I would bring based on that planning, NATO planning. I would say that if there is going to be a viable—viable peace plan from which NATO can derive a viable mission statement and develop a realistic set of military objectives, then the NATO plan can be successful. But it is not without a lot of danger. For example, there is a whole series of conditions for success that have been well thought out over particularly the last year that are part of that NATO plan, and if those conditions for success are not part of the environment, NATO can fail.

I would not as a military operation put this into the category of a high-risk military operation, but it is certainly not without risk, certainly not without risk to U.S. forces, who tend to become a magnet for opposing forces in peace enforcement operations, and most certainly there will be casualties.

I would further conclude that another serious issue is the issue of lifting the arms embargo and that the timing for that is not now

and it would be perhaps a serious blow to what could otherwise be achieved.

I believe even more strongly than the fact that NATO could pull this off, I feel even more strongly that the United Nations as a military organization cannot pull it off. It would be a continuation of the serious ad hocracy that has developed there over the last 2 or 3 years, which is getting us nowhere.

I guess the key question is the question of United States forces participating on the ground in Bosnia, and if someone asked me should they participate, I guess I would give them a resounding yes-no because I have a dual logic on this. If we have a bad peace plan, the United States should not participate, and there could be a bad peace plan.

I recall the Vance-Owen plan, and when we started to look at that in terms of its military viability, it was not—such simple words and phrases like monitor heavy weapons. Lord only knows how a military leader is to grapple with that political term. So the Vance-Owen plan was not viable. So if we don't have a viable peace plan, the United States should not go.

If for some reason because of political compromise or whatever it is not found prudent to create a theater operation with a single theater commander and a clear military chain of commands for command and control, if that does not exist, the United States should not participate.

The issue of numbers—I do not like the number 25,000. It is a nice round number, but that is a top-down driven number that, in my opinion, is extremely dangerous. The way you determine the size of the force is to start with the mission, develop the objectives, look at the military task to be performed, and have the commander tell you how many forces and what kind of forces you need and when they need to arrive and when they can go away. If through some forms of political compromise in the United States or NATO the numbers get driven down through compromise to the point where the commander loses his flexibility and does not have a viable force, then the United States should not participate.

Another reason that I would give for the United States not participating is that if the North Atlantic Council denudes the operation plan. I am probably a little biased, but believe there is a good military operations plan. It is extremely comprehensive. It wasn't done overnight. There are tens of thousands of man-hours of work in that plan. The plan itself runs to a thousand pages. A lot of you have seen it. The backup material runs many thousands more. There is not a lot we don't know about what is inside that plan.

Significant portions of that plan have to be approved by the North Atlantic Council. The military plan that goes in the front door can become a formula for failure coming out the back door if they do not leave it in its relatively pure form and if what comes out the back door of the North Atlantic Council is not a viable military operation, the United States should not participate.

Now, turning to a short brief logic trail on why the United States should, first of all, I believe that if we are going to achieve military objectives associated with the peace plan, then NATO should get the mission. NATO has done all of the planning; all of it. NATO is running an air operation. NATO is running a maritime oper-

ation, and NATO has done the ground planning. So NATO should get the mission. If they do, NATO cannot afford to fail.

NATO is a vital institution in Europe today and will continue to be, but if NATO goes into this out-of-area contingency operation and fails it will no longer be a viable institution. NATO might succeed without the United States, but their success would be dramatically enhanced if the United States is not only directly involved but is a lead participant in the execution of the NATO ground plan.

If NATO accepts the mission and the United States does not participate, in my estimation that is the end of the United States leadership role in Europe. People are searching for what are the vital United States interests in this Bosnian mess. The vital United States interest is in Europe, and if we are not a leader, a strong world player in European affairs, then we are taking a giant step backward.

Those are some of the conclusions I have come to in a couple of years of working this issue and also in those 2 years working almost on a daily basis with the senior people in UNPROFOR, people for whom I have absolute respect. They are wonderful, well-intentioned people. They have been thrust into a horrible ad hoc organization that is getting nowhere at the speed of light.

I will close and anticipate any questions you may have. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Boyd, welcome to the committee.

STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES BOYD, USAF, (RET.), FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

General BOYD. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, members of this important National Security Committee, since you all know that I am a professional officer now retired in the U.S. military, I would destroy my credibility at the outset were I to tell you it is a pleasure to be here testifying before your committee today. I can say in truth, sir, it is an honor as a citizen to perform this duty and to help you in whatever way I can to fulfill your responsibility in determining what is in the best interest of the American people with respect to this Balkan tragedy.

With your indulgence, I would begin with a quote from Rebecca West's book entitled "Black Lamb and Gray Falcon" published in 1938. "English persons, therefore, of humanitarian and reformist disposition constantly went out to the Balkan Peninsula to see who was in fact ill-treating whom, and, being by the very nature of their perfectionist faith unable to accept the horrid hypothesis that everybody was ill-treating everybody else, all came back with a pet Balkan people established in their hearts as suffering and innocent, eternally the massacree and never the massacrer."

That is a quote I used in an article I published in "Foreign Affairs" and I repeat it here because it characterized with such exquisite irony how little has changed in the last half century or so and our ability to grasp that central feature of the Balkans. There are no white hats there.

I came here today with no particular agenda, but there is a steady, constant theme to my thoughts on this subject over the

past year or so. When you walk the ground in Bosnia talking with countless natives of the region, U.N. personnel, AIDE workers, embassy officials, private foreign entrepreneurs, when you read all source intelligence reports, not just the newspapers, day after day, year after year, it finally begins to sink in that while these ethnic groups may differ from each other in superficial ways, there are no qualitative differences. All have committed unspeakable atrocities against each other and all have legitimate fears that have been played out in the past with breathtaking brutality. Even if the Serb in a quantitative sense is more culpable than his Muslim and Croat counterpart, at least during this brief slice of a centuries' old conflict, emphasizing this point at this stage of the process would be as counterproductive as railing against the Palestinian Liberation Organization's history of terrorism in the midst of delicate Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. The peace process in Bosnia will not benefit from the vilification of one of the actors.

If the United States aims to play a meaningful role in resolving this terrible conflict, they cannot allow themselves to become impassioned partisans for one faction or another. They must attend to the fears of each and help craft and implement a solution which answers rather than intensifies the concerns of all.

There may be good reason to engage our forces on the ground in Bosnia, but only if we do so in an utterly impartial and even-handed way. All parties to this conflict have one fundamental characteristic in common; none wishes to live as an ethnic minority in a society dominated by the others. The process of implementation of any peace accord that we might come up with will be extraordinarily delicate and complex. To treat one group differently than another will almost certainly lessen the other's fragile commitment to peace and we will go from a very difficult enterprise to an impossible one.

It is this point, sir, and if no other, that I would leave you with today. I will take whatever questions you have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Mr. Dellums.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, with the exception of one question that I would like to direct to General Covault, I would like to yield so that some of my junior colleagues can engage the witnesses. Just one factual question of General Covault.

You mentioned that there is a thousand-plus page contingency plan. I am thrown by that because I would like to know what that has reference to. Is this a plan for the extraction of UNPROFOR forces or was this a nominal notional peacekeeping planning exercise?

It is difficult for me to understand how there could be a plan of that elaborate specificity that could be written up in a thousand pages when we don't have the parameters of a peace plan at this point. I would like to understand what you have reference to.

General COVAULT. That is a very good question, sir. When the Vance-Owen peace plan looked like it was going to come to fruition, we began a very hasty process of building a military plan to accommodate that peace plan with some specificity. When it became obvious that the Vance-Owen plan was going to wither on the vine, we found that the work that we had done created any number of com-

mon areas of concern, common issues associated with moving a force into Bosnia for whatever reason.

We began doing studies of the ports available, lines of communication, military supply routes, bridge classifications, numbers of bridges, status of roads, enormous amounts of engineering work. We had divers in the water at Split finding out exactly what classes and types of ships can come in, how close they can come in, and exactly how many fuel storage tanks were available there and who could contract quickly to clean them out and put fuel in them. The list of things that you can do as boilerplate data base is almost endless.

Then as time went on we were given specific missions, and one of those most recent was the withdrawal of the United Nations, of UNPROFOR from Bosnia, from all of former Yugoslavia. And all that data that we had worked on came into play.

With respect to implementation of a peace plan, we have written sample mission statements, what the commander's intent would be, given certain parameters of the peace plan, what would be the military tasks to be performed, and what force levels would it take to perform those tasks. We spent an awful lot of time on command and control because given any circumstance we felt very strongly that you needed to create a theater with theater institutions and theater intelligence and theater logistic systems and a theater commands and control. So all that got worked in great detail, submitted to SHAPE, a lot went in and out of MAC for debate, but as sort of an overall plan of action for moving ground forces into Bosnia to do any number of contingency operations, I would tell you that 90 percent of that plan applies.

Mr. DELLUMS. I would yield to my other colleagues. I would like to come back, however.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cunningham.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, and I am sorry I didn't get to hear the first panelists' testimony, but I am in an odd position that I agree with the panelists, and General Boyd, I don't think that anyone could have stated the situation more clearly.

I also agree, General, that the military operations plan, having dealt with them in multiplicity, that if you take only a portion of it out the back door you are going to fail and, unfortunately, when we get into something like this where it is a top down driven scenario, that is exactly what happens; is that you only take pieces of it, and I think we will fail.

I guess my question to all of you is that we were told, and I talked to General Boyd a few minutes back there, General Shalikashvili and the Secretary told us they were going to come to us for an emergency supplemental. That will cost us between $1 and $5 billion. I think General Boyd stated a total of about $6 billion. The President of France day before yesterday said if we go in there, we can plan on a 20-year stay. General McKenzie said that he wouldn't go in there at all. But looking at those kinds of costs and the testimony we have had before this committee, that readiness is there in all the services, but it is paper thin over a long period of time or even short period of time.

How would you expect us to pay for this kind of an operation if the plan is to take it out of defense, which is already paper thin?

General BOYD. May I clarify, sir, one point. The figure that I gave you, my estimate of over $6 billion is the total NATO bill for 1 year, of which the U.S. cost would be over 3 and plus—30 percent of the NATO slice.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Yes, sir. But how would it affect our capability if our readiness is there but it is marginal, and yet we plan on taking $1 to $5 billion out of our defense plus ups, which is to bring up our readiness level in the plan that you are talking about with success; if we take that readiness away from our military forces that we have plused up, does that affect the outcome of our potential outcome in that portion of the world, General?

General BOYD. If there is no supplemental, I would assume it will be taken out of readiness and operation and maintenance, base operations support. There is no place else to get it.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Would that affect the outcome?

General BOYD. Well, the priority would have to be the ongoing mission, and so it would get the resources it needed. What happens to the rest of the force is what your concern is.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. What would happen if, say, Saddam Hussein became active within the year or North Korea or Turkey's expansionism into Greece? Could we meet those commitments?

General BOYD. I would urge Congress if it is going to support commitment of its force to this enterprise that this Congress also support a supplemental. I don't think you can do one without the other.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I agree. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much, and I thank the panel for your participation today.

General Boyd, I read with great interest your article in "Foreign Affairs". I compliment you on it. It is the clearest statement I have run into yet. However, I think you should retitle it something to the effect that there are no Sunday school boys in the Balkans. If there is anything that I get from that, it is your statement of a moment ago and the statement that they are all—they all have rather tragic world histories.

I will only ask you one question, General. General Boyd, based upon your personal and professional experience, will you tell us under what circumstances you would recommend that a sizable American military force be deployed into the northeastern area of Bosnia as peacekeepers, considering, and I want you to spell this out as best you can, the nature of the mission statement, the neutrality, the command and control, the training of Muslims, and most important the rules of engagement.

General BOYD. First of all, that is a very good question, a very complex question.

First of all, it would have to be a mission—first of all, we would have to be in support of a peace accord that made sense, and that it was clear all parties to the agreement support it. If all parties to the agreement are not clearly in support of a peace accord, then it isn't a peace accord. And in that case, we would be committing forces to make war, to impose force, to impose a peace on factions that did not want peace. Perhaps that is the mission that we might

ultimately accept, but we should accept it understanding that that is what the mission is.

But if we are to try to support a peace accord and we are confident that it is one which all of the parties sincerely wish to accept and implement, and then we see them on the ground in Bosnia making steps toward implementing that peace themselves, then that is the first condition that I would require for supporting the introduction of troops.

Second of all, you asked command and control. I think that they are planning now, and certainly it would be a condition that would be required for my support, for it to be under the command and control of NATO; the implementation force would have to be the NATO chain of command.

There is a side piece as you are, I am sure, aware with respect to some support forces, Russian forces, which would not come under NATO but under a national command structure which then reports to two political entities. And that is satisfactory.

I would urge strongly that the implementation force not be saddled with the additional burden of arming and training one faction, for two reasons. One, it would be a task that would be a great distraction from the principal task that they were there to perform, but most importantly it would be to clearly take sides in the conflict.

Any figleaf or fiction that it was an impartial, fair and even-handed application or implementation of the peace accord would be lost in that very fact itself, and I firmly believe that to keep all parties desirous of implementing this peace, they must know that the implementing force is not implementing unfairly or asymmetrically.

Finally, if we do try to implement a force that favors the Federation over the Serbs, we most certainly will drive the nationalists in Russia to force their leadership away from any support or cooperation with this effort. And it is in our long-term strategic interest that we keep Russia engaged with the West, cooperative with the West, helpful with the West in any kind of enterprise such as this.

Did I miss any specific thing?

Mr. SKELTON. Rules of engagement.

General BOYD. We would have to be extremely robust, extremely specific. That ground commander must have great authority, great latitude to implement within his own judgment, within his own authority, must be able to treat violations of the peace accord by any faction instantly and equally no matter where they come from.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you so much. That has been very helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Skelton. Thank you, General. Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

We have an administration that is committed apparently to sending troops to Bosnia if there is a peace accord. We have had several hearings now and a number of witnesses and the big majority of those witnesses have indicated that they would support the administration's position. But we have a major dichotomy here. The inquiries and communications from our district, if it is like others, are running far more than 10 to 1. I have to look and look to find

a single communication that says that we ought to send troops to Bosnia.

A recent resolution by the House, and in spite of the fact that many of the people voted because they felt that they needed to support the President's right to conduct foreign policy, a big majority are opposed to sending troops to Bosnia. I think that it is very hazardous for us to commit our troops to Bosnia with a big majority, I feel, of the American people opposed to this. So obviously if this is the right thing to do, then we have an urgent priority to educate the American people so that they understand that this is the right thing to do. And we don't have much time to do that. Who in your view should do this? And how can they do it?

General COVAULT. Well, I have some views on that. I happen to agree with you—I have great respect for John Q. Public because I am one of them now.

What I find living in a community of very well-informed and knowledgeable people is that they know very little about the Bosnian issues, can't keep the players straight, who did what to who, when, why. The public has been educated by sounds bites from the media, in many cases not well done by writers filling up pages, not having taken the time to educate themselves.

I couldn't agree with you more that the American public has to get educated on the pros and cons, and in my view that falls to the leader of the Nation. It falls to the Commander in Chief. Certainly he can send John Shali and the civilian members of the Defense Department around to testify and give their views and all that, but when it comes to convincing the American people that something needs or does not need to be done, it falls to the role of the Commander in Chief. That is his title. I don't think anybody else ought to do it. He ought to do it quickly.

Mr. BARTLETT. Why is he not doing this, in your judgment?

General COVAULT. Well, I would hesitate to even offer a guess as to why the President is or is not doing something. Some people have said timing is everything. I hope he is just waiting for the right time. I think the time is now.

Mr. BARTLETT. Do the other members of the panel share these views generally?

Mr. ZIMMERMAN. I agree with General Covault; only the President can do this. I think it is time that he starts—he may be hesitating because there is no agreement in hand, so all of these factors haven't kicked in yet, but my guess is that the American people may be very sympathetic to a strong argument for involving American forces in Bosnia if there is a good agreement and if all the military requirements that General Covault and General Boyd have discussed are met.

Because we have always been responsive to issues where there have been moral imperatives. There were moral imperatives, for example, in dealing with human rights cases in the Soviet Union, and the American people responded to that. Here I think there are some.

I disagree to some extent with General Boyd in his comment that there is a kind of an equivalence among all the ethnic groups, some are up or some are down but they are more or less all the same and equally guilty. Rebecca West wrote that wonderful quote in

1938. She had not yet been through World War II in which there was a Nazi puppet state created in Croatia which we all fought against, which her country did, too. We are certainly in a situation today where there has been a systematic set of executions taking place by one side. The others have done it to some degree, but not anywhere near to the degree that the Serbian side has done it. We are involved in an aggression which was primarily sponsored by the Bosnian Serbs and by Serbia; but that doesn't mean that we should take sides in a peacekeeping operation. I agree with both Generals that we shouldn't do that.

The very negotiations are designed to produce an agreement that all sides can sign on to. By its very nature, it has to be impartial; otherwise one of the sides won't accept it. That will be the agreement if we get it, and I think we will, that will have to be monitored and enforced on the ground.

It does seem to me that the American people will be responsive to that if they understand that the alternative is more war, more ethnic cleansing, a major blow against NATO, if it is not able to handle this problem, if it is not allowed to handle this problem, possibly spill over to other parts of Europe where our interests, for example in Greece, are much more definitely set forth than perhaps in the Balkans, and the feeling that American leadership has failed a test. We got right up to the point of a negotiated settlement that only we could do and that we have done or will have done, and then we failed. I think if that is all put to the American people in a much more eloquent way than I can put it that they will see that.

Mr. BARTLETT. You are very eloquent. My time has run out and I think time has probably run out to educate the American people if the administration is intent to do what it says it is going to do, and that is to commit troops almost immediately after a peace accord is reached. The time to have begun this education process was a long, long time ago. That didn't happen and now we are going to be faced with a crisis. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Peterson.

Mr. PETERSON. If I may kick off on the last statements, I think one of the reasons why the administration has made the statement they have as to the U.S. commitment to send troops is because that was one of the elements to get the three to the table. It may not be something that is locked in, and I think that this panel has made the case that we should not make a decision at this time as to whether we would or would not put American troops on the ground, because we have no document, no plan, no organization, no function under which we could place them there. And for us to make at this time a predetermined absolute statement that says we will or we won't is wrong.

I think General Covault made it very clear it is a clear yes and no. And it has to be based on what happens in Dayton. I can't understand why we are so afraid of working toward peace. I think we have to take every opportunity to work toward peace. Whatever that opportunity is, peace is a risk just like war is a risk. It is not an easy—there is not an easy answer to that and this particular part of the world is more complex perhaps than anywhere else because of the ethnicity, the centuries-old conflicts, the way this

damned country has been butchered up over the years with borders and process and everything else; but I think this panel has done a beautiful job of bringing this to some reality, and I hope everyone has listened, and I hope those who are not here, which it is embarrassing that they are not, will read this testimony, because this was reason and logic and focus today. None of these persons who gave testimony today are on some political trip. They are speaking from experience, education, and from the heart, obviously, with the individuals coming out of their homes, actually, and offering some insight.

But I think if anything was heard here today and learned here today, it is that we should not say yes or no to American commitment of troops until we see what the peace accord is.

And then I agree with the other caveats that have been made; that is to say straight lines of command, immediate response for rules of engagement, take no sides, make damned sure this thing is neutral, absolutely do not engage in rearmament of one side—absolutely totally ludicrous. And be sure that we bring in all the players.

Chuck noted the one and we didn't, I don't think, cover it adequately, but Russia is a major player in this scenario, and America and Russia, for the political reasons, should have virtually equal responsibility in this scenario, whatever the scenario finally comes out.

But I just think that we have got to really be careful here. The vote we took on the floor the other day was a totally political vote, playing to our own uninformed constituencies. We took advantage of the fact that they are totally uninformed on this issue, and we played right to it. It was wrong. We should be working as a point of leadership to that constituency. It is not only the President's job to educate our constituency; it is our job, and we can sure as the devil do it. But we can't do it by going home and saying that everybody else is wrong.

So I am not one who wants to take sides here. I just want us to do it professionally, with some reason, some logic, and then I want to risk peace. And I think that is the challenge for this Congress.

I have been in wars; Chuck has been in wars. We know how it is to risk war and we are willing to do that too when the chips are down, but I think it takes a heck of a lot more courage to risk peace when you are dealing with circumstances that we are dealing with and facing in Bosnia. And I would challenge my colleagues to listen, read with very careful scrutiny the testimony of each of these individuals, who I think have done a marvelous job of bringing this issue before us, and I thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Covault, a question I have, we have an arbitrary exit to pull troops out of that region of 1 year, and one of the reasons that you mentioned awhile ago that we should be there would be our leadership in NATO, and that if we fail in that then that would hurt us in the long run, and the short run, also.

But my question is, unless we have I think a real clear and defined reason to send peace enforcers to Bosnia, that when we start

sustaining casualties, that the American people unless there is a good, solid reason for us to be there, will not I am afraid have the stomach to see us continue there for a year.

What happens if we have to pull out and we have set a date of 1 year and we have to pull out before then like Somalia, like Lebanon? What happens to our leadership then?

General COVAULT. Well, there are a number of questions inside of the question that you asked. Let me begin with the 1-year issue, and I have been asked that question before by friends and neighbors, can we complete this action in 1 year?

My answer to that is to do what in a year? One of the criteria for success I believe is that the military action would be one of limited objectives, limited in the sense that do effectively what we can do and stay away from mission creep and stay away from things that we can't do. The military in a year cannot begin to come to grips with the refugee issue in a year, for example, or with all the humanitarian relief issues.

General COVAULT. So to me, it will not be hard to define an exit strategy. People say that that is the key issue. I don't see that as difficult. The exit strategy to me consists of compiling a list of military tasks to be performed if the commander is given the proper theater command and control and the proper forces, size, and composition, to accomplish those tasks, then the commander should tell us how long it is going to take him to do that, given that he is—given the fact that he is given the opportunity to prepare the battlefield and set the conditions.

So there are lots of criteria and what "if's" involved in all that. And if we walk ourself through that, we can have some great expectation that we are going to be successful.

What could cause us to walk away from that? If the primary criteria of the peace plan break down. In other words, if the leaders of one or more of the factions initiate military operations, it has broken down. It ceases to exist. And we ought to have criteria right upfront that says we are out of here. Back to the issue of limited objectives.

What it is that the military can do is in sequence, logically, they can open ports, they can begin to prepare lines of communication, they can initiate the civil military campaign plan. And having done those in order, then they can ensure that the fighting has stopped, followed by the creation of a safe and secure environment, the belief in a safe and secure environment, and you begin to believe that when people can move freely throughout the country. That is what I mean by limited objectives.

Once you have done all that, you have done what you can do militarily. Now, if at that time other forces have not begun to reestablish the institutions, effectively reestablish the institutions, then all that the military has accomplished up to that point is going to be for naught. Because it will degrade so quickly, if the institutions are not put in. You start with an institution of order and justice. Absolutely essential, right upfront, because there is no order and there is no justice.

You do that and then you begin to put in place the political institution, the economic institutions, leading right along the spectrum that leads you to the end of that spectrum, which is having other

things in place, order, justice, political system and all that, leading to economic interdependence. Make me dependent upon you, whatever your ethnic group. And make me come home with a paycheck, something that no one is doing now. And mama kicks me out the door every morning to go to work to earn that pay to bring home so that we can buy a car and travel in a free society, et cetera, et cetera. It all leads toward the end of the spectrum with interdependent economics. But don't expect the military to do all those kinds of things, limited objectives.

The refugee issue is just almost too hard to think about. If you put the refugee issue in American terms, just close your eyes and imagine 125 million Americans, by comparison, 125 million Americans not living where they want to live, forcibly displaced, and every one of them is mad as hell at somebody. And they want to get—many of them want to get revenge. That is the refugee environment that exists there, in comparative terms.

The military can't solve that problem. We have got to put the institutions in place after the military has created this safe and secure environment. Now somewhere—so the exit strategy is the military is going to perform these tasks, about 10 of them, these objectives, given these forces they can do it in this amount of time. If they can't, fire the commander. And if the peace process breaks down, go home.

Mr. SCHEAR. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add to the question Mr. Lewis just asked. I agree with much of what General Covault has said, and in particular I would like to underline his point about the importance of institution building outside the strict sphere of military responsibility. I worry that IFOR and the U.S. troops assigned to it are going to be hostage to a degree to how fast those institutions are sort of revived, if you will. And it is going to take some time.

I had mentioned the civil police in my testimony. There were well-trained police forces prior to the war, but they have evaporated. And now they are going to be rebuilt largely on the basis of a greatly changed situation where you will have cantonal police from different ethnic areas having to work together.

I think this committee, and the Congress at large ought to be asking the tough questions about who is—who in the international community is going to take hold of that issue squarely. Is it going to be an international organization in Europe or the United Nations or a coalition of the willing?

But, you know, Commissioner Ray Kelly from New York did a good job down in Haiti, but just at the beginning of that operation we are going to have to face a lot of these tough issues. And I worry about a situation where the timetable is extended because we don't have police on the beat and we don't have public prosecutors who can investigate crimes or judges that are independent and impartial to try cases or prisons to hold people convicted of crimes. And it goes on and on.

I also want to add a point about the refugees. I don't think we will get too many refugees going back initially. The circumstances, the conditions, are not going to be propitious for that. They will have concerns about their own safety and there will be a strong temptation on their part to engage in vigilante justice, if they do

go back and see that the fellow down the street may have been the one who burned down the house two years earlier.

And as far as the international operation is concerned, we have to be very worried about an uncertain situation where large numbers of refugees want to go back initially. I can understand and appreciate their desire, but it has to be a carefully phased operation.

We also have to finally recognize there are going to be hot-spots around the country where the military will have to be out in force, around Gorazde, where there were a lot of Serbs cleansed out of there who want to get back in, if Gorazde stays in the Bosnian Federation.

There are Muslims who would like to get back into the areas around Brcko and Banja Luka. There are 60,000 or 70,000 Serbs in the Serb part of Sarajevo who don't want to accept the authority of the Bosnian Government. There are going to be hot-points around this country and we have to be very sensitive to what we can do to try and calm that down once a peace agreement is achieved. And I don't think it is going to be an easy task.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I might follow up quickly.

To the question of timing, do either of you think it is important to make a distinction between 12-month participation of the United States in IFOR efforts, and the continued presence of IFOR beyond 12 months? And that is an important distinction that no one has made here.

The assumption of the question is that the United States is there for 12 months, they extract themselves, the whole thing falls apart. But I am not sure that that is true and I think it is important in the context of this hearing to make a distinction, maybe the United States is there for 12 months in the start-up of this process, and that IFOR continues its presence beyond 12 months and all the factors that you have alluded to continue to be carried out beyond the 12 months. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. SCHEAR. I can see a situation, Mr. Dellums, where the U.S.-assigned units to IFOR could depart well in advance of the rest, where there is no reason we have to be there to turn out the lights on IFOR.

Having said that, I would be hesitant about recommending a course of action which holds us to a specific timetable. I think that gives all kinds of bad incentives for certain bad guys, if you will, to just lay back and wait until U.S. troops have left. So I think we have to be flexible. And I think also if you go in strong and the security situation does improve, we can phase down fairly quickly.

There are risks attached. Some of them have to do with the factions. I must say in all candor, I think some of them also have to do with groups and organizations not necessarily falling under the control of any of the factions, such as Mujahedeen elements operating in central Bosnia. And we have to be concerned about all that and know upfront what the magnitude of the problem is. But I do think that we have to show some flexibility in regard to the timetable.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a good point you make.

General BOYD. May I add a point, Mr. Dellums?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General BOYD. It would, in my judgment, be unlikely that if the United States were to withdraw its forces from IFOR, that anyone else would stay.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I was going to suggest. We have been talking about, all along, that we destroy NATO if we didn't go along with this plan. I wondered what would happen if we would pull out of it after being there for a year, wouldn't the same thing happen if NATO is going to object to it?

General BOYD. I think it has been clear from all of the major players, they are not going in, in an IFOR mode if we are not in. And I don't think they are going to stay if we are not there either.

Mr. DELLUMS. Well, wouldn't you agree that—well, let's just explore that for a minute.

General BOYD. There is no objective reason why we couldn't leave and leave an IFOR unit behind. I am just saying I don't believe it will work that way.

Mr. DELLUMS. For the sake of this discussion, let's assume that there is progress in moving from a cold peace to a warm peace over that 12- to 18-month period. Then you would not make the flat-out statement then that given that progress, that an IFOR complement of people continuing to play the peacekeeping role could not continue to be in place without major presentation of the United States?

General BOYD. If we have no—if great progress is being made, I think everybody's going to be anxious to leave. What I would say, sir, if you—if you commit your troops——

Mr. DELLUMS. That is the front part of the question.

General BOYD. Well, the bottom line of the question, in my view, is if you are going to commit these forces, commit them with no date when they are going to withdraw, and don't put a ceiling on how many you send. Send enough to do the job, and leave them there long enough to get the job done.

If we are—I completely agree with Dr. Schear, if you set a date when they are coming out, all those who wish you ill will lay in wait for you to leave.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, just one continuing response.

I agree with both of you in that regard. I think that was one of the tragic mistakes of Somalia. I felt very strongly that Somalia was the first post-cold war test of America's role as peacekeepers. And one of the points at which it was blown, and we could talk about a number of those points, where we went from a humanitarian mission to a combat function, one of the things that when we did set a date certain, we rendered that situation impossible.

And the interesting thing that I find here, as I said earlier, that consistency is not necessarily all it is cracked up to be, but I find it fascinating that a number of my colleagues now are challenging the notion of the 12 months. And I think that that is a mistake, to put that hard and fast, were the very same people who were prepared to impose 12 months in legislative terms.

So it is very interesting that the same mouth at one hand can say, wow, the President went 12 months, but in the context of Somalia, pushed the issue of a date certain in order to extract these forces.

I think that, you know, Mr. Peterson, the gentleman from Florida, in my opinion, made the most extraordinary statement here about risking peace. I think the future is now and I think the role of the United States is about peacekeeping. And we are learning how to do all of that.

I would like to see the date come when we have people trained specifically to handle the subtleties and the nuances of peacekeeping. Before we get to that ultimate paradigm, I think of the transition is going to be U.S. military forces playing that role and training to play that role.

A number of my colleagues in some way see that outside of the function, think that our troops ought to be sitting around preparing to wage world war III, when I think Bosnia is the future and the future is now, and if we are going to spend $250-some billion, then let's learn how to play the role of peacekeeper because that is the role that is evolving here. And I think that that is where we are headed.

I think you are right about us playing this significant role as peacekeeper in the world. We have got to learn how to do it. And the problem is the conflict among my colleagues on the one hand, is how do you handle the issue of the length of time that troops are in these areas?

I agree with the two of you that we should not lay down a time certain, because we have got to learn, we have got to be flexible in order to try to handle it. The problem that a number of my colleagues have is that if you can settle it easier if you tell people we are going to go in quickly and get the hell out fast. And therein lies a tremendous conflict, because these are two principles, one, political survival, and the other, how to make peacekeeping a reality where those two points are in collision. And it creates massive conflict in the body politic when those two points are colliding; political survival on the one hand, and the need to address the reality of an emerging world where we play the role of peacekeeper and keep those doors open to learn how to do this on the other hand.

Am I making my point? I think that is the conflict very clearly and very obviously in the body politic.

The CHAIRMAN. And I agree with the gentleman about what he said, setting a deadline, too. But on the other hand, people back in Somalia who said we should not set a deadline, are now saying we should set one. It was just opposite in some cases.

But what I want to get you experts to clear me up on, I like to take advantage of expert witnesses, try to learn something, but I keep hearing the term ethnic cleansing. I read in the papers all the time, and trying to understand what caused all these things to happen to know how to deal with them, how we couch things sometimes make a difference. I heard some other experts say that it is not ethnic cleansing because they are all Slavs. It is more religious cleansing. Can you all take a shot at that and help me out on which one of the experts are right?

Mr. ZIMMERMAN. Well, let me try, Mr. Chairman.

Almost everybody who lives in Bosnia is a Slav. And almost all of them are even more closely related than just being Slavs. Because when the Turks took over Bosnia in the 15th Century, some of the Slavs that lived there converted to Islam. So even the

Bosnian Muslims in their inheritance are either Serbs or Croats. So that is the complication.

The Muslims became a nation in Yugoslavia only after World War II. Tito created the Muslim nation, to go with the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia. So they are relatively—a relatively new nation in Yugoslav terms, and they were created not in terms of their religion, but in terms of what was called ethnicity. Although the ethnicity is Slavic, like everybody else's.

So they don't have the same kind of religious background that a Muslim in Iran or in Libya or in Egypt would have. And that has been a problem for them in getting the kind of support from other countries, for example, that they would have. Many of them drink, many of them don't observe Islamic traditions and so forth.

Nevertheless, because since World War II, the Muslims and the Croats and the Serbs have felt very distinct and have fought each other in World War II, Bosnia was a major killing ground. The major victims per capita were Muslims. The major victims in absolute terms were Serbs.

The major perpetrators of the ethnic cleansing and the murders in those days were Croats. So there is a history of this ethnic hostility.

For 40 years after World War II, it didn't play an enormous role, because there was a basic division of power in Bosnia, which was accepted by everybody. Where it really started was the elections of 1990, when a plurality of the votes was won by the Muslim party. That was Izetbegovic's President, Izetbegovic's party. The Serbs either were scared or professed to be scared that Muslim population increases would create a Muslim majority and then they would close Bosnia down to everybody else and create an Islamic state.

In my own view, I was there at the time, there was no evidence for this at all. It was purely a made up kind of fear campaign. But a lot of Serbs bought it.

And then you had the recognition of Bosnia by the Western countries in early 1992, which became a pretext, I think not a reason, but a pretext for the Serbian aggression which took place in April. And the Serbs claimed that there was ethnic discrimination against them by the Muslims.

Again, I don't think there is any evidence for that, and Milosevic assured me several times in the spring of 1992 that the Serbs had no grievances in Bosnia. He made a distinction with Croatia, where the Serbian minority was in fact discriminated against by the Croatian authorities.

He said in Bosnia, that wasn't the case, that the Serbs had no grievances in Bosnia. So if they had no grievances, they had no pretext to start an aggression except that they simply wanted to increase the territory that they controlled. That created the reaction from the Muslims and you got the ethnic cleansing and everything else.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you got me confused about as much as I was when I started.

Mr. ZIMMERMAN. Sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. It makes a point, though, that experts disagree on things. And my problem is which set of experts do I listen to?

Dr. Schear, you want to take a shot at it?

Mr. SCHEAR. Yes, if I could just add a small point here, Mr. Chairman. One of the tragic features about this whole dynamic of ethnic cleansing is the fact that once people are dislocated, uprooted, cleansed, and go into another area, they become forces for instability in their own right.

And I am thinking in particular of the Serb communities, much beleaguered communities in so-called Sector East of Croatia, around the town of Vukovar. I was there about 14 months ago and had a chance to see some of the damage firsthand. It was really quite appalling, in fact.

The interesting thing about that area, though, is that the Serb communities, the indigenous communities there, prewar, some of the extremists there were responsible for cleansing large numbers of Croats out. Some of the towns had Croat pluralities or majorities and they are all gone, they are out in Zagreb and other places.

What happened, though, is that a lot of Serb refugees from Bosnia and Krajina have come in to take over housing in other areas that was vacated. And the poor Serbs there kind of wish there were some more non-Serb indigenous people around, because the newcomer Serbs are much more extreme, much more prone to criminal activity.

The level of Serb-on-Serb crime in eastern Slovenia, sector east, has gone way up over the past 2 years. And I suppose in a sense it gives one hope that if some of the refugees could come back and you could deal with the refugees that are there, you could calm things down. But it tends to be a dynamic that builds on itself. It is very hard to disentangle.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Thank you.

Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to open this up to the panel.

In a recent trip over to Macedonia visiting with our people in Naples, I had a very high-ranking official tell me that, in his opinion, 10 years from now, there would be a larger Croatia, 10 years from now a larger Serbia, and what is now referred to as Bosnia would be somehow enveloped into those two countries, that everything that is going on is just more or less holding the inevitable off and if the American forces are there for 12 months or for 12 years, the net result is the same; that Bosnia disappears and half of it goes into Croatia, the other half goes into Serbia.

How do you gentlemen feel about that?

Mr. ZIMMERMAN. There is undoubtedly an enormous appetite among the Serbian and Croatian leadership to divide Bosnia between them. And we know Milosevic, the Serbian leader, and Tudjman, the Croatian leader, have discussed this several times. And Tudjman has occasionally been indiscreet enough to make it public.

It seems to me that the fact there is this appetite and this danger for the Muslim community, which was 43 percent of Bosnia before the war, is the very reason we need to be in there. Because if we are not, this process can happen quite quickly.

I think there is at least a fair chance that if we can have peacekeepers in there with American participation, I think absolutely essential, that you can create these—some habits of peace that will

make it harder for extreme national leadership, such as now exists in Serbia and Croatia, to push for this kind of division of Bosnia.

Mr. TAYLOR. May I respond with another question?

Then why didn't that happen after 40-plus years under the iron fist of communism directed by Tito? Because they quit fighting each other for 40-plus years, and yet almost as soon as he was gone, they went back to it.

Mr. ZIMMERMAN. The reason he kept it together, because he was very strongly antinationalist. If you were nationalist in Tito's Yugoslavia, you very quickly went to jail. And there are a number of Bosnian-Serb nationalists who went to jail. Izetbegovic himself, the Muslim leader, went to jail for writing a book which was deemed to be a nationalist tract. There is an argument about that. Tudjman in Croatia went to jail.

What changed the situation was the coming to power of very strong Serbian and Croatian nationalist leaderships in the late 1980's and early 1990's. What you got in Serbian Croatia was nationalism from the top down. Using the medium of television, an enormously important weapon, to get people to think of themselves in ethnic terms and to hate other ethnic groups. Serbs were taught to hate Croats. Croats were taught to hate Serbs, and they were both taught to hate Muslims, and you got this kind of escalating pressure that worked against Bosnia.

Mr. TAYLOR. May I respond?

Mr. ZIMMERMAN. Please.

Mr. TAYLOR. A further question.

When you say they were taught to hate, I am having a little trouble fathoming that when I am told that when a Croatian child is born, if it happens to be a male, that many of the mothers literally hold them up like the scene in "Roots" and say this is my Serbian avenger.

I don't think that is something that just happens. I have got to believe that that is something that has been around for a long time. It is not going to disappear in 12 months.

Mr. ZIMMERMAN. Of course, there is a long history that goes back many centuries of ethnic hostility in that part of the world. There have also been long periods in those centuries of peace and it hasn't been an unbroken period of hostility. But there has been plenty of it.

The seeds were certainly there, but what it took to make them grow into these poisonous plants was the activities of these nationalist leaders. So I blame Milosevic and Tudjman, much more than I blame the Croat people or the Serbian people. Although the seeds of some hostility were in those people as well.

Mr. TAYLOR. Would any of you other gentlemen like to respond?

And if I may, Mr. Chairman, because I know I have only 5 minutes, one theory I keep hearing is that we have to do this, otherwise NATO loses face, there is no longer a reason for NATO. The counterpart to that is, though, that it would be a bigger embarrassment for NATO and for the United States to deploy and then have 50 or 60 young Americans killed or a village ransacked by one of the groups and women and children killed, the scene is seen on CNN, much like Mogadishu, and whosever mind in the polls next year about this time, and someone's going to be behind in the polls,

trounce the floor of Congress, forces a withdrawal vote, and that vote carries, and it will, that that is a bigger embarrassment to NATO and to the United States than to not go in on the ground at all?

Mr. DORNAN. Would the gentleman say that again, because I want to take down this plan, because I will take that vote to the floor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Interestingly enough, I didn't name you. I thought it would be Duke.

Mr. DORNAN. Would the gentleman yield for a serious comment on last night?

Mr. BATEMAN. Well, not on my time. If it is not my time.

The CHAIRMAN. I think he will be yielding too much.

Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, I would like to hear them respond.

Mr. DORNAN. Because "Nightline" last night was all about this.

Mr. TAYLOR. Gentlemen.

Would no one like to respond?

General BOYD. I will respond. I mean you have set up a dilemma which nobody wants to respond to. Both cases are embarrassing to NATO. Both cases tend to weaken NATO, and nobody is going to take that. You put a Hobson's choice here.

I think it is not so useful to think in the context of what this does or does not do to NATO. I think you were better off thinking in terms of the context of the United States' interests, United States interest in Europe, United States interest in maintaining a vehicle of leadership in Europe.

The thing that makes us a European power, not because we have territorial aims there, NATO, as an alliance structure, makes us a European power. We are a European power. It is in our interest to be a European power, because half of our foreign investment is in Europe. It is not useful to contemplate things that would weaken our ability to stay and stay in a leadership role in Europe. NATO happens to be the vehicle by which we do that.

If we can't determine that it is in our national interest to be there and to stay there and to see this thing through, then we shouldn't excuse ourselves for some other reason. We should just say it is not in our interest and therefore we are going to leave. You have to determine if it is in our interest.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bateman, your shot.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Schear——

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, you want to get somebody else to answer that?

Mr. TAYLOR. Dr. Schear raised his hand.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, I didn't see Dr. Schear.

Mr. SCHEAR. I was just going to add, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Taylor has made the clearest case I have heard for a serious, sustained debate in Congress and authorization by Congress before the United States dispatches troops into this situation.

We would be in a very difficult situation if we were to replay the Mogadishu syndrome, and I think one of the problems there is that the Congress may not have been engaged at the proper point when that operation changed its character.

If NATO goes in and the United States goes in as the leader, it has to accept the risks and to see the process through, and I do

think objectively you look at the lay of the land and the problems attached to not keeping a lid on this conflict and trying to solve it, and you very quickly get into a wider war.

Already with all the new Serb refugees in Serbia, there are more problems in Kosovo. Greater numbers of Muslim Kosovars are heading into the Albanian parts of Macedonia. There is a deep concern there over the future character of relations between Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia. That area could blow up, and with threats further abroad. So I do worry about the spread of the conflict.

But if Congress isn't in on the takeoff of this thing, I think we may have a crash landing. I worry about that.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Taylor.

Now Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am truly sorry that our colleague, Mr. Peterson, was not able to remain. I listened to his, I thought, rather polemical statement, and while I thought it polemical, I agreed with a good part of it.

One aspect of it that I would like to focus on very, very briefly, before I ask the panel to give me some reactions to a few items, his statement that the vote on the floor was totally political. Obviously he and I did not vote the same way on that resolution.

I would like for him to know that I did not cast that vote on a totally political basis, I cast it with a great deal of real anxiety and angst, because I don't like being in a position of not giving support to the President as the architect of our foreign policy.

One of the things that has become very clear to me in the discussion today—and this panel have been remarkably valuable—is that there are ways to get involved in this and to undertake this mission and there are ways not to do it.

What I find very distressing, and perhaps maybe critical to what I might ultimately vote to do, if we come to that, is, is the administration and its chief spokespersons—the Secretary of State, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense—going to continue to talk in terms of, this is a 1-year deployment? Because I don't think that makes any sense.

It was said this morning that while we would be committed only to a 1-year deployment—and this is from an intelligence briefing this morning—that we were there only for 1-year participation in IFOR, that the IFOR mission would be ongoing probably for several, if not many, years.

Well, if a part of the argument is that we as a NATO ally must be a part of this operation on the ground at the outset, what is it in logic that says that we extricate ourselves at the end of a year even if the operation is going to be ongoing?

Mr. DELLUMS. If you do it by agreement. That is the answer.

Mr. BATEMAN. But the problem I am having is, this administration hears NATO allies saying we want you there on the ground, you are providing the logistics, you are providing the command and control, you are providing the air cover, you are providing this, that, and the other, is not sufficient, we want you there on the ground.

Of course they want us on the ground. It lessens the cost to them in manpower as well as in treasure, and so they want all of ours

they can get. But if that doesn't serve our national interest and if that isn't fair, we should be saying so, not acceding to it at the outset, and I think that is basically what we have done.

This morning I am told that the reason we must be there on the ground is because the Bosnian Muslims have made it clear they don't want any peace unless we are there. Well, they don't want peace very badly if the only way they are willing to have peace is to have us there on the ground.

And why do they want us there on the ground? Because they perceive us, and I think they know their potential adversaries perceive us, as being their friends and on their side.

It makes it even worse when the Secretary and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs speak in terms of one of the objectives that has got to be met in the peacekeeping agreement is a Bosnia with defensible borders and we must make sure that the Bosnians have the arms and the capability to defend their borders—that is, we are going to arm and train the Bosnian Muslims—yet we are there as a part of a peacekeeping force. That is not the kind of deployment that makes any sense. It is not the kind of deployment any of you have said makes any sense. But that is the very kind of deployment that is the conception of the people who are saying we must do that.

I am very willing to undertake an American role there. I think we have a role there. I think we have an interest there. But Heaven's sakes, we can't pursue it stupidly, or we will have gained nothing, but we will have lost a great deal. So I thank you all for making it certainly possible for me to understand better the point.

This debate should not be entirely about whether you do or you don't. There are ways in which perhaps you do do it; there are ways in which, by golly, you ought not to do it; and I would like to see the debate carried on on that more rational basis than whatever the cost we have got to be there. And I would invite any reactions.

Mr. ZIMMERMAN. I think, Mr. Bateman, you have made an extremely important intervention here.

I think maybe it is necessary to separate out the role of the United States as it was over the last 3 months and the role as it will be in trying to enforce and monitor a peace agreement.

We did not play a neutral role in August or September of this year when we bombed Serbian installations from the air. We were obviously taking sides, whatever we chose to call it. We were taking sides, but we were taking sides because to be neutral against aggression and against summary executions and ethnic cleansing and so forth was not a fair position to be.

And because of that, because we were prepared to take sides against the Serbs, the situation was created where you could actually get a cease-fire, which is still in place, and a negotiation, which is just started. If we hadn't taken sides, none of that would have happened and the war would keep going.

So we now face a situation of, what we do during the negotiation and as part of the agreement? I think you are absolutely right to argue that it makes no sense to be arming one side as an agreement is implemented. It does seem to me our role has to change if we are part of a peacekeeping force. We can't be arming the

Bosnians. There may be other ways to ensure that there is no violation of the agreement.

I would like to see the threat of air power continuing if one of the sides is prepared to violate the agreement. But it is true, I think, that there is no way the agreement would work, the peacekeeping force would work, without American participation. The Bosnians don't trust the United Nations. They don't trust NATO without the United States. And I think they have good reason not to trust that. So it wouldn't work. It would break down, and you would get conflict.

So either we are going to be there and it works or we are not going to be there and it won't work, and I am afraid we are caught in that dilemma.

It seems to me that if we get rid of the element that you focused on, I think quite correctly—and I think most of the panel has already spoken to this and I agree with them—that we don't arm the Bosnians during the same time we are taking an impartial stance in trying to enforce an agreement among all three parties, and if we are prepared do that, then it seems to me we ought to be there and we should be there as long as it takes to get the mission done.

Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, could you indulge me a minute?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; if you can get Mr. Dornan to hold off.

Mr. BATEMAN. I will be very brief. I take your point.

The thing that is alarming to me is, if we are going to play the role that is needed to be played by our presence there, we already are at great liability by virtue of the air strikes and the role that we played that got them to the bargaining table.

And I don't want to be misunderstood. I am glad we did the things that we did that brought it about. It is something all Americans ought to be proud of.

But having done it, we create an impression, a conception, of us and our role that is antagonistic to our being part of the peacekeeping force. Our troops become perhaps more of a target, they may be more of an aggravation than the troops of other nations.

And it is not a matter of our not participating; believe me, we will be participating. We will be a major bill payer, we will be a major source of the logistics and all the rest that goes. The military hospitals and health services and the things we will be providing will be a very obvious American presence, which may be a better contribution than American land forces in Europe's backyard, when economically and equitably this is a burden that they should be willing to carry the largest portion of, not trying to see how big a portion of it they can thrust upon us.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dornan.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, we discuss all of this in the abstract as though it were the beginning of a new Presidency or the second term of Woodrow Wilson or Roosevelt, an Eisenhower or Ronald Reagan, a two-term Presidency.

What has caused cynicism to reign supreme across the land is this talk that we were going to be out in a year, that no matter how many firefights were ensuing anywhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or if it spilled over somewhere else, peacekeepers caught in eastern Slovenia, the Vukovar area, where we have just

asked the Belgians, because of their experience, to stay a little longer, where in Zagreb at the U.N. headquarters I learned that the Russian troops in eastern—in that eastern sector had all their trenches dug with the gun ports faced toward the west, into Croatia—that if we had firefights going in several spots, somebody would blow a whistle as though it were World War I and everybody would stop the firefight, fight a strategic retreat, and leave.

What is making this so cynical is, it is all tied to the election, which is a year from Sunday, November 5.

Those of us who wear, for quite serious reasons, a countdown watch—mine is set toward the Inauguration, which is 76 days later—we know that there is a factor here that the First Lady used on a television show in January—January 26, 1992—in discussing the heavy baggage that the eventual winner carried, and she said, "We have decided to roll the dice."

And what is frightening to a lot of Americans, this Member included, is that there is an aspect of rolling the dice that, if it goes sour, there goes the Presidency. But if it works, the way Haiti is supposedly working, then there is a certain maturity factor of foreign policy successes.

I don't see how, in a situation where the people are not yet exhausted killing one another—and this seems to be the most tragic aspect of male-dominated societies, that when killing starts and the blood debt on each side, Hatfields and McCoys—I don't care what part of the world it is—as the blood debt picks up and a father has to avenge his son, a brother a brother, a younger son avenges a father—as the blood debt picks up, the intensity of the killing picks up, and then it appears in all of history an exhaustion factor kicks in, and somebody says it is time for the killing to stop. The songs are written, the poets write.

I have seen it in Northern Ireland, I have seen it in Lebanon; we see it in Rwanda, sort of, and Burundi and Goma in Zaire in the camps. It appears there is an exhaustion factor, but maybe not.

The killing looks like it is going to start again. They are starting to kill again in southern Sudan, places that are beyond the reach of BBC and CNN cameras, like Tibet, East Timor; we don't know what is happening there.

There is no exhaustion factor here yet. There are still people on both sides that are perfectly ready to mortar marketplaces and kill innocent women and children.

And the situation of the French pilots is particularly loathsome. The French Foreign Minister used the word "grotesque," a statement out of Radovan Karadzic's mouth a week ago—about 10 days ago—that we don't know where they are, they have been kidnaped from the hospital. They were shot down when I was at Aviano. It was August 30. So that is 2 days in August, 32, 63, 65 days ago that Mirage was hit. It was filmed on videotape. You could see it hit; you could see two good parachutes. And on day 52 we are told they are still in the hospital.

Were they almost beaten to death then after they were captured? They evaded for several days, and then they were captured by Bosnian Serbs. And then with, again, the French Foreign Minister's statement in this grotesque statement.

Karadzic says, "Well, they were taken by brigands, probably for ransom, or maybe the Bosnian Muslims got them," and the French papers speculate they may have been murdered already.

Suppose that was an American female pilot—we have 13 in the Air Force now and about that number in the Navy—and a male front- or back-seater. Suppose we had an American fighting officer, male or female, missing, and suddenly some side tells us, well, they are kidnaped by some unknown group, maybe this group. It would be on the front page of all our news magazines, the way O'Grady was, a happy ending story.

I would just ask all of you to comment on what you think the odds are for that type of riveting tragedy involving real persons: Gary Gordon, Lincoln, ME; Randy Shugart, Lincoln, NE. Both married. Gordon, beautiful little children, Ian and Brittany.

Do you know who those two names are? The Medal of Honor winners for giving their lives to try and rescue Durant. And they saved him, couldn't save his crew members, the three of them. Ray Frank was the copilot—3 combat tours as a Huey pilot in Vietnam, 36 combat months in Vietnam, within 29 days of retirement. And the younger rangers in Delta Force, guys called him the old man, and Ray Frank's body was stripped and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu with the two door gunners, David Cleveland, Tommy Fields. And two young Delta Force guys, sergeants in their mid-thirties, begged three times to go down and rescue them and win a posthumous Medal of Honor.

These are real human beings that we lost. No. 19 killed on October 6, 1993, was Matt Rearson. That was a direct hit in front of the Ranger hangar at Mogadishu International Airport.

I obviously keep track of real human beings here, and if one person gets killed, I will match his life against Clinton's life, adulteries, draft dodging, and financial corruption out of Little Rock. I will say, which one is a better American?

This is a game we are playing that has to do with elections and politics. So all your geopolitical analyzing doesn't mean anything if we are talking about being out in a year and the year is already up.

So now we have to talk about—what?—being out in 11½ months, being out in 11 months, being out in 10 months, or is all that going to end?

Where you are sitting, Doctor, is where Warren Christopher sat, and he said, not very strongly, "What are we going to do, let George do it?" You know who George was? The other NATO countries. Well, if you take out Iceland with no forces, and you take out Germany because of World War II embarrassment, and you take out Italy because their contribution is real estate and bases, Brindisi and Vincenza and Aviano and Villa Park and all of that, take them out because they put up real estate, and you take out Greece which has opted for the wrong side, and you take out Canada and the United States because we are in a different continent, you still have 10 nations left.

And the British and French showed that they can fight and fight forcefully with their rapid reaction force, and they weren't wearing robin's-egg-blue helmets or ball caps or berets, they fought in their NATO combat gear, and they got respect, and they tore the hell out

of some Serb positions, the Bosnian Serb positions, with 155-millimeter accurate artillery fire. That is respect.

Is that what we are getting into? What are we going to do there? And it is so utterly politicized, and there is a scandal brewing in Haiti. You would better study Haiti's instability the minute we leave.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out, the gentleman has gone on about 15 or 20 minutes.

Mr. DORNAN. The specific question—I will repeat it—is, tell me all how the political factor, U.S. domestic politics, influences your deepest thinking on what we are going to do once we get there if there are time factors involved in how long we stay.

And I do not have anything else to say or no followups.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know. Anybody may answer.

Mr. ZIMMERMAN. May I answer that, Mr. Chairman?

I want to address the part of Congressman Dornan's statement that dealt with risk, the risk to American military personnel.

Obviously there is going to be a risk if we are committed in Bosnia, and the political question, I guess, is whether that risk is counterbalanced by the advantages of being in there, and one of the advantages of being in there of course is a saving of other human beings, in this case Bosnian human beings who would otherwise, if the war continues, be killed.

You mentioned the exhaustion factor hadn't been reached yet. I agree with that. What caused the cease-fire, in my view at least, is the rebalancing of forces in Bosnia coming from the American air strikes and from the Croatian victories in Krajina and in western Bosnia. That brought together a political-military situation which made all sides much more susceptible to a cease-fire than they were before. That wasn't exhaustion. So we are not at an exhaustion situation yet.

But it does seem to me that an agreement which is properly implemented, with all the safeguards that have been discussed here, can help to bring an exhaustion factor a lot closer than it is now, by creating real incentives to living without conflict and disincentives to violating the agreement and the truce and starting it over again.

I think everybody has to decide for themselves where they come down on this. For me, assuming it is a good agreement and the rules of engagement are the right ones, putting American forces in there is worth the risk that you described so graphically and which obviously has to be considered.

Mr. SCHEAR. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Dr. Schear.

Mr. SCHEAR. Just a very quick response, sir.

I agree with Ambassador Zimmerman. I think this mission, if the agreement is right, if the rules of engagement are right, is a meritorious mission, setting aside the question of timing.

I would defer to other people on the motivations behind the timetable. I see some problems in setting a date specific, as I have said before, and I would prefer that there not be a rigid timetable.

Second, if we don't have a war crimes tribunal which is up to the task of exacting some measure of justice for the victims, we are

going to be in this cycle for a long time, because the exhaustion factor has not been reached, as you have stated.

I think that one of the tragedies of this whole conflict is that guilt tends to be a collective phenomenon, not individual. Specific individuals pull triggers, burn townhouses, raped women, did unspeakable things, and we need a thoroughgoing international process that looks and appears to be impartial, but proactive, to go after the leadership and trigger men, and these people aren't going to be able to travel very far, because if they cross an international boundary they may be arrested.

I think if we can utilize a war crimes tribunal process to deal with the sense of anger, which is clearly there, then I think we are one step ahead, recognizing this is a very difficult conflict.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Schear. Anyone else?

General BOYD. We all have made our thoughts clear, I believe. I think one thing we all agree in is that, if we do put our forces in here, that we should not restrict them at the outset on how long they stay, nor should we restrict them to some artificial limit in size.

I think the other problem that we are talking about in terms of how to deal with the refugee problem is an enormous one. Since August 1, there are somewhere between 300,000 and 380,000 Serbian refugees that have been added to this mess, all with a serious grudge.

We have problems with war criminals of all factions. We hear about most of them on the Serb side in this country, but in a fair reading of the press and in talking with people all over the ground in Bosnia, all of the factions have identified people that they believe to be the most heinous of criminals, war criminals.

Whether the IFOR gets involved in that or that kind of mission creep we have also dealt with, or we have talked about, it is a very dangerous thing in my view. There will be risks that we haven't calculated.

It is true that the Serbs have reason to particularly dislike us based on the air strikes, but I would submit to you that there will be just as much risk or more perhaps from Muslims and Croats shelling our troops and blaming it on the Serbs with the hopes that we will react against them. This is a perilous mission.

What, again, I have said, and I hope that you will understand: I did not come here to argue that we should put troops in, only that you consider the very great complexity of the mission, the very great complexity of the historical background that brings us where we are today, in your careful and thoughtful deliberations, when you decide if it is in the national interest for us to put troops in on the ground.

Again, I would emphasize, we hear, because our press has pretty much picked sides, as has this administration, but I would say that if you read the press in Europe, there are as many stories about the Croat atrocities in Sector North and South as there are about Serb atrocities in Srebrenica.

These are very brutal people. They have antagonisms that you have discussed, sir, that go back centuries. We are not going to settle this issue, we are not going to bring it to a happy ending, in 12 months, no matter how good the peace accord is that we try to

implement. We should go in, if we go in with the idea that this is going to take some time.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to try to get you out of here by 5 o'clock, gentlemen. We have one more questioner.

Mr. Longley.

Mr. LONGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just have to state for the record, I haven't been in Washington that long, but I can't think of any more stinging rebuke against anything I might do in this committee than a charge of partisanship. And I would also say that one of the more difficult charges for me to make against anyone, including the Commander in Chief, would be to make that similar type of charge.

I am gravely concerned about the issue, and I again want to come back to a comment the ranking member made. There have been some several outstanding comments this afternoon. I supported the administration twice in opposition to lifting the embargo, but in many respects I feel like someone who has maybe helped a boy with a wagon up to the top of the hill only to find that they didn't settle for their victory and they have gone careening down the other side.

What I mean by that is that I have not seen an issue in the 10 months that I have been here in my district that has created the intensity of feeling that I am seeing on the issue of whether we put American troops into Bosnia or not, and I think a function of it—and this is, I guess, what—I want to state what concerns me, because I really—this is really a very, very troubling subject to me.

We are making—what really concerns me is that the administration appears to be making promises about its objectives and how it is going to go into this situation that just seem to be totally at odds with the reality as it has been described by you gentlemen and by others before the committee, and some of the assumptions that we are making—that we are going to arm and equip, that we are going in to negotiations not with the question of whether or not we will put American troops in, but on the assumption that we are going to put American troops in—we already know how many, 25,000. We don't know what the mission is, but we are going to put 25,000, and, by the way, they are only going to be there for 12 months, and there is no suggestion—there is an ostensible suggestion of neutrality, but yet the facts are clear that we have been very partial to the Bosnians and the Croats and against the Serbs.

And in a very simple way, I don't detect any appreciation whatsoever for the tremendous complexity of this situation.

And stating that, you want to pick up on Mr. Taylor's comment, which is, isn't the possible graver risk that we enter this situation on absolutely false pretenses, or on false assumptions, that reality will not meet, and we have created a far greater catastrophe by wading into a situation we don't understand than by acting resolutely on one that we do. I would pose that as a question for any comments from the panel.

General COVAULT. I will tell you that particularly over the last year as I continued to work on plans, we talked more and more about the formula for failure.

We had done so much thinking about how we could achieve certain objectives and almost to the point where we were out of ideas, and we thought we had a good plan written down.

We really gave a lot of serious thought to this business of a formula for failure and what the circumstances might be that could cause us to fail even though we had good intentions, et cetera.

I guess I am, in a way, endorsing some of what you have said, that there are many elements in that formula and they are all out here, and if we come to conclusions and make decisions that we are going to do certain things at certain times before the whole formula is laid out for us, you could end up with a formula that has more elements for failure in it than it has for success, in spite of our best intentions.

For example, something that bothers me an awful lot: Let's say we had a scenario where we get a really good peace plan, and then the next thing that happens is there is pressure brought to bear by citizens or by the North Atlantic Council, or whoever, to demonstrate that we are going to move very fast, and the first thing we want are combat troops on the ground, in days we want combat troops on the ground, an absolute formula for failure, because we don't have a theater.

You have to establish a theater command and control system, you have to create a theater communications system, you have to create a theater multilogistics system, you have to build roads, repair bridges, open ports, improve, and we have to implement—a word that folks don't like any more—the psychological operations to prepare the battlefield so that when we do commit those troops it will be as part of a larger formula for success.

But it scares me that people are going to see the fact that combat troops on the ground is the very first thing that ought to happen, we have skipped phase 1 of the plan and 2 of the plan, and we are on a track to failure, and it can happen, and it scares me a lot.

Mr. LEWIS. Could I make a statement, a very short statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We are trying to get——

Mr. LEWIS. I am sorry, it is still your time. Could you yield me a second, Mr. Longley?

Mr. LONGLEY. I would like to hear the answers from the other panelists.

Mr. SHEAR. I want to make a brief response.

I think one of the serious risks is that we won't go in very smart about the complexity of local politics and in each of the factions and that the job of working with civilians is going to be glossed over until a very advanced stage of the process.

One of the most effective things we can do, if we are smart, is to go in there and work with local councils, various towns, to work to support moderates on each side, the Muslim community, the Croat community, the Serb community, in their efforts to stitch together these towns piece by piece, and I fear that without a strong civilian component—that is, not only the civil affairs side of the military effort, but strong civilians, international staff from NATO countries, Americans who are there on the ground who know who the bad guys are and who the good guys are—we are going to be flying blind, and I worry about that.

Moreover, one of the other serious risks is that right now we don't know how committed the Bosnian Serb leadership will be to an agreement.

One of the unusual aspects of our use of air power was that it tended to give Milosevic a lever to bring the Bosnian Serbs to heel. We are also making an assumption that current leadership on the Bosnian Serb side won't be around.

If not them, and they are discredited, then the question is who, and will they be vested in the agreement as much as Milosevic is.

A good thing about taking sides occasionally is that you can ask your friend to make concessions that he wouldn't make otherwise if you weren't there to back him up, and when we used air power against the Serbs in early September, we also asked the Bosnian Serbs to move a little bit on the issues of importance in the negotiations, and I think that has brought things along to our current point.

So I think we have to strike a balance between being neutral on the one hand and being supportive on the other hand when it serves our purposes to be so.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS. I disagree with Mr. Dellums, his statement about world peacekeepers. I think if we go into this as peace enforcers that we better go in with a national interest at the heart of our reasons for being there, because the American people, their taxes go to the common defense, that our military is to provide for common defense and to protect our vital national interest. That has been the history of our involvement in foreign affairs, and I think it would be a bad mistake to go in as a world peacekeeper. That isn't a good enough reason for the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dellums.

Mr. DELLUMS. I would like to ask a question and just say to my colleague that now and then it seems to me that there is a great moral challenge that lifts us beyond our so-called vital national interest, and it seems to me that that great moral challenge is, how do you end the killing and the dying and the slaughtering? That is something that we need to address in the context of the 21st century.

Dr. Schear, you mentioned that, based on the dynamics on the ground, that we now have this brief window of opportunity. Would you comment as to how fragile you think this moment is? How long does this window stay open? What factors are conducive to closing that window and fracturing this rather delicate moment?

Mr. SHEAR. It is hard to put a timeframe on this window. I see the major threats to closing it as the following.

First of all, the Muslims and the Croats decide to resume offensive operations in northern Bosnia, pushing out more Serbs, creating a circumstance where Serbia may feel that it has to enter the war in Bosnia to protect its own.

Already the Serbs have put up checkpoints preventing any further Serb civilians from going into Serbia from Bosnia. It is a sign that they are closing their door to further flow of people.

Second, will the Croatians decide to solve the rest of their Serb problem by attacking in Sector East.

I think both those possibilities could close this window very quickly and lead to further escalation. That I do fear.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you.

Mr. LEWIS. I would like to thank the panelists for being here today. It was a very good job. We appreciate it. I think it will help us in making some of our decisions.

Thank you so much.

[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES TO BOSNIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 8, 1995.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd D. Spence (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will please come to order. We are going to go ahead and get started. We have some conflicts this morning and others will be coming in later on.

Last week, as part of the committee's ongoing exploration of the Bosnian situation, we heard a number of intelligence assessments about the situation on the ground in Bosnia.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Mr. DELLUMS. I am sorry. I hate to intrude on the opening statement of the Chair, but my thought was that given the fact that an extraordinary human being lost his life a few days ago, I would ask that we bow our heads in a moment of silence for Prime Minister Rabin, who gave his life in the cause of peace.

[Moment of silence.]

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very appropriate that we do that. He was a leading figure on the world stage who had done a lot for peace in the world. I had known him for a number of years and we have had many meetings together. He was just a great leader.

Last week, as part of the committee's ongoing exploration of the Bosnian situation, we heard a number of intelligence assessments about the situation on the ground in Bosnia. Today, the committee will look at the difficult operational and tactical military issues that confront our troops if they are called upon to deploy to Bosnia as peacekeepers.

This morning, we will hear from a panel of distinguished witnesses about the conduct of military operations in such an environment. First, we will hear from Lt. Gen. Anthony Zinni. General Zinni is currently the Commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force participating in an operation to provide comfort in Northern Iraq and the U.S. deployment to Somalia. General Zinni also commanded the force which provided the protection for the U.N.'s with-

drawal from Somalia. The committee looks forward to General Zinni's testimony concerning any lessons he learned about peace operations in a complex political and military environment.

Following General Zinni will be retired Army Gen. David Maddox, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. 7th Army and the U.S. Army in Europe. During his tenure, General Maddox wrestled with the challenges of an array of potential Bosnia missions. He is well versed not only in the operational requirements of such a mission but also the support and sustainment demands involved.

Finally, we will hear from Andrew Krepinevich, Director of the Defense Budget Project, a local bipartisan think tank. He will address a number of issues, including how military operations are inevitably linked to political and strategic goals.

In the course of this morning's testimony, I hope our witnesses will shed some light on a host of complex operational issues, among them being what is the military mission or objective? By what route will our forces deploy? Is the size of the planned United States force adequate to secure and patrol this area of operation? What is the right composition of our forces for this mission? What should be the rules of engagement for this sort of a mission? How will military success be defined? What does victory look like in this kind of operation?

How will coalition forces be integrated into the U.S. contingents operation? What role will NATO rapid reaction corps play in controlling day-to-day operations in Bosnia? To what extent will our troops be responsible for the conduct of civic action and civil affairs operation? How will our troops be expected to react to major violations of the peace that do not occur directly within the American area of responsibility?

These are just a sample of the kinds of issues that I hope we will hear from our witnesses this morning and that they will be covering.

Gentlemen, I thank you for agreeing to appear before the committee. I look forward to your testimony and I would like to recognize Mr. Dellums for any comments he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I join with you in welcoming today's witnesses to the committee's ongoing inquiry into the current situation in Bosnia. Lieutenant General Zinni, General Maddox, and Dr. Krepinevich each bring different perspectives on military planning requirements for the participation of U.S. forces in a peacekeeping role in the former Yugoslavia, and I very much look forward to hearing their insights concerning these issues.

This is especially true in light of what may be a critical and the central role U.S. forces could play in implementing and thereby securing a peace agreement between the contending factions, as was observed and articulated by the four witnesses before this committee last week. The hearings on which the committee has embarked should grant the opportunity to prepare ourselves to consider the many implications that will ultimately have to inform our judg-

ment concerning any possible peace agreement reached among the parties in Ohio and what the proper U.S. participation in implementing any such peace agreement would be.

To this point, we have addressed the broad issues relating to the peace initiative. Today, I hope the witnesses will help us to understand more about the practical implications of our potential involvement, preparing ourselves, Mr. Chairman, to make an assessment of the terms of such an agreement and any implementation strategy that would include U.S. participants is the right thing to do.

As I cautioned my colleagues when we heard previously from both the administration and outside witnesses, coming to judgment early would be a mistake. This caution was not heeded by at least one of our witnesses last week. Making a determination as to what the United States should do in regard to implementing an agreement before we know both its contours and requirements would be premature and potentially tragic.

It is my hope that today's witnesses, with their varied military planning and assessment experiences, can contribute especially to an understanding of how to assess whether any potential proposed force is appropriate to perform the assigned task with a minimum of risks.

I have often expressed the view that Somalia was our first experience in conducting peacekeeping operations in the post-cold war era, and we all know that did not turn out as we planned or hoped. Many have pointed out that our early mission succeeded brilliantly in ending the mass starvation and in bringing stability to wide areas of the country. It was at the moment when we changed our mission and took sides in the local conflict that things began to go badly.

I am especially interested in your views on how we can avoid repeating the bad portions of the Somalia experience, as well as the negative experiences of the U.N. forces in Bosnia, while capitalizing on some of the positive lessons learned in Somalia and in Haiti.

Most of our colleagues would agree that peacekeepers should be seen as impartial. They should make no enemies, take no sides. After appearing to some to have helped prosecute a military effort against the Serbian forces, what would be required to cause the United States to be perceived as a credible peacekeeper? How might the other elements of the multinational military force be seen by the parties? Would the participation of Russian forces serve to bolster the confidence of the Serbian elements that Serbian interests would not be unfairly enforced anywhere or be unfairly forced away?

If a successful peace is brokered, and given the generations of conflict and the generally complicated geographic distribution of the various ethnic groups, what does the military possess that may be required to help deflect or diffuse the conflict and stabilize the region?

How do we ensure that the rules of engagement and the training of the peacekeeping forces will prepare the force to resolve the many varied crises in a manner that will contribute to an overall positive solution to the problems confronting the parties while ensuring, on the other hand, the safety and security of our own

forces? Are there considerations for military-to-military interaction with indigenous military units that would enhance the chances for success, for example?

These and numerous other questions will occupy us during the weeks to come. Knowing your views, the witnesses this morning, as to the military planning considerations will be useful in our effort to support the most efficacious approach to ending the bloodshed, ending it before it spreads, and ending it in a manner well calculated to reach a durable peace.

As I noted earlier, Mr. Chairman, making a determination as to what the United States should do in regard to implementing an agreement before we know its contours would be both premature and potentially tragic, but that does not absolve us of our responsibility to explore the issues that will determine the frame of reference for the future congressional decisionmaking once a viable peace plan has been put into effect.

I join with you in looking forward to the experienced and informed testimony of our distinguished witnesses this morning and their response to our many questions.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thanks the gentleman for his remarks.

Without objection, the prepared statements of all of our witnesses will be submitted for the record and you can proceed as you like, starting with General Zinni.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. ANTHONY ZINNI, COMMANDER, 1ST MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

General ZINNI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sir, my experience comes from five peacekeeping and humanitarian operations that I participated in on the ground and several others that I was involved in in the planning parts of the operations. I am not directly involved, neither is my force, in Bosnia, but I would like to share some of the lessons learned that I took away from the operations I did participate in.

I would begin by saying that every one of these operations is different, and we have to be careful what we take from one operation that we think might be successful or might not work. They each have their own characteristics. The environments are significantly different, and so each has to be judged on its own merits and the situation evaluated on the ground.

There are two keys, I think, to determining how difficult the operation will be. One of the keys is the degree and the quality of consent of all those factions that you are dealing with and the other is the degree of complexity.

Consent is something that probably comes in different forms and in different degrees. Some is reluctant. Some is very enthusiastic and positive, and there may be even factions that do not participate and have not voiced their consent or do not provide or give their consent. Consent can be lost throughout the course of the operation, and I think it is important to monitor the degree of enthusiasm, the degree of cooperation, the degree of consent that is being maintained.

Complexity has to do with the other dimensions beyond just the military. The military portion of this naturally deals with security tasks and other designated tasks, but most likely there will be a humanitarian effort, a political effort, maybe an economic recovery effort, a number of other things ongoing. The involvement of the military in that has to be clearly defined. The cooperation and coordination has to be clearly defined. They cannot be viewed as separate dimensions. They have to be well coordinated and they have to be cooperative.

I have found that the earlier the involvement, the better chance is for success. If there is an agreement, hot on the heels of that agreement is the best time to get involved. I think in the immediate aftermath of an agreement, when there is hope, when expectations are high, that is when the initiative can be gained and that is when the operation can best get off on a good foot.

It is important to start the planning as early as possible, and it is important to include everyone in the planning. I mentioned all the dimensions that would be involved—the humanitarian, the political, and others. The planning has to include all those in a coordinated fashion.

We cannot stovepipe the military planning or the political planning or the humanitarian planning, and this becomes difficult because there are a lot of agencies, governmental, non-governmental, those outside our own political framework, that may be working in the area. As much as possible, we need this degree of coordination as soon as possible.

Everyone will be making assessments on the ground. It has been my experience that assessment teams pop up in these operations from unexpected directions and sources. They provide different evaluations as to the situation. This causes problems with policy makers, again, because assessments come back stovepipe. We need to coordinate any assessment process.

What goes on in the humanitarian area or the political area does affect the military area, so those assessments, especially where they may conflict or differ, have to be worked from the bottom up at each echelon so we understand why they differ and so we can again gain the coordination necessary to make our plan a cooperative one.

It is necessary in the beginning to go through the details of planning, in other words, to define the intent, to define the center of gravity, that which you intend to affect and cause the operation to be a success, to define the end state conditions that you want to achieve, the exit strategy if one is necessary, but all those pieces should be fully in place. They may change and they may have to be reevaluated because the situation is always changing, but you need a point of departure and you need a clear understanding between those who set the political objectives and those who define the military tasks as to exactly what is going to be accomplished.

We have to stay focused on the mission and we have to keep the mission focused. The danger here, of course, is mission creep. It is a well-worn, I think, phrase. We should allow possibly for mission shift. There are times that the mission that we go in to accomplish is not appropriate or needs modification, but that ought to be a deliberative process, an iterative one, with the commander in the

field all the way back to the policy makers agreeing on those shifts and neither side shifting or moving the mission.

It is important on scene to centralize the planning, to make sure we have a single plan, a single set of objectives, but I would emphasize it is probably just as important to decentralize the execution. In these areas, you travel very short distances and see remarkably different environments, different ethnic groups, different religious beliefs, different degrees of government authority, and each commander in each sector has to have the freedom to adapt that centralized plan as he sees best fit.

On the ground, everything has to be coordinated and the mechanisms have to be in place so we avoid stovepiping. It truly is a fact that what goes on in one dimension can adversely or positively affect another dimension. What the humanitarian effort is doing, what the political policy makers on scene are doing will affect how the military is viewed and how their operation is conducted, so there needs to be some sort of agency on the ground, some sort of executive steering group, something that pulls together all these efforts on scene.

We have to go in knowing the culture and knowing the issues. Oftentimes, as in Somalia, one of the biggest problems is we do not understand a culture that is remarkably different than ours. We do not understand the history of the conflict. We do not understand the root causes of the problem. This will affect how we conduct operations. It affects how we deal with people on scene. It affects how we not make enemies and maintain a degree of neutrality.

It is probably important to get key institutions started immediately. That is the best sign of hope. That is the best way to raise expectations. Usually, security institutions, in some cases, the establishment of public services where there have not been any, but things that send positive signs, that begin the recovery process as soon as possible. They bring on a life of their own and they tend to make things move very quickly and they allow us to maintain the initiative and the momentum.

My next point has to do with one that was already mentioned by Congressman Dellums. Do not make enemies. That is a very difficult thing to do. If we do make an enemy, we have to be clear that he is an enemy and he has done something wrong and treat him as such. We cannot delude ourselves to think we still maintain neutrality when, in fact, our actions and how we are perceived lead to something completely differently. We have to be clear on who the enemy is, if there is one, or who has violated something that is unacceptable to us. But at all costs, we should attempt in the beginning to maintain the perception of neutrality.

We have to seek on the ground unity of effort and unity of command. If we look back and examine some of the things that went wrong in places like Somalia, we can see that lack of unity of command, that lack of unity of effort. Too many different military commands, too many stovepipe functions going on that are not well coordinated and that are not welded together at every echelon, beginning with the commander on scene, cause us problems.

We have to open a dialogue with everybody involved. Every faction has to have a forum at which they can bring up their gripes, their complaints, their issues, where we can deconflict problems,

where we can issue ultimatums or we can issue rules of behavior or whatever. But we should not isolate anyone. There has to be a means of talking through an issue first and not leaving violence as the only alternative for someone that has a gripe. These mechanisms have to be in place in the area of operations.

We should encourage innovation and non-traditional approaches in these operations. Traditional military thinking does not always get it. We have to be imaginative. A lot of times, operations in this environment really become significantly different than the normal way we do military operations. The military is not the centerpiece. Normally, it is the humanitarian or the political effort that is going on, and learning how to support those efforts become key. It again points back to the issue of coordination.

In these operations, personalities are oftentimes more important than processes. You can have the best process, the best plan in the world, but it will not work if it is being run by the wrong person. People count in these operations. We need people that can communicate. We need people that can deal with different cultures. We need people that can understand the dimensions, the issues that are taking place and can adapt.

We have to be careful on scene as to who we empower. We will empower people by the nature of our operation. Simple things like contracting for services, dealing with certain leaders, will, in fact, empower them. We have to be clear to understand who we desire to empower, who we desire not to empower, or if we want to maintain neutrality, that we are careful not to inadvertently empower anyone that should not be, because this changes perceptions of our force.

We have to decide on the image that we want to project. If we want this image of peacekeepers, of neutral peacekeepers, then we have to build that image through the media, through psychological operations, and we have to do a lot of work to maintain that image throughout the course of the operation and constantly test to see how we are being perceived.

That leads us to the need to centralize information management. All too often in these operations, information is stovepiped out. We conduct a psychological operations campaign unaware that probably the greatest influence on the population we are dealing with is the media, and that is run through a separate organization. Those that deal with the media may come in many forms. We may have too many people dealing with the media. We may not be accurate. We may not be portraying the image and the purpose that we want. So all the information management should be centrally managed.

In coalition operations, we need to seek compatibility and we need to seek compatibility in three areas. We have to ensure that everyone on the ground that is part of this force, part of this process, whether it is military, political, humanitarian, that the political objectives are compatible. They may not be uniform but they have to be compatible. We cannot have members of the force or others on the ground out prosecuting an agenda that differs or runs contrary to the objectives of the force as a whole.

The force must have cultural compatibility with each other and with the people they are dealing with.

And third, it must have military interoperability or military compatibility. If it is to work together, then it must be able to operate together. The procedures must be the same, the rules of engagement, procedures for calling in fire support and other routine military kinds of operations. The technical procedures must be in place and the interoperability must be in place. Our radios must be able to talk to each other. If one force is providing logistics support, it must have the capability to provide that support to unique forces that may possess equipment or other capabilities not familiar with the providing force.

We also must have doctrinal and tactical interoperability. We operate or come from a different base on how we do business. Our tactics, our approaches to things, the doctrinal base that we use should be compatible and it should be understood and that aids unity of command.

And finally, we need to ensure that our forces are trained and our staffs and senior officers are educated on how to deal with this kind of operation. It is significantly different. Tactical evolutions can dramatically affect the course of operations. A young sergeant at a road block or at a check point could make a decision or cause something that can happen that can affect the outcome, success or failure, of the operation. Constant awareness, understanding in this very difficult complex operation is necessary, and the senior staffs and commanders have to understand those things or those component parts about these operations that are significantly different from normal military operations.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Maddox?

STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID MADDOX, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ARMY EUROPE AND 7TH ARMY

General MADDOX. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I was asked to discuss the military aspects of our involvement in Bosnia, but I think I need to preface that with sort of my background and what I think has changed.

I had been clearly a product of the cold war. I spent 15 years in Germany, but the last 6 years changed all of that, being there. Hindsight is very interesting because it was an easy situation. There were political issues and the real view of a cold war going hot is the political process failed and it was a military issue. We looked at things as military operations that honestly were military reactions to a situation in which the political process had failed, so it was the job of somebody in uniform and those in civilian clothes had not been able to accomplish the mission.

At the end of Desert Storm until the time I left Europe at the end of last year, we had conducted 52 deployments of soldiers in Europe—operational deployments, not training deployments—52 of them, involved over 20,000 soldiers. I asked my historians to go back in Europe and find out how many we had made from the end of World War II to the beginning of Desert Storm. The answer was 29 with 11,000 soldiers in 44 years.

The difference with all 52 deployments was that all of them were political issues requiring the role of the military. While that may be subtle, it is very critical to the discussion on the military aspects of going into Bosnia. It is a political issue requiring military force. So most of the issues that I have are political issues, the answer to which drives the military solution, so I think that is very, very important.

Why is the United States going to go? What is the political objective of being involved, and from that political objective, what are our military objectives? Honestly, we cannot work that and get into the specific mission tasks until we see the agreement that is signed.

I thought well before I retired that we would have soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was involved in the planning on several occasions and people would say, how many soldiers have to be involved in the force? And after having done it about four times, I said, would you kindly tell me what the mission is, because the answer is different every time.

So what is the mission? What is our role going to be, the role of the force—not just the U.S. portion of it—the role of the force in humanitarian assistance? What is the role in escorting forces to get them realigned? Are we going to be involved in any disarming of forces, and everybody says no, about equipping and arming somebody.

How about establishing boundaries and then securing those boundaries, marking them, providing observation, conducting patrols? We know how to do that. Are those internal borders, external borders, or both, because I think we tend to forget this is supposed to be one country. We have gotten hung up into two parts of this three-part country, putting the Bosnian Serbs in one camp and the Croatians and Muslims in another. This is supposed to be a country with a Croatian-Muslim federation and a Republic of Serbia, part of one country. So borders, yes, but to do what with regard to those borders?

What is our role going to be in the relocation of refugees? Internal security, not just the borders between portions of this country but the internal security, what is our role there?

Then I think the most critical issue, because I can come up with opposed answers to all the other questions, what is the role of this force when there is a violation of the peace? Is it to report it to someone, or are we supposed to act about it, and if act about it is the role, let us define it, because there we have got to be neutral. If we are going to take military action to a violation of the separation of the forces within the new Bosnia, then whatever we do regarding one part of that force has got to be done equally with the other part.

Then there is the whole role of nation building, creating the conditions for nation building, because I do not think the military should be a nation builder but can certainly help in creating those conditions, helping to establish law and order. Then there are engineering-type tasks, certainly initial life saving and reconstruction, and then the coordination of all the international agencies. We ran the operation in Rwanda and Zaire, and my deputy, who was the JTF commander, was coordinating activities of 88 independent or-

ganizations, and they do not like to be coordinated, but creating the environment within which they can contribute and reinforce each other is very important.

That is just part of the list, but defining what is it we want our military to do there is the first step. And without that, you cannot figure out what force is required to do it. It gets down to the type of force, the number of people, and how you may view that as changing over time.

This is going to be a combined force, so the big issue is, what is the size of the force required to do the mission and then what is the U.S. portion of it? I would argue there are two parts to the U.S. portion. One is if the United States is given an area and say, you run the operation, you do the mission in that area, there is a force associated with it.

With this combined force, there are some aspects of the capabilities of the United States that our allies do not have and we will be asked to contribute some force to the combined force that will support us but has a role bigger than just supporting the U.S. side. Sometimes those get mixed and both add to a total.

Then you get force constraints, that is, how many countries do people want to have participate? How many countries want to participate? And from that, the number of soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen that are involved.

The chain of command is important. I think from the NATO side, we are in good shape. NATO, half south, the arc. The division, the U.S. division that if we go has been planned has worked this for a long time with the rapid reaction corps, so that relationship is there. But I believe that all of the forces that are currently in the UNPROFOR that are there need to get rolled under the same chain of command. You cannot have two bosses.

Clearly, I think that is the issue with regard to Russian participation. My view is having Russians there has a lot of merit. The issue is, what is the command relationship? Are we all working for the same boss on the same sheet of music? That does not necessarily have to be the—you can work that where you plug them in, but you cannot have an independent operation by one nation that is involved in the rest.

Rules of engagement, we tend to think of the protection rules of engagement. Those can be worked and they are easy, not easy from the point of view of getting all participants to agree with what they are and what they mean. Many people criticize the rules of engagement in the United Nations. They are not that bad. It is every country has defined them differently. So even some authority that exists within the U.N. rules of engagement are not implemented in Bosnia today.

The big issue on rules of engagement is when—hopefully, never, but if there is a violation of the peace accord and you have a conflict that occurs, what are the rules of engagement? Not what do I do if he shoots at me, what am I supposed to do if this goes from a peacekeeping operation to a conflict?

Force projection, how are we going to get the force there? Honestly, we have worked that. At least for the European force, you have some benefits because you can get there by rail, too. So you can use sea, you can use air, and you can also use rail. You have

some political coordination to make that all happen, but it is doable.

You then have the force protection issue, and it is force protection over time and my issue is you have to expect this thing goes to hell and go so that you are ready to deal with that situation and your force is properly protected. If you are wrong, that is wonderful. You cannot be wrong the other way. So you have to plan your force protection side expecting mission creep, doing everything to avoid it, but make sure that you do not put your servicemen and women in danger.

Then there is the support issue. How do you sustain this operation? There is some sustainment that is going on because of the number of UNPROFOR forces that are there already. It is that when you add 65,000 or so, if that is to be the number, you add to the requirement. The big issue is the terrain is terrible and winter does not help it, but you have to go work that. I think it is workable.

I think the whole thing keeps coming back to, what was the agreement, because if the agreement was not to have peace in Bosnia and we do not believe that the agreement made by people who signed paper has any validity in influencing those people that are in the country, we have a very different situation. So if there has been a peace accord and we believe that there is consensus, then I think a lot of the initial concerns on security are lessened.

More important support is what is the political and national support for our servicemen that go there, not whether I can get the logistics to them. And what about the financial support, because this operation will not be cheap, and I know what my budget was a year ago. I have to tell you, I could not pay for it.

So those issues, which are political issues, need to be worked and it is related to what was the mission. It needs to be clear, it needs to be clear for the total force, and it needs to be clear for the American portion of it. If I know what I was going for, I ought to be able to describe what it looks like when I did it, and then I have an exit criteria.

In my view, it was our success in Rwanda and Zaire. We put down when we went in what we were going to accomplish and we checked off whether we did it or not, and when we got it done, we said, we are done. We are leaving. There are others who suggested that we could take on new missions and stay longer. I was involved in part of that. We said, no, we went to do these tasks and those tasks are done and we left.

So having figured out why did we go, we ought to have some idea of what it will look like when we did it and then you have a basis for leaving and declaring success, because everyone can figure out why you could do something else later. Honestly, I do not like the image that this is a Korea or this is a Cyprus or this is a Sinai. So it is what did we go to do and when can we leave.

My personal biggest issue is a view before we know what the mission is when we are going to get it done, and I think that deciding up front how long it might take is very important. I do not think the mission should be to go, and I do not think mission success is a clock. I think that that aspect can hold for us a lot of danger.

If we are going to go and we are going to leave in a year or some time on the clock with no relation to why we went and what it is we were to accomplish, I think we have got a heck of a problem. If the military plans to go for a 1-year operation and it ends up 2, the military is in one heck of a problem. If we plan for 2 and it ends up 1, it is easy, and with that is our ability to sustain the support in the United States for our operation there.

That concludes my comments.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Mr. Krepinevich?

STATEMENT OF ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, JR., DIRECTOR, DEFENSE BUDGET PROJECT

Mr. KREPINEVICH. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my purpose here today is to raise issues pertaining to the operational challenges that will likely confront any U.S. military deployment to the Balkans to enforce a peace agreement. I want to emphasize that my raising these issues or questions does not preclude that the Defense Department may have some encouraging answers to them.

Moreover, while it is critical to consider the potential operational challenges that our forces may encounter, they represent only one of several factors, to include political, economic, and humanitarian factors that should be examined in deciding whether to deploy troops to Bosnia.

And finally, I want to emphasize that even if these questions are answered favorably, we will never be able to eliminate entirely the uncertainties and risks involved in deploying U.S. forces.

Military operations tend to be notoriously unpredictable. As one general sagely observed, no battle plan survives contact with the enemy. As we have seen in a score of conflicts on a hundred battlefields, contact with the enemy produces surprises. Some may be pleasant; many are not.

In providing answers to these questions, however, the Defense Department can help reduce the level of uncertainty surrounding the prospective deployment of some 20,000 troops to Bosnia in pursuit of peace and help us better understand the level of risk they will face.

I will focus my presentation on the U.S. force's objective, its size and composition, measures of effectiveness, rules of engagement, and the area of operations. I am also prepared to discuss issues pertaining to stability operations, force mobility, and the role of IFOR coparticipants.

First, let me turn to the objective. What are U.S. forces being asked to accomplish? The administration has offered criteria for deploying United States forces to peace enforcement operations in Bosnia. They are, first, the objective must be clear and understandable to the American people. Second, the chances for success must be high. Third, the support of the American people must be assured. And fourth, the administration must have an exit strategy.

These criteria, I would like to observe, are not absolutes. Satisfying them will not necessarily guarantee success, nor will failing to satisfy them necessarily spell disaster, but these criteria should be

addressed if only to allow us to better understand the risks involved in deploying U.S. forces.

It is interesting to me that all of these criteria imply an understanding of the objective. Unless the objective is clearly stated and understood, it is difficult to gauge the prospects for success, the possibility of winning popular support or fashioning an exit strategy. Moreover, if the administration's criteria are not satisfied and U.S. forces are deployed, their effectiveness could be substantially impaired.

For example, absent popular support here at home, would U.S. commanders tend to avoid to a greater degree than normal operations that might result in U.S. casualties, even at the risk of compromising the mission? Faced with a 1-year deadline, would they have their troops hunkered down, leading to an end state where we can claim to have met our 1-year obligation and yet depart without having accomplished much? Or if our forces are deployed even though the chances for success are not high, would U.S. commanders be prone to take more risks in an attempt to accomplish the mission?

Next, there is the issue of the force size and composition or the force mix itself. Is the size of the U.S. force sufficient to control what evidently will be a barrier area separating the belligerents? Current plans reportedly call for a U.S. component to comprise some 20,000 troops as part of an overall NATO force of some 60,000.

At present, the mission appears to be one of separating the belligerents by establishing, along with other IFOR members, a 12-mile-wide barrier, at least along the frontline between the Bosnian Muslim forces and the Bosnian Serbs. Within this area, IFOR units will conduct stability operations, whose traditional intent has been to provide a secure environment for the local population.

In terrain such as U.S. forces encountered in Desert Storm, it was relatively easy to monitor activity within a given area. The terrain was generally flat and devoid of vegetation. The problem becomes much more difficult, however, in terrain such as jungles, cities, forests, and mountains. As U.S. forces discovered in Vietnam, the Israelis in Beirut, and the Soviets in Afghanistan, terrain such as this can swallow up large units trying to exercise control over the enemy's movement.

Are those U.S. forces to be deployed capable of effectively monitoring and controlling movement, which is to say, perhaps, infiltration, in their area of operation, which is characterized by hilly, if not mountainous, forested terrain and by weather that, especially in winter, makes observation and fire support and air operations especially difficult.

What does the Army say, for example, is the optimum and minimum force necessary to control an area of operation such as this? Is the force vulnerable to saturation, for example, the simultaneous effort of many infiltration teams to penetrate a barrier? Put another way, does force effectiveness degrade gracefully or precipitously?

Another issue is, is the United States deploying the proper force mix? Reportedly, the U.S. IFOR contingent, aside from its rapid reaction brigade, would be highly mechanized, including substantial

numbers of tanks and other armored vehicles. Yet, U.S. forces will apparently be assigned to patrol a predominantly hilly, if not mountainous, area that has a relatively austere road network and that apparently boasts few bridges capable of sustaining the weight of armored vehicles.

Heavy armor might be well suited to a force that intended to hunker down in a few major base areas for a year. This could support a U.S. operational concept whose top priority is minimizing the risk to U.S. personnel. However, if the U.S. mission involves the actual control of this rugged area of operations, then the case can be made that the force mix ought to be much more heavily weighted in favor of infantry forces that can actively patrol in rough terrain and whose mobility could be enhanced by helicopters. In short, one might expect to see relatively more infantry and air assault elements and relatively fewer mechanized units.

Along these lines, it seems prudent also to ask, will being the meanest dog in town and having the ability to bring a large hammer down on those who challenge the U.S. force really dissuade attacks on American troops? Despite their formidable fire power and unquestionable quality, American troops will be an attractive target for at least one and perhaps all three of the belligerent parties.

Secretary of Defense Perry has stated that U.S. forces will not be intimidated. He had asserted, quite correctly, in my estimation, that the U.S. component of the IFOR will likely be the "meanest dog in town" and have the ability to "bring a large hammer down" on those who would provoke it. But this raises several important issues.

First, it is helpful to be the meanest dog in town when what you are talking about is fighting another dog. But those who target U.S. forces would have a strong incentive to compete not as dogs but rather as fleas. American forces in Vietnam, in Lebanon, and in Somalia were effectively engaged not by regular forces operating in large formations and out in the open but by small, irregular forces engaged in hit-and-run attacks.

Senior American military leaders well recall the Viet Cong mortar attacks, where the mortar crews dispersed only seconds after launching their salvo; the sapper teams that penetrated U.S. security to strike at American bases; and the suicide terrorist attacks against troop barracks. Unfortunately, the people of the Balkans have long demonstrated considerable proficiency in this kind of warfare.

Second, irregular operations typically offer little in the way of lucrative targets upon which to bring a large hammer down. If U.S. forces are attacked in the manner described above, it will be difficult to identify the source of the attack. Even knowing the location of the attack will not necessarily be an indication as to whether it was a Serb, a Croat, or a Bosnian Muslim force that launched it.

Even if the identity of the attackers is known, given concerns about rogue militia forces, all sides will also have a strong incentive to claim that these were the forces that conducted the attacks, they were unauthorized, and that therefore the United States should refrain from retaliating against them. In sum, the U.S. military may find itself trying to swat fleas with a sledgehammer.

There is also the issue of measures of effectiveness. What measures or indicators will be employed to determine whether or not the U.S. IFOR contingent is progressing toward meeting its objectives? I cannot stress too greatly the importance of choosing the appropriate measures of effectiveness. Choosing the wrong measure can lead U.S. forces to focus on the wrong kind of operations. The result could be that you achieve your measure of effectiveness but you fail to achieve your mission.

For example, two measures of effectiveness employed by U.S. forces during the Vietnam war were the body count and the level of ammunition expended. Unfortunately, neither proved an effective measure of the U.S. force's progress toward their objective in that war.

In the Korean war, for a time, the principal MOE was the seizing of terrain or the U.S. forces rate of advance. In the gulf war, one measure of effectiveness was the number of Iraqi tanks destroyed, the belief being that they were at the heart of the Iraqi Republican Guard, Saddam Hussein's principal military force.

And so the question, what measures of effectiveness will U.S. forces be employing in their operations in Bosnia, and why were these measures chosen, and what is the link between the measures of effectiveness and accomplishing U.S. objectives? Along with measures of effectiveness, one must also examine the rules of engagement. What restrictions will be placed on U.S. forces in responding to hostile or threatening activity?

If U.S. forces will be patrolling a 12-mile-wide barrier snaking along forested mountainous terrain, this ensures that they will never be far out of mortar and artillery range. Assuming enemy forces practice a shoot-and-scoot engagement tactic, in other words, firing one or two rounds and departing quickly, American commanders will be faced with the challenge of identifying the location of attack and bringing fires rapidly against it before the enemy scoots. This raises several operational and tactical issues.

First, given the terrain and prevailing weather conditions, how do U.S. forces plan to identify the source of the attack? American counter-battery fire in Desert Storm bordered on the magnificent, but will U.S. forces do as well against irregular forces following different tactics and operating in a different climate and a different terrain environment?

Second, will the rules of engagement permit U.S. forces to engage targets outside their area of operations? If so, under what circumstances? For instance, what if enemy fire is determined to be coming from a populated area, for example, a town or a village? Will U.S. forces be directed to fire on the village? If not, then what is their recourse?

Or if U.S. forces fix the location of a shoot-and-scoot attack as being four miles outside their area of operations, do American commanders on the scene have the right to maneuver their forces against the attackers? What restrictions, if any, will be placed on their ability to practice this form of hot pursuit? Who will determine the restrictions, the U.S. commander on the scene, NATO, the United Nations?

Third, under what circumstances do American forces have the authority to order either a preemptive strike against threatening

forces or to maneuver U.S. forces outside their area of operations against a provocative force? Again, who determines the rules of engagement in this case?

There also is the matter of how will U.S. forces react to a major violation of the peace that does not affect the IFOR directly? For example, what could and would the U.S. IFOR contingent do in the event that Croatian forces undertook to recapture Eastern Slavonia, a region close to the anticipated U.S. area of operations? What would the U.S. forces do in the event the Bosnian Serbs secede and petition for annexation to Serbia?

What would the risks be to U.S. forces? What obligation would they have to enforce the peace under these circumstances? Given the potential scale of such a conflict, what kind of increased demands could be made on U.S. troop levels? To what extent would it delay the departure of U.S. forces from Bosnia?

Last, I would like to address the area of operations itself. Here, one would want to know, for example, how will U.S. forces deploy? Reportedly, the U.S. contingent will be deployed further inland than either the French or the British-led contingents.

What infrastructure is available to support the rapid insertion of 20,000 troops into the area around Tuzla? What air fields can support U.S. transport aircraft? What about the roads and the rail network? To what extent will U.S. forces rely on them for deployment and resupply? If U.S. forces must trickle into their area of operation, how will they defend themselves during the early days of an operation, when they will be at their most vulnerable?

Furthermore, how will U.S. forces secure their lines of supply and communication, and at what cost? Which air fields, roads, and rail networks are secure, and if they are not secure, what level of U.S. forces would be required to secure them, for example, from mortar or artillery attack or from sappers or saboteurs?

In Vietnam, for example, often one-third of a maneuver force's combat power was absorbed defending and patrolling the area around the unit's base. Providing security to air fields, base areas, and other key points could become a manpower sink, diluting the force required to patrol the 12-mile-wide barrier. How do U.S. forces plan to deal with this prospective challenge?

In summarizing, I would like to cite the great German military intellect, Karl von Clausewitz, who wrote, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive."

To what kind of conflict are the American people and their elected representatives preparing to embark the U.S. military? What is its nature? What are the objectives? Are the forces we are preparing to deploy the proper forces for accomplishing the mission? Have we chosen appropriate measures of effectiveness to guide their operations? How will the environment, the rules of engagement, and the U.S. force's engagement in stability operations limit or influence their operational effectiveness? We must find the answers to these questions and to the broader questions of policy and strategy, as well.

Every military operation has its elements of uncertainty and risk, but we can minimize the uncertainty and better understand the risks through hearings such as the one being held here today. We owe it to the people of the Balkans, to our allies, and to ourselves, and especially to the young American men and women who may be placed in harm's way, to identify the kind of enterprise upon which we may be embarking, lest we mistake it for something that it is not or portray it as something that is alien to its nature.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present my views.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Krepinevich follows:]

TESTIMONY OF

DR. ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, JR.

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE BUDGET PROJECT

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON

U.S. MILITARY DEPLOYMENT
IN BALKAN PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS:

OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

November 8, 1995

I am here today to raise issues pertaining to operational challenges -- not provide answers. These operational challenges are those that senior policymakers and commanders should address in contemplating the deployment of U.S. forces to the Balkans as part of an Implementation Force (IFOR) to enforce a negotiated peace. I also want to emphasize that by raising these issues, I am not suggesting that the Defense Department may not have encouraging answers to some, or even many, of them.

Moreover, while it is critical to consider the potential operational issues that our forces may encounter, they represent only one of several factors that should be examined in deciding whether to deploy troops to Bosnia. Consideration of diplomatic, political, economic and humanitarian issues is obviously also of great importance.

Finally, I want to emphasize that even if these questions are answered favorably, we will never be able to eliminate entirely the uncertainties and risks involved in deploying U.S. forces on an operation such as that contemplated for the Implementation Force, or IFOR. Military operations tend to be notoriously unpredictable. As one general sagely observed, "No battle plan survives contact with the enemy." As we have seen in a score of conflicts, on a hundred battlefields, from Vietnam to Desert Storm, from Beirut to Mogadishu, from Haiti to Grenada, contact with the enemy produces surprises. Some may be pleasant, many are not.

In providing answers to these questions, the Defense Department can help reduce the level of uncertainty surrounding the prospective deployment of some 20,000 troops to Bosnia in pursuit of peace, and help us better understand the level of risk they will face. I will focus my presentation on operational challenges our forces could prospectively face, to include: the U.S. force's objective; its size and composition; measures of effectiveness; the area of operations; the rules of engagement; stability operations; and the role of allies.

WHAT IS THE OBJECTIVE?

What are U.S. forces being asked to accomplish? Are they being deployed as peacekeepers, or peace enforcers? Are they being sent to enforce the dividing lines between the Croats, Muslims and Serbs, or to defend the borders of a multi-ethnic state that Croatian president Tudjman has declared "an artificial creation"?

The Clinton Administration has acknowledged the importance of having a clear, achievable objective if military operations are to be conducted effectively. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has offered criteria for the deployment of U.S. forces to peace enforcement operations in Bosnia. He stated that:

- the military objective must be clear and understandable to the American people;

- the chances for success must be high;
- the support of the American people must be assured; and
- the administration must have an exit strategy.

These criteria are not absolutes. Satisfying them will not guarantee success. Nor will failing to satisfy them necessarily spell disaster. Nevertheless, these criteria should be addressed, if only to allow us to better understand the risks involved in deploying U.S. forces. It is interesting that all of these criteria imply an understanding of the objective. Unless the objective is clearly stated and understood, it is difficult to gauge the prospects for accomplishing the mission, for winning popular support, or for planning a successful exit strategy.

Moreover, if the administration's four criteria for U.S. military intervention in Bosnia are not satisfied, and U.S. forces are deployed anyway, the effectiveness of U.S. military operations could be substantially impaired.

For example, if U.S. forces are deployed absent popular support here at home, would U.S. commanders avoid, to a greater degree than normal, operations that might result in U.S. casualties, even at the risk of compromising the mission? Faced with a one-year deadline, would they have their troops hunker down, leading to a end state where we can claim to have met our obligations, and yet depart without having accomplished much? Or, if our forces are deployed even though the chances for success are not high, would U.S. commanders take more risks in attempting to accomplish the mission?

IS THE FORCE TO BE DEPLOYED APPROPRIATE FOR THE MISSION?

Is the size of the U.S. force sufficient to enforce a barrier between the belligerents?

Current plans reportedly call for the U.S. component to comprise some 20,000 troops (with several thousand additional support troops in Croatia), as part of an overall NATO force of roughly 60,000. This Implementation Force apparently will comprise three divisions: one U.S., one French, and one British. Brigades from other NATO nations will be incorporated into these divisions, which are reportedly slated to have three brigades each. A tenth brigade will be provided by the United States to serve as a rapid-reaction force, able to reinforce quickly any IFOR element. The U.S. force would establish its headquarters in Tuzla, the French in Sarajevo, and the British near Gornji Vakuf.

At present, the U.S. force's mission appears to be one of separating the belligerents by establishing (along with other IFOR members) a twelve-mile wide barrier, at least along the front lines between the Bosnian Muslim forces and the Bosnian Serbs. Within this corridor IFOR units will conduct stability operations (STABOPS), whose

traditional intent has been to provide a secure environment for the local population. Current plans apparently call for U.S. forces to be deployed for a year. During that period, the United States also will undertake to train Bosnian Muslim forces (either directly or through the use of contractors) to effect a stable balance of forces in the area. This, it is hoped, will deter any of the parties from resuming hostilities once U.S. forces are withdrawn.

In terrain such as U.S. forces encountered in Desert Storm, it was relatively easy to monitor activity in a given area. The terrain was generally flat and devoid of vegetation. The problem becomes much more difficult in terrain such as jungles, cities, forests, and mountains. As U.S. forces discovered in Vietnam, the Israelis in Beirut, and the Soviets in Afghanistan, terrain such as this can "swallow up" large units trying to exercise control over the enemy's movement. Are those U.S. forces to be deployed capable of effectively monitoring and controlling movement (i.e., infiltration) in their area of operation (AO), which is characterized by rugged, if not mountainous, forested terrain and weather that, especially in winter, makes observation (and fire support and air operations) especially difficult?

What does the Army say is the optimum (and minimum) force necessary to control its expected AO? Is the force vulnerable to saturation (i.e., the simultaneous effort of many infiltration teams to penetrate the barrier)? Put another way, does force effectiveness degrade "gracefully," or "precipitously"?

Is the United States deploying the proper force "mix"?

Reportedly the U.S. IFOR contingent (aside from the rapid-reaction brigade) would deploy seven maneuver battalions drawn from the 1st Armored Division and 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, both of which are located in Germany. These forces are highly mechanized, including substantial numbers of tanks and other armored vehicles. Yet they will apparently be assigned to patrol rugged terrain that has a relatively austere road network, and that apparently boasts few bridges capable of sustaining the weight of armored vehicles.

Heavy armor might be well suited to a force that intended to hunker down at a few major base areas. This might support a U.S. operational concept that was primarily interested in minimizing the risk to U.S. personnel. However, if the U.S. mission involves the actual control of its rugged area of operations, then the case can be made that the force mix ought to be much more heavily weighted in favor of light infantry forces whose mobility might be enhanced by the use of helicopters. In short, one might expect to see relatively more infantry and air assault elements, and relatively fewer mechanized units.

The presumption here is that U.S. commanders had both a mission and an operational concept in mind when they determined both the size of the U.S. IFOR contingent and its composition (i.e., the force "mix"). If this is true, then:

- What is the *mission* upon which they based their force size/mix?

- What is the *operational concept* that drove their force size/mix requirements?

On the other hand, if this presumption is untrue – i.e., if the U.S. IFOR contingent size and mix are not based on any clear sense of its mission, then one must ask: Why has the Defense Department settled upon this particular force mix for deployment to Bosnia?

Will being the "meanest dog in town" and having the ability to "bring a large hammer down" on those who challenge the U.S. force really dissuade attacks on American troops?

Despite their formidable firepower and unquestionable quality, American troops will be an attractive target for at least one, and perhaps all three, of the belligerent parties. A strong case can be made that the Bosnian Serbs will view American forces as the enemy. After all, the United States has supported the buildup of Croatia's armed forces, conducted air strikes against Bosnian Serbs in support of Bosnian Muslim forces, and is now planning to train and arm the Bosnian Muslim force during the period of U.S. force deployment (an undertaking the other two great powers -- Britain and France -- have declined to support).

Moreover, U.S. forces may also represent an attractive target precisely because the United States would be crucial to the success of the NATO operation in Bosnia. If the United States were to withdraw its forces, it would affect the military balance of forces far more than a withdrawal by any other IFOR member. When one adds to this the alleged U.S. public's allergy to incurring casualties, it would only seem to increase the incentive of IFOR opponents to target U.S. forces.

Secretary of Defense Perry has stated that U.S. forces will not be intimidated. He has asserted, quite correctly, that the U.S. component of the IFOR will likely be the "meanest dog in town" and have the ability to "bring a large hammer down" on those who would provoke it. But this raises several important issues:

- First, it's helpful to be the "meanest dog in town" when you are talking about fighting another dog. But those who target U.S. forces would have a strong incentive to compete, not as dogs, but as "fleas." American forces in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia were effectively engaged, not by regular forces operating in large formations and in the open, but by small irregular forces engaged in hit-and-run attacks. Senior American military leaders recall well the Viet Cong mortar attacks where the mortar crews dispersed only seconds after launching their salvo; the sapper teams that penetrated U.S. security to strike at American bases; and suicide terrorist attacks against troop barracks. The people of the Balkans have long demonstrated considerable proficiency in this kind of warfare.

- Second, irregular operations typically offer little in the way of lucrative targets upon which to "bring a large hammer down." If U.S. forces are attacked in the manner described above, it will be difficult to identify the source of the attack. Even knowing the location of the attack will not necessarily be an indication as to whether it was a Serb, Croat, or Bosnian Muslim force that launched it. Even if the identity of the attackers is known, given concerns about "rogue" militia forces, all sides will also have strong incentives to claim that such attacks were "unauthorized," and that therefore the United States should not retaliate against them. In short, the U.S. military may find itself trying to swat fleas with its sledgehammer.

BY WHAT MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS WILL U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS BE JUDGED?

Put another way, what measures or indicators will be employed to determine whether or not the U.S. IFOR contingent is progressing toward meeting its objectives? Choosing measures of effectiveness (MOEs) is a critical exercise. Choosing the wrong measure can lead U.S. forces to focus on the wrong kind of operations. The result could be that the MOE is achieved, but the mission is not accomplished.

For example, two measures of effectiveness employed by U.S. forces during the Vietnam War were the body count and the level of ammunition expended. Neither proved an effective measure of U.S. forces progress toward their objective in that war. In the Korean War, for a time the principal MOE was the seizing of terrain, or the U.S. force's rate of advance. In the Gulf War, one measure of effectiveness was the number of Iraqi tanks destroyed (the belief being that they were at the heart of the Iraqi Republican Guard, Saddam Hussein's principal military force).

What measures of effectiveness will U.S. forces be employing in their operations in Bosnia? Why were these measures chosen? What is the link between these MOEs and accomplishing U.S. objectives?

WHAT ARE THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) FOR U.S. FORCES?

What restrictions will be placed on U.S. forces in responding to hostile or threatening activity? Apparently, the bulk of the U.S. forces slated for deployment to the Balkans will be patrolling a twelve-mile wide barrier snaking along forested, mountainous terrain. This ensures that U.S. forces will never be far out of mortar and artillery range. Assuming enemy forces practice a "shoot-and-scoot" engagement tactic (i.e., firing one or two rounds and departing quickly), American commanders will be faced with the challenge of identifying the location of the attack and bringing fires rapidly against it before the enemy "scoots." This raises several operational and tactical issues:

- First, given the terrain and prevailing weather conditions, how do U.S. forces plan to identify the source of the attack? American counterbattery fire in Desert Storm bordered on magnificent. But will U.S. forces do as well against "irregular" forces following different tactics, and operating in a different climate and terrain environment?

- Second, will the ROE permit U.S. forces to engage targets outside their area of operations? If so, under what circumstances? For instance, what if enemy fire is determined to be coming from a populated area (e.g., a town or village)? Will U.S. forces be directed to fire on the village? If not, then what is their recourse? Or if U.S. forces fix the location of a "shoot-and-scoot" attack as being four miles outside their AO, do American commanders on the scene have the right to maneuver their forces against the attackers? What restrictions, if any, will be placed on their ability to practice this form of "hot pursuit"? Who will determine the restrictions -- the U.S. commander? NATO? The UN?

- Third, in the event U.S. commanders identify forces outside their AO operating in a manner that could threaten their troops (e.g., spotting mortar crews deploying their mortars), under what circumstances do American forces have the authority to order either a *preemptive* strike against the threatening forces, or to maneuver U.S. forces outside the AO against the provocative force? Again, who will determine the ROE in this case?

How will U.S. forces react to a major violation of the peace that does not affect the IFOR directly?

For example, what could (and would) the U.S. IFOR contingent do in the event that Croatian forces undertook to recapture Eastern Slavonia, a region close to the anticipated U.S. AO? President Tudjman has vowed in no uncertain terms that this last portion of prewar Croatia would be retaken, by force if necessary, from Bosnian Serb forces. Reports are that Croatian forces are concentrating for an attack. There also are reports that Serbian forces (that is, forces belonging to Serbia proper) have undertaken large-scale military exercises along their country's border with Eastern Slavonia. (Of course, assuming Croatia retakes the area prior to a U.S. deployment, there also is the possibility of a Serb counteroffensive.) A related scenario could see the Bosnian Serbs secede and petition for annexation to Serbia. The Bosnian Serb parliament has already demanded the right of Serb sections of Bosnia to secede

What would be the risks to U.S. forces? What obligation would they have to enforce the peace? Given the potential scale of the conflict, what kind of increased demands would this place on U.S. troop levels? To what extent would it delay the departure of U.S. forces from Bosnia?

There are other scenarios that are equally disquieting. President Tudjman has described Bosnia as an artificial creation. Recently the Croatian legislature passed a law

giving all Croats in Bosnia the right to vote in Croatian elections. If the predominantly Croatian sections of the Bosnian Federation decided to secede and request annexation into Croatia, and if the Bosnian Government (i.e., the Bosnian Muslims) decided to employ force to block the secession, how would U.S. forces respond, if at all? How would such a clash occurring in what would be the U.S. "rear area" affect the U.S. mission? Indeed, is it reasonable to assume that there is any rear area in Bosnia? To what extent would a resumption of conflict between the Croats and Bosnian Muslims put at risk the U.S. IFOR contingent's lines of supply and communication? What contingency planning is being done to ensure the safety of U.S. forces under such circumstances?

THE AREA OF OPERATIONS (AO)

How will U.S. forces deploy?

Winter is fast approaching in the Balkans. Bosnia is dominated by rugged terrain. The U.S. contingent would be deployed further inland than either the French- or British-led contingents. What infrastructure is available to support the rapid insertion of 20,000 U.S. troops into the area around Tuzla? What airfields are there? Which airfields can support U.S. transport aircraft? What about the road and rail network? To what extent will U.S. forces rely upon them for deployment and resupply? Are they capable of supporting the initial surge of U.S. forces into the region? How does the harsh winter climate degrade the transportation network's capacity? If U.S. forces must trickle in to their area of operation, how will they defend themselves during the early days of the operation, when they will be at their most vulnerable? What infrastructure is available to support U.S. forces once they are deployed? For example, will American troops be billeted in tents during the winter?

How will U.S. forces secure their lines of supply and communication, and at what cost?

Which airfields, roads, and rail networks are secure? If they are not secure, what level of U.S. forces would be required to secure them (e.g., from mortar or artillery attack, or from sappers)? Given that U.S. forces will patrol only a twelve-mile wide strip of territory, will providing such security be a perpetual requirement? In Vietnam, for example, often one-third of a maneuver force's combat power was absorbed defending and patrolling the area around the unit's base. Providing security to airfields, base areas, and other key points could rapidly become a "manpower sink," diluting the force required to patrol the twelve-mile wide barrier. How do U.S. forces plan to deal with this?

Does the planned U.S. IFOR contingent adequately reflect the increased demands on manpower that may be placed upon it by limitations on mobility?

A key relative advantage of U.S. ground forces is their mobility. Mobile forces, able to redeploy quickly in reaction to changing circumstances (e.g., to reinforce rapidly

U.S. forces under attack; to patrol a greater amount of terrain in a given period of time) can serve as a "force multiplier," reducing -- perhaps dramatically -- the number of troops that a relatively static force would require to accomplish its missions at a comparable level of effectiveness.

In the Balkans, however, several factors will likely substantially reduce the mobility of U.S. forces, especially during the winter months:

- *Weather:* Winter weather promises to reduce significantly the mobility of U.S. ground forces, and the effectiveness of U.S. helicopter and high-altitude reconnaissance operations.

- *Terrain:* Rugged terrain also acts to reduce substantially the mobility of ground forces. Moreover, local forces will be far more familiar with the terrain than U.S. forces. Thus U.S. forces may well be at a relative disadvantage in terms of ground mobility.

- *Infrastructure:* Bad weather and relatively few major airfields could limit the flexibility of resupply efforts and thus, indirectly, ground mobility. Bridges that cannot handle U.S. Abrams tanks or Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) would likely further limit mobility. The relatively austere road network further contributes to the problem.

- *Mines:* Recent military operations in Bosnia have seen all sides employ land mines in large numbers. Depending upon such factors as the prevalence of minelaying in the U.S. deployment area, U.S. countermine proficiency, and the willingness (and ability) of those who placed the mines to aid in their removal, the influence of land mines on the U.S. force's mobility could be significant.

How are these prospective limitations on U.S. force mobility being taken into account in predeployment planning? To what extent can they be surmounted? What is the impact on U.S. mission effectiveness? On U.S. force requirements?

TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE U.S. IFOR CONTINGENT COMMITTED TO STABILITY OPERATIONS, AND WHAT IS THE PROSPECTIVE EFFECT ON U.S. OPERATIONS?

American forces have a long history of providing support for the victims of war. The U.S. IFOR contingent intends to conduct stability operations as one of its missions. To what extent are U.S. forces obligated to minister to the needs (e.g., food, shelter, medical care) of the population in their AO? What level of U.S. support is being planned? Upon what assumptions are these support requirements based? Is there the possibility that the U.S. AO might become a "magnet" for displaced persons? If so, what will the consequences be for the effectiveness of U.S. military operations?

Correspondingly, what plans have been made concerning who will govern in the U.S. AO? Will civil authority be exercised by the Bosnian government? If so, how will that limit U.S. operations? For example, how might that affect the ROE under which U.S. forces must operate? If civil authority is to be exercised by the U.S. military, what are the manpower requirements? What are the implications for U.S. military effectiveness? For example, to the extent that the American military is responsible for order and not the local police force, what is the drain on American manpower?

In a number of internal conflicts over the last forty years, one side or another has had an incentive to *deliberately* create a large displaced population (e.g., in Vietnam to open up areas as "free-fire" zones; to saturate displaced person support systems). How are U.S. forces preparing to handle such a problem if it develops? What impact might it have on U.S. manpower and materiel requirements?

THE ROLE OF ALLIES

How will cooperating and supporting forces in the U.S. IFOR contingent's area of operations be integrated into American operations?

Reportedly, U.S. forces may be operating with Czech or Polish forces, and receive some support from some 2,000 Russian support troops. Apparently, the United States also is to provide a brigade-size rapid reaction force for the entire IFOR. What kind of command relationships will exist with these forces? To the extent that U.S. forces are operating with, or receiving support from, such forces, how does this influence U.S. forces' military effectiveness and security?

Are there opportunities for "Catch-22" situations in which the U.S. forces must accept one undesirable situation to avoid another? For example, the U.S. IFOR contingent may want to share intelligence data with Polish, Czech or Russian forces in order to better coordinate operations and support. But this may involve compromising the capabilities of U.S. intelligence systems and communications links. How is the U.S. military prepared to address this issue?

Furthermore, to the extent that Bosnian Serb forces view Americans as enemies, and given Russia's long history of support and friendship with their fellow Slavs in Serbia, there exists a more than trivial possibility that U.S. and Russian forces may be working at cross purposes. To what extent (if any) could Russian support forces compromise the effectiveness of the U.S. IFOR contingent? How is this being taken into account in U.S. planning?

Are U.S. forces prepared to handle a great power withdrawal from the IFOR?

The United States could be the first of the great powers to withdraw its forces from Bosnia, for two reasons. First, because of the U.S. force's prospective one-year deployment window. Second, because American troops could be the principal target of efforts to sabotage the IFOR. Still, it is conceivable that either or both of the United States' great power allies, Great Britain or France, could withdraw their forces first.

What operational and logistical challenges would an early withdrawal of either French or British forces pose for the U.S. IFOR contingent? Would U.S. lines of supply and communication be compromised? How would the U.S. military handle such a contingency? What additional resources (if any), in the form of manpower or materiel, would be required under such circumstances?

SUMMARY

The great German military intellect, Karl von Clausewitz, wrote "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions, and the most comprehensive."

To what kind of conflict are the American people and their elected representatives preparing to embark the U.S. military? What is its nature? What are our objectives? Are the forces we are preparing to deploy the proper forces for accomplishing the mission? Have we chosen appropriate measures of effectiveness to guide their operations? How will the environment, the rules of engagement, and U.S. the force's engagement in stability operations limit their operational effectiveness? And will the IFOR's multinational character serve as a force multiplier for U.S. forces, or will the whole of the IFOR be less than the sum of its components, thereby diluting U.S. military effectiveness and, perhaps, presenting it with some demanding and unanticipated operational requirements? We must find the answers to these questions pertaining to the operational challenges our forces will encounter, and to questions on policy and strategy as well.

Every military operation has its element of uncertainty and risk. But we can minimize the uncertainty and better understand the risks through hearings such as this one being held here today. We owe it to the people of the Balkans, to our allies and to ourselves, and especially to the young American men and women who may be placed in harm's way, to identify the kind of enterprise upon which we may be embarking, lest we mistake it for something it is not, or portray it as something that is alien to its nature.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the opportunity to present my analysis of the operational challenges that may confront U.S. military units deployed to the Balkans. I would be happy to respond to any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

All of you have raised a lot of questions and Mr. Dellums and I both have made some comments along these lines of things you have raised in the way of questions. Let me just start off by raising one of them.

We were concerned in Somalia, as I look back on that experience, about mission creep, that you have referred to. I know the President at that time said we will not make that mistake again, and we went from chapter six to seven, peacekeeper to peacemaker.

Here, we are starting off with the peacemaking, so I wonder about that, especially in the context that we will be operating. Some of you mentioned the fact that we have to see what the peace agreement is before we can decide what to do, in many respects, even if we should do it or not, I would ask. A couple of you referred to the neutrality business, if you are going to be a peacekeeper, you have to be neutral. You referred to locating the source of a violation and from whom it is coming and these kinds of things as difficulties.

I think it is best summed up by we had General McKenzie before the committee not long ago. You are all familiar with General McKenzie, former U.N. Commander there. He just summed it up by saying, do not touch it with a 10-foot pole, and the reasons he gave for it were some of the things you are talking about. He said, to be a peacekeeper, you have to be neutral. As Mr. Dellums has said, make no enemies and choose no sides and that kind of thing.

He said, you cannot be that way already because you have taken sides, rightly or wrongly, he said, in conducting the air strikes. For the most part, we did that. And because Secretary Perry is talking about equipping one side even after we get there and training them, that is obviously taking sides, too. He said you cannot be neutral because of what you have already done. People do not forget that. Therefore, you cannot serve in that capacity.

He said, let the British and the Germans and even us Canadians do it and you can support the effort in other ways, but don't you do it, because you lose that critical element of being neutral, which you have already committed otherwise on.

So I would ask that question of you. How can we serve in this capacity as a neutral force, even if you do not consider the fact of how we are going to react to violations. He even gave the example of mortar rounds being fired from the other side's positions or in towns and you would not know how to react to that. Would you go in and fire on a town when the mortar rounds might come from that particular town? How do you deal with those kind of things, even aside from the question of the neutrality?

If any of you would like to help me—General Maddox?

General MADDOX. Mr. Chairman, let me at least start. I think it gets back again to what are we trying to do? We throw words around. I do not know what any of them mean. They all have "peace" in the front of them—peacekeeping, peace making, peace enforcement from the United States. None of those have anything to do with peace.

But it is, what are we going to do? If our role is to assist in establishing a peaceful nation and that end state is the desire of the people of that nation, then I think there is a clear role for the U.S.

military to play in assisting in that transition. That is not going into a nation that does not want peace and trying to make them have it.

I know very well how to pick a guy I do not like and fight with him. That is easy. I know how to support one guy. I know how to go in with a group of people who have been fighting each other who want to stop it and assist, and there are some clear dangers in that. I do not know how the heck to get between two people who are convinced they are going to kill each other and try to stand between them and stop that.

So if peace enforcement means the latter, I have to tell you, I have 35 years of experience and I do not know how to do that. If the peace accord is a peace accord, the parties involved want peace and there is some evidence that it goes beyond those that signed the paper, and the role of the military is to assist in getting that done, and yes, we have to deal with the violation, I think we can work how to do that.

But if it is to go in where people do not want peace and try to enforce it, I do not know how you stay neutral. I know how to stay neutral in the other situation, but neutral does not mean weak. Neutral means strong enough to take action, but you take the same action against a violator and you do not care who that violator may be.

I do not know if that is helpful, but to me, there is a very clear distinction between assisting people who want peace and trying to make people who do not want any to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is fair.

General Zinni?

General ZINNI. Sir, I think one approach is clearly up front, there has to be laid out what are unacceptable acts and that has to be evenhanded, unacceptable by anybody, and the action that will be taken if those acts are committed.

I think, also, you convey your neutrality, even though you may have to react to an unacceptable act against one particular faction, you convey your neutrality by your evenhandedness in other areas, for example, humanitarian effort. If you are in this case providing the same level of humanitarian care for Serb refugees as you are for Croat or Muslim refugees, again, it goes back to my point about the image you want to create, the publicity that receives. That is balance.

In Somalia during Operation Restore Hope, the part that I was there for which was successful, we did, in fact, have a conflict with Aideed. We did, in fact, attack one of his units, kill a number of his militia men and wound a number because they committed an unacceptable act. He was warned three times, and I met with him and his generals about the act that was being perpetrated, firing from some of his cantonments. After the third warning, we took down the cantonment. We offered the opportunity to leave the weapons and they fired on us. We destroyed the cantonment.

We immediately recalled the Security Committee back in. I met with the senior generals and I said, this was a response to an unacceptable act. It does not necessarily put you outside of the process. That is your call. But you have to understand why we did it. The

decision by Aideed and his followers were to put this behind us and that it was an unacceptable act and they understood it.

It goes back to the point of maintaining dialog and fairness, even though you may have to react at times to these unacceptable acts, but to be able to do it evenhandedly to all those who commit them and not have exceptions and to keep the dialog and the talking open so you can hear the gripes and complaints, so you can determine who is responsible.

It puts a lot of pressure on intelligence, on coordination, on the dialog, so that you can find out who is up to these sorts of things, and you cannot punish the trigger puller. You have to punish the decisionmaker. You have to kill the command and control network that sponsors these sorts of things and not just hunt down trigger pullers. I think those are parts of the solution in these environments.

The CHAIRMAN. If you can really decide who they are. When they fire from different positions, you might be having to try to decide that problem. Are they really the people coming from that decision or somebody who is just located temporarily there?

General ZINNI. I think in these environments, human intelligence, the people in the areas know who is committing what. Usually, these areas are defined by ethnic boundaries, by religious boundaries, and what happens in those areas, people know what is causing them. Your ability to create the kind of intelligence source and open up the lines of communication and dialog, and I will go back to my point about people counting—people with experience on the ground, people who know how to negotiate, people that understand the culture.

The best intelligence I received in Somalia was from Aideed's generals who I befriended there and knew well. We were able to get Warrant Officer Durant and Omar Shantali, the Nigerian prisoner, out after Ambassador Oakley and I went back after UNISOM 2 because we knew Aideed and we knew the people and we told him he had to release the prisoners unconditionally, and he did. That is the kind of faith and trust that you have to build in there that helps preserve your neutrality. It is a lot of parts, and that is one part.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Krepinevich?

Mr. KREPINEVICH. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that in its most general sense, what the United States force will be sent to Bosnia to do will be essentially to preserve the peace while the peace agreement is being effected or put into place. But what kind of peace agreement will it be? Will it be a decent interval before the partition of Bosnia, preserving a Croat-Muslim federation and letting the Serbs eventually annex to Serbia, or will it be an attempt to preserve a multiethnic state?

Whatever the shape of the peace agreement is, it seems to me that it will create winners and losers and we will be part of the effort to enforce an agreement that has created winners and losers, winners and losers in terms of the disposition of Sarajevo, winners and losers in terms of whether or not there will be a corridor to Gorazdeh, how the Serb issue of a corridor between their two sectors is resolved, the issue of Eastern Slavonia, and finally the measles map between the Croats and the Muslims within Bosnia,

where you have a situation where the Croats there are now voting in the Croatian elections. So this agreement will create winners and losers.

As General McKenzie observed, because of our previous actions, we have already been typed by at least one of the groups as an enemy, and when that happened in Somalia and when it happened in the early 1980's in Lebanon, even though our forces were far superior in fire power, we still were not able to preserve our neutral status and avoid some form of military engagement.

The 1-year deadline, I think, is very important in all of this because essentially, if you are talking about preserving peace while being neutral and implementing a peace agreement, if you look at history, this kind of conflict typically takes years for the hard feelings to wear away, whether it is India-Pakistan, the Arabs and Israelis, or the Greeks and the Turks on Cyprus.

Typically, this has required forces being in place for a protracted period of time unless you are able to effect some kind of military balance, and that may be the other aspect of the 1-year deployment period. Can you build up the forces of one side enough to effect a balance which perhaps could justify the withdrawal of U.S. forces after a year, and perhaps their replacement by forces of another nation?

But again, it gets back to what my colleagues say about the importance of knowing the objectives and can you work within those objectives and maintain your neutrality?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Dellums?

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, General Maddox, you raised the rhetorical question at the end of your answer to the chairman's question, I am not sure whether I am being clear. I thought you were extraordinarily clear and very focused and I appreciate your response.

Second, Mr. Chairman, I think this hearing clearly points out and underscores for the purposes of emphasis what I have been trying to say over the several hearings that we have had, and that is to take a position on a strategy to implement a peace plan until such time as we, (A) understand the contours, and (B) understand the requirements, is premature and potentially very tragic.

Having said that, I would like to focus my first question to you, Mr. Krepinevich. I believe very strongly and have stated publicly on numerous occasions that the end of the cold war has ushered in a period of change and transition that requires innovative thinking, changes in our thought processes, and thoughts that are counterintuitive to what we thought in the context of the cold war.

With that as the backdrop, I find it fascinating and interesting that you opened your testimony with a quote from a military person, part of the quote, contact with the enemy, and you ended your testimony with a quote from another military person dealing with war.

My question, then, is fairly obvious, given my initial comment. Is a discussion of the deployment of forces in a peacekeeping role, hopefully, that is a consensus peacekeeping role, is it consistent with that to discuss enemy and discuss it in the context of war if the post-cold-war now requires us to move beyond that kind of

thought process and begin to think in a much more innovative way about how we help people transition to peace? Your comments were about contact with the enemy and war, and you went back and used cold war analysis and cold war examples.

How is that appropriate? I only ask not to debate you but rather to draw you out. How is that appropriate as we begin to think in a whole new world where we are all starting off together, because as I said, I think we are bumping our heads against brand new realities that require us to think in different ways, yet you started and ended your testimony very traditionally, war, enemy, fight, shoot, this kind of thing. Is my question clear?

Mr. KREPINEVICH. Yes, sir, it is quite clear.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. KREPINEVICH. The first quote, that "No plan survives contact with the enemy," was a quote from the 19th century, and the basic thrust of my statement there is that about all you can expect is the uncertainty of it all, that if we try to sit here and get absolute guarantees about how this operation will unfold, I think we are on a rather quixotic quest. I do not think that you can ever get an exact guarantee of success or an exact notion of how a military operation will unfold. So the quote, "No plan survives contact with the enemy," you can substitute circumstances or the environment and perhaps that would be a better way to phrase it.

The last quote, the one from Clausewitz, basically has been oft cited and it is a quote that essentially asks the reader or the listener to realize that every kind of conflict—or there are many different kinds of military conflicts, many different kinds of military operations. It is extremely important to understand, before committing yourself to such a conflict, to understand its true nature and its true character.

So the actual quote would, I think, support your notion that we should not prejudge the nature of this military operation. We should not assume that it is an extrapolation of the cold war, and that the old measures and the old requirements still attain.

Now, in terms of talking perhaps more about conflict and less about peace, I think the sad fact is that there has been a conflict in this area. I think the sad fact also for us is that our history and experience in Lebanon and in Somalia, where we originally went in as peacekeepers or on humanitarian missions, is a lesson in which one side perceived that we were actively supporting another faction, that, in fact, we did find ourselves in a conflict situation.

This is not to say that that is something I hope for or wish for, but I think, as General Maddox said, it is far better to go in and at least have an appreciation for how you will operate under the worst circumstances so that you are prepared than to go in expecting the best and find yourself having to react not to a peaceful situation but to a situation that has degenerated into conflict. I guess that is all I would say on that.

Mr. DELLUMS. General Maddox, would you like to react?

General MADDOX. I would like to react, because I agree with you totally on the issue of the change. As a soldier, maybe I wish it were not true, because it is much easier if you will tell me who I am not supposed to like, but I do not find that the nature of what we are being asked to do today.

We are asked to go into situations that are very unclear, very unpredictable. I believe that you must be prepared for the situation to turn on you, so it is my issue, neutral does not mean weak. Neutral ought to mean very strong.

But I think that we cannot—unless someone will create the situation where they will tell me who the enemy is, then the issue is you go in with a very different set of rules and a very different mindset, and it is the issue of neutrality, it is the issue, and I think it is going to be hard with some issues that are before the negotiations right now with the Bosnian Serbs. But my issue is if the military goes in to assist in the transition from war to peace, we have got to interact with in exactly the same way the Bosnian Serbs as we do any Muslim or Croatian force, to try to assist in that transition.

Now, that is not the mission if the Government of this nation gives the military and wants us to go fight one of the parties—a very different game. But I think that most of the things we are being asked today to do is to use the military in a political situation and it is not to just go beat on somebody.

Mr. DELLUMS. My second question is, I indicated earlier, I think that taking a position on this until we understand the contours and the requirements is both premature and, I think, tragic. Given that, that notwithstanding, without knowing the specifics of the peace plan, there is a time limitation circulating out there, 1 year, and there is a troop level limitation already established out there, 20,000 to 25,000.

I would appreciate it if you folks would respond to the implications of setting a duration limit and a troop number limit prior to having seen the contours and understand the requirements. Are there any implications to that? Let me start with General Zinni.

General ZINNI. Yes, sir. I would go back to General Maddox's point, first of all, about the troop levels. Before you have the tasks assigned, it is difficult to determine the exact numbers. Generally, if you have an area that you know you will be assigned and you can determine basically the size and the environment, that helps in a general sense. But I think the task will not only help in total numbers but in the composition of the force. If, for example, you are into infrastructure repair, the implication is for a greater number of engineers, perhaps, than maybe maneuver forces.

I think Mr. Krepinevich talked a little bit about types of forces you need. Is it more appropriate for light armored vehicles or helicopters or is it armor that you need in there? What is the environment? What is the threat, based on what you are trying to achieve and what the tasks are?

I think, in a general sense, setting a duration is good. I do not think in a specific sense it may be. I would be nervous about a very precise duration period, but I think it is helpful for us in planning purposes to know approximately how long we think the mission would take. This is not alien to military planning.

When we conduct an operation, we estimate times to conduct these operations. Again, given the task, we may be able to piece together a general sense of time. This has to do with, do we intend to rotate troops? Do we intend to contract and expand the size and

types of troops based on what we achieve at different phases of the operation?

So time is helpful in a general sense, but probably not helpful in a specific sense because of what was mentioned regarding an enemy's ability to wait you out or use your time limitation to your disadvantage.

I want to make one point about your previous question, Congressman, and this is something that maybe disturbs me about some of the testimony here. Peacekeeping is not something, or humanitarian operations, that we just take on as an additional duty and pops up. My force is tasked by two CINC's to prepare as the peacekeeping or humanitarian force in their region, the Central Command and the Pacific Command. We invest a lot in training and preparation.

We are also responsible for military support of civilian authorities west of the Mississippi. We do a lot in fighting wildfires, in tending to the L.A. riots that occurred years ago, being on alert for earthquake relief, and a number of other things, counterdrug operations. We do train and we do understand this. We teach not to take on an enemy.

The second part of an estimate of the situation in military terms is enemy, second to mission. We teach that it is not a physical, monolithic enemy. In this case, it is a condition. It is anarchy, starvation. It is possibly chaos. What we have to do is counter it by implacing order, by alleviating the situation. Now, these are the same forces I respond to CINC's in Korea and Central Command for major regional contingencies. We are the first force called upon to go to Korea or to Southwest Asia in a larger contingency, and our forces can separate the two if they are trained and educated and given the missions.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you, sir.

Is there any other comment?

General MADDOX. I think trying to establish force levels and time limitations before the mission has been locked in can create you lots of problems. Having worked alternative missions, the troop levels personally do not bother me a lot, although they need to be fine tuned once you have got down what the heck is the agreement and what is the mission.

Personally, I cannot think through, given what you read about the peace agreement, what you can get accomplished and be out of there in a year. So the time limit issue, while going longer in the year may create political problems, from a military point of view, I do not know what you are going to get done in a year. To simply say, I went there, I was there a year, and I left, I do not think is something that I want to write down in my memoirs as to what I accomplished.

So the year bothers me. If we decide it is a year going in, as I said in my initial comments, there are things you do in planning that you will do very differently if you believe it may go longer than that. You are going to have to rotate forces. You have to figure out how to go do that and take a lot of actions. So deciding before I know exactly what the mission is how long it is going to take me personally bothers me.

Mr. KREPINEVICH. I would just add to what the two generals have said by saying that it certainly limits your flexibility and your options if you work against hard troop and time deadlines.

Just to give one example, if your objective is to build up the Bosnian Muslim forces, then you have to ask yourself, can you do it within a year? How would you do it? Then who would you replace U.S. forces with in a year that can still enforce the barrier between the competing parties?

I would like to say one other thing, and that is that I suppose that I respectfully differ with you, Congressman, and with General Maddox on this notion that everything is radically new. I find, for example, that if you look back at some of our operations during the cold war say Greece in the late 1940's, Lebanon in 1958, the Dominican Republic in 1965, the British in Cyprus around 1969, our own troops in Lebanon in the early 1980's, and then, of course, Vietnam, I think you find a lot of things that are similar in terms of the kinds of conflict that we see in Bosnia, as opposed to the kind of conflict we would have seen if we had fought that cold war battle in Europe that, fortunately, we never did fight.

I think the general aspect of these kinds of conflicts are that the social, the economic, and the political dimensions relative to the military dimension are far greater than they are in large-scale wars like Desert Storm, for example, and that certainly has to be taken into account, and the kinds of things that General Zinni mentions about the importance of coordinating those elements and not stovepiping them, not looking at the military dimension in isolation, become especially important in these kinds of conflicts.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, as you will recall, on virtually every occasion that we have had these hearings, I have tended to yield my time to let other people who are junior to me have an opportunity to speak with the witnesses. I chose to take my option here as the ranking member to try to focus some questions and I appreciate that.

I just want to make one final observation that is occasioned by your comment, sir, and this is unsolicited. As one who came here 25 years ago from Berkeley raising my voice in the name of peace, I find it fascinating that in this gentleman's opinion, it is the military, perhaps beyond the civilians, beyond my colleagues, with all due respect, who better understand the subtleties and the nuances and the need for change and innovation in the context of the post-cold-war world. I mean, that staggers the imagination.

Here are people that you would ostensibly think would be rigid folks who understand the need for change. It is the politicians and many of the civilian thinkers who have great difficulty understanding these nuances and the subtleties and the need for change in the context of the post-cold-war world, and I have to try to ask myself, how could this be?

Maybe it is because the military understands the need for change because down on the ground where life is real, they have to function and change in order to survive because they are dealing with life every day in a practical way and they change because it is necessary and they do not have to go home and explain it to a constituency.

When you are a politician and the Bible says, if you have to explain it, you are in trouble, then you do not change because you have to explain it. So the easier thing to do is to keep the myopic view and continue to walk down a cold war road in the context of a post-cold-war world that requires change. It takes some courage and it takes some thought process, it seems to me, to start talking about change in the context of a post-cold-war world.

So I finally said at the end of the day, I understand why the military can make these changes, and when you listen to the testimony, here are people who are saying, I know I have to change. General Maddox is saying, it is difficult for me because it was easier when you said, go shoot the bad guy, than it is to say, stand among three groups of people and help them transition to peace, and you are dealing, as the general pointed out, with economic institutions and political institutions and diplomatic institutions.

The world is radically changing, sir. That is my only response to you. I find it fascinating that the military seems to be light years in front of other people who have great difficulty giving up yesterday's thought processes for today's reality and tomorrow's evolution.

I yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bateman?

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and special thanks to the witnesses, who I think have been enormously helpful, at least for my part, in trying to separate out how we ought to approach the decisions that presumably we in the Congress are ultimately going to have to make with respect to our role in the Balkans.

I am going to make a few observations and then I would like for you all to comment. Let me preface my remarks by saying that perhaps, unlike some of my colleagues, I can be persuaded that there is a role for the United States as the paramount world leader in the Balkans and that we almost by virtue of our leadership have to be there.

What is disturbing to me is not—and I want to make this very clear—I have no reservations about the ability of our military leaders and planners to plan a well-conceived operation and for our troops, our forces to be able to implement a well-conceived plan. My problem is that I am not sure that our political leadership has determined what our role should be and what our mission should be.

We have made an open-ended commitment to deploying substantial numbers of forces, identified as 20,000 to 25,000, but we have done that before we have defined the mission. We have said that, contrary to everything that seems logical to me, that while we are there as peace enforcers, peacekeepers, peacemakers, that we are going to arm and train one of the combatant forces. That does not seem to make any sense to me.

We have told that we will not send anyone there unless there is a good peace agreement. Well, I would take that as an obvious, but how much confidence do we have that the people in Dayton, OH, can sign a magnificent agreement but it is not accepted, is not operative on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, or Croatia? I do not have that much confidence that they can control

those elements within their own factions who may destroy any peaceful agreement that is made.

If you assume that they do enter into sincerely and meaningfully a peaceful resolution and agreement, then if, in fact, it is that, why do we need IFOR of 60,000-plus armed combatants on the ground, if they generally want peace and if it is an effective resolution of the conflict?

What sense does it make for us to be planning and thinking in terms of American forces being deployed on the ground when we are talking not in terms of an agreement, though maybe this would change—hopefully it will—where the forces are agreed to disarm and we participate in enforcing the disarmament of the conflicting combatant parties as opposed to are we not only not going to have disarmament, we are going to have the very opposite. We are going to do some unilateral arming of one of the combatant forces.

Several of you have made reference to how important it is that we understand the culture. I have read very extensively on the history of the Balkans. I know something about it, not nearly as much as one needs to know, but I know something about it. But the one thing that I do not have is any understanding of the culture. It is absolutely unfathomable to me that allegedly, presumably civilized people could conduct themselves in such an uncivilized manner against one another. I find that very, very difficult.

I find it also difficult in trying to wrestle with this problem that we are told one of the reasons we must be there as a world leader and as the preeminent leader of the NATO alliance, that it will do immeasurable damage to the alliance if we do not participate by sending ground forces. That bothers me in the context of it ignores the fact that we will be looked to for most of the logistics, the air lift, the sea lift, the intelligence, the command and control, much of the sophistication that will support and sustain whatever force is there, and yet in addition to all of that, we must have a sizeable ground combatant force there.

That does not seem to me to be necessarily an equitable sharing of the burden of this mission as between NATO partners. It also overlooks something. If we are talking about as steadfast NATO partners, we have to participate, but at the same time we are saying to our NATO partners, we are going to arm the Muslims, which is to them anathema, that does not seem to me to make sense.

I see the red light is on. I could go on for some more and invite your reactions, but I guess I had better rest it at that.

The CHAIRMAN. If anyone wants to respond, but do not feel like you have to. [Laughter.]

Mr. KREPINEVICH. I would just make a quick observation as to what you said, Congressman, about arming one side while trying to preserve a position of neutrality. That certainly creates a situation where, as you said, you are at cross-purposes with your allies. You are planning on leaving in 1 year. It is not clear that they will not be left behind with, in part, a situation you created. And also, the fact that you are arming one side creates a certain incentive among the competing parties for you either to stay or to go, and people may try and hurry the process by which you will leave and other people may try and hinder the process in ways that will encourage you to say.

So I think certainly that I would agree. You have to carefully think through all the ramifications of undertaking this kind of a commitment.

General ZINNI. I would say one thing about arming and disarming, sir. The case of arming a force, I think you have to begin with understanding what kind of force are you creating. If you provide planes and tanks to a force, you are creating an offensive force and adding to the problem. If you provide antitank weapons and antiair defense weapons and that kind of training, you design a force as best you can to protect itself.

There are no guarantees, obviously. Weapons can be used in many different ways. But I think if you are clear as to what kind of force you are creating and for what purpose and it is tailored that way, it can be done in a fashion that does not upset the balance or add to the violence or problems but does allow some element to protect itself.

In disarmament, I think we have to be very, very careful how much the military gets involved in forcible disarmament. Disarmament is really a political process and it really is best done voluntarily. Certain things may work in certain situations, incentives for weapons and other sorts of things, training programs to rehabilitate former militia into productive farmers or whatever. But it is dangerous to go about a house-to-house taking away of weapons. That does create problems and enemies that you will end up regretting in the long run.

Mr. KREPINEVICH. I would just like to add one point, if I may. I made an issue of raising measures of effectiveness. If one of the principal missions is going to be to arm, for example, the Bosnian Muslims, then what is the measure of effectiveness? Is it arming them defensively, as General Zinni says, but defensively vis-a-vis whom? Is it the Bosnian Serbs? Is it the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia? The Bosnian Serbs, Serbia, and perhaps even the Croats, as well? I mean, Switchman has described Bosnia as an artificial creation. So again, there are important issues in terms of the measures of effectiveness that have to be determined, I think, here, as well.

General MADDOX. I will make a very quick one. I think we do need a good peace agreement to go into this thing. I think with the history of the area and what has occurred in the last few years relative to it, if they agree to have peace and if they have influence on the people within the country, I think they are going to still need help to go pull that off, and so I think there can be a role there.

With to the NATO peace, I agree and it was my comment earlier that said, in addition to any force that we provide on the ground to go conduct direct operations, there will be a request of the United States to provide those functional areas that you mentioned where we have the only capability to go make that happen.

What comes out, though, when you end up talking to our allies is that there is viewed a difference if you do not put somebody in the same degree of threat that everybody else did, and that is what gets you hooked into the, put some people on the ground. It is sort of the reverse. If you did not have unique capabilities and so you did not have to provide any force to the combined organization, the issue is relatively equal participation in sharing the threat. So that

gets rid of the driver that says, we would like the United States to contribute to the ground operation, and whether we agree with the number or not, there has got to be some limit to how much we are going to go do in that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. First, I wish to thank each of you for your excellent testimony. I assume from your testimony that the pole star to this whole Bosnian business is whether there is a peace agreement that is signed and that there is a spirit of intent to live up to it by each of the parties.

Second, your comments about troop numbers and troop levels is rather interesting, because there are some good articles on the large numbers that the Nazis had, both off in S.S. divisions as well as other German and their allied divisions in there and did not do a very good job, and at the same time, the partisans were fighting each other as well as the Nazis, so we do not know.

Third I think it is insanity to simultaneously try to keep the peace and to train, arm, and equip the Muslims at the same time. I think it is insanity to have unequal rules of engagement. I think it is insanity to allow a sanctuary for violators. Those who attempt to keep the peace must be able to pursue violators and punish them wherever they find them.

I would like to ask a question of General Maddox, a hypothetical question, and I would ask these other two gentlemen to give addendums to his answer, if you would. General, based upon your experience and your recent command, that is why I choose you for this, sir.

General, assume there is a workable peace agreement. Assume you are also convinced that the spirit of intent by the parties signing thereto is that they intend to live up to that agreement. Based upon your personal and professional experience, under what conditions would you recommend that United States troops be deployed into the Bosnian area as peacekeepers, along with other NATO troops? Would you please state those conditions for us?

General MADDOX. You established in your hypothesis the most important piece, which we are taking as a given, and that is that there is a peace agreement and there is evidence of spirit of intent to follow it up, because if you change that, I am going to come out with very different views. But let us take that, and some of the conditions that I will establish, I believe are agreed to already.

There needs to be a chain of command that is consistent, that is capable of providing decisions relative to changing military situations. Personally, I do not believe that the United Nations can provide that. I think NATO is a structure that can. So a NATO command and control structure is important, but I want all of the military forces to respond to the same command and control structure.

Second is rules of engagement. Rules of engagement have got to be established for two sets of conditions. One is those rules relative to an attack on any of the force, but the other set, which I think are going to be harder to develop, are the rules on actions when you observe a violation of the conditions of peace.

Writing the rules is one thing. The second one is whether or not we can get the participating nations to fully agree with the intent

of those rules, because when you do not have that, you end up with very different execution going on in different places in the battlefield.

Third, which is tough, hopefully, with the common unity of command and hopeful unity of purpose, is that the nations, in fact, agree to a command structure. That is, when the commander directs his force to accomplish some task, the subordinate commander does not go back and call his country to find out whether he is going to follow it or not. I think some of the structure that we have right now will allow that.

My fourth one is that the role of the military has got to remain neutral, and that does not mean that it does not enforce issues relative to violation but does it across the board. I am bothered by the arming piece, and again, it gets back to the peace accord. While I am glad no one said I had to do it, I would honestly prefer a situation where all sides disarmed than trying to get one where all sides are equal, and that is what the arming piece is related to. I am not sure where I come out on that.

The last one is a clearer statement on the transitioning of the operation, because I do not believe that the total operation is 1 year or 2, but it is what the phases are and therefore where some transitions may occur. It is trying to define some exit criteria to get us out, but it is related to mission.

That is possibly too long, but those are my views to the question, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Would either of you other two gentlemen have an addendum?

General ZINNI. Sir, I would just add that following a peace agreement that was comprehensive and had the right spirit, that the military tasks were clearly defined and understood by everybody up and down the line, that the political objectives and the military tasks are carefully matched up so in the mind's eyes of all those that signed the agreement and said our political objectives really envision how the military will carry out those tasks on the ground. That is probably the most important point.

The second would be that there is a clear understanding of all factions and parties as to what is unacceptable and what will be punished or reacted upon.

I think the third point is that all the efforts on the ground, not just the military, have to be absolutely coordinated and the mechanism has to exist on scene to pull it all together. Those on the ground making policy, those conducting humanitarian operations, those arming, if that is the choice, or whatever, that are working outside the military dimension have to be tied together so everyone understands what they are doing and how it affects the other dimension.

The third point, and this is echoing General Maddox', that there has to be unity of command, a single command, and I think there are innovative ways of doing that. I think recognizing things such as coordinating authority and deferring to a NATO commander may be an option for some force like the Russians without them submitting to command, but there is the spirit of a single decision maker and there is unity of command.

And my final point would be, and this is most important on the ground, is that the mechanisms to engage all the factions in a dialogue, the fora that should be set in place for all them to come to a table, because there will be friction, there will be events that will be misunderstood, but the ability to communicate and to open those lines, military to military, if you will, on security issues, that maybe can get beyond the political and other issues, but where the military leaders on the ground can talk to those that own guns and that there is a means to vent other than through violence.

Mr. KREPINEVICH. I would just add a few small points. One is, again, any agreement will create winners and losers. There are enough outstanding issues so that in the process of coming to an agreement, people will walk away from that table having felt that they did not accomplish all of their objectives, and there are enough independent operators to make you wonder that even if someone is speaking for their respective group, whether they are able to control that group over the period of time that the agreement is being enforced.

One concern I would have is the extent to which we are involved in stability operations and to make sure that we understand what our requirements are there. General Zinni said it is important not to stovepipe the planning there, and I would agree with him wholeheartedly. To understand clearly up front, are we responsible for basic needs? Would there be a tendency if U.S. forces provide greater support for the U.S. area to be a magnet for displaced persons or refugees and how would that affect the accomplishment of the military mission?

And the importance of working with civil agencies. To the extent that we have had experience with this in the past, we have usually found that the military, even though ostensibly it is divorced from this operation in the minds of some, it has the transportation assets, it has the ability to secure supplies and so on. It is a very wise idea, I think, to work closely with civilian agencies in the process of conducting the stability operations.

Finally, if we have a 1-year window, then what we are doing upon departing after that 1 year is altering the military balance, and I think we have to think about that and about how that will weigh upon the continued good intentions of the participants to abide by the peace agreement. We need to have that exit plan that says, we are changing the military balance, whether we arm the Bosnian Muslims or not, and how does that change in the military balance affect the incentive structure for people to stay at peace as opposed to return to war?

We ought to have an idea of who is going to replace U.S. forces, because it seems to me we are in a situation like you have in the Sinai or in Cyprus and a few other parts of the world, where you are going to need separation that lasts beyond a year.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very, very much.

Mr. BATEMAN [presiding]. Mr. Tiahrt.

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the comments from the testimony that we have here. I think Mr. Krepinevich touched on something when you were explaining about how we have looked at situations similar to this before and one of the situations you mentioned was Vietnam in the

early 1960's. It jogged my memory of a television program I saw recently, "General Schwartzkopf Remembers," I think was the title of it. It was with Dan Rather.

One of the questions that he was asked was, in retrospect, what lessons did you learn from Vietnam. He said a lot of things, but three things really stuck in my mind. First of all, he said, there is no such thing as a limited war, and I hope that that is not what we are looking at here, although General Maddox talked about planning for the worst possible scenario. Maybe you want to comment on that later.

The second thing was that we must have a list of specific objectives, and I think we have covered that quite well. I liked what General Zinni said about having your political objectives equal your military tasks. I think that is very important, and we have heard that resonated here several times.

The third thing he said was never place our troops in a military situation without the support of the American public, and I think that is the one that concerns me the most today. How would we ever know? Maybe this is not fair for General Zinni, since he is still in uniform, but perhaps General Maddox could talk to this. How would we know when we have the support of the American public? How would you have confidence?

That is what I am kind of struggling with. How would we know when we have the support of the American people to go into the Balkans and become a peacekeeping force despite all the risks that are involved? I would also like you to touch on the first thing that I talked about, about a limited war. Is that the worst possible scenario? What is the worst possible case?

I do not know if I should direct this, but I would like to start with perhaps General Maddox on the support of the American public.

General MADDOX. It is one of the toughest issues to me. I am not sure that there is full agreement at this table with my view that we cannot be in and out in a year, but I feel that way, and the extent to which my statement may be true, the support of the American people becomes a bigger issue.

We have to be able to put into a sound bite that you can use, that the press will pick up, that tries to describe why in heck we are there so that the American people can have some acceptance of why their children may be involved in this. And so it is the hard job of defining what it is we are going to do and explain that in a way that people can understand it. I mean, not everybody has got to like it, but can understand why we did it.

As I have sort of skirted several times, I come down in very different positions based on conditions. So the support of the American people, the support of the Congress of the United States, some understanding by the press is going to be critical if we go, because my personal belief, it will be only through a strong act of God that if we go, we are not going to have some soldiers killed.

Mr. KREPINEVICH. I would just add to that my feeling that, at least from what I have seen in the polls, the support goes down dramatically as the number of projected casualties goes up, at least from what I have seen.

I would say that here is the opportunity for leadership to be shown, to explain to the American people why this is important, why the benefits exceed what we see as the risks, and to shape public opinion, to lead public opinion, if you will.

I would also say that public opinion is no guarantee as a test of determining whether or not a military operation will succeed. For example, there was strong opposition to going into Haiti among the American public. As General Maddox said, if you assume the kind of benign circumstances that Congressman Skelton was talking about, then despite opposition from the public, you may be able to succeed in any event if the parties are willing and have an incentive to preserve the peace.

On the other hand, we have seen cases obviously the opposite, where public opinion was strong going in, for example, as in the case of Somalia, but where the mission has changed, the circumstances are changed, the plan did not survive contact with the enemy or whomever, and public support very quickly dissipated and there was not that leadership that went before the American people and said, this is why we are there and this is why we need to persevere.

So I think it is very much two things. One, a case of leadership and taking the case to the American people, and the other, the fact that you cannot use public opinion, which tends to be volatile in these sorts of situations, as a predictor of success or failure.

Mr. TIAHRT. If I can conclude, Mr. Chairman, I think you are right. We cannot use public opinion. My concern is, what do we tell the parents of children who give their lives for this effort? What was the primary American interest in this region? It is not a NATO nation. What was driving us to put them in harm's way? I am struggling with that answer yet today, and I think a lot of us are. Mr. Hefley put it that way on a previous day in previous testimony, and I think that is really the bottom line. When we can convince the American public that it is worth the risk, then we will be in the Balkans.

Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much, and I want to thank our witnesses for excellent testimony.

Let me just ask at the outset, is there any provision in the North Atlantic Treaty which makes this a NATO alliance requirement mission or obligation for parties to the treaty?

The answer General Maddox has given by shaking his head is "no." I understand, then, that it has become a NATO undertaking because, first, we all feel much more comfortable fighting under the context of the NATO chain of command, but it is not a NATO obligation in and of itself.

Let us suppose that a peace agreement is reached but the spirit of the parties is pretty crabby about it. There is some give and take in the agreement. It does not look like a stable or terribly satisfactory agreement. It is just a papered-over arrangement. There is a cease-fire but there is no assurance it will be sustained. We all remember what Lord Carrington said the other day who dealt with these leaders first, that you could not trust them that they would sign their names to anything and then not feel obliged to comply with it.

Let us assume that the Congress looks at this and says, we do not think it is a stable, workable peace agreement. We are not going to authorize or commit American forces to it. What are the consequences in that context for NATO and for the standing and leadership of the United States in the world?

General Maddox, I think it is easier for you to answer that than General Zinni.

General MADDOX. I think there are two aspects. One is, I do not believe that we would get a peace agreement if the United States had not stood up politically to that issue. So I think the United States, for whatever set of reasons, stood up in a leadership role and said, we should be able to facilitate trying to get to a peace accord.

The issue, then, is how do you transition that document and try to get peace there, and can that happen with no external influence? Clearly a judgment on my part. I seriously doubt that. I just think there is so much animosity there that they need some external help to go make that happen.

Mr. SPRATT. You do not think, then, there is any kind of peace agreement that might be reached that would be stable enough to be self-executing, sufficient and stable enough to be self-executing?

General MADDOX. I do not know if I want to put my name at the bottom of that statement, and I am not sure I want to banter intellectually long enough to sort out exactly where I come out, but I really do think that implementation is going to be tough.

Now, could it happen with nobody doing anything except the parties that are there? It could. I mean, if there is enough control by those that were involved in the signing of the peace accord, and one of the problems right now is the Bosnian Serb involvement in it, but if there is enough control of subordinates in agreement, could it happen by itself? It is possible. My only view is that I think with external help, there is a heck of a lot better chance of that occurring.

Given that, our European allies would like to see peace there for lots of reasons—troops they have put on the ground, money that they are spending, impact of refugees coming out of that area.

Mr. SPRATT. If I could stop you, if all of those reasons apply to them, and I think they apply to them far more than to us, why do they not assume the virtually full responsibility for it? They can come up with 60,000 troops in all of Europe and deploy those troops there. This is part of the European continent. The refugee problem is their problem. The instability problem is primarily their problem. Why do the Europeans not take over the dominant role here?

General MADDOX. If the Europeans are going to take over the dominant role, then my view is they are going to create a structure different than NATO. The structure that has been developed to deal with problems affecting the Western alliance has been NATO. I personally think that there are benefits of that alliance far beyond the military side of it. So it is the natural place to try to go work it. If it is the place to go work it and the United States plays a significant if not dominant role within that structure, then I think we are involved in it.

Mr. SPRATT. My light is on. Mr. Chairman, could I make one statement? I just wanted to say that I think, indirectly, all three of you made a case for participation almost unconsciously and that is that these peacekeeping, peace implementing, peace enforcing operations are going to increasingly be a feature of the world we live in, the security world we live in today, and if we are going to understand them and if we are going to lead in this world, we probably have to participate in them. And if we participate, we are probably going to, as you put it, General Maddox, have to assume our fair share of the risk, of we will have to go in harm's way as well as asking other countries to do so.

As we listen to you talk about what needs to be done in the way of rules of engagement and command structure and neutrality, it is clear to me that we have come a long way since Beirut. We are learning from the participation, and we learned from the participation bitterly in Somalia. It may be that part of this is all a part of the necessary learning experience of how to conduct these operations that are going to be increasingly called upon in the world we live in.

Mr. BATEMAN. With that, Mr. Buyer, and followed by Mr. Taylor, whom I had not observed when I recognized previously.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, before I ask some questions, I want to comment on comments made by Mr. Spratt. I find you to be a very thoughtful member and your comments with regard to Europe, very appropriate questions. Mr. Spratt, we have had these conversations before. When you look at the history of Europe and the United States participation in Europe, from World War II and the Marshall Plan, we provided for the peace and stability of Europe for over 50 years and helped grow the economies, and now we are bringing forces home, relocating, having to do military construction projects and all kinds of things as we relocate.

We are sending a message to our European allies that while we have provided for that peace and stability of your continent, we are also asking you to have a greater burden in the stability of your own continent, whether it is renegotiations of status enforcement agreements or our burden sharing agreements, as recently signed in Norway. It is a disconnect that we send that message to our European allies, yet always go back over to Europe and take the lead.

I am going to use that as a segue into there are those that like to talk about the constitutional question of, he is the President. He is the Commander in Chief. We should speak as one voice. Let us not try to undermine the peace process, and that type of thing.

First of all, let me be very clear. I compliment the President with regard to bringing the presidents of the warring parties to the peace table. I think that is an extreme compliment to his administration.

Second, I think the United States has a key and vital role to play in the peace process, and we can maintain our leadership role being the sole remaining superpower with regard to NATO in providing our air power and airlift, our sea power and sealift, and our logistical support. But with regard to the ground troops' presence in Bosnia, the Europeans should, in fact, take the lead, and it

would be a disconnect and inconsistent with the message we are sending to our European allies.

That is without even touching into the questions of, have we lost our neutrality or not, and I know, General Zinni, you touched on a little bit of that by only talking about the perceptions that are out there. If Americans are killing Serbians and we are going to be arming Muslims, how do you think some of the rogue organizations out there that do not have distinct command and control are going to think and feel?

That is who your gunnery sergeants, that is who those on the ground are going to have to deal with, are those rogue elements. We can, through diplomatic channels, make and file our complaints, but you are still dealing with a lot of different rogue elements that are out there in a territory that is 70 to 80 percent mountainous, highly cliffed, pretty amazing.

We, the Congress, were a very good listener when the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense came and testified. I think that this committee gave a strong bipartisan skepticism. My colleague, Paul McHale, and I brought forth that sense of the Congress resolution to send really a message, not only to the President but also to the warring parties, that they should not sit down and negotiate a peace agreement relying upon United States ground troop presence in Bosnia. For this Congress, by a vote of 315 to rebuke the President's policies, he should be a very good listener to what the Congress is saying under the President.

We will continue to monitor the peace process, and I am hopeful that the White House will tone its language, its rhetoric, and would also change its direction with regard to United States troops on the ground in Bosnia. If, in fact, they continue the present course in its tone and direction with its blinders on and ignoring the will of the American people through the vote of this institution, the Congress, it forces the Congress to move in a way of which historically we have never done before, and that is on a binding resolution to cut off the funds for ground troops.

We will see where that is going to go, but General Zinni, I have a specific question for you. You are over here to testify about the plans and operations. I am extraordinarily concerned when I hear that we are going to send in the ground troops, they will only be there for one year, and this recent article I just saw about the roads. One Pentagon expert said, roads and damaged or down bridges could hamper tank operations. Ninety percent of the bridges are not even capable of taking a 70-ton tank, if not 95 percent of them. Eastern bloc tanks, such as those in Bosnia, are about 30 tons lighter than the biggest United States tanks.

The thing that really concerned me is I have heard this number being thrown around about taking 103 tanks to a part of the world that is not tank country. Why are we doing that? If we do not have the bridges to handle that type of tanks and we have to go in and build infrastructure in the middle of the winter, help me out here.

General ZINNI. Sir, first of all, I am here because of my past experience in peacekeeping operations, and I can address the lessons learned and translate the task. I am not involved in any way—in any way—with Bosnia planning. My force is not involved. I am from a different part of the world. I am not involved in the deter-

mination of forces. I am not involved in the determination of mission and task.

Mr. BUYER. May I do a follow-up, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. BATEMAN. If any of the other witnesses want to respond, I think they can, but in fairness to those who have stayed so long, I think we have to just let the witnesses respond to the questions you have asked, if there are other witnesses who wish to respond.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you.

Hypothetically, hypothetically, General, we have a country that is 80, 90 percent mountainous, a lot of cliffs, a lot of rogue elements. We also have in the deepest, harshest time of winter that you are going to put in 20,000 of your troops and you do not even have the infrastructure, the bridges, the roads to handle them. So for your logistics, to provide the support to the troops, you are going to have to go in and build all of that. Tell me about the success of how——

Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Buyer, I think your question and your point is well made. It is a question of whether or not the witnesses wish to respond to it, but in fairness to the other members who have been waiting so long, I think we have to move on unless one of the witnesses chooses to make further comments.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to indicate to you that I have been called to a meeting with Chairman Spence. I have to leave and I apologize to my colleagues and to the witnesses. Thank you very much for your excellent testimony.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.

Mr. BUYER. May we have an opportunity for them to respond, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. BATEMAN. Yes. If General Maddox or Mr. Krepinevich wish to comment on that question, that is fine. Or, for that matter, if General Zinni has further response to the question, but we cannot let you go on and on with the question.

Mr. BUYER. I understand.

Mr. BATEMAN. The ball is on the court of the witnesses at this point.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you.

General ZINNI. I would hesitate to answer a hypothetical question like that. I would have to see the ground and go through the analysis as a commander to give you my judgment on the kind of force, and I would not presuppose to judge the Commander of the European Command or SAC. That is his AOR.

Mr. BUYER. That is a good political answer.

General MADDOX. The only comment I would make is it depends on what sector people are given. There are areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina where tanks have been used, and if we are placed in those locations, clearly, you have to deal with getting them places. But I have worked other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that was not a problem. So there are some areas where a tank is a useless piece of equipment for any side. There are other places where forces there have very effectively used them, and I would not want to put my soldiers there without a capability to deal with it.

Mr. KREPINEVICH. Just very quickly, I suppose there are a number of possible explanations, and so I am, I suppose, being specula-

tive here to some extent. One possible explanation is that the troops that are going in are armor-heavy because that is a vestige of what we had in Germany during the cold war when we anticipated armor-heavy engagements with Soviet forces.

There is a phrase in the Pentagon, "if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail." So if that is the force you have, then that is the force you have to use. Although there have been some remarkable transformations in terms of the unit that we have stationed in Italy, that, in my understanding, would be the rapid reaction force under Colonel McDonough.

There is the possibility that, in fact, this force very well conforms to the mission. If the mission, perhaps, is to establish a number of base areas, to have a clear show of force to intimidate and deter somebody, to show people that you are the meanest dog in town, and that you are not terribly worried about the prospect of the kinds of irregular operations that I alluded to, then maybe this is your force. On the other hand, if they do revert to unconventional or irregular operations, this may not be the optimal force.

I just recently spoke to a senior U.S. military officer returning from that region. According to him, there is one main road that includes the tunnels and the bridges that can move outsized equipment through that area. He could not speak to the side roads, the hilly or mountainous terrain.

In terms of the terrain itself, he was in the area. He said it is very mountainous, very hilly, forested. If, for example, however, you were worried about operating further to the north, which would be out in areas that are not currently covered by the projected IFOR deployment, then as you get towards Hungary, you do get to areas that are more characterized by plains, plains being flat terrain, where armor could be quite valuable.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you.

Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As many Yugoslavs as there are in south Mississippi, is it Krepinevich?

Mr. KREPINEVICH. Krepinevich, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. My apologies. It is interesting you mentioned Colonel McDonough, because I went to visit him a couple weeks ago and on the way I read his book, "Platoon Leader." It raised a very interesting question, and I believe your testimony and also General Zinni's referred to it, and that is, if you recall in the course of his book, at the end of the year, although the Vietcong had never run over his post, they went into the village nearby that was probably a Vietcong village where all the men were gone, presumably all fighting with the Vietcong, and they massacred the villagers and blew up the village to make the point that, OK, we could not take over your base but you do not control the area.

I raised that question to Colonel McDonough. I said, is it not possible that even if we deploy and we know what the hardships are going to be with the smart weapons not working and with the pilots not being able to use their night-vision goggles, the helicopter pilots, should they have to resupply someone or reinforce a unit, a hilltop unit, at some point.

I said, could not one of the warring factions, in effect, get into a village, blow the place up, rape the women, kill the children, and although not as shocking to the American public as the scene of dragging the ranger through the streets of Mogadishu, would not the American public still come to the same conclusion, what in the heck are we doing there? We are not saving women and children. I thought we were there to save women and children. I got a nod from the colonel, that he saw this as a problem, as well.

I would like to open it up to the panel. It is one of the questions I think all of you have asked. What are we really going to try to do there? If we are arming and training Moslems, if we are deploying through Croatia, and I would hope that the staff briefing has changed to reflect that—it is not through Serbia, it is through Croatia—then we have picked sides. We are obviously going to pay the Croatians something, either in money or weapons, in order to use their territory.

We have picked sides with two of the three combatants, and it does lead me to believe, since we have already bombed the Serbs, that they are going to find some way to get even with Americans, and there are several ways to do so—actual shooting of Americans, or going into a village that should be in the American sector, protected by Americans, and hurting those innocent people.

I am just curious if you also see that as a problem, or am I dead wrong on this? It is okay to tell me I am dead wrong. Lots of people do it. [Laughter.]

General ZINNI. I would go back to your initial analogy using Vietnam, which I think is dangerous. I spent 2 years in Vietnam and the lessons are certainly burned into me. I bled there, too, so they are really burned into me.

But I do not think we are going to go there to control villages, and I think we have to be careful that we do not confuse every element of violence with a violation of the peace accord. In our time in Mogadishu in Somalia, and I want to emphasize, my time in Somalia was not in UNISOM 2. It was in Restore Hope and United Shield. In United Shield, we had zero casualties, despite their best efforts.

But we probably reduced the level of violence in Mogadishu in those first months we were in there below any major city in the United States. But an act of violence got more CNN attention than anything else. The good that was being done in terms of the hundreds of thousands of people whose lives were saved maybe gets lost in some of that because it is taken out of context.

But again, I would go back to the purpose of this peacekeeping force. First of all, maybe it goes back to the question that was asked before about peace agreements. If you have a peace agreement, why do you need troops in there? Well, because the parties that sign an agreement, if even in spirit they really, really want peace, there is still a lack of trust. It is still necessary to have an arbitrator. There is still a reliance on someone to observe this peace and report it honestly and accurately.

So if the intent is good, it is just like arbitration in this country between parties that want a solution. They are looking for a third party to validate it. Probably our underwriting of this is important to them.

Mr. TAYLOR. But General, may I follow up? This came from a high-ranking officer over there. I do not want to get him in trouble. But he said that when a Croatian child is born, if it is a son, the mother takes that child outside and holds it up almost like the scene on "Roots" and says, "This is my Serbian avenger." How do you change that kind of hatred?

General ZINNI. I will just base it on my experience, and this is really a ground-level view. I have seen in my 30 years, and in this last 5 years, a hell of a lot of people die. The people that die are women and kids and old people. The percentage of civilians that die in conflict today are 80 percent, as opposed to 5 percent in World War I and a rising level.

I think, to a point, we have to get to a point in a given society where that mother does not want to hold that child up anymore, knowing that the child will die probably before it becomes able to be an avenger of Kosovo, as Kaplan stated in his book, "Balkan Ghost." That society has to finally decide to change.

I think any peacekeeping mission is offering an opportunity to change. That is all we are offering. If they do not take the opportunity, that is why we have exit strategies, and I think they need an opportunity to change. That is my best take. We cannot enforce something they do not want. If there are unacceptable acts and there are violations of the peace agreement, that is why you define an exit strategy. The peace accord is not being held to. We have no business there.

Mr. BATEMAN. Are there other comments?

General MADDOX. Let me just quickly hit it. A rogue rebel force can go kill some people in a village. A gang can kill people in the District of Columbia. The fact that we have 65,000 soldiers in Bosnia will not preclude that event from being able to be perpetrated, but as General Zinni said, I do not think that is what our mission will be or should be.

But I also do not believe that we are viewed so negatively. The last time I planned it, we were not going to put our troops in exactly the same place that apparently the current plan has them, but I worked how to get there by rail. If we need to run a train through Serbia, I honestly do not think there is any problem at all running a train through Serbia.

I ran a train with our vehicles over and moved my vehicles by rail going around the north side of Bosnia and Herzegovina to get tracks into Macedonia and had absolutely no problem, although the coordination with some of those countries was a thrill.

So I do not believe that there is that much animosity at the macro level. I think there is a very clear danger, you get somebody that does not like us, and so you have to deal with it at the local level.

Mr. KREPINEVICH. I would just say that, again, so much depends on the good will of the parties and the nature of the peace agreement. Certainly, if the circumstance is one in which the primary need is for U.S. forces to show they are the meanest dog in town, to show up with a lot of heavy equipment to establish a few major base areas, not to be terribly concerned about the welfare of the local population—that is somebody else's responsibility, and that works, then you have a success, I suppose.

If, as General Shalikashvili said, that United States forces are going to be engaged in stability operations, which is an old term that had kind of been buried after the Vietnam war, I thought, then that implies that you are responsible for the security and the welfare of the people in your area of operations. That means, to a greater or lesser extent, if rogue forces go into a town or village and there is a massacre, part of that problem is your problem.

So there is an issue of whether or not U.S. forces are responsible for controlling their area, for controlling the movement of hostile forces within that area and providing a basic level of security and basic needs, food, clothing, and shelter, for the people within their area of operations, or if they are responsible for coordinating, as General Zinni said, with the civilian organizations that are.

But I guess the ultimate point that I would agree upon is that I do not see you affecting a fundamental change in the nature of relationships in that area by staying there for a year. That used to be one of the favorite phrases of the Vietcong. The Americans come, the Americans go, but we are here forever.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, could I have a very quick followup?

General, I am going to leave you out of this because you are uniformed and I do not want to get you in trouble. But between sergeant majors and all the way up to 4 stars and 2 stars, I asked somewhere between 20 and 25 people off the record, if they had to vote to put ground forces into the former Yugoslavia, into Bosnia, and to the best of my recollection, only 2 said they would vote to do so. Now, that was all off the record. General, that is why I have to leave you out of this.

I am curious, General, you being very, very familiar with the situation, sir, what would you do? Would you vote to put American ground forces in? If it came to a vote in Congress—and I think it should, I think it has to; that is our job—and you were a Congressman, would you vote to put American ground forces into the former Yugoslavia under the conditions that we anticipate they will be?

General MADDOX. Yes, under the conditions we stated. If you ask a soldier, do you want to go and put yourself in harm's way and any of them say "yes," I am going to question their judgment.

Mr. TAYLOR. One was a helicopter pilot, sir. You know how I feel about helicopters.[Laughter.]

General MADDOX. But establishing the conditions become very, very important in answering that question, because you can get me to say absolutely not, also, by changing the conditions. But given the conditions that were stated and the political issues that I raised as far as what is the mission that was established, I would say "yes."

Mr. KREPINEVICH. I would like to also make one point by way of preface and that is soldiers should not vote. It is not their job to tell the policy makers when they should go and when they should not.

Mr. TAYLOR. They were asked. There is a big difference.

Mr. KREPINEVICH. I would tend to agree with the general. There are circumstances under which I would vote "yes," but again, it would depend upon the nature of the agreement, the kinds of winners and losers it created, which, it seems to me, would help you define what kind of incentives people would have to keep the agree-

ment. And, of course, the size of the force and whether it was adequate to accomplish the mission that it was given.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BATEMAN. If I might, before turning to Mr. Lewis, it seems that the answer to the last question comes back and puts this in the perspective from which I made my remarks. It is not to me a question of whether there may be circumstances under which we should deploy forces in the Balkans. It is a question of if we do it right, for the right reasons, under the right conditions, the right circumstances, with a great deal of anxiety on my part, that we are not setting the stage for the right conditions to be the operative conditions.

With that, Mr. Lewis?

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, thank you.

Since the Iron Curtain fell, up until that time, I think our vital national interest was the basis for why we would be involved in a conflict anywhere in the world, and I think the Constitution says that we are to provide for the common defense. Since the cold war, the post-cold war, as Mr. Dellums mentioned a little while ago, is it our new mission in the world now to be the world peacekeepers, or do we make the decision in placing our troops anywhere in the world along with vital national interest as peacekeepers or peace enforcers? Or is it just our new mission now to be the world police?

If that is the case, I think we are going to end up getting in trouble. I think it is fortunate that we had no casualties in Haiti because I think that if we would have had casualties there, the American public would have asked for our troops to come home. They did in Somalia, and I think they will in Bosnia if we start suffering casualties, because I do not think that, as General Maddox mentioned a little while ago, that a sound bite is going to be good enough when we start seeing troops engaged in conflict and casualties start resulting from that and there is not a clear, definite reason why we are there. I do not think being the world peacekeepers is going to be a good enough reason.

General Maddox, I would like for you to comment on that.

General MADDOX. I hope we are not the world peacekeepers.

Mr. LEWIS. I do, too.

General MADDOX. There are lots of them, lots of places where we are not, so we are really not, at least yet, in a role that because there is a role for peacekeepers we are necessarily involved.

I think the dilemma comes with regard to a statement that you made and that is we would not get involved in a conflict unless it was in our vital national interest, and the problem that we have is if you take the conditions that we have described, you can argue that it is not a conflict.

I still believe that we have to be able to articulate why it is worth our while to be there, but it is to me a lesser definition than why I am going to go in in a war. But I think it is the dilemma today with the conditions of instability that have erupted since the end of the cold war on what our role is in situations that we honestly did not have to face very often before that.

So I hope we are not world peacekeepers. I hope we do have debates on, is this worth our getting involved? But again, the distinc-

tion that I think has been argued today is to do what, and it was not to go fight the Bosnian war.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you.

General Zinni, do you think that we have this particular mission to be involved in—I think you were in Somalia—that we should be the world peacekeepers, the police force?

General ZINNI. I guess, sir, your original question I would turn around as a question. Would it ever be in our interest to be able to conduct a peacekeeping operation? I think if you look at it that way, I certainly am not in a position to determine vital national interests and whether we should or should not go.

But I do think that, and I would agree with Congressman Dellums, the world has changed. I have been involved, as I said in the opening statement, in five operations in the last 5 years. Obviously, each one of those, it is debatable as to whether national interests are involved or not. In northern Iraq with the Kurds, maybe they were as an aftermath of the war.

But that aside, I do think that there is a need for us to be capable of conducting these kinds of operations because I do think we will find it in our national interests at points in time to be able to conduct this operation. Now, whether this is one of those points in time is obviously beyond my scope of responsibility.

But I would say, and again, I guess I am treading on a little light ground here. I am getting outside my pay grade. But there comes a role with being a leader in the world, too, and the problem I have is because of my experience, oftentimes I am put in the position to talk to the American people about this. The CNN images capture them. There seems to be a sense that they want something done and they do not want to see hundreds of thousands of people die needlessly. These wars and these conflicts and these problems kill the innocent, not the guilty, and they seem to want to be able to do something and they seem to want to be able to do it casualty-free. It does not work that way.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you.

Mr. BATEMAN. Next is Mr. Longley.

Mr. LONGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to listen to the answers. There have been a number of very good questions.

I think that one of the issues that I am very concerned with is the confusion on the part of the public as to exactly what our national interests are and how we are preparing to execute them.

I note that I had an opportunity to review this morning a speech that was given by the Secretary of Defense in August to the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in Phoenix, AZ. He made a point that, "We are prepared to use military force when our vital national interests are involved. That is, when the survival of the United States or our allies is threatened by military force, by economic strangulation, or by the threat of nuclear weapons."

He went on to say, "The crises with Iraq and North Korea last year both fell into that category, so we were prepared to use military force, but there are other situations where we have national interests at stake but they are limited national interests and not at a level that might be called vital. In Bosnia, for example, the survival of the United States is not at stake."

He goes on to talk about the role of limited involvement and he ends on the concept that, "We need to be involved on a limited basis in certain situations but that, in my judgment and in the judgment of General Shalikashvili, United States interests in Bosnia do not warrant that level of commitment. Therefore, we have not and will not enter the war in Bosnia as a combatant."

I want to just say this, that irrespective of whether I have accurately quoted the Secretary or not, this is the type of message that on a day in August the American public heard, and then barely 2 months later, we are talking about going into a part of the world where we are going to be the meanest dog on the block, all of this in the context of the fact that the single most important decision that we can make in this Congress or that the President can make is to commit American forces into any theater under any conditions.

And with that backdrop, barely 6 weeks ago, we had a defense budget vetoed. We currently do not have a budget, let alone a defense budget. We are operating on continuing resolutions. On a very fundamental level, I think the public has a great amount of unease about exactly how well-wired we have our sense of priorities in Washington, not just the military and the foreign policy apparatus, but the Congress.

I would like to ask a question focusing on the lack of a budget, the lack of any request for funds for Bosnia, the fact that we are operating on a continuing resolution. Could any of you address the impact that this might have on the planning for the operation and/or the indirect impact on the operation of the Defense Department? Sir?

Mr. KREPINEVICH. We have done an estimate based upon what we understand in terms of duration of the operation and the prospective troop levels involved, as has the Defense Department. Both my organization, the Defense Budget Project, and DOD come out with an estimated incremental cost of conducting such an operation of between $1 billion and $2 billion over the course of a year.

Now, this funding is not typically part of the defense budget, since the military cannot program for military operations in advance, not knowing when it will be called upon to become engaged or deployed. What has happened in the past is the administration has come forward requesting supplemental funding to cover the cost of these operations. In the interim, what it has done is to take funds from other accounts, typically the operations and maintenance accounts. There are accounts within that part of the defense budget where it can draw on funds basically to sustain the operations of military forces in Bosnia.

In fact, the administration has done this in the past, as have earlier administrations, most recently in Haiti, Rwanda, the operation Deny Flight, for example. Those are operations that DOD funds out of hide until it can come to the Congress and request a supplemental appropriation.

Mr. LONGLEY. General Maddox, do you have any thoughts on that question? To what extent is the ability of a commander to appropriately plan for this type of an operation affected by the lack of a budget?

General MADDOX. I do not think his ability to plan for the operation is affected by the lack of a budget, because planning for the operation does not mean executing it. The real issue is, and get the money maybe in later and where it comes from. That has impact, because as it affects the operating command's O&M budget, if anyone thinks there is extra money in there, they need to have visited me more. There is not any. So as those moneys get diverted to go conduct this operation, you put great strain on those commands, and even getting it returned in a supplemental at the very end of the year is not very helpful.

So not knowing how the money is going to be dealt with, and if at the DOD level they can take care of it and not affect the direct operating command's ability to train their forces, maintain their equipment, and care for their people, then it is a different issue. But as it comes down to the operating command, as it generally does, and it impacts your existing budget, it is a very serious issue.

Mr. LONGLEY. Thank you.

General Zinni.

General ZINNI. I agree with General Maddox exactly.

Mr. LONGLEY. Thank you.

Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. McHale.

Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, welcome. I am deeply appreciative of all of your testimony. General Zinni, I offer you a special welcome and I ask you to give my very best regards to General Laboute and Colonel Madis when you get back out to 1 MEF.

Gentlemen, I am an advocate of a strong and active foreign and military policy on behalf of the United States. I supported the gulf war. I believe that we had to respond vigorously, perhaps even more vigorously than the administration did to the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea. I supported the deployment of troops to Haiti, and so I am hardly an isolationist.

I think the President acted wisely in terms of reinvigorating American foreign policy on Bosnia. I believe that Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke is halfway to the Nobel Peace Prize and I hope he makes it all the way. I supported air strikes in defense of the safe havens, and I am unequivocally opposed to the deployment of ground forces.

I traveled to Bosnia 2 months ago and had an opportunity to observe the ongoing, the unfolding events on the ground, and what I am worried about is this. Our witnesses who appeared in front of us last week talked about our going-in position, one that I think is laudable, defensible, moral, and militarily in jeopardy.

I believe that if we send in 25,000 American ground forces, because weaponry, particularly small arms, can be found throughout the entire population, I believe there is a high probability that our forces will come under fire. Whether it is sniper fire, mortar rounds, artillery rounds, a shoulder-fired missile that would take out a Chinook helicopter, I think we will experience casualties. At that point, I am concerned about an escalating cycle of violence, where the commander's intent has been expressed that we will be the meanest dog on the block. That is a good deterrent but a prescription for an escalation in violence once casualties are actually inflicted upon American forces.

My question to you is this. If we send forces in and if they come under hostile fire, perhaps from a source that we cannot even clearly identify, but if the commander's intent, as previously expressed, is to respond aggressively as the meanest dog on the block, perhaps as a deterrent for future such events, how do we respond without creating a cycle of violence? If you were the battalion commander who loses five soldiers to three mortar rounds, how do you, consistent with the commander's intent, respond under those circumstances?

That is the end of the spiel, gentlemen, and I present that scenario because I think it is a probability. There are mortar tubes all over the place there. There are AK–47's all over the ground. Shoulder-fired weapons capable of taking out a helicopter can be commonly found throughout this theater of operation. If some rogue element beyond the political control of those who are negotiating now in Dayton should utilize that weaponry and kill Americans, how do we respond without escalating the violence potentially to the level of conventional small-unit warfare?

General ZINNI. Sir, I think going in, first of all, it is hard to describe a particular situation or response if we are talking about a mortar is fired here or there. We have to prepare this force in the maximum way possible for protection, and we can get into the technical aspects of that, whether it is the proliferation of counter-battery radars, when it is a significant number of snipers for counter-sniper operations.

I would take you back to United Shield. We knew we would be fired upon. We definitely were absolutely sure of it, and we were. But we did extraordinary work in engineering and in preparation, in bringing in the right kinds of forces to respond in a proportional way, because that is what the rules of engagement are going to require. You are not going to eliminate a city or a village because a mortar round fires out of it.

All that has to be built in in the beginning. It does not prevent the possibility of casualties. That can happen. But commanders can do things operationally, technically, tactically to minimize that as best as can be done.

I would emphasize, also, the communications on the ground, and I mean the dialog, again, going back to the intelligence work to determine responsibility. It is not that hard in these environments to determine responsibility. Now, it may be very difficult to prove it in a court of law, but I think you can readily understand who is attempting to engage you.

Mr. MCHALE. My concern is this, general. I agree with what you are saying, but I think the ability to respond to the likely source of hostile fire without the degree of proof that you would need in a court of law gives rise to the possibility that our military forces would come into aggressive contact with the civilian population, and that worries me greatly.

For instance, in the scenario I created, there are three mortar rounds that come in on a hilltop. We lose five soldiers. We cannot prove to a certainty who dropped the rounds down the tubes but we know that those rounds came from the vicinity of a nearby village and that those who are in the village know who dropped the rounds. That is a likely scenario.

You then have a battalion commander who is told by the intent of his superiors he is to respond aggressively, and I am worried that at that point, the going-in strategy escalates unthinkingly to the level of small-unit combat, where that battalion commander wants to take action consistent with the intent given to him, but he is not even quite sure who is individually responsible for the killing of his men.

I would close with this and then invite a response. My light is on. What you experienced in Somalia, general, and I was not in Somalia, so forgive me for making an assumption here, but I believe that the level of potential combat, the amount of weaponry, the aggressiveness, the degree of conventional military training in Bosnia is at several magnitudes higher than that which existed among the irregular forces in Somalia. These are real soldiers with real weapons who have trained and operated at the small-unit level, not to in any way disparage the very real threat that was faced in Somalia, but this is much closer to conventional warfare, at least from what I had observed.

Mr. Chairman, I will conclude at this point.

Mr. BATEMAN. I think we had better put the ball back in the witnesses' court at this point.

Mr. MCHALE. Let me do that. I do not want to be guilty of Mr. Buyer's fault. I am afraid it may be infectious. [Laughter.]

If you could respond to that, I am really worried about that, that good intentions will translate after casualties into conventional warfare.

General ZINNI. Sir, obviously, your situation is a very real one. I mean, obviously that can happen, and maybe is very possibly going to happen. I think that in many ways, conventional forces are easier for us to deal with than unconventional forces, and I would argue that in many ways, a Desert Storm is easier than a Somalia, as it was easier than a Vietnam.

I do not think there is any way you are going to guarantee a casualty-free operation. I would discourage anybody from either advertising that or hoping even for it in this kind of environment for the reasons you laid out. I do know that our rules of engagement allow us to respond to hostile intent or hostile action and the commander with the proportionate means has the ability, in his judgment, to respond and to react, and I think if there is a threat, you will find not only that battalion commander but that commanding general reacting in some way to prevent it or to counter it. It may involve engagements at small-unit levels.

I think you bring up a very real problem in the matter of escalation, the ability to take action, to take effective action, but then to contain the action and maybe restore the condition prior to that. That is unique to peacekeeping kinds of operations and very difficult to do.

Mr. MCHALE. It is the key here.

General ZINNI. It is the key, and it is something the commander—you cannot loosen the escalation ladder on either side. Again, I go back to my point of unacceptable acts and continuing dialogue and accountability. It is difficult to work through those things and it is difficult to accept some of the things that may hap-

pen after that and the people you have to deal with after that. It is the nature of these operations.

General MADDOX. First, I have been opposed to ground troops in Bosnia, not when I wore a uniform that I was necessarily asked to make for the decision making side of that, but I have been to the UNPROFOR headquarters, met with the commander, and had very heated debates on why the United States did not have ground troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I did not think that the means were provided to execute the mission properly, nor were the rules written right to allow soldiers to be successful. So I have been personally very opposed to having U.S. ground troops in there, but for a very different mission, very different reason.

Do I think that if we put troops into Bosnia-Herzegovina for this operation with a peace accord and with a strong belief that it will be supported, that our soldiers will come under fire? Yes, I do. Do I believe that we will have casualties? Yes, I do. Do I believe that we need to be the meanest dog in town? I am not really sure what the heck that means, but I want to go there with the capability to deal with a situation in which I am placed, and clearly, the UNPROFOR forces have not been. I do not want to be in a situation where my soldiers can be bullied and there is nothing that I can do about it.

So whether that is the meanest dog in town, I do not know. I want to have the capability to deal with situations that may be presented. I do not believe that if our soldiers are placed under fire, that they or their commanders will react in an undisciplined way or take retribution against those that were not involved in the engagement. I think that will cause situations which will be very frustrating for some commanders because you will not be able to sort a particular one out.

But I do not believe that the quality of our military forces today are such that you are going to see them escalate the situation and engage people that were not involved in it. I think that is going to be the tough piece, but do I think that we can get into some local fights? Yes.

Mr. MCHALE. Let me insert this very briefly. I did not mean to imply that our forces would respond in other than in a completely professional way. The troops that we have going in are among the best soldiers that our country has.

Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. McHale, I believe you have caught the virus.

Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

Mr. KREPINEVICH. Sir, I will keep my response brief. It seemed to me that when the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs testified, in fact, they may have offered two approaches for the kind of scenario that you present. One, in fact, is to be the meanest dog in town, and when something like that happens, if you can find out who the perpetrator is, then you do bring that heavy hammer down and say, look, we are not messing around. You want to play with us, we can play that game. We can play it in spades.

The problem with that is, again, you may not be one dog fighting another. You may be a dog contending with fleas, and in that case, it may not be very easy to identify who to retaliate against.

The other problem is that perhaps who you are retaliating against really cannot control the local forces that are giving you a hard time. A classic example is the terrorist attacks in South Vietnam in 1964 and the bombing raids that did nothing to abate them.

The other approach is one that was alluded to, I think, by General Shalikashvili when he talked about stability operations, and this is quite a different approach which essentially involves efforts to control the area of operation so that you minimize the prospect that you will have those kinds of bands, that kind of military equipment available to people in your area. Unfortunately, that leads to all sorts of questions pertaining to how far out do you patrol from your area. Do you patrol as far out as mortar range, artillery range? Where does the limit end?

Second, what are the rules of engagement, and if you do get fire from that village as opposed to from a field, what is the commander authorized to do, return the fire, and so on. If you receive fire from outside of your area of operations, are you authorized to go into hot pursuit of the enemy if it goes back over the area that you have designated and into, say, Serbian territory? And, of course, the problems magnify if you start to talk about problems with your lines of communication and lines of supply being compromised. The good portion of the German Army was swallowed up in the Balkans in World War II trying to do such things exactly as that.

So I think they are excellent questions. They call for careful thinking about the kind of force we send in there, because each type of approach requires a different force mix, the rules of engagement, the measures of effectiveness, and also, as was alluded to, how we coordinate with civilian agencies and with our allies who are also going to be operating in this kind of environment along with us.

Mr. McHale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, in light of the current attendance, I am tempted to ask for additional time by unanimous consent. [Laughter.]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bateman. I am not sure Mr. Dornan would agree to that.

Mr. Dornan. I will stay, if you want to go after I do.

Gentlemen, first of all, General Maddox, I have not seen you since a very cold Belgian morning, December 16 of last year, the 50th anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge, where in defiance of the orders of Congress 18-year-olds found themselves in combat, and that was not supposed to happen. There was a specific law that 18-year-olds would replace troops in the States and they ended up, 4 months after being drafted, in combat, and we had more troops overrun in the 106th Division, two whole regiments surrendering, the worst surrender since Bataan, the second biggest in American history.

It was a very inspirational day and I was shocked then and am still shocked that not a single U.S. Senator or other Congressman showed up for the 50th anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge.

I tried to focus my attention down to the first units that were overrun, where a man would die in the arms of his foxhole buddy and then he would probably freeze to death if he was not wounded himself, and those graves were not found until weeks later, an

amazing stand by our forces to stop the last German blitzkrieg of the war.

Saturday, after a Presidential forum in Bangor, ME, I asked where Lincoln, NE, was, and I drove north an hour into really thinly-populated American territory, to Lincoln, NE, to find the grave of a Medal of Honor winner ranger—excuse me, he was not a ranger, he was Delta Force—who had died in the streets of Mogadishu, whose body was desecrated far beyond what we saw on television. Keep in mind, I am in my seventh year on the Intelligence Committee and there are certain things, out of sympathy for loved ones, that you have to keep private.

I found the grave of Gary Ivan Gordon, born between my fourth and fifth child, so I could be his dad. He was 33 years old, born August 30, 1960, and died October 3, and he died before some of the rangers who died after midnight, so it is October 3. On his gravestone was a Medal of Honor, a green beret etched into that white standard Arlington stone. Then over here was driven, set into the stone, a medal, the Delta Force medal, which I had never seen. I called them and asked for a patch. I did not know there was one. We can now say Delta Force all we want, since it is on a gravestone.

And I called down to Fort Bragg and I said, where is Randy Shugert buried? I want to visit his grave. He was the ranger, then Delta Force, who begged on the radio with Gary Gordon to go down at ground level and try and rescue Durant's crew. They rescued one, the aircraft commander, Durant. The two door gunners, Ray Frank, three combat tours in Vietnam, who was within 29 days of discharge, and the two Medal of Honor winners. Those five were the bodies we saw dragged through the streets.

General Zinni, I know your reputation. I know the superb job you did over there, but what was the point? Aideed is still fighting the grandson of the Madi, the part that Lawrence Olivier played in Heston's cartoon. The Madi's grandson and Aideed are still duking it out. People are still dying and they are begging for us to come back. So is a Gary Gordon, is a Randy Shugert going to die in some little gully in Bosnia?

Consider this. On one of the ABC primetime shows this week will be a story on a hero. They call it a hero. He escaped an invasion—not the quality of hero of Shugert and Gordon, and young Scott O'Grady would admit that. He followed his training and was a scared little rabbit who evaded—that is his own quote—and did a great job. He is in Reader's Digest this month.

But consider this. If Scott O'Grady had befallen the fate of the two French pilots who, coincidentally, were shot down on Gary Gordon's, what was supposed to be his 35th birthday, those two French pilots have disappeared. The French foreign minister called it a grotesque statement that they were kidnapped from a hospital on day 52. This is now day 70-something. What were they doing in a hospital 52 days after their successful bailout? We saw the parachutes come down.

If you personalize this down to the level of those two French pilots, and I just sent my staffer to get their names, as I forgot them again—they are difficult to memorize, very French names—I think of being on the ground at the special forces training camp, run by

a 28-year-old lieutenant colonel who was an All-American football player for 3 years at Northwestern. He is a Croat. Then I see the young foreign minister who played football at Northwestern leaving Dayton today to go to a Northwestern football game. He is the Muslim foreign minister. So there is a lot of American feeling in the Croatian community, the Muslim community, and certainly the Serbian community.

Gentlemen, the defense minister of Croatia, who is a Canadian pizza franchise entrepreneur, told me that they breed MiG's. They have gone from 6 MiG's to almost 30, and we know they are not breeding. What it means is there is no embargo. He told me that every three airplanes that come into Zagreb, one whole load of military supplies from Iran and other places goes to the Muslims.

How can we possibly insert ourselves into the middle of this triple civil war other than, and I will finish on this, and I said it to Shalikashvili and Christopher and Perry sitting there, what is wrong with airlift, sealift, hospitals, intelligence from satellite architecture to the world's greatest listening devices? What is wrong with air power, which I was against, but now I have succumbed to because of the brutality of bodies being blown around marketplaces while I was there—other than all of that and more, why do we have to insert ground troops?

Please, general, grab those three sheets there. You will recognize Cap Weinberger's six commandments, augmented by four of my own——

Mr. BATEMAN. I believe the gentleman's time for questioning has expired and the ball is in the court of the witnesses. I think they understand the question.

Mr. DORNAN. Please look at those 10 commandments, and can you, if you so choose, give me a written comment on my comments on how we do not satisfy 1 of the 10, Cap Weinberger's 6 and my 4 added, the 10 commandments, what we should ascribe to before we put ground forces on the ground.

Mr. BATEMAN. The witnesses may respond, if they would like.

Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Chairman, could the gentleman repeat the question?

Mr. BATEMAN. No, he cannot. [Laughter.]

Mr. DORNAN. Just pick any one of those 10 commandments. Each take one of choice and respond how my analysis of the violation of that commandment is wrong.

Mr. BATEMAN. Would the witnesses prefer to submit answers for the record to any of these, or is it manageable for you within a reasonable period of time?

General MADDOX. I could submit mine in writing.

Mr. KREPINEVICH. I prefer to do the same, Mr. Chairman.

[The material was not submitted for the record.]

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BATEMAN. If the panel can indulge the committee just a little longer, I have one question that I would like to ask, and then I think in fairness to such a superb panel of witnesses, we should allow you to be excused.

But in the testimony that we have heard, it is contemplated that the American forces would be headquartered in Tuzla and would be assigned a corridor that extends from the northwest to the

southeast of some 50 to 60 road miles, is my recollection of the description of where the forces would be. The indications on the map we were furnished that day did not indicate that this was an area that is presently under conflict, where there is this sort of measles/smallpox kind of phenomena that we see in so much of Bosnia, but essentially a Muslim-controlled area. It did not appear that we would be there to maintain a separation zone, the 12-mile separation zone that is talked about, because it is not a frontier.

I just wondered if I misunderstand where our troops are supposed to go and what they are being deployed to do. It seemed like more a reinforcement operation for the Muslims than it is interjecting a peacekeeping force. Could you all comment on that, if you are abreast of what the plan is?

Mr. KREPINEVICH. I do not know much more than what I can glean from the papers. I do not have my security clearance anymore, Mr. Chairman. All I can say is from what I have heard, you are correct, that the area is dominated by Muslim population, that the level of conflict in that area has been relatively low throughout the period of war the last few years.

I would say that it is my understanding that the frontier that the United States forces would have to control is in excess of 300 kilometers, and so one might reasonably ask, given the terrain, are the forces adequate to man that kind of frontier, and that it is my understanding that they are not there so much to back up Bosnian Muslim forces as they are to interpose themselves between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs. So the need for the corridor is to try to keep them far enough apart so that they cannot engage in artillery and mortar duels over our heads.

Mr. BATEMAN. General Maddox or General Zinni, do you have any observations on that?

General MADDOX. I am not knowledgeable enough about this specific area to really respond. I think one of the important aspects, though, that applies to most areas, we will find certain—you sort of have to cut it out, but you will find areas where no major conflict, in fact, has occurred, and while they are predominately one side or the other, in many of them, there are mixed ethnic people still living in them.

I mean, the notion that the country is going to divide itself into three ethnically pure groups is not true, and in many places, it has not happened at all. So I think there is going to be a very mixed bag in sectors with what the responsibilities are, but I cannot speak to the specifics.

General ZINNI. Sir, I have no knowledge.

Mr. BATEMAN. I think with that, in fairness to the witnesses, who have been here a long, long time——

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, could I submit the names for the record of those French pilots?

Mr. BATEMAN. Indeed, you may.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. They are Captain Frederique Chiffot and Lieutenant Jose Saudisnex. I do not want their names lost in history.

Mr. BATEMAN. We do thank you. You have been extraordinarily helpful and superb witnesses and a great benefit to the committee.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The following material was submitted for the record:]

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October 31, 1995

The President
The White House
Room 102 East Wing
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Please know that I very much want to help you in supporting the promising Bosnian peace initiative. However, I have great concerns about the effort to equip and train the Bosnian Muslims, especially while U.S. troops are operating in Bosnia.

I believe the "equip and train" effort corrupts the implementation force (IFOR) as a neutral peace force, and needlessly places the lives of American troops at risk. The effort will cause America to be perceived as a party to the conflict in the eyes of the Bosnian Serbs, their friends, and their allies. There will be no avoiding it, even if an attempt is made to keep the effort separate from IFOR. The message received in the region will be clear: American troops are not in Bosnia to implement a peace agreement, but rather to protect the Bosnian Muslims.

The purpose of the "equip and train" effort is to establish military parity. However, given what has happened in Bosnia over the last three months, I question the assertion that a military imbalance exists. On the contrary, I suggest a regional military balance has existed for sometime. Furthermore, I sense that the warring factions have grown weary of prolonging the fight.

We are walking down the dangerous path toward an arms race in Bosnia just at the time when American troops will attempt to bring peace to an area suffering from a savage war. Will not the Russians respond to the cries of their ethnic cousins, the Bosnian Serbs, who fear being driven from their homes in the future by a menacing Bosnian Muslim force? Our effort to equip and train Bosnian Muslims could bring more war to the region.

No matter how we try to separate it from IFOR, the effort to equip and train will have "RED, WHITE, AND BLUE" written all over it. This would jeopardize the safety of U.S. forces. The Serb partisans will have an incentive to make American troops pay the price, and American troops will become the object of Serb anger and acts of vengeance.

Therefore, I believe that we should defer any effort to

equip and train until IFOR departs the country. My suggestion keeps faith with the Bosnian Muslims without needlessly jeopardizing the lives of American troops.

Again, Mr. President, I want to help you bring peace to Bosnia. But I would find it difficult to support U.S. participation in IFOR should we embark on the dangerous path of equipping and training Bosnian Muslims.

Sincerely,

IKE SKELTON
Member of Congress

IS:whn

8 Nov '95

10 Commandments for Committing U.S. Combat Forces

1. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the situation is vital to U.S. or allied national interests.*

2. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless all other options already have been used or considered.*

3. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there is a clear commitment, including allocated resources, to achieving victory.*

4. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there are clearly defined political and military objectives.*

5. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless our commitment of these forces will change if our objectives change.*

6. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the American people and Congress support the action.*

7. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless under the operational command of American commanders or allied commanders under a ratified treaty.*

8. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless properly equipped, trained and maintained by the Congress.*

9. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there is substantial and reliable intelligence information including human intelligence.*

10. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the commander in chief and Congress can explain to the loved ones of any killed or wounded American soldier, sailor, Marine, pilot or aircrewman why their family member or friend was sent in harm's way.*

(Developed by Congressman Robert K. Dornan and former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger)

1. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the situation is vital to U.S. or allied national interests.*

   What vital interests are at stake? We already are preventing the spread of conflict with troops elsewhere in the Balkans such as Macedonia.

2. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless all other options already have been used or considered.*

   What about lifting the arms embargo? What about tightening trade sanctions? What about further air strikes?

3. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there is a clear commitment, including allocated resources, to achieving victory.*

   Are 25,000 U.S. troops enough? Are there enough European forces?

4. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there are clearly defined political and military objectives.*

   What are the political objectives - protect small "enclaves" in the middle of a civil war? What are the military objectives - seize and hold specific terrain or stand and become targets for all warring sides?

5. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless our commitment of these forces will change if our objectives change.*

   Will we realistically be able to withdraw U.S. forces after a year if peace is not achieved, even if these forces are directly engaged in combat?

6. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the American people and Congress support the action.*

   Neither Congress nor the American people support this operation. A recent CBS/New York Times poll indicated only 37 % of Americans support the President's position on Bosnia. Further, 79 % believe he should seek approval from Congress before sending any troops.

7. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless under the operational command of American commanders or allied commanders under a ratified treaty.*

   The command structure for U.S. troops involved in this operation seems confused at best with U.S. ground troops serving under deputy European commanders and a NATO council of civilian representatives from member states. Will France and Denmark have to approve U.S. combat requests for M-1 tanks and AC-130 gunships?

8. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless properly equipped, trained and maintained by the Congress.*

   Why has the President nearly doubled the defense cuts he promised in his campaign and under funded his own "Bottom Up Review" defense plan by as much as $150 billion? Shouldn't he restore spending if he plans to use our military as world policemen in Bosnia, Haiti, and elsewhere?

9. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there is substantial and reliable intelligence information including human intelligence.*

   What reliable intelligence sources do we have in Bosnia? Will our sources be compromised through intelligence sharing agreements with non-NATO countries such as Russia?

10. *Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the commander in chief and Congress can explain to the loved ones of any killed or wounded American soldier, sailor, Marine, pilot or aircrewman why their family member or friend was sent in harm's way.*

    Can we honestly make this case? American lives are at stake!

OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES TO BOSNIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 15, 1995.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:45 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd D. Spence (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will please come to order. We have been waiting on one of our witnesses, but I understand she is in the building and is coming up presently, so we will go ahead and get started.

Today, the committee continues its series of hearings examining the potential deployment of United States ground forces to Bosnia as part of a NATO peacekeeping force. Several weeks ago, the committee heard from a panel of administration witnesses presenting their rationale in defense for current Bosnia policy. In their testimony, Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, and General Shalikashvili discussed three primary factors underlying the deployment plan, European stability, NATO solidarity, and American credibility. My hope is that we can look at these factors in more detail this morning.

Accordingly, I want to welcome our panel of distinguished witnesses this morning. First, we will hear from the Hon. Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Ambassador Kirkpatrick will be followed by the syndicated columnist and insightful essayist Charles Krauthammer.

Preserving European stability, NATO solidarity, and American credibility are three of the most important and serious challenges facing the United States in the post-cold war world. They go directly to the question of defining America's national security and military strategy, and as such, they should not be invoked lightly.

Unfortunately, some in the administration continue to raise the ghost of this century's world wars in arguing why America must send ground troops to Bosnia. Testifying before us, Secretary Christopher stated that Sarajevo was once the spark that ignited an entire continent. But Secretary Christopher would appear to be confusing the initial spark with the raging forest fire that followed. Unless the great powers themselves provide the fuel, as they did earlier this century, there will be no great conflagration.

The wider Balkan war we have been hearing about for several years simply has not come to pass.

Yet, by defining Bosnia as a risk to European stability, NATO solidarity, and above all, American credibility, the administration could find itself in the position of providing more than enough fuel to fan the current conflict into a wider war.

Thus, the committee has a profound responsibility to examine the issues of European stability, NATO solidarity, and American credibility within the context of coming to grips with our national interest in the Balkans. This is no small challenge. I hope our witnesses can help us in this endeavor.

In particular, I hope our witnesses will address the following questions: Must the United States involve itself and exercise a leadership role with every issue of American security or can European security matters be trusted to the Europeans alone? What, if any, are the linkages between stability in Bosnia, stability in the former Yugoslavia, stability in the Balkans, and the larger European balance of power?

If the Bosnia mission is not a success and provokes a United States withdrawal, or if the United States withdraws after 1 year but before peace is secure in Bosnia, what will the effects on NATO be? And if the Bosnia mission is not a success, will claims about American credibility force us to remain in Bosnia longer than anticipated to enforce an unenforceable peace?

These are representative of the difficult questions that we are wrestling with. Yet, without compelling answers, I believe the administration could be making a mistake to deploy ground troops into the Bosnia quagmire.

I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing before the committee and I look forward to your testimony.

Mr. Dellums is not present right now, so we will go ahead with the testimony. First, we will recognize Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

STATEMENT OF JEANE KIRKPATRICK, FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the committee and you for inviting me to testify today on this important subject. I welcome the committee's hearings on United States troop deployment in Bosnia.

Obviously, it is a difficult—no, it is an impossible situation for the committee or its witnesses to decide whether it will be necessary or desirable to support and implement an agreement which does not exist, whose terms are unknown, about which there remain large differences among the parties to the conflict.

We do not know, so far as I can ascertain, if defensible borders will be drawn for Bosnia and Herzegovina, if the arms embargo will be lifted, and a Bosnian army trained to defend its country from well-armed neighbors. We do not know who else will be participating in a multinational peace force, nor how they will be integrated or commanded, nor under what rules of engagement they will operate, nor what kind of exit strategy is planned.

It is impossible, then, to decide now that the United States should participate in a hypothetical force to defend a hypothetical agreement, but it is possible to address some questions relevant to

the deployment, and I know that this committee has been doing just that.

Are there important national interests at stake in Bosnia? My answer to this question, Mr. Chairman, is yes. Americans have moral, political, and strategic interests at stake in former Yugoslavia. Recall that two world wars have spread from the Balkan tinderbox, wars which engulfed the European continent and eventually involved the United States, as well, because we are a part of the Western world and cannot finally be indifferent to brutal aggression and mass murder in the heart of Europe.

More than 2½ million Bosnians have been displaced from their homes in this war; more than 200,000 killed. Concentration camps, torture, mass rape, and mass murder have become familiar again in the region. Methods used against the people of Bosnia: starvation, slaughter, forced population transfers, and other instruments of ethnic cleansing, dehumanize the victims. Indifference to them dehumanizes us.

The committee requested a description of the precise connection between stability in Bosnia, the Balkan peninsula, and the balance of power in Europe, but precise connections are known only after events have developed. Often, even usually, they come as a surprise. We know that violence and conquest are contagious. The former Yugoslavia is centrally strategically located. Location is not everything in international affairs, but the centrality and ethnic diversity of former Yugoslavia give developments there a greater geostrategic significance than if those countries were more isolated and remote.

Moreover, the countries of Central Europe recently released from the Soviet empire have new governments and new borders which are more susceptible to destabilization than established regimes. In the current conflict, violence sponsored by the Serbian Government has already spread from Kosovo to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has repeatedly extended across Macedonia's borders. We cannot know where it might end if permitted to continue. Russia, too, has a stake in the region, and Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Turkey, and Italy, among others.

We should not forget that Benito Mussolini and his lectures inspired Adolf Hitler and others, nor that Mussolini's aggression against Ethiopia presented the League of Nations and its members a challenge they could not meet, and the League collapsed, and Hitler was encouraged by Italian successes to consolidate his own powers. Hitler's success in occupying the Rhineland encouraged him to move again, into Austria, Czechoslovakia, and beyond, to the very ovens of Auschwitz and the graveyards of Normandy.

Through it all, our European allies watched, never dreaming that Hitler's appetites would extend so far or with such consequences. They had vital interests and no prescience. The same combination has guided the European response to Serb appetites.

The harm done by violent tyrants in this century has always come as a surprise, but the United States and the whole of democratic Europe have a large stake in ensuring that extreme nationalism, xenophobia, and Serb conquests do not whet the savage appetites of would-be tyrants and conquerors in the Balkans and their neighbors.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is important, however, to be clear, that to say the United States has an interest and an important interest in ending violence and conquest in Bosnia and in promoting and preserving stability and democracy in the region is not to say that we must, therefore, send 25,000 U.S. troops to take part in a 60,000-man peace operation, nor is it to say that such operation is likely to succeed. No new-style peacekeeping operation undertaken by the Clinton administration in an area of conflict has secured peace.

U.N. peace operations conducted in Somalia and Bosnia over the last 3 years have achieved virtually none of their goals, although phase one of the Somalia operation undertaken by President George Bush succeeded in delivering large quantities of food and preventing mass starvation in Somalia.

Recent peace operations have suffered from disorganization and disagreement among participants, lack of coordination and political will, military incompetence, and ineffectiveness. Some of their shortcomings were a consequence of the United Nations' lack of skill and experience. Some were a consequence of the diverse interests, priorities, goals, and perspectives of participants, which are common to multilateral operations.

It is not clear the proposed multinational operation, which will combine many governments, languages, organizational habits, can succeed in coping with current problems, though it is clear that an operation under NATO command has a better chance of success than one commanded by the United Nations.

Mr. Chairman, you asked, does American credibility require deploying 25,000 U.S. troops on the ground? I believe American credibility is at stake only if the Clinton administration has made commitments to supply such a force without consulting with the Congress. But America's allies understand that the Congress plays an important constitutional role in foreign policy and will not be shocked by even a change of position by the U.S. Government.

Failure to provide ground troops might do superficial damage to America's credibility, but committing troops and failing to achieve our goal would do major damage, really major damage. It is not possible to contemplate the damage to America's credibility that would result in making a commitment and then failing to achieve our goals, as happened in Vietnam and in Somalia. This is not an idle worry. It is not clear to me that the Clinton administration understands how to use force and the threat of force to establish credibility and achieve our national goals.

Mr. Chairman, you asked, is deployment of U.S. troops necessary to preserve NATO? It cannot be. We do not know what kind of commitment was made by the administration to NATO, but we do know that our European allies, all of whom are NATO partners, except for France, have long sought to have the United States commit ground troops in Bosnia, which the United States Government has wisely declined to do. The United States has, however, played a significant role and NATO has played a significant role in air and sea activities in Bosnia.

As you know, U.S. ships have monitored enforcement of economic and arms embargoes. U.S. planes and pilots have relieved pressure on UNPROFOR forces under attack, as they were permitted by the

United Nations to do so. They have carried out airdrops of food and medicine to populations under siege, monitored no-fly zones established in the U.N. Security Council, monitored the installation by Serb forces of air defenses, rescued Capt. Scott O'Grady, conducted the first nonlethal airstrikes in human history, provided high-altitude surveillance of Serb activities, including confirmation of the movement of Serb tanks across the border into Bosnia to participate in the assault on Srebrenica and the murder of Bosnian males following the fall of Srebrenica last July.

Until now, NATO's participation in former Yugoslavia has been carried out under the double-key command system, which required U.N. authorization for each operation. That authorization was granted slowly and with reluctance, with the result that NATO air power has not been used effectively, nor has it been successful, nor has any aspect of this U.N. and NATO operation in former Yugoslavia been successful, and that is the rub.

The rub is that our allies have preferred the system of the double key and they have preferred peacekeeping under U.N. command as well as NATO command. It was their choice. They chose the U.N. command and the double-key arrangement, even though that meant listening to American objections and it meant failure of the operation, essentially.

I believe that U.S. refusal to provide ground troops for a new phase of peacekeeping might weaken and might strengthen an already weakened NATO, but it will not do so unless our NATO allies are more committed to doing nothing than to doing something. Deployment of 60,000—it is incredible, that number—60,000 troops, not Americans, but allied troops, may quite likely, in my judgment, simply bring inside NATO disagreements among allies on tactics that have so far remained outside the NATO framework. These disagreements among allies are serious and likely to become more serious.

Should the United States deploy 25,000 ground troops in former Yugoslavia? That, finally, is the question. My judgment is, not if there are alternative strategies that can contain aggression and control this violence. We should not do so unless President Clinton makes a persuasive case for the deployment to the American people, and he has not yet done so.

We should not do so unless there is a clear understanding and agreement among NATO members concerning command, should it be American, and rules of engagement. They should authorize the use of overwhelming force in response to an attack on people.

We should not do so unless there is a realistic prospect that the peace in the region can be maintained after the departure of U.S. troops. We should not do so unless there is an agreement that provides defensible borders for Bosnia and Herzegovina and lifts the arms embargo and helps equip and train Bosnian Armed Forces so that they can defend themselves, as Croatia now defends itself.

I continue to believe, Mr. Chairman, that there are some grounds for promise in a lift-and-strike policy with the United States helping Bosnian military forces. Only this policy, in my judgment, could prevent recurrence of aggression and the spread of war and at a much lesser cost, if it were reinforced by an active American diplomacy and a substantial U.S. presence in the area.

I do not know for certain why the Clinton administration has not tried a lift-and-strike strategy to create peace on a firm foundation in the region. I suspect it is because the Clinton team is reluctant to confront our allies' opposition to the provision of arms to Bosnia even though the refusal of arms to Bosnia is a clear denial of their rights to self defense under the U.N. charter and gives us, I believe, a moral obligation which we would not otherwise have.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that Bosnia has been forced to pay the price for allied reluctance too long. It has been too long denied the right of self defense. I think the arms embargo should be lifted unilaterally if it cannot be lifted multilaterally and that this should be done promptly.

I would support and would urge the Clinton administration to support troops for Bosnia, providing that the arms embargo is lifted, a policy of protection of Bosnian civilians by air strikes—by NATO air strikes, American air strikes—is adopted, and providing that the Bosnian government accepts the agreement that is proposed to it.

What is needed in Bosnia is not just peace, Mr. Chairman, it is a just peace. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kirkpatrick follows:]

COMMENTS ON DEPLOYMENT OF 25,000 U.S. FORCES IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA

TESTIMONY OF JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK

Leavey Professor, Georgetown University
Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

Before

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, November 15, 1995

Statement of Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Leavey Professor, Georgetown University
Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
to the National Security Committee
U.S. House of Representatives
November 15, 1995

Testimony concerning the deployment of 25,000 U.S. forces in Bosnia Herzegovina.

INTRODUCTION

I thank the Committee on National Security for inviting me to testify today on this important subject. I will try to restrict my remarks to subjects directly relevant to the Committee's concerns.

I welcome the Committee's hearings on U.S. troop deployment. Obviously it is difficult -- no, impossible -- for the Committee or its witnesses to decide whether it will be necessary or desirable to support and to implement an agreement which does not exist, whose terms are unknown, and about which there remain large differences among the parties.

We do not know whether defensible borders will be drawn for Bosnia Herzegovina, whether the arms embargo will be lifted and an Bosnian army trained to defend its country from well-armed neighbors. We do not know who else will be participating in a multinational peace force, nor how they will be integrated and commanded, nor under what rules of engagement they will operate, nor what kind of exit strategy is planned.

It is impossible, therefore, to decide now that the United States should or should not participate a hypothetical force to defend a hypothetical agreement, but it is possible to address questions relevant to the deployment.

II. U.S. National Interests in Bosnia

The Committee asks: Are there important national interests at stake in Bosnia? My answer to this question is yes, Americans have many important interests in this conflict.

I have believed from the outset of the war in former Yugoslavia that important moral, political, and strategic interests are at stake in the Balkans. Recall that two world

wars have spread from the Balkan tender box -- wars which engulfed the European continent and, eventually involved the United States as well — because we are a part of the Western world and cannot be indifferent to brutal aggression and mass murder in the heart of Europe.

More than two and one half million Bosnians have been displaced from their homes in this war, more than 200,000 killed. Concentration camps, torture, mass rape and mass murder have become familiar again in the region. The methods used against the people of Bosnia — slaughter, starvation, forced population transfers and other instruments of "ethnic cleansing" dehumanize the victims. Indifference to them dehumanizes us.

The Committee requests a description of the "precise connection" between stability in Bosnia, the Balkan peninsula and the balance of power in Europe. But "precise connections" are known only after events have developed. Often they come as a surprise.

But we know that violence is contagious. And that conquest is contagious as well. Former Yugoslavia is centrally, strategically located. Location is not everything in international affairs, but the centrality and ethnic-diversity of former Yugoslavia give developments there greater geostrategic significance than if those countries were more isolated or remote. Moreover, the countries of Central Europe -- recently released from the Soviet Empire -- have new regimes and new borders which leave them more susceptible to destabilization than established regimes.

In the current conflict, violence sponsored by the Serbian government has already spread from Kosovo to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina. It has already extended across Macedonia's borders. We cannot know where it might end if permitted to continue. Russia, too, has a stake in the region, and Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Turkey, Italy.

We should not forget that Benito Mussolini and his Black Shirts inspired Adolf Hitler and others, nor that Mussolini's aggression against Ethiopia presented the League of Nations and its members a challenge they could not meet -- and the League collapsed, and Hitler was encouraged by the Italian's success to consolidate his own powers, and that Hitler's success in occupying the Rhineland encouraged him to move again -- into Austria, Czechoslovakia and beyond, to the ovens of Auschwitz and the graveyards of Normandy.

Through it all, our European Allies watched, never dreaming that Hitler's appetite would extend so far or with such consequences. They had vital interests and no prescience. Much the same combination has guided the European response to Serb

expansion.

The harm done by violent tyrants in this century always comes as a surprise.

The United States and the whole of democratic Europe have a large stake in ensuring that extreme nationalism, instability, xenophobia and Serb conquests do not whet the savage appetites of would be tyrants and conquerors in the Balkans and among their neighbors.

III. The proposed deployment: Is it necessary?

To say the United States has an interest in ending violence and conquest in Bosnia and an interest in promoting and preserving stability and democracy in the region is not to say we must send 25,000 U.S. troops to take part in a 60,000 man peace operation -- much less that such an operation would succeed.

No new style peacekeeping operation undertaken by the United Nations and the Clinton Administration in an area of conflict has secured peace. U.N. peace operations conducted in Somalia and Bosnia over the last three years have achieved virtually none of their goals -- although Phase I of the Somalia operation, undertaken by President George Bush, succeeded in delivering large quantities of food to prevent mass starvation in Somalia.

These "peace operations" have suffered from disorganization and disagreement among participants, lack of coordination and political will, military incompetence and ineffectiveness. Some of their shortcomings were a consequence of the United Nation's lack of skill and experience. Some were a consequence of the diverse interests, priorities, goals and perspectives of participants -- which are common to multilateral operations.

But it is not clear that a multinational operation involving many governments, languages and organizational habits can succeed in coping with difficult military problems. Clearly, however, an operation under NATO command has a better chance of success than one under U.N. command. That is what is now proposed.

a). Does American credibility require 25,000 U.S. troops on the ground?

U.S. credibility is at stake only if the Clinton Administration made commitments to supply such a force without consultation or consent of the Congress. But America's allies understand that the Congress plays an important constitutional role in U.S. foreign policy. Failure to provide ground troops might do superficial damage to America's credibility, but committing troops and failing to achieve our goal would constitute a devastating blow to the credibility of the U.S.

government -- at home and abroad. The worst outcome would be an effort that first committed U.S. forces to the task and then failed as in Vietnam and Somalia.

Moreover, it is not clear that the Clinton Administration understands how to use force -- and the threat of force -- to establish and maintain credibility, and achieve goals.

b). Is deployment of U.S. troops necessary to preserve NATO? We do not know what kind of commitment was made by the Administration to NATO. Neither do we know how many NATO countries have committed to participate, nor on what terms.

Several NATO countries -- Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United States -- have had troops in and around former Yugoslavia for two or three years operating as part of a U.N. force, under U.N. command and as part of a NATO force as well. Much effort and billions of dollars have achieved almost nothing.

U.S. forces have participated in the conflict in Bosnia through air and sea missions conducted under the auspices of NATO. U.S. ships have monitored enforcement of economic and arms embargoes. U.S. planes and pilots have relieved pressure on UNPROFOR forces under attack, carried out air drops of food and medicine to populations under siege, monitored the "no fly" zones established in U.N. Security Council Resolution 781, monitored the installation by Serb forces of air defenses, rescued Capt. Scott O'Grady, conducted the first non-lethal air strikes ever, provided high altitude surveillance of Serb activities -- including confirmation of the movement of Serb tanks across the border to participate in the assault on Srebrenica and of mass murder of Bosnian males following the fall of Srebrenica last July.

Until now NATO's participation in former Yugoslavia has been carried out under a "double key" command system which requires U.N. authorization for each operation -- authorization that was granted slowly and with reluctance.

NATO air power has not been used effectively and has not been successful. More serious is the fact that these arrangements have reflected the preferences of the United States' NATO allies.

Our NATO allies -- the British, Dutch, Belgians and French -- (the French are still not members of NATO) -- preferred peacekeeping under U.N. command. The United States, stung from the Somalia experience, did not place U.S. forces directly under U.N. command in former Yugoslavia, but closely coordinated U.S. and NATO operations with and recognized the authority of the U.N. Secretary General and his Representative over NATO operations.

The result was to undermine NATO's credibility and effectiveness.

So, is it true that U.S. refusal to participate with ground troops in a new phase of peacekeeping in Bosnia would weaken NATO? I find it unpersuasive that U.S. refusal send 25,000 ground troops for peacekeeping duties on the ground would further weaken an already weakened NATO.

Deployment of 60,000 troops may simply bring inside NATO disagreements among allies on tactics that have so far taken place outside the NATO framework.

IV. Taking into account these factors, should the United States deploy 25,000 ground troops in former Yugoslavia?

- Not unless President Clinton makes a persuasive case for this deployment.

- Not if there are alternative strategies that could contain aggression.

So far the alternatives have not been authoritatively tried or even considered -- at least publicly. They should be. Bill Clinton should make his case to the people and take his case to the Congress.

- Not unless there is clear understanding and agreement among NATO members concerning command - (It should be an American.) and rules of engagement (They should authorize the use of overwhelming force in response to attacks on people.).

- Not unless there is a realistic prospect that the peace in the region can be maintained after the departure of U.S. troops.

That requires 1) defensible borders for Bosnia Herzegovina, and 2) lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia Herzegovina and helping equip and train Bosnian armed forces so that they can defend themselves as Croatia can now defend itself.

I continue to believe that there is promise in a "lift and strike" policy in which the United States, (and NATO if so inclined) accepts responsibility for the arming and training of Bosnian military forces. I think such a policy could prevent recurrence of aggression and the spread of war -- if it were reinforced by an active American diplomacy and a substantial U.S. presence in the area.

I do not know why the Clinton Administration has not tried a "lift and strike" strategy to create a peace which could last. I suspect it is because of the reluctance of our allies to "take sides." But only a policy which faces facts, takes sides,

punishes aggressors, and leaves defensible borders can meet American standards and achieve American goals.

I fear the same reluctance of the same Allies may encourage the Administration to design a strategy that does not provide a solution, but requires 25,000 U.S. ground troops. That would be a great mistake.

We need realistic plans, realistic means, and goals consistent with our ideals.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, ma'am. Without objection, the statements of all our witnesses will be submitted for the record.

Mr. Krauthammer.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, SYNDICATED COLUMNIST AND ESSAYIST

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I would like to thank you and the committee for asking me to address you on an issue of as paramount national importance as the potential and potentially imminent deployment of U.S. troops in Bosnia, and I might add that I am doubly honored to be asked to do so in the company of Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

We can debate for days the rights and the wrongs and the history of the war in Bosnia. Everyone has his own theory on what and why it went wrong. My theory is that the seminal mistake was the haste with which the West recognized Croatia and Slovenia and then Bosnia, in effect de-recognizing the Yugoslav Federation without having first demanded as a condition of recognition two things. First, ironclad provisions for respecting the rights of minorities, and second, prior agreement with the other member republics of Yugoslavia on frontiers.

Nonetheless, it is far too late for history and blame. There is an issue looming before us, a very serious and imminent issue, the deployment of American troops. My opinion on this issue is quite straightforward and clear. The deployment of 20,000 or so American ground troops to police a ceasefire in Bosnia would be a serious, indeed, a grave mistake for the United States.

Now, one could take up the committee's entire morning with a dissertation on why this is so, but I would like to focus simply on two points. First, in practical terms, this is a no-win situation for the United States. Such a deployment can only end in one of two ways. First, it will either end in a humiliating retreat, as in Somalia, but with the stakes higher and the commitment larger after some incident involving a major loss of American life and cries from Congress and from the American people for withdrawal.

Or, we will continue in our involvement, indeed, escalate our involvement, send more troops to protect existing troops, and be caught in a longer term static and defensive deployment with painful losses, ambiguous rules of engagement, and escalating friction among NATO allies, most of whom do not want to remain there but would do so under American leadership, and no way out.

Now, these are the practical and the tactical reasons for being against this deployment. No definable objective, no identifiable enemy, no exit strategy, and I would also argue that we have a minimal national interest in the conflict and in the area.

But there is a larger strategic reason to be wary of such Bosnian involvement and that is that to use heavily armed combat-ready American ground troops as peacekeepers is to fundamentally misunderstand America's role as the world's sole superpower and to fundamentally miscast the finest and most powerful military in the world.

The role of the United States as a superpower is to be the ultimate balancer of power in the world and to intervene militarily when a regional balance has been catastrophically overthrown or

when global stability is threatened. Iraq's conquest of Kuwait and its looming threat to the rest of the Arabian peninsula was just such an event. It required American action. It could only be reversed by American action, by the use of America's massive and sophisticated military machine, and it was reversed by American action. That is the role of a superpower.

It is decidedly not the role of a superpower to place itself in between the combatants in a civil war of marginal importance to the world balance of power, indeed, I would argue of marginal importance to the regional balance of power, among unreconciled parties who have already shown a propensity for killing and kidnapping peacekeepers and who will have a much greater incentive to do exactly that when the peacekeepers are wearing the uniform of the most powerful and, I might add, the most mediagenic country in the world.

When America sends peacekeepers, it is not sending peacekeepers, it is sending targets. There is a reason why for the last 50 years Americans have generally not been used in peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping is the job of small countries with no particular interest in the outcome of a conflict, who are of no particular geopolitical importance to the combatants on the ground, and who can assert, therefore, a certain neutrality.

We are not neutral in this civil war. We have made our sympathies with the Bosnian Muslim side abundantly clear in our declarations, in our use of air power, and indeed, in our promises to arm the Bosnian Government even as we act as peacekeepers, an absurd contradiction of the very idea of peacekeeping.

Imagine a President who came before the Congress and said that Israeli-Palestinian peace required the presence of 25,000 American troops on the ground in the West Bank to separate the combatants and to help them as they make peace. The President, I would argue, would be laughed out of this Chamber. Yet, he is asking Congress to approve a similar deployment not in a two-sided but a three-sided war which has been conducted at a much higher level of ferocity than any Israeli-Palestinian encounter for the last quarter century.

Well, you might say, do we not have Americans in the Sinai? Yes, but they are not ground combat troops. They are observers. They do not use heavy tanks. Their basic weapons are binoculars and cellular phones.

If all that was required of the United States in Bosnia was a token observer force, as in the Sinai, to lend the prestige and the moral support of the United States to a settlement agreed upon by the warring parties, I could see no objection to such a deployment. It would be lightly armed, easily deployed, and easily withdrawn. Its function would not be to fight or to prevent others from doing so but simply to give the imprimatur of the United States to a self-enforcing agreement among the parties themselves, and that is the key point.

If the combatants in Bosnia are serious about ending the fighting and accepting roughly the distribution of territory and roughly the balance of power that now exists on the ground, then they should do it and enforce it themselves, perhaps with the help of a few U.N. blue helmets from truly neutral countries. If they are not prepared

to do so, then between them is no place for American troops to interpose themselves.

Now, let me address the three questions that the chairman has posed about how nondeployment would affect NATO cohesion, European stability, and American credibility. On NATO, there is no doubt that our nondeployment would be a blow. Indeed, the single most effective and strong argument in favor of deployment invokes NATO. To renege on this promise of American relief to our NATO allies already trapped in Bosnia would be the worst blow that the Clinton administration has yet delivered to NATO cohesion. Whatever the strategic folly of having our troops in Bosnia, the argument goes, our NATO allies want us to take the lead on the ground and we have promised.

I would argue that true reneging would be a blow, but actually sending troops would be far worse. No good outcome of such a deployment is foreseeable. Either it results, as I indicated above, in humiliating retreat, in which case our allies are left high and dry and betrayed, or it lingers on and we persist in a thankless, unwinnable, and costly operation, a source of constant recrimination and resentment among the allies, against them for getting us in and against us for keeping them in there, that erodes and finally exhausts the alliance's 50-year store of solidarity.

There is no good way out. Better, therefore, to inflict one blow on NATO now than an inevitable series of blows in agonizing succession later.

What could we do to assuage the complaints of betrayal by our allies if we do not deploy? I think the answer is quite simple. Offer to deploy American troops immediately and in sizable number with the sole objective of evacuating any ally who wishes to leave Bosnia now, now that we are not going in. This at least would be a mission with a beginning and an end, with a clear operational objective, and with a clear political objective, as well.

It would demonstrate to our allies, particularly our Gulf war allies, the British and the French, that our decision not to send 25,000 American ground troops on indefinite peacekeeping duty is animated neither by timidity nor by an unconcern for them. Indeed, we would risk our soldiers to extricate them, but not to join them in a quagmire.

The second question that you asked, Mr. Chairman, about European stability is, if you will forgive me, nonsense. The threat of this Bosnian war spreading to the rest of Europe has been raised monthly for the last 4 years and proves more hollow by the day. With the Croatian reconquest of the Krajina in August and the recent Serb-Croat accord on eastern Slavonia, the war is, in fact, contracting before our eyes, even as the administration argues that it is threatening to expand.

There are warnings all the time about the war spreading to Macedonia or Kosovo or Albania or even to Greece and Turkey. What is the evidence for the spread of this war? Yes, there was 1914, but this is not 1914. There is no Austria-Hungarian empire on the verge of collapse. There is no Ottoman empire waiting to be carved up. There is no drive for territorial expansion among the European powers. Imperialism is now 50 years dead. The idea of great Euro-

pean powers occupying other countries for glory or God and country and church exists only in parody and in old movies.

There is no European interest in the Balkans other than staying out of the morass. The idea of the great powers going to war over control of this tragic piece of land, I believe, is simply absurd, which leaves us with the last issue of American credibility.

Yes, whenever the United States makes a commitment and reneges on it, credibility is damaged. There is no question about that. That is the cost of refusing to deploy and it must not be denied. But the responsibility for that cost lies squarely with an administration that has made that foolish promise without proper reflection. It does not lie with Congress, which is trying to save the country from what I believe would be a disaster.

Moreover, one has to weigh what would happen to American credibility were we to deploy and then withdraw under pressure after a demonstration of impotence, as in Somalia or Lebanon. Ask yourselves, is American credibility greater today after our entry and then withdrawal from Somalia than it would have been had we never entered Somalia in the first place?

Practically, then, what should Congress do? It should, I believe, firmly reject the idea of sending a large, heavily-armed American combat presence as an active peacekeeper, or an implementation force, as it is euphemistically called. The Congress should reject that idea unequivocally. Yes, this will cause great difficulty to the negotiators in Dayton. It may even cause some possible tentative agreement based on the expectation of American deployment to collapse. That would be an unfortunate result, but that would have to be laid at the feet of the parties in Bosnia themselves. They cannot expect the United States to impose a peace that they are unwilling to make on their own.

What will happen? What will probably happen is that the parties will have to meet again in Dayton or elsewhere. We will have to return to the parties and redo any agreement until it becomes an agreement that can stand on its own, with perhaps a token U.S. and NATO observer force and perhaps some U.N. blue helmets, neutral-country U.N. troops to act as the local constabulary to police a separation zone.

We make the parties to the war in Bosnia an offer. Make a real peace, as in Sinai, for example, and we will support you, but nothing less. It is your choice, it is your country, but it is our soldiers. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Krauthammer follows:]

Testimony of Charles Krauthammer
to House National Security Committee
on Bosnia

First I would like to thank you and the Committee for inviting me to testify on an issue of as paramount national importance as the potential deployment of U.S. troops in Bosnia.

Now, we can debate for days the rights and wrongs and history of the war in Bosnia. Everyone has his theory of what and why it went wrong. Mine is that the seminal mistake was the haste of the West in recognizing Croatia and Slovenia and then Bosnia -- in effect derecognizing the Yugoslav federation -- without having first demanded, as a condition for recognition, 2 things: (1) ironclad provisions for respecting of the rights of minorities, and (2) prior agreement with the other member republics of Yugoslavia on final frontiers.

Nonetheless it is far too late for history and finger pointing and blame. There is an issue looming before us, a very serious and imminent issue: the imminent deployment of American ground troops.

My view on this issue is quite straightforward. The deployment of 20,000 or so American ground troops to police a cease fire in Bosnia would be a serious, indeed a grave mistake for the United States.

One could take up the Committee's entire morning on a dissertation on why this is a bad idea but let me focus simply on two points.

(1) First, in practical terms, this is a no win situation for the United States. Such a deployment can only end in one of two ways:

(a) It will either end in a humiliating retreat, as in Somalia, but with the stakes higher and the commitment larger, after some incident involving a major loss of American life and cries from the Congress and from the American people for withdrawal.

(b) Or we will persevere, indeed escalate our involvement, send more troops to protect existing troops and be caught in a long term, static and defensive deployment with painful losses, ambiguous rules of engagement, escalating friction among NATO allies -- most of whom do not want to remain there but would do so under American leadership -- and no way out.

(2) That is the practical, tactical reason: no definable objective, no identifiable enemy, no exit strategy. But there is a larger strategic reason to be wary of a Bosnian involvement: to use heavily-armed, combat-ready American ground troops as peacekeepers is to fundamentally misunderstand America's role as the world's sole remaining superpower, and to fundamentally miscast the finest, most powerful military in the world.

The role of the United States as superpower is to be the ultimate balancer of power in the world, and to intervene militarily when a regional balance has been catastrophically overthrown and global stability threatened. Iraq's conquest of Kuwait and its looming threat to the rest of the Arabian peninsula was just an event. It required American action; it could only be reversed by American action -- by the use of America's massive and sophisticated military machine; and it was reversed by American action.

That is the role of a superpower. It is decidedly not the role of a superpower to place itself in between the combatants in a civil war of marginal importance to the world balance of power -- indeed of marginal importance to the regional balance of power -- among unreconciled parties who have already shown a propensity for killing and kidnapping peacekeepers, and who will have a much greater incentive of doing exactly that when the peacekeepers are wearing the uniform of the most powerful and, I might add, the most mediagenic country in the world.

When America sends peacekeepers it is not sending peacekeepers. It is sending targets. There is a reason why, for the last fifty years, Americans are generally not used in peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping is the job of small countries with no particular interest in the outcome of a conflict, who

are of no particular geopolitical importance to the combatants, and who can therefore assert a certain neutrality.

We are not neutral in this civil war. We have made our sympathies with the Bosnian Muslim side abundantly clear in our declarations, in our use of air power, and indeed in our promises to arm the Bosnian government even as we act as peacekeepers -- an absurd contradiction of the very idea of peacekeeping.

Imagine a president who came before the Congress and said that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process required the presence of 20,000 American troops on the ground in the West Bank to separate the combatants and help them to make peace. The president would be laughed out of this chamber. And yet he is asking the Congress to approve a similar deployment in not a two-sided but a three-sided civil war which has been conducted with a much higher level of ferocity than any Israeli--Palestinian encounter over the last 25 years.

Well, you might say, don't we have Americans in the Sinai? Yes, but they are not ground combat troops. They are observers. They do not use heavy tanks. Their basic weapons are binoculars and cell phones. If all that was required of the U.S. in Bosnia was a token observer force as in the Sinai, to lend the prestige and the moral support of the U.S. to some settlement agreed to by the warring parties, I could see no objection to that. It would be lightly armed, easily deployed and easily withdrawn. Its function would not be to fight or to prevent others from fighting, but simply to give the imprimatur of the United States to a self-enforcing agreement among the parties themselves.

And that is the key point. If the combatants in Bosnia are serious about ending the fighting and accepting roughly the distribution of territory and roughly the balance of power now on the ground, then they should do it and enforce it themselves, perhaps with the help of a few blue helmets from truly neutral countries. If they are not, then between them is no place for American ground troops to interpose themselves.

Now let me address your three questions about how non-deployment would effect NATO cohesion, European stability, and American credibility.

On NATO there is no doubt that non-deployment would be a blow. Indeed, the single most powerful argument {ital} in favor {unital} of deployment invokes NATO: to renege on this promise of American relief for our NATO allies already trapped in Bosnia would be the worst blow Clinton has yet dealt to NATO cohesion. Whatever the strategic folly of having our troops in Bosnia, the argument goes, our NATO allies want us take the lead on the ground (surprise!), and we promised.

True, reneging would be a blow. But actually sending troops would be worse. No good outcome of such a deployment is foreseeable. Either it results, as I indicated above, in humiliating retreat -- in which case our allies are left high and dry and betrayed. Or it lingers painfully: we persist in a thankless, unwinnable and costly operation, a source of constant recrimination and resentment among the allies -- against them for getting us in, against us for keeping them there -- that erodes and finally exhausts the alliance's 50-year store of solidarity.

There is no good way out. Better, therefore, to inflict one blow to NATO now, than an inevitable series of blows in agonizing succession later.

What could we do to assuage the complaints of betrayal by our allies if we do not deploy? Simple: Offer to deploy American ground troops immediately in a sizable number with the sole objective of evacuating any ally who wishes to withdraw now that we will not be going in.

This, at least, would be a mission with a beginning and an end, with a clear operational objective, and a clear political objective as well. It would demonstrate to our allies -- particularly our Gulf War allies, the British and the French -- that our decision not to send 20,000 ground troops on peacekeeping duty is animated neither by timidity nor by any unconcern about

them. Indeed, we would risk our own soldiers to extricate them. But not to join them in a quagmire.

The second question -- European stability -- is, if you will forgive me, nonsense. The threat of this Bosnian war spreading to the rest of Europe has been raised monthly for the last four years and proves more hollow by the day. With the Crostian reconquest of the Kraijna in August and the recent Serb-Croat accord on Eastern Slavonia, the war is in fact contracting. There are warnings all the time about the war spreading to Macedonia or Kosovo or Albania or even Greece and Turkey. Where is the evidence for the spread of this war?

Yes, there was 1914. But this is not 1914: There is no Austria-Hungarian empire on the verge of collapse. There is no Ottoman empire waiting to be carved up. There is no drive for territorial expansion among the European powers. Imperialism is now fifty years dead. The idea of Great European powers occupying other countries for the glory of God and country and church exists only in parody and old movies. There is no European interest in the Balkans other than staying out of the morass. The idea of the Great Powers going to war over the control of this cursed, tragic piece of land is simply absurd.

That leaves us with the last question: American credibility. Yes, whenever the United States makes a commitment and then reneges on it its credibility is damaged. That is a cost of refusing to deploy and it must not be denied. But the responsibility for that cost lies squarely with the administration that made that foolish promise without proper reflection, not with a Congress trying to save the country from disaster.

Moreover, one has to weigh what would happen to American credibility were we to deploy and then withdraw under pressure after a demonstration of impotence as in Mogadishu or Beirut. Ask yourselves: Is American credibility greater after our entry and then withdrawal from Somalia than it would have been had we never gone into Somalia in the first place?

Practically then, what should the Congress do? It should firmly reject the idea of sending a large heavily-armed American combat presence to be an active peacekeeper or "implementation force," as it is euphemistically called, in Bosnia. The Congress should reject the administration's proposal.

Yes, this will cause great difficulty to the negotiations in Dayton. It may even cause some tentative agreement, based on an expectation of American involvement, to collapse. That would be an unfortunate result but it would have to be laid at the feet of the Bosnian parties themselves. They cannot expect the United States to impose a peace that they are unwilling to make on their own.

What will happen? What will happen is the parties will have to reconvene in Dayton or elsewhere. We will have to go back to the parties and redo any agreement until it becomes an agreement that can stand on its own with perhaps a token NATO observer force or even some UN blue helmets to act as the local constabulary and police a separation zone.

We make the parties this offer: Make a real peace as in Sinai and we will support you. But nothing less. It is your choice. It is your country. It is also our soldiers. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Geren.

Mr. GEREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank both the witnesses for raising many thought provoking and almost provocative points. I would like to pose a question to Ambassador Kirkpatrick about the impact of the present arms embargo.

We have had some witnesses before us and read some of their writings that suggest that this arms embargo really has not rendered the Bosnians incapable of defending themselves, that through Croatia, that we have achieved somewhat of a balance of power arms-wise in the face of this arms embargo, and that opening up an arms embargo or even taking another step that is contemplated by some, looking ahead to a peace agreement, feeling like we need to do more to arm the Bosnians, in fact, would result in an imbalance, one that would favor the Bosnians over the Serbs. Could you address that?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Yes, Mr. Geren, I would be happy to.

I think it is clear, if we look at the history of this conflict, that, first of all, it is clear that Serbia has been the source of aggression in this conflict and that that aggression has followed a path of anticipated least resistance.

The first target of Serbian aggression was, in fact, not Croatia, which is, Charles, why we know that it was not simply recognition of Croatia that precipitated this violence. It was Slovenia. It was conducted under the impression that Slovenia would be unable to defend itself. There was an impression in Serbia that the Serbs had essentially a monopoly on weapons. The Slovenians had, in fact, managed to retain enough weapons that they met a Serb offensive with a very lively defense.

Meeting strong armed resistance, the Serb attention was turned from Slovenia to Croatia, which was without arms with which to defend itself. Croatia remained a target of Serb aggression for quite a long time, during which it scrambled mightily to collect arms with which to defend itself.

Now, its task in collecting arms to defend itself was complicated, of course, by the arms embargo, which it is very important to remember was adopted before any of these states existed. We may argue endlessly about whether they should exist. The fact is, they do exist and not only did they hold referenda and declare independence, each of them, after President Milosevic had denied them their constitutional rights to circulation in the Presidency, but they moreover were admitted to the United Nations and all the nations of Europe have diplomatic relations with them and so they are, by all the normal standards, states.

And as states, they are entitled to the guarantees in the U.N. charter of self defense, the right of self defense and collective self defense. It is the one form of force that is sort of wholly approved by the U.N. charter and wholly authorized by the U.N. charter, but you cannot defend yourselves if you do not have weapons. The arms embargo was interpreted by members of the Security Council as carrying from a unified Yugoslavia to the various component states. This has made it very difficult.

Croatia has a happy geographical situation. It has a lot of open borders and it has good friends and it was able to procure arms in violation of the arms embargo, by evasion of the arms embargo. Those arms were not from the United States, let me say. Croatia procured its arms from neighbors, rather, much closer neighbors than the United States.

Once they were able to mount a defense, the Serbs turned their attention away from Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they have been focused ever since, Bosnia being a land-locked country surrounded by people, surrounded by other countries, dependent on the other countries to procure any arms, and it has had a very difficult time doing so. I think the reason for that is, above all, geographical.

Now, I have believed and many other people have believed that the nature of the assault against Bosnia is more like a massacre than a war, frankly, and that it has taken this character because the Bosnians are defenseless. I think that the international community, as it is called, has a very large responsibility for the slaughter, for example, of Bosnian males and the forced transfer of millions of Bosnian civilians.

I think that you may extend violence if you permit people under fire to defend themselves, but it is also the most basic form of assistance that one people can give another, is to help them defend themselves, give them the instruments with which they can defend themselves rather than deny them those instruments. We read even in the Warsaw ghetto it was important to the people trapped there that they had a capacity to defend themselves in the last days. I think it is true in Bosnia.

Mr. GEREN. Thank you. I see my red light is on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Geren.

Mr. Bartlett?

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

I would like to address a question to both of our panelists, whom I am very appreciative are here today. Do both of you agree that, all things considered, that the embargo ought to be lifted multilaterally if possible, unilaterally if that is not possible?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Bartlett, I certainly believe that is the case. I think it is important to do so and that it is the first act that should be taken.

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. No, I do not agree with that. I think the question of unilaterally lifting the embargo, I think, is a serious one. I think it would set a serious and deleterious precedent for other embargoes in the world, that other countries could then claim that they could run and break unilaterally because it does not agree with their policies.

As to the question of a multilateral lifting of the embargo, right now, I am not sure it is the most urgent issue on the agenda. It is true that the Bosnians were defenseless at the beginning of the war, but they certainly are not now. Over the last 3 months, the ones who have been suffering huge defeats in this war have been the Serbs. They were rejected from Krajina in 3 days with the largest refugee exodus of Serbs, I might say, in the entire war. They

then lost a huge chunk of the heartland of Bosnia under attack from the Croats and the Muslims together.

The Muslims have, obviously, been getting arms through the Croatians. They have obviously been able to operate with the Croatian Army with tremendous effectiveness over the last 3 months, and in fact, it is the Serbs in Banja Luka who are the ones who are on the defensive, so that at the present time, I think there is a rather fortunate, perhaps fortuitous, but certainly a fortunate balance of power on the ground. This is precisely a time when we ought to urge an agreement among the parties to accept roughly the status quo and impose on themselves a peace.

Now, once that peace is signed, once the parties have agreed, I would see absolutely no impediment to a lifting of the embargoes generally and helping those parties, particularly the Bosnians who, relatively speaking, are underarmed. But I think lifting it now, just when the Muslims and the Croats have been on the offensive and the Serbs are on the defensive, I cannot understand how that would contribute to a balance of power, and you need a balance of power on the ground if you want to have a relatively stable peace and any chance of a peace agreement.

Mr. BARTLETT. What you are saying, I gather, is that de facto, there has not been an effective embargo, that armaments have gotten through and that it is fairly academic whether we lift it or not. Is that what you are implying?

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. Yes, but it is also, apart from the arms getting through, the arms have now been used, so that there has been a shift of balance of power on the ground. It is not just that the stores of arms in government hands in Sarajevo are larger today than they were 6 months ago. It is that the territory under the control of the Bosnians and the Croats is far larger today than it was 6 months ago and they are in a position to actually increase their advances because of Serb defeats.

Mr. BARTLETT. The Ambassador has a comment?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Yes, I do. I think that is a really misleading characterization of what has happened, because what has happened is that the Croatians and Croatia have managed to acquire quite a large number of arms, and with those arms, the Croatians have decided to reclaim territory which was captured by the Serbs in 1991–92 from them and has been occupied ever since.

As Serbia has felt the impact, the economic impact of the economic embargo on Serbia and the cost of the war has gone up for Serbia, President Milosevic, I think, became less interested in supporting the Serb presence in those conquered lands of 1991–92. So what happened in Krajina was that the Croats used force and their weapons against the Serbs who occupied the Krajina and the Serbs provided no assistance to the people who were occupying the Krajina. Without assistance, those Serbs were unable to preserve their ill-gotten gains from the 1991–92 aggression.

In all of this, Bosnia has gained very little military strength. To be sure, some weapons have gotten through, mainly from some Muslim countries, actually, but not many. I think that what is required is that Bosnia be helped and permitted to acquire enough strength that it can mount at least a rudimentary defense of itself and its people and territory. Thank you.

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. Could I just make one point?

Mr. BARTLETT. I see my time is up. The red light is on. I hope that someone else asks what was to be my second question, and that is about how we will do the least damage to NATO, now that apparently the administration has made what I think to be an ill-considered commitment to commit ground troops. Now we are faced with a dilemma as how do we now limit the damage that is going to be done to NATO.

I hope someone will ask that question. My time is up and I do not have a chance to ask it. Thank you very much.

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. Mr. Chairman, could I make just one brief point on the question of the embargo? It seems to me the bottom line here is that at a time when the Serbs are clearly in retreat, this is not a time to alter the balance of power by lifting the embargo. I think with the Muslim-Croatian Federation on the offensive and certainly in a strong position, I think it would be unwise to do that at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. First, let me welcome our distinguished guests. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, you make Columbia, Missouri, and Stephens College proud today.

Let me ask, Mr. Krauthammer, you have an article from October 27 in the Washington Post. The pole star of your article, as far as I am concerned, sir, is buried. In the paragraph in which you speak of neutrality, this whole idea of American—and Ambassador Kirkpatrick, I would like for you to comment on this, too, but I will address my question to him first because it came from his article—the idea of American troops being in the area as neutral peacekeepers, and then you go on to say in the very last sentence in this paragraph, sir, "Even more absurd, the administration intends to simultaneously peacekeep and arm and train the Muslims."

I could not agree with you more. If we are peacekeepers, that is wonderful. That is fine. It could work. It could work. It will take a lot of luck, but it could work. But, on the other hand, if we are arming and training and equipping, either indirectly by contractors, by CIA, or Brazilians, whoever it may be, if it comes from the American taxpayer, we are choosing sides and the Serbs are not dumb. We could very well end up even more targeted because of this.

How correct am I, Mr. Krauthammer, and Ambassador Kirkpatrick, I would appreciate your thoughts on that, too.

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. I think you are absolutely right, Mr. Skelton, and I think it speaks to the fundamental incoherence of administration policy on this issue. I mean, after all, you do not have to be a foreign policy genius to figure out that peacekeeping and arming one side at the same time is a contradiction in terms and an invitation to disaster. I could see an argument for one or the other policy, but I cannot see an argument for the two at the same time.

I think if the administration were to deploy and the Congress were to acquiesce, at least that issue ought to be resolved before any deployment, that we either do one or the other, but we cannot do both.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I agree entirely. I think that the notion of—first of all, the notion of peacekeeping in the midst of a very savage war which has been underway is itself bizarre, and the notion, then, that we should be neutral as between aggressors and victims and rapers and victims of rape and murders and victims of murder is bizarre. And the notion that we can be neutral while assisting one side, by providing arms or any other support, is even more bizarre.

I think that we really—I understand how the administration got here. It got here because of a desire to accommodate the United Nations conception of peacekeeping and our allies' preferences for neutrality. It is, and I agree with Mr. Krauthammer on this, at least, an incoherent position.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you so much.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Buyer.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to begin, first of all, by a compliment to you for your continued leadership in regard to this issue and also to my Democratic colleagues, most of whom are here, who are asking the tough questions and I compliment them for not hiding from the tough questions for fear of the answers. Some of the administration, I have this sense that they prefer us to wait and pause until after there is an agreement and then permit them to sell an agreement and for us to ask questions later. So I compliment the leadership of the chairman for moving forward with these hearings and for the testimony of these two witnesses.

As I listen to the arguments of the administration, in particular the Vice President, it borders along almost some fear-mongering, and I would like to share this with you and ask for your comment. The questions that were asked by the chairman for you to testify here today coincides with the administration's argument.

Number one, if the United States does not participate, that it leads to the destruction of NATO. That second, the loss of America's ability to lead in the world is hampered. Third, we have this moral cause and we cannot walk away. And fourth, if the United States is not on the ground, there is no peace, the war continues, the containment policy fails and leads to the instability of Europe.

I submit that you cannot lead a country by falling prey to the weakness of fears, that you lead a country through the strength of her character and we can participate, and I think that there is a strong bipartisan support in this committee that we, number one, compliment the President for bringing the parties to the table.

Number two, we compliment the work that is being done in Dayton and we support the peace process, only of which we would undermine in the peace process is a false premise, and that is the precondition of the predicate that the United States must have ground troops in order for there to be a peace agreement. We want the parties to focus on the real reasons they are killing each other so there will be a real peace to keep.

I thought that Senator Nunn had a very stimulating comment, very provocative in his comment, that perhaps even we should, as a question, delay placing ground troops in the harsh of winter to

see if there really is a peace to keep as the sides bed down for winter. I thought that was an interesting question that I have heard in this.

But I also think that many of us believe that we can maintain our leadership role in NATO by providing not only our leadership but our logistical supports, our air power and sea power, our airlift and sealift, and do that.

But please comment for me, if you will, on the administration's argument that this totally—I tried to follow you, Ms. Kirkpatrick, on this loss of cohesion of NATO. I just do not believe that NATO is such a weak entity that if the United States does not send ground troops but we participate not only in our leadership of providing logistics, combat service support, that NATO falls apart and leads to the destruction of NATO. Does it not ring hollow?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I do not believe that NATO falls apart, either. The operation in Bosnia and in former Yugoslavia has never been primarily a NATO operation. It has been primarily a U.N. operation, under U.N. command, moreover. I think that the NATO became involved as the United States Government and the administration sought a means of participating in an arrangement which was already operating under U.N. command and, moreover, which our principal NATO allies, the Brits, for example, and the Dutch, desired to have continue to operate under the U.N. command.

This has been a very complicated situation. I think the Clinton administration desired, then, to become involved, and they chose NATO as the means to do it. I do not think that it can be a NATO operation exclusively because, among other things, the French play too important a role and the French are not military members of NATO, so there you are.

Mr. BUYER. If we take a step back and look at a much bigger picture here, when you talk about, yes, we have gone to Europe twice in this century, and over the last 50 years, if we provided for the stability of Europe as a continent and we have grown the economies of Europe, whether it is through the Marshall plan and on, we now have been saying we are consolidating our forces, withdrawing many of our forces from Europe, renegotiating a lot of our status of forces agreements and burden sharing agreements, and so we are asking Europe to take a greater lead within their continent. How do we get Europe to take the lead on the ground?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Buyer, a very interesting thing happened. When Serbia attacked Croatia after Slovenia, that was during the Bush administration period, of course, and there was some discussion about what we should do next, and the then-president of the European Union, Mr. Poos of Luxembourg, said this is a European problem which should be dealt with by Europeans. There is no role here for Americans.

This was interesting, and I think President Bush, fresh from the gulf crisis and so forth, felt, fine, you take this. What was interesting was that the first efforts were made by the European Union, diplomatic efforts and then military efforts, and they were really unable to achieve any of their goals, even in a kind of a minimal way. So they threw the ball to the United Nations, having failed themselves.

I think we now are in a situation where the European Union has failed, the United Nations has failed, and the issue is whether the United States should seek to act in this situation which is manifestly complicated and difficult. It has been made more difficult by European failure. The fact is that our European allies have not yet organized themselves as an effective security and military and foreign policy instrument, but they have been trying to function that way and it has created something of a mess, I think, as well as confronting a difficult problem.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I think we are just about to raise a point here that has been overlooked. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, didn't our country, I will not say push NATO, but sell NATO on this whole idea of us getting involved that way?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think so, absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the way I remember it.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I do not think there has been a NATO initiative. I do not even think there is evidence of a real NATO commitment today, except as a response to U.S. initiatives. I think that is right, Chairman Spence.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Edwards.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick, I would just like to ask the question, putting aside all of our views on intervention right now, this House might be voting later this week or in the next several days on a measure that would have Congress go on record as cutting off appropriations for the deployment of any troops to Bosnia until there is explicit congressional approval.

From your perspective as former Ambassador, does that have any broader implications or any concerns about that type of vote in the midst of a treaty negotiation? Do you think we would be better advised to delay that type of vote, regardless of our personal positions on troops in Bosnia, until after the treaty negotiations are completed, or would you, if you were in the driver's seat, would you say Congress should go ahead and have that vote very quickly?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Edwards, I do not say this in a partisan spirit at all but I would like to say that if I were dealing with it, I would have come to the Congress a long time ago, actually before we made commitments to NATO or allies of any kind.

I believe that the administration has been remiss in not undertaking consultations—extensive consultations and sustained consultations—with the Congress on the sort of fundamental issues which the Constitution gives the Congress responsibility as well as the President. I think that that failure has led us into a kind of mess now. Of course, it not only weakens our Government but it is embarrassing for our Government to be confronted with the organized opposition and determined opposition even from the opposition party within our own Government at the same time that it is representing us with our allies and others in complicated international negotiations.

I really believe that it is an embarrassment to the American Government and that all of us have a kind of obligation to try to work

our way out of this as quickly and as discretely as possible, to some sort of common understanding of American policy here.

Mr. EDWARDS. I mean, I agree that we can go back and in 20/20 hindsight say the administration should have communicated more closely with Congress, but the fact is we have negotiations going on right now in regard to a peace treaty.

Let me put it this way specifically. If the White House were to say very clearly, if you delay this vote, we will give Congress the right to approve or disapprove of sending troops to Bosnia to enforce the peace treaty, just as Congress voted on Desert Storm, sending troops and authorizing war there. If the President and the White House were to make that explicit commitment, would you then think it would be wise for this Congress to delay a vote on shutting off appropriations for sending troops to Bosnia until after the treaty has had a chance to be negotiated?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Edwards, yes, with a single caveat. I would think it would be wise to be responsive to such a request, only with the caveat that it is not the administration that can give Congress the right, in my opinion. It is the Constitution that gives Congress the right and the duty to consent to any large-scale commitment of U.S. forces in a war situation. But yes, I think that would be wise.

Mr. MCHALE. Would the gentleman yield for just a moment?

Mr. EDWARDS. I would be glad to yield.

Mr. MCHALE. I would simply point out that yesterday, the President in a letter to the Speaker of the House, made that very commitment.

Mr. EDWARDS. I thank the gentleman for making that point. I think it is important.

Could I ask Mr. Krauthammer to respond to the same question?

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. Yes. I think it would be a mistake for Congress to wait, because imagine the two alternatives. If you wait, you are sending a signal to the negotiators in Dayton, and particularly the parties, that there is a significant chance that there would be a deployment, and I think that will affect the negotiations, in which case you will end up possibly with an agreement which depends on 20,000 Americans. Then you are presented by the President a fait accompli and you have in your hands either accepting a disaster or rejecting it and destroying the agreement.

I think if you act sooner, you have an effect on the negotiations as they occur. If you go on record very quickly indicating that you cannot support an agreement that would require the deployment of 20,000 Americans, then you inevitably, and I think in a good way, alter the negotiations and you let the parties in Dayton know that that kind of agreement, which is now almost imminent or perhaps imminent, is not going to fly and they should not come back and present it.

So I think it is very important that you act as quickly as possible in order to let particularly the Bosnian parties, the Croats, the Muslims, and the Serbs know that they will not have an agreement with any support from the Congress that requires being held up by 20,000 Americans. They will have to find another agreement or no agreement at all, and if you wait, you will not send that message.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you both.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate being taken out of order because I have a markup, as you know.

I would like to thank Dr. Kirkpatrick and Mr. Krauthammer for being here with us this morning and articulating your thoughts so clearly. Let me bring up an issue which you have both referred to. Mr. Krauthammer, you referred to American troops as potential targets and Ms. Kirkpatrick referred to the arming of the Bosnian Muslims by perhaps Islamic, I have forgotten the term exactly, but Muslim countries, Islamic countries.

It seems to me that there is a pattern occurring in the Middle East which may also have some roots in Bosnia. It seems to me that certain Muslim forces have recognized that to accomplish their goals, perhaps the conventional military method is not as convenient nor as successful as methods that we generally refer to as terroristic methods. I think a case can be made that in the Middle East, that recent events can be traced back to that, to terrorism and to events which have occurred which have divided seriously the Israeli people and the Israeli Government.

It seems to me that if we look at what is beginning to happen in Bosnia and look at evidence that Islamic forces may be and probably are organized in Bosnia into mujahedeen-type forces, and looking at events that have occurred as late as October 22, 24, 25, 27, November 5, where these forces have been identified as being active against U.N. forces in Bosnia, that we may have an extension of Middle Eastern terroristic policy beginning to occur.

Do you agree that that is a valid thought process and analysis, and if so, could you speak to it?

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. I think that Americans are targets wherever they are, regardless of the history of the locale, simply because of the power and importance of the United States. If you kill Americans, you have made a point. If you kill Moroccans or Pakistanis or Canadians, it is a smaller point and makes a smaller impact on the international scene.

We have learned our lesson in Somalia and in Beirut. I cannot see how we can deny that, that whereas other countries might be able to serve in a way where they are perceived as neutral, we are almost never perceived as neutral because, in fact, when you are a great power, you have interests which commit you often on one side or another, whereas the Fijians do not have interests. That is why they serve under the United Nations with distinction and much success.

Now, you are asking about the additional factor of Islamic hostility to the United States because of a whole host of historical reasons. I think that is an additional factor, so that whereas in Somalia the fact that we were targets had nothing to do with Islamic fundamentalism or terrorism, there might be an additional incentive to go after Americans because of our involvement in the Arab-Israeli dispute, because of the hostility of Islamic fundamentalism to the United States, and there might be elements who might take advantage of our presence in Bosnia to make a point. I am not sure it would be a decisive reason against our deployment but I think it is an additional danger that we ought to take into account.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I guess I think that we should not only think about Islamic states or movements that are sometimes hostile to the United States, we should also think about those which are friendly to the United States, for example, Turkey, which is a loyal and active member of NATO, and moreover, about the large Islamic population which, in fact, exists in Europe, where in France, for example, with which the French have had a very long and in this century troubled relationship, but it is there, it is real, and no one's interests are served by exacerbating differences and seeking to inflame relations among Islamic political types and others.

A Moslem friend of mine, a distinguished Egyptian diplomat, has said to me, do not call them Moslem fundamentalists, that violent extremist political actors have acted not on the basis of religion any more than the man who just shot Yitzhak Rabin in Israel acts on the basis of religion, although he may claim to. It is an idiosyncratic interpretation of religion.

I would say with regard to Beirut, which I lived through in the Reagan administration, the decisions about the United States participation in that ill-fated peacekeeping effort, actually, the terrorists who attacked American Marines as they slept and murdered them in their sleep also attacked Israelis and French—I have to say this to Charles Krauthammer—they attacked French and Israelis and Brits as well as Americans. They attacked everyone.

The Reagan administration drew a lesson from that experience in Beirut and it was that the peacekeeping approach to situations of high conflict is not useful. I think that was correct, and I think that is really the moral of that experience.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Harman?

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to commend our colleague, Mr. Buyer, for the comments he made a while back about the constructive, I think he said the courageous role that some members of this committee are playing. This committee has a great longstanding bipartisan tradition, and I would hope that on every issue, but on the toughest issues like this one, we would all get in there and learn our stuff and speak our voice. I would like to commend him particularly for the role he has been playing on this issue.

Mr. Krauthammer, I am a great admirer of your writing. It is clear. It is eclectic. It is not partisan. And I happen to agree with you, really, to an absolutely on this particular issue. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, I commend you, too, for the clarity of your thoughts.

My question is this, and I put this question to the Vice President yesterday when several of us met with him. Why are we destroying NATO, or arguably destroying NATO, if we should decide that committing ground troops now is not a good idea? My thought is that we might take an incremental approach to this, NATO might, with our leadership, as follows.

Help to create this peace agreement which reflects the views of the parties there, not our direction but our encouragement, and then provide sea and air support to make sure that the agreement of the parties sticks. Provide no ground troops, not United States soldiers, not French soldiers, not Brits, not any NATO countries' soldiers, at least for an initial period. Let our reinforcement or our

guardianship in the air and from the sea be our commitment in NATO to make sure this peace lasts, and then 6 months, a year down the road, see how it goes and perhaps reassess the situation then to see whether any additional effort on the ground might be justified by NATO.

I would just like your comment on whether you think that might make sense, both of you.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I agree with you.

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. I would simply add one thing, that apart from that, there is the fact that the President has made this commitment. Now, I think there is agreement among many of us that it was unwise, but because it has been made, it has some significance and that the Congress going on record as being against that commitment is a serious step and it will have an effect on NATO.

I think the realism, the lack of realism has been a real problem in our entire approach to the Bosnian issue and we ought not have a lack of realism here. It will have an effect. It will be a cost. I would argue that the cost of deployment on NATO itself would be infinitely higher because of the inevitable frictions and disputes and resentments and recriminations that would unfold in this incredibly fluid, ambiguous situation.

If you think of the friction between the United States forces and the Italians and the Pakistanis in Somalia—this was not a particularly NATO operation in Somalia—you multiply that by a factor of ten and you can imagine the conflicts you would have on the ground in Bosnia.

Ms. HARMAN. But Mr. Krauthammer, can I interrupt you just for a second?

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. Sure.

Ms. HARMAN. One of the things the Vice President said was how unfair it would be if we refused to send ground troops and other countries in NATO had to send them, so we would let them die on the ground.

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. I understand.

Ms. HARMAN. I was trying to suggest a different course, which is no one does, which I think might have a different impact on NATO.

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. I was going to make the point that because of the cost to our NATO cohesion by reneging on the President's promise, which I think is a serious effect, we ought to couple any statement that we are not sending our peacekeepers with, and this, I think, is important, another statement that we would, however, be willing to offer the active deployment of ground combat forces in order to extract any allies who need extraction. I think that is a commitment that ought to be honored. I think it makes a hell of a lot more sense. The risk is infinitely smaller. The time span is much more contracted.

I think if you have the Brits, for example, and others who are waiting for us to come on the ground and lead and have the expectation that we will come on the ground, stay on the ground as peacekeepers and lead and then find out that that will not happen, we owe them, if nothing else, at least a commitment to a short, rapid extraction. I do not think it would be very dangerous because, unlike a year or two ago, peacekeepers are almost all within

government-controlled territory. They are not exposed in the safe areas. The Brits have left Gorazde.

It is not going to be a harrowing, high-wire operation, but I think it would be a way of telling our NATO allies that NATO matters. We are not abandoning it. We are simply choosing a wiser course.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but Ambassador Kirkpatrick wants to make an additional comment. Would that be all right?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, ma'am.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I would just like to add that at some previous time, the administration has actually made just the commitment that you have described, namely of United States troops to assist in the evacuation of other forces peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia, and I suppose that commitment still stands. We did that coupled with a commitment to undertake air strikes to provide some basic protections. I suppose that commitment still stands. I am not entirely sure.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from Jacksonville, FL, Mrs. Fowler.

Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, I would like to follow up on the question that Mr. Edwards asked you earlier in relationship to the resolution that we are considering bringing to the floor this week, because I know Mr. Krauthammer's answer to this and yours were a little different and I wanted to just clarify.

If we do not bring this resolution forward before the peace talks are concluded in Dayton, do you not see this as a problem in allowing them to use a pre-condition of this peace agreement they come to, thinking that we would end up sending these troops, being able to?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think that anything—all possible alternatives are today difficult, and moreover, they make the government, the administration's task more difficult.

I can only say that our allies do not conduct their affairs in order to satisfy us or make it easy for us to understand their plans or their intentions often, and I am afraid I think we have to, as self-governing people, we have to, with as much consideration and responsibility as possible, try to make clear what our Government and what the elected representatives of the people think about this.

I think whatever the Congress does now is difficult and will make the job more difficult for the administration, but surely every ally of ours in the world, certainly our NATO allies, understand that this issue is hotly debated in the United States. The House has already passed a resolution and the Senate leadership, the majority leadership certainly, has issued a number of quite clear statements.

Mrs. FOWLER. I think our concern is while certainly they are aware of our position, unless we take one before the peace agreement is completed, exactly what Mr. Krauthammer alluded to could happen. They have reached a peace agreement and we in the Congress are in the position of saying, no, the conditions upon which you have based that agreement are not ones with which we agree, and then we are the ones doing in the peace agreement. If

we do not speak firmly before this process is completed as to what we the Congress are willing to agree to, then we could be in the awkward position, and then it is not our fault we are there.

As you said, I mean, hindsight is better than foresight. This should have been discussed many, many months ago, but unfortunately it was not. So we are now in a position that none of us like. It is not a good one to be in. But to avoid us getting into a worse position and obligating our young men and women to lose their lives because we have had some problems with lack of negotiations causes a lot of us some concern.

Timing is difficult, but they are making progress in Dayton. That is the good news. But the bad news is from all I hear, and I know when Secretary Christopher was before us, he and Secretary Perry made it very clear that they considered it part of their purview to make part of that peace agreement the obligation of 25,000 U.S. ground troops. A lot of us are very concerned that if we do not send a real clear message, we could end up in a bigger mess than we are in now.

I know, like we have said, we are in a difficult position, but you would not have a problem if we went ahead and tried to send that message?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think it is a difficult situation. That is really all I have to say about it. It is a difficult situation.

I do not think, however, that—I have not believed from the beginning of this conflict that it was necessary or desirable to put American ground troops in the former Yugoslavia and I have tried very hard to think positively about the administration's views and position on this. No matter how hard I try, I still conclude that it is not desirable or necessary to put American ground troops into former Yugoslavia.

I think that the administration assumes the responsibility when it makes commitments in spite of the well-known and frequently articulated misgivings of the majority of the Congress and of Americans on this issue.

Mrs. FOWLER. Unfortunately, they made those, and now it is, I think, incumbent upon us to maybe reiterate our feeling, because again, the reality is we are going to have young men and women losing their lives because the negotiations were not done or commitments were made before they should have been made, but I do not think many of us want that on our heads, that we did not go ahead and speak.

As Mr. Krauthammer so eloquently pointed out, the alternative is a peace agreement based on sending troops that we do not want to send, so it is a tough situation, I agree. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, ma'am.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask our witnesses to comment on two things. First is, we have heard in prior testimony that it may be in our strategic interest and in our relationship with the Islamic world to get in and stand up for the Muslims in Bosnia. I would be interested in your thoughts on whether there are significant U.S. interests with the Islamic world which may be affected by our decision on wheth-

er to participate on the ground in peacekeeping or peace enforcement or not.

My second question is the relationship of Russia. Are there significant effects which may occur on our relationship with the Russians on whether we do or do not decide to send combat troops on the ground in Bosnia? Of course, it was the Russians' relationship with the Serbians which helped escalate what happened in 1914. There have been some that argue that if we put our combat troops on the ground and have to enforce a peace against the Serbians, we may potentially increase tensions between ourselves and Russia.

So I would appreciate your thoughts on the role of Russia in enforcing the peace and Russian interests in how that affects what we do or do not do.

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. Let me address the Russian issue first. I must say, it is very unclear what exactly would be the relationship between the American and Russian troops on the ground. There have been some reports about agreements, but I must say I have read them as carefully as I can and I cannot quite make them out.

I think there is an incredible irony here that for 50 years of the cold war, when the Russians were our enemies as the Soviet Union, we managed with great care and caution to make sure that United States and Russian troops were never near each other in any proximity in any hot war. It was simply too dangerous. We had the war in Vietnam, the wars in Afghanistan and everybody understood the rules of the game, which is that we had to remain at arm's length. Even where we were in close proximity, in Berlin, for example, we made sure it was never a situation of hot war.

Now, after those 50 years, those 50 harrowing years, to enter into a situation in Bosnia where we and the Russians have troops on the ground in very close proximity with rather different allegiances—we have, after all, supported the Bosnian Government with air strikes. The Russians are clearly in support of the Serb side, or have been, at least, in the rhetoric. To introduce our troops and theirs on the ground in that kind of situation in an ongoing hot war still unresolved, I think is quite mad.

Now, unless we have an absolutely airtight arrangement under which we and the Russians work shoulder-to-shoulder as in one of these 1930's propaganda movies, I am not sure how it can work, and the worst possible outcome would be if we are actually territorially divided and we are in some kind of Bosnian government zone, the Russians are in some Serb zone, as in Berlin, and we are on opposite sides of a divide. I think that is a prescription for friction which is entirely unnecessary and dangerous.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I would say that I think the administration would like to see this operation as an opportunity for United States-Russian cooperation, unprecedented United States-Russian military cooperation in a constructive task. I think that you can make a case of that.

I would myself not like to see United States forces there at all, frankly. I think that the arrangements for United State-Russian cooperation and the functions that I guess they would be serving will not constitute the kind of danger that Mr. Krauthammer has suggested.

But with regard to the United States relations in the Islamic world, I find it interesting that there have been two people targeted for genocide in the heart of Europe in the last 50 years. Interestingly enough, they are both religious minorities. First, the Jews by the Nazis, and then the Muslims in Bosnia. It tells me that religious tolerance may not be as high in the heart of the Western world as people are prone to think, and I find it a sort of dismal fact, two facts, in fact.

I believe that it is very important that the United States make clear its solidarity, its political, and military strategic solidarity with the democratic Islamic peoples in Europe as well as on the fringes of Europe and that we underscore our close constructive associations with such peoples and such states as, for example, Turkey and Morocco, to just name two. Bosnia was a multinational, pluralistic, democratic state and I think in a desire to be that, we must be very careful not to permit this to become an Islamic-Christian kind of a confrontation.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. McDade—Mr. McHale.

Mr. MCHALE. Can I trade for Mr. McDade's seniority?

[Laughter.]

Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think there are really two issues that we have to look at now, and I would address this to Ambassador Kirkpatrick. The first is the dubious wisdom of the troop deployment mission, and Madam Ambassador, on that point you have been eloquent and clear. You and I are in full agreement. I happen to believe that it is a disastrously misguided judgment to send American ground forces into Bosnia, unnecessary and potentially tragic.

On the second question, which is the timing of the congressional role, you have been masterfully equivocal. I have listened to your answer to that question several times now and it has been delivered with various shades of meaning, so perhaps we could be a little bit more precise.

With regard to the role of Congress in this matter, I think Mr. Buyer and I acted properly in offering a nonbinding resolution prior to the beginning of the negotiations. And like Mr. Buyer, I believe that now is the time to ask very hard, very critical questions. Those of us who believe that this is a mistake should raise very publicly responsible criticism now. But I have deep concern that now is not the time to engage in binding potentially partisan debate during the ongoing negotiations.

Yesterday, the President sent a letter to the Speaker of the House that unequivocally pledged there would be a timely opportunity, perhaps over a 2-week period of time, for deliberative debate and a vote on this issue prior to the deployment of American ground forces. If the President had not made that commitment, I would agree with Mr. Krauthammer and I would urge continuing legislative action during the negotiations.

The fact that there is a threat of such action on Friday is largely the fault of the administration, their failure to consult with the Congress earlier and their rhetoric after the passage of our resolution a week ago.

Nonetheless, my only question to you is, in a historic context, dealing with the question of separation of powers between the Presidency and the Congress, and envisioning some future Republican Presidency and a Democratic Congress, in light of the fact that the President has now pledged a request for a vote at the end of this process, do we want to set the precedent of the U.S. Congress during diplomatic negotiations engaging in extensive partisan debate on binding statutory authority? I would appreciate, because I have such high regard for your ability, an intellectually honest answer that would apply not only to this administration but to future administrations under similar circumstances.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. McHale. I think that the reason I have perhaps been equivocal in my responses on this issue is that I think it is so difficult. I believe deeply and seriously in the importance, as well as the legitimacy, of Congress' constitutional role in foreign policy and I clung to that position even under the most difficult circumstances, as, for example, the making of Central American policy during the Reagan administration, when the temptations to regard Congress as an illegitimate nuisance were very great.

I believe now that the President's letter—I agree with you. The President's letter must be taken very seriously. We all have a commitment, also, to coherent American government which enables us to deal responsibly with other governments and other powers, and we want our Government to be able to be effective in its dealings with other governments.

I guess I think that the President's initiative, or his response in this letter, makes it unwise for the Congress to pass a binding resolution in advance of the completion of an agreement, but I say it and I feel very unhappy about it as I say it, because I would hate to see a binding agreement be reached in Dayton, or what is purported to be a binding agreement be reached in Dayton which did not take account of the position of the Congress. I think, however, the Congress has already made itself clear enough.

Mr. MCHALE. Yes; your position, Madam Ambassador, is the same as mine. My light has just come on. Let me simply say that if the administration ignores all of the warning shots that we have sent across their bow, immediately after the initialing of the agreement, if that term is included, I will very vigorously in the form of binding statutory action help lead the fight against a troop deployment, but that is the time for the congressional role.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. May I make a point, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. My impression is that Congress will not support a deployment. The question is, which will do more harm to the United States, declaring that in a binding way now or declaring it in a binding way after an agreement is presented.

I would humbly submit that the second alternative will do more damage to the United States. You will have some kind of very public agreement with handshakes and media and ceremony in Dayton. It will then be presented to the U.S. Congress. Assuming you then, as you have pledged to do, work against any deployment and

cut off any funds which would support such a deployment, that, I think, would be a diplomatic disaster for the United States.

However, I think less damaging—still damaging, but less damaging—would be an action which occurs now, while the negotiations are going on, because what will its effect be in Dayton? Do you think any of the parties will walk out on account of that? Perhaps. I think it is unlikely, though. I am not sure that it is in the interest of any of the three parties to go home if Congress has in a binding way declared that American troops will not be on the ground. It will, I believe, alter the trajectory of the negotiations and at least give a chance of an outcome which this Congress and the American people could support.

Mr. McHALE. Mr. Krauthammer, that was the message we sent last week.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We have a vote on and will have to recess. We will be right back, if you can wait with us.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. McHale, for a brief statement.

Mr. McHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the ranking member, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Dellums' opening comments be included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is agreed to.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dellums follows:]

Submitted for the record

Ronald V. Dellums

OPENING COMMENTS
HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS
HEARING ON BOSNIA
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
NOVEMBER 15, 1995

Mr. Chairman:

I want to commend the Chairman for conducting this very important series of hearings into the situation in Bosnia. As I have noted throughout these hearings, it is vitally important that any decision we make concerning possible U.S. involvement in a Bosnia peacekeeping operation be fully informed and be done with reference to the actual agreement and the operational plans to implement that specific agreement.

Clearly this hearing falls into that category where the Committee seeks to inform itself about the issues at stake generally, in the hope that such information will aid us in looking later at the specific agreement and operational proposal.

An understanding of U.S. interests in European stability, NATO solidarity and U.S. credibility are certainly among the information that would constitute making such an informed decision.

But as we listen to our witnesses today let us remember — as I have also noted throughout these and other hearings: There are no experts on the post-Cold War era. The era is too young and unsettled to have allowed for the development of such expertise.

I would submit that we are all seeking to identify, refine and give life to an appropriate, new U.S. foreign and national security policy. In that context, we must ask many questions to which the wise would caution against hasty answers.

Prominent among those questions is: How do we take advantage of this changed world in a manner that can help us to avoid conflict and armed violence, and especially to avoid having it spread and widen? It is in this inquiry that we must come to grips with the larger issue of the role of U.S. forces being used to assist in international peacekeeping operations generally. In the context of an actual agreement, we may then ask whether and how U.S. peacekeeping forces might be employed in Bosnia to achieve our goals.

I have sat through our earlier Committee hearings on Bosnia with rapt attention to the offerings of the witnesses, and listened attentively to the questions posed by my colleagues and the answers that they received. Mr. Chairman, let me offer a few thoughts that may help to frame the inquiry today. I hope this will help us all to think about what interests the United States may have in getting involved in stopping this conflict.

First, I note that some of our witnesses have said that the U.S. should not place its forces at risk in Bosnia, that peacekeeping in that war torn region should not compel us to risk <u>any</u> American lives, and that American troops would especially be targets of attack. "Let the Europeans do it," has been their answer; let us support them logistically, if at all, they said.

It is interesting, Mr. Chairman, that this aversion to risk taking disappears for many of my colleagues when we contemplate war fighting elsewhere. I look at the situation on the Korean peninsula — an area where

we have deployed tens of thousands of troops to keep the peace — and I remember colleagues willing to go to war over nuclear materials in the possession of the North Koreans. They said, "Forget ~~damned~~ the diplomacy," argued against the agreements that would permanently control those materials, and were prepared to fight at a cost tens of thousands of U.S. lives and hundreds-of-thousands, if not a million, civilian dead.

How does one compare the willingness to run the extraordinarily modest risk by comparison, that may attend a deployment to keep the peace in Bosnia.

I do not understand the moral compass that willingly points one toward war as opposed to diplomacy, but turns away from peacekeeping in support of diplomatically arrived ~~derived~~-at agreements.

In addition, I remember witnesses who have talked about the operational difficulties associated with the terrain, potential guerrilla fighters, irregulars and even a breakdown of a peace agreement in the context of Bosnia. These are real concerns, and we must be certain that we are prepared to risk the lives of our

sons and daughters only for something truly important. Yes, terrain and armed opposition are always elements that one must understand and one must plan to manage the problems they create — if the risks are worth taking. But as with preparing for a war, we must have confidence that our military planners are well able to plan, staff and equip the forces for the job they have been given.

I also remember that several of our witnesses — including a former Bush administration ambassador, generals formerly in command in the region, and academics with practical experience on the ground — agreed with the view that the United States had important interests in Europe and NATO, and that those interests could be dashed by a failure to participate on the ground. They were called upon to testify to us concerning their understanding of the situation and potential problems on the ground. Nonetheless, when pressed, they unanimously agreed that the U.S. had important interests that would be served by helping to secure a Bosnian peace, and that it would have to do so

by directly participating with ground forces as peacekeepers.

So today we come to a point at which we seek information concerning our interest in NATO and Europe, and whether or not an unwillingness to commit troops to implement an agreed-to peace agreement would reduce U.S. leadership in the world.

I yield to nobody in my willingness to look at issues with a fresh view, and to seek to understand the effects of change on our most deeply held assumptions. Even so, it intrigues me that we are here today to inquire into our interest in NATO and Europe.

I read the Contract with America and its military component as manifested in H.R.7. I noted the high regard in which it held NATO, and its expressed view that NATO should be expanded i order to meet U.S. security interests in Europe. I also note that when some disparage of placing U.S. troops under U.N. command and control, legislatively they have willingly made an exception for NATO commanders. I note our participation in the North Atlantic Assembly, our support for CINCEUR and all the other manifestations of

what appears to be a continuing commitment to European engagement.

Given all this and despite our allies fervent pressure on the United States to be willing to engage troops on the ground, some seem unwilling to make the connection: U.S.-NATO relations must assuredly rise or fall in some significant measure on our willingness to participate within a NATO operation in Bosnia. I wonder at this seeming inconsistency, especially when the U.S. earlier rejected European-based peace initiatives and induced our allies to participate in our effort.

It may well be that no peace agreement emerges from the Dayton proximity talks, and this moment of consideration will pass.

However, if a peace agreement emerges, one in which the parties look to the United States for leadership and support, we will be confronted with an enormous moral choice. For the choice before us will not be just the relative priorities for the disposition of U.S. troops; it will not be just the question of

siphoning off resources that might go to training or procurement; it will not even just be concerning our readiness to fight some postulated conflict that shows no current sign of emerging in either of the imagined theaters.

No, the choice will be between using U.S. forces to secure a peace that will actually stop the genocidal slaughter of innocent civilians or letting the fighting resume. The choice will be between avoiding a relatively small risk to those forces, and securing a large potential gain in lives saved. While some may focus, and correctly, on our vital national interests when it comes to exposing thousands potentially to their deaths, the moral equation changes when the risk is so dramatically reduced and the gain so potentially large as it may be in a peacekeeping operation.

So, Mr. Chairman, while we proceed today to inquire into those United States interests that may warrant the deployment of U.S. peacekeeping forces to secure the peace, let us also keep the moral dimension of stopping the slaughter in mind. For it seems to me that the

moral argument in favor of intervention must be confronted as well as the issue of United States interests.

Especially it must be confronted and considered by those who would argue on moral grounds for lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia and letting the parties be free to fight it out with all the further bloodshed that such a strategy would entail.

It seems to this gentleman, that ending the violence through a peace agreement that may well be attainable is a far superior moral position than is that of ensuring that the conflict continues by ~~further arming one of the sides to the conflict.~~ increasing the numbers and firepower of weaponry in an area that has already experienced so much killing and dying.

Mr. McHale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Bateman.

Mr. Bateman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Mr. Krauthammer, we are very pleased to have you here and to have your contribution to our efforts to grapple with this very, very trying and difficult question.

This morning, I attended a breakfast meeting with the Secretary of Defense and the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, obviously, the discussion was entirely on this issue. One of the things that has disturbed me throughout and which continues to disturb me, and I would like to have your reactions to, is when I question whether or not there is still a part of this contemplated peace arrangement and our mission that we would arm and train the Bosnian Muslim forces.

The response that I got is that they were seeking an agreement in Dayton for disarmament to create a balance of military capability between the competing factions, but that if that did not succeed, we would undertake, not necessarily by the United States forces or the United States Army or Department of Defense, but we would sponsor in some manner the training and equipping of the Bosnian Muslims in order to put them in a position to defend themselves.

It would seem to me that if the negotiations are in that context, you invite the Bosnian Muslims to refuse to a disarmament because that way they are going to be assured that we will arm and train them. So you create a disincentive for the parties to reach a parity of forces on a negotiated agreed level of disarmament. That strikes me as being a bit incoherent.

We also are, I think, in sort of a catch-22 when we discuss we must do all of these things because of our role in the vital importance of the NATO alliance, but our NATO allies have been very steadfast for the past many, many months that we should not lift the arms embargo, that we should not arm the Bosnian Muslims, and yet we are doing that but with the stringent objections of NATO allies. So what are the implications for the alliance if that is the basis on which we are doing all of these things?

Very interesting, also, to me was the indication that the status of the agreement worked out on command and control vis-a-vis the Russian contingency is that their brigade would be operating as a part of the American division. It would be under the command of General Dalwin. It would be under the operational or the tactical control of an American general as the division commander. The Russian unit receiving its orders from General Dalwin issued through a Russian general, but the orders coming from him and the Russian general being, in essence, only a conduit of the order.

I am not sure whether that is not somewhat tenuous, but there was another aspect of it that was also of some real interest. That which the Russians have not signed off on is the insistence that the political and policy direction of the IFOR would come from the North Atlantic Council, the Russians insisting that it must be 16-plus-1, consensus of the 16 members of the NATO Council and the concurrence, in effect, of the Russians, which we have said is totally unacceptable, that policy control would be exercised by the NATO Council in consultation with the Russians.

Do you have any views on those aspects of what I was told this morning?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Bateman, thank you. That is very interesting. I think that it is true that there is a lot of—that many different messages are sent concerning the most basic issues here, including the issue of whether we are seeking disarmament of the parties, for example, or armament of the party that lacks arms.

I think myself that a strategy that requires, that proposes to protect the weakest member by disarming the stronger is not a very reliable agreement. It is generally the case, in all cases that I am aware of, in fact, that security is not enhanced by a strategy that seeks disarmament, because strategies that seek disarmament usually fail, quite frankly. It is more likely to be enhanced by achievement of a balance of power on the ground or at least an adequate force on the part of all the parties that they can inflict a price for action against them, and that, I think, recommends the strategy of lifting the arms embargo.

It is certainly true that our allies, some of our allies have opposed, notably the British, I think, and to some lesser extent perhaps the French, have opposed lifting the arms embargo. The Russians have opposed lifting the arms embargo, and they have been very persistent in this. It is sometimes said of British policy that they simply really will not agree to lifting an arms embargo ever. It is adamant and unanimous.

It is interesting to reflect on the fact that Mrs. Thatcher, of course, took a very different view about the lift-and-strike strategy from the very beginning. Policies change as leaders change. It does not even require change of parties, often.

I think it is hard to imagine that an administration which has been deterred from lifting the arms embargo during the most bitter fighting will lift the arms embargo after there is an agreement, if there is an agreement not to do so. So I do not think the prospects look very good for an agreement that will then ultimately lead to lifting the arms embargo and that is the reason that I believe it is very important to have an understanding up front that the United States will reserve the right to unilaterally lift the arms embargo.

With regard to the Russian arrangement, like almost every other aspect of this proposal, the proposed arrangements are experimental, totally experimental. There is no precedent. There is no experience. There is no real sort of grounds for supposing that it will work out as expected. I think that just as we do not know what the agreement is and what it will finally provide or how it will be enforced, we also do not know how any agreement that we make with the Russians will work out.

I therefore do not believe that we should make any important, really important decisions based on information that is as inadequate as currently exists on this matter and that I think that we barely even have enough information to speculate in a relevant fashion about what the Russians may do or what role they may demand or what the French or the British may say.

The French, of course, are not members of NATO, either. We should be clear about this. It is not, therefore, a NATO operation simply because the French are not members of NATO. So we

should at least be sensitive to all of the ambiguous, unsettled, and unknown aspects of this proposed agreement. There is no agreement. We do not know what it would say if it existed.

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. I might add to that, Ambassador Kirkpatrick has called our arrangement with the Russians experimental. I think that is absolutely correct. It is also clever, too clever by half. The fundamental fact is that the Russians do not want to be under our command and we insist that they be under our command, and all of these arrangements are ways to paper over that contradiction, which cannot be papered over. I find it incredible that the Russians would agree to have a battalion under the command of an American general. We would never imagine such an arrangement in reverse.

I think that there is one other issue, and I am not sure whether, Mr. Bateman, it was raised by the administration this morning, but there is the question of the rules of engagement here. As I understand the administration's position, they would be in a 10-kilometer-wide separation zone, "the meanest dog in town", I think is how the Secretary put it. And the question was, well, who would you fight?

As I understand it, the administration's position is if there is a rogue battalion, a rogue commander of any side who trespasses on the zone or who does something else untoward, we will respond. However, if it looks as if one of the three signatories is acting in force or sort of as a command decision to violate the agreement, we will then say it is not our fight and we leave.

My question is, when somebody is coming over a hill with a bunch of tanks, do you send them an e-mail and ask them, are you a rogue or are you from central command? I mean, these arrangements are beyond experimental. They are Utopian and extremely dangerous.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentleman from Maine, Mr. Longley.

Mr. LONGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Aside from the issues of neutrality and whether or on what basis we could maintain impartiality, given the fact that we might be arming one party and not the other, and I recognize that as something, but I want to get, Ms. Kirkpatrick, the comment that you made, where you suggested that the problems with NATO and the problems that the various policies in Bosnia have experienced are as much a result of European disarray as confusion with American leadership.

And as a second part of that, and this would be for both of you, really, two questions. One is, to what extent are the problems with NATO and our difficulties in that area due to a lack of consensus among European allies as to how to deal with the situation, and number two is, are there interests in Bosnia that candidly concern the United States that may not be as pressing to Europe, and I am thinking particularly of the Iranian involvement. I would be interested in your thoughts on both of those points.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I will say only what I understand to be the case with regard to any Iranian involvement. My understanding is that no one seeks Iranian involvement and that——

Mr. LONGLEY. If I could just clarify, on a very general basis, I am advised that the Muslim countries in the Middle East are very concerned with the future of Bosnia and have been contributing arms and funds to support them, and that includes Iran.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Right. Yes, except that, of course, the Muslim countries in the Middle East are no more united on this issue than Christian countries are usually or Confucian countries are usually on major issues. I think that Turkey remains a principal target of Iran and the fundamentalists, as Egypt remains a principal target of Iran and the fundamentalists and an ally of the United States.

So I think we have to distinguish not between Muslims and non-Muslims so much as between extremists and violent outlaw states, in which category Iran falls. No one, I think, desires their presence in Bosnia or anyplace, for that matter.

We do have European allies who do include—and we have, of course, the problem with the Russians, too, in the sale of technology and high-tech instruments and the transfer of technology to Iran, which strengthens that country. We, of course, also have an extremist Islamic movement in Algeria which constitutes kind of a permanent problem and potential threat for France and is a matter of grave concern.

So these have to be borne in mind. They are grounds enough for prudent people to avoid seeing this or couching it as a Muslim/non-Muslim kind of a conflict. I think that is very important and we should all bear it in mind all the time as we think about the Bosnian situation.

I believe that our allies have multiple goals, in NATO, out of NATO, just as we do, and they have some conflicting policies, too. Sometimes their governments change. French policy changed somewhat from President Mitterrand to President Chirac. That is one reason that it is very important for us to think through our own goals and policies that are appropriate to our ends and not to give undue weight to the concerns of our various allies in the situations. I return to that. I believe it very deeply.

Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Krauthammer.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Let me say a word about NATO involvement and NATO cohesion on this issue. The administration gives the impression that unless NATO acts in Bosnia, it has lost its raison d'etre, that this is the real test of whether this alliance has any meaning or importance in the post-cold war world. It is almost as if, and this is, I think, perhaps stretching it a bit, the administration is wanting to inject NATO into this situation as a way to give it something to do at a time when it appears to have nothing to do and no purpose.

I would argue that NATO has an enduring purpose and that is to be an alliance whose original goal was to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union and now is an alliance which is a defensive alliance prepared and in place in case the Russian experiment in democracy goes wrong, in case Russia resumes its propensity over the last 300 years to expand. We are not in any way being aggressive towards the Russians, simply saying, knowing history and having a recollection of how things have gone wrong in the past, we need an alliance in place against the only potential great power enemy

to our friends in Europe, namely potentially Russia gone wrong. We remain friendly as ever with Russia today, but that is always a possibility.

I do not see why we have to invent a role for NATO. That is an extremely important goal. It has over the last 300 years been a source of great instability and tragedy for Europe, its relations with Russia, relations to the East, and that is why we have a NATO. We do not have to go around inventing roles and giving it make-work, waiting to see how the Russian experiment turns out. If it turns out over the next generation that Russia becomes a stable democracy, integrated into the West, then we could abolish NATO or have them join it, which would amount to the same thing.

But in the meantime, I do not see why this issue in Bosnia, whatever the merits of the Bosnian involvement from its own merits are, it ought not be done simply in the name of giving NATO something to do.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Chairman, may I add just a word, please?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, ma'am.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. NATO is in Bosnia. It has been in Bosnia. It has been active, air and sea, in Bosnia because the United States sought to act under an administration other than the United Nations. NATO has not been active on the ground, but it is there in Bosnia in the air and sea.

Now, what has been active on the ground are European and Asian and other forces acting under a U.N. umbrella. The Secretary General has said the United Nations will not continue in Bosnia. The largest contingent of forces there are the British and the French, in fact, and they could act under their own rapid reaction force if they chose, but when we talk about NATO becoming active in Bosnia, we are talking about the changing of the administrative arrangement and the name under which Britain and France and the Netherlands keep forces on the ground in Bosnia. That is what we mean.

I think it is very important to be clear that NATO has been active in the air and sea for years now and the question really about NATO is the same as the United States. We have been active in the air and sea. Should NATO have ground troops in Bosnia? I think that most of us probably think that nobody should have ground troops in Bosnia, in fact, except the people of the area, but that is the issue. It is ground troops.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, ma'am.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Tanner.

Mr. TANNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will be brief. I know our panel has been here a while and I want to thank you both for being here. I am sorry I could not be present for all of the testimony because it is very important, very interesting, and I think most insightful.

Most of the questions that I have have already been covered by some of the other people, particularly with regard to the short-term possibilities. I would like to ask for your observation on this scenario. If there is a peace agreement, I personally am convinced that the parties to that agreement will be the only ones that can keep

it. Peace, I do not think, can be imposed on a group of folks that do not want it any more than a democracy can be imposed on people that do not want it, and I really have a hard time convincing myself that we ought to put ground troops into a place where the people want to fight and want to shoot us and each other all at the same time.

So I would suggest that the question is not one of peacekeeping. First of all, I do not think it is possible, but second, I do not know that that is our role in this entire scenario, but I think containment is a role that we must take seriously, containment from this conflict spreading. History is replete with what happens when that takes place.

So you overlay the possibility of it spreading if we choose to do nothing during the next few months, overlay that with an unstable situation in Russia that someone asked about earlier. Who knows where they are with Yeltsin's health and so forth. You have a right-wing group in Germany that are agitating, and we know the historical alliances of both of those groups with the combatants in the Yugoslav peninsula.

So given that fact and given the potential for a spreading of the violence if we choose to do nothing or choose to do less than is necessary to minimize the risk of that spreading, then I think the ultimate question we have to ask ourselves is, what is that risk of a situation becoming explosive beyond our control, and where are we and how do we assess that risk when we try to explain to the American people what we think ought to be done when ultimately a vote comes on what we should do.

Have I articulated it well enough? This is what I am concerned about. We all would agree, I think, 99 percent of us, that to send troops to Bosnia to keep people from killing each other, while it may be a noble humanitarian purpose, is very difficult to justify to the American body politic. The risk of not doing anything when we have a chance to contain the violence, to keep it from becoming a potentially chaotic situation, that is a different question. Thank you.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Tanner, I addressed that issue in my testimony and so did Mr. Krauthammer and we were on opposite sides of the issue. I have been concerned about the possibility of spread of this conflict in an unstable area at a time when we still have unstable governments today, and I remained concerned with it. I might say that so do a good many other people who have watched the evolution of the politics of that region very closely.

I think humanitarian purposes are valid in international relations, let me say, and in foreign policy, and that there are also important humanitarian factors here, but I just do not think it has been very clear how we best serve our undoubted concerns about not permitting the spread and not permitting continued massacre in the regions.

I believe we could more likely contain the spread and discourage the spread by arming the Bosnians, lifting the arms embargo and arming the Bosnians and using American air power and NATO air power until they were able to defend themselves, quite simply, and they have made quite a bit of progress in that regard. I believe we

can have a better chance of securing a peace that could last than we do by interposing 60,000 allied troops.

I think the peacekeeping strategy of containing conflict is experimental, Charles, Utopian. It is unproved. It has not worked anywhere and there is no prospect that it will ever end, it seems to me.

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. Let me just address the issue of spread. I really do believe that the threat of the spread which is used as a rationale for this kind of deployment is vastly overblown. We have heard this argument now since the beginning of the war in 1991, the threat to the entire region, of involving Albania, involving Macedonia, involving Greece and Turkey, and I concede that if the conflict in Bosnia threatened to bring the Greeks and the Turks in, for example, it would be very serious. It would be of concern for the United States. It would be of vital interest for us to do something, but that simply has not played out.

Even if I were to concede that the threat was there in the past, I think it is quite clear that whatever threat of spread existed over the last 4 years or so is diminishing. After all, what was the main engine for instability in the former Yugoslavia? It was the desire of the Serbs to achieve a greater Serbia. That was the great destabilizing element in the whole equation. It created the war in Croatia and in Bosnia, as Ambassador Kirkpatrick indicated, it started with an attack on Slovenia.

Now this greater Serbia movement is in retreat. The Serbs have essentially given up all of their conquest in Croatia with the latest agreement a few days ago on Slavonia, on Eastern Slavonia. They are in retreat in Bosnia itself. So how anyone can argue in the face of 4 years of contrary history and in the face of the last 6 months of the main engine of this instability being in retreat, I do not understand. I mean, I think that argument is used by the administration exactly as you indicate, Mr. Tanner, because Americans are reluctant to risk 25,000 American lives purely for humanitarian reasons, so the administration is reaching for some strategic rationale. Expansion of the war is the strategic rationale. It does not hold up.

The CHAIRMAN. I have Mr. Hefley, Mr. Cunningham, Mr. Hunter, and Mr. Taylor. Mr. Hefley.

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, apologize for having to be in and out of this hearing because what I have heard has been very helpful. I apologize if I repeat things.

You have illustrated, both of you, that there are an enormous number of questions that we simply do not have the answers to, and I think, Madam Ambassador, that you indicated until we get some more answers, we probably should not engage in this. So I think the question comes of when the President should come to the Congress.

You stated in your testimony on page 5 here, the question about should we deploy 25,000 troops, not unless President Clinton makes a persuasive case for this deployment. In response to one of the questions, you indicated that it would be better for us to wait until the peace talks are done for the Congress to act.

But I worry, Ambassador, that the troops are a part of the agreement. They ought to be there dealing with the things that have caused them to kill each other for all these years and not base

their agreement on whether we are going to put 25,000 troops in or not. It seems to me that we as the Congress have an obligation to let the negotiators there in Ohio at least know in advance that Congress at this point is not convinced, we do not have the answer to the questions, and that we want to be convinced before this is done, not after the fact. What is your response to that?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Hefley, I wholly agree with you that the presence of 25,000 American troops should not be a term in an agreement because the agreement should not be contingent on the presence of 25,000 American troops. It implies that if they were not there, there would not be an agreement or if they departed, the agreement would fall apart. We certainly do not want to commit 25,000 troops forever to Bosnia.

I believe that the agreement should reflect some sense of mutual interest and minimum satisfaction of mutual goals by the parties to the conflict. Then it will be for the rest of us to decide how the agreement should be, in fact, enforced and whether we are prepared to enforce it. I believe there are alternative ways of shoring up an agreement, and if there are not, it is not an agreement that is going to be viable. This is the problem. I do not think an agreement that depends on 25,000 American troops is a viable agreement, period.

Mr. HEFLEY. Then should we not in the strongest possible way and before it is initialed—and I know the administration says, well, we will initial it, then it goes to Paris, then it floats around and different people have to sign it, and you will have plenty of time to act and we will come to you then. He said this in a letter to Speaker Gingrich yesterday. But should we not prior to the initialing let them know in the strongest possible way that they have a job to do of convincing the Congress? We may agree wholeheartedly, but if we could somehow let those negotiators know that this is not to be part of the agreement, would that not make sense?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Hefley, I think the negotiators know and I think that the Congress has let everyone know, in fact. I saw a letter of last week that Mr. Dole and Mr. Gingrich jointly addressed to the President in which they made very clear that there was no commitment and no commitment to make a commitment, moreover.

So I think there has been a lot of communication of the opposition in the House. A letter from Mr. Dole and Mr. Gingrich just the day before yesterday, or maybe it was just Mr. Dole, said that the support for the agreement or the purported agreement was nil in the Congress of the United States. So I think there has been a lot of communication of these profound doubts.

I believe, moreover, that the administration and the negotiators understand that there is no commitment on the part of the Congress of the United States of 25,000 American troops to implement an agreement or enforce an agreement. I think that is clear, whatever formal resolutions are or are not passed.

Mr. HEFLEY. But does it not make it more difficult for Congress? Each step that we go along the way, they kind of suck us in just a little bit. We will put 2,000 surveyors over there to survey the strength of the competing forces and we will initial the agreement but we are not really signing the agreement. The further we get

sucked in, the more difficult it would ever be for Congress to say, no, we do not think it is a good idea. You have not answered the questions.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think the Congress will find the strength to say that.

Mr. HEFLEY. I hope you are right. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cunningham.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wish Mr. McHale was still here because I agree with him to a large extent about the troops, but I also agree with Mr. Krauthammer that the binding legislation, if it was taken after the fact, would be disastrous. I think not only disastrous for our troops and for the country, but disastrous for Congress, that if there is an agreement reached in Ohio and then the Congress says no, I think it would be viewed by Congress as an obstructionist to peace and I know many Members would not be willing to go that route. If they did go that route and the President sends troops anyway, he stands a risk of our fears coming to fruition. But, on the other hand, the real losers are the men and women that we send there.

Second, a 1-year time line over there is $3 billion to $6 billion, and Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry have already stated, well, we will just take it in your plus-ups for national security at a time when our national security is at an all-time low. We will not allow that to happen.

But I do not want a partisan vote of Republicans versus Democrats on an issue like this. I think it is important. If an agreement could be reached to where the troops were not a part of the agreement, I think Congress would come forward bipartisan on both sides and say, how can we help? But I think I would also have to agree, and I have the concerns of Mr. Hefley, let us not send in peacekeepers or observers like we did in Vietnam where it was allowed to escalate, either.

Second, I think that you are correct in the fact that the Bosnian Muslims are not the radical fundamentalists, that there are thousands of, at this very instant, thousands of radical fundamentalists from the Islamic nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and they are well established. Now, is Izetbegovic willing to go along with them? Of course. That is where they got their arms. That is where a lot of the Croatian arms came from.

After the fact, I do not think that they would be as strong as far as being able to launch a national jihad, but I think their influence and the real threat to the United States, Great Britain, and France is an intelligence threat after a peace is reached in that portion of the world. I think that that is important.

I would like to read from, this is Abu Ali Maliali who is the head of the Mohadin in Bosnia, and I would recommend, this is Josef Bodansky. Now, I warn you that this publication is written with a Serb slant, but let me quote. "We know that we will have a day in which to fight the Jews and Almighty will grant us victory, and also we know that the best soldiers we fight, the Christians, and all those are promised and rejoiced from the messenger of Allah," and it goes on. I think you can see the message of the fundamentalist Muslims in that portion of the world. That is a threat and it has to be, I think, eliminated.

I also look at Muhallovich in Belgrade, that I agree, the threat has diminished. Since the Croatians and the Muslims have got the power and the arms, I think it would give Belgrade a real bloody nose if they tried to continue the nationalism, and that is what it is all stable from. I disagree with you on the fact that it has all been Serbia in nationalism, because I look at the Ustasia and I look at history and I look at the Croatian movement toward nationalism, as well, and both sides.

My youngest daughter used to go up and slug my oldest daughter. Then she would come run crying when the daughter would chase her for sympathy. I had to treat my daughters both alike, and I do not think we have done that in that portion of the world. I do feel that, and I have the documentation, to where the bomb in Sarajevo was placed by the fundamentalist Muslims, and the French and the British experts have stated that, to get sympathy so that if there is a peace agreement between Croatia and the Serbs, the Muslims lose out.

Is Izetbegovic a fundamentalist? No, but I think he will go along with the fundamentalists to get more power in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He does not want that portion of the world split. They want that power, and I think that that is another problem that we face in that portion of the world.

I think most of you have answered most of the questions, but I think the real threat is a terrorist threat afterwards, that it is a CIA and an intelligence threat, and I think it is a threat to our troops and to our national economy when we are trying to balance a budget and to our national security readiness.

I yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize to the panelists for being called away repeatedly. Hopefully, I will not repeat other people's questions.

No. 1, I want to agree with what both of you have said. I have serious doubts. If we have to go in, there should be a very clear-cut mission, and quite honestly, I agree with you more that we should not go in at all, even if there is a clear-cut mission.

On top of what everyone else has said, I would like to ask you all to comment on a thought posed by a writer from Mississippi by the name of Stephen Ambrose, who wrote Eisenhower's biography and most recently "D-Day", but prior to that, a book called "A Rise Towards Globalism", where he begins with the premise that almost every great country, and I think he says every great country, at some point gets to feeling that they have to get involved in just about everything in the world and in trying to fix everything they end up losing almost everything because they have overextended themselves.

What are the chances that we would be falling into that trap in Bosnia? Again, it is out of the sphere of NATO. We do not have any sort of a treaty with these folks as far as a mutual defense. Are we not indeed overstepping the bounds that just make common sense?

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. I think that is a very good point, and I think it really is extremely important at the end of the cold war to have

reasonably clear in our mind where we ought to involve ourselves and where not. I think the administration, I am afraid to say, has done a bit of a disservice in this debate by trying to paint those who have much skepticism about our interest in Bosnia as isolationists.

There is a very powerful strain of isolationism in the country, but this is not isolationism. I think an intelligent interventionism, an intelligent handling of our role in the world is making a discrimination, making distinctions between those areas in the world where we have a serious national interest, a vital national interest, and which would justify risk to American life and limb and where we do not.

I think the gulf war, the invasion of Kuwait, the threat to Arabia was a very serious threat to international stability. That is a threat of a scale and magnitude that only we could meet, and we did meet it and I think correctly.

But to draw from that example the notion that we have to confront all threats to peace in all regions of the world, I think, is wrong, and if we do, we will certainly bleed ourselves dry in terms of blood and treasure, but also we will remove from the American body politic any desire to get involved at all.

If we overstep, I am afraid we, as a 25,000-man deployment in Bosnia, which I think would be indefinite, would be dangerous, and would involve many losses, would be the single greatest encourager of American isolationism since the Vietnam war, and I think it would very much hinder us in the future in meeting real challenges, and that is why I think in making these kinds of decisions, we ought not be swayed by the rhetoric of isolationism/nonisolationism. You simply have to look at each situation and decide if it reaches a threshold for American interests.

My personal opinion in this particular case is that Bosnia and Herzegovina never has. We have other reasons—humanitarian—for wanting to end the war, simply to see the killing stop. But as a matter of national interest, I do not think it rises anywhere near the threshold needed, certainly not for a deployment of this magnitude and this danger.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Taylor, I, too, am convinced that with the end of the cold war, we simply do not have a national interest in maintaining the large numbers of U.S. troops in as many areas of the world as we have done during the cold war and which I think was prudent during the cold war.

I do believe that we have an abiding interest in Europe for the stability and democracy of Europe, which is related simply to the fact that we are a European people, fundamentally, not exclusively ever, but fundamentally, our civilization, our law and courts are European, Anglo-Saxon, above all, in origin. So I think we have a larger stake in armed quarrels that develop in Europe than we do in most other parts of the world.

I do not think we should ever send American forces anywhere that we do not have an urgent vital national interest, not just a vital one but an important one, an urgent interest which can only be defended by putting our forces in harm's way, and I think that that should only be done as a last resort and where it is the only viable alternative.

That is why I emphasized in my statement that I thought we should explore other alternatives and I thought that the administration had not made clear why they chose this alternative among all the alternatives available, because I assume that we have and I believe that we have an interest in peace in the former Yugoslavia, and I think it is demonstrable, frankly.

But I do not think we have the kind of interest that requires putting 25,000 American troops in harm's way, and I think it is a bad habit to think that we should solve most problems in the world or concerns by sending American forces. I do not think that we should.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Before I recognize Mr. Hunter, our last questioner, Mr. Krauthammer, you brought up the question a while ago about us committing some time back to our ground forces helping to extract our allies from Bosnia and that reminded me that that was the only time the administration has ever said they were in favor of putting ground troops, combat troops on the ground, and it always said that is the only way we will put combat troops on the ground, is to help extract our allies. That was the only way up until this time right here when they prevailed upon NATO to go in that way.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Chairman, let me commend you for putting together as our leader on National Security one of the finest hearings I have ever attended at a time that has been kind of unique in this debate in that we have had really a couple hours of reasoning with two of the finest thinkers in this country and a lot of great Members on both sides of the aisle.

Just one reflection here and idea, and I would ask you to maybe tell me what you think of it. I went over this with Secretary Perry when he initially appeared before us. The argument was always in the cold war days that America had to have an out-of-balance role in Europe because of the Soviet Union and the fact that we were the only superpower that could offset the enormous strength of the Warsaw Pact, and because of that, the American people and our allies accepted the idea of massive troop deployments, massive expenditures, and a real dedication of American resources in Europe.

Those days are over, and as Mr. Krauthammer has observed, may resume at some point. NATO, therefore, still has an important role. But because of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, we now have a situation that can be handled by our European allies.

I was impressed when Secretary Perry, I thought one of the facts that he presented that disserved his argument that we had to leap in with troops was one of his placards or posters that showed some 30 other nations, European and Asian nations, participating in this particular operation, the idea being somehow that because there were so many participants, so many people going to the party, somehow we just could not resist being part of that, and I thought that made exactly the opposite point.

So my question would be, is this not an opportunity for a turning point in Europe in the sense that our allies have the opportunity

to mature and take the reins in a way that they were not able to take the reins during the cold war days, and that if we insist on having this heavy U.S.-loaded NATO presence, that we are going to deny them that opportunity to mature?

I guess my second question would be, and there always has to be a second question—no Congressman can stop at one, you know that—but I think there is a chance that U.S. troops could be the worst thing if we really want peace that we could put in that situation because we are the most inviting targets in the world for those that would disrupt. Nobody who has a television set can forget the enormous explosions that occur in this, both with respect to our allies and ourselves in this nation, when you have a Somalia, when you have a Lebanon.

I think that lesson means to everyone that if you can drive a car bomb into a number of American troops, you can create an instability and reverberations that you could not duplicate if there were any other country in the world handling this so-called peacekeeping chore. Thank you.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I would say, Congressman Hunter, the allies, especially the British and French, Germans to a lesser extent, Italians to a lesser extent, have been very deeply involved. They have been much more deeply involved than the United States has been in former Yugoslavia from the outset until today. They have thousands of troops on the ground and UNPROFOR forces.

Unfortunately, the UNPROFOR operation did not prove very useful. The principal reason, I think, for that was the U.N. command and control and rules of engagement which were simply not realistic and hampered rather than served the allied cause there. But our allies have been there and they have been very much involved and we have not agreed with their policies frequently because we have found them ineffective. I think that is still the case, that they have led and we have not liked the outcome.

The outcome—just a word on spreading. I cannot resist. There is not any question about whether this conflict will spread. The conflict has spread from the outset. It has spread from repression in Kosovo to Slovenia to Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina and began to lap over into Albania and Macedonia. Now, the reason I think that it has been contained somewhat in Macedonia is, above all, the presence of those peacekeepers on the border and the large allied role in the region, including the American role in the region, and including the American peacekeepers on that Macedonian border. That is not a very good way to deter aggression, but it has been there and it has so far sort of deterred in the context of the current conflict.

But our allies have led in that conflict, and in another sense besides simply sending ground troops for peacekeeping and UNPROFOR. They have also formed the rapid reaction force with quite a bit of help and material from the United States, and that rapid reaction force has operated, again, within U.N. rules of engagement, which is to say it has not operated very effectively, but that is, I think, the point. The allies have led and we have not been satisfied with the outcome.

Second, I think U.S. troops——

Mr. HUNTER. See, I think, Jeane, maybe we should be somewhat satisfied with the outcome.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Maybe we should be.

Mr. HUNTER. I know it has been clumsy and dangerous and tough, but they have picked up these reins and maybe the idea that America still has to be top-heavy with these troops in this situation is the wrong idea.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think it is the commitment of this administration and the previous administration to the persistence of NATO and a major role for NATO that has led to this administration's policies. I think this question does lead directly to the issue of whether or not the preservation of NATO as a principal sort of source of security in Europe is one of the goals of American foreign policy. This administration and the Bush administration and the Reagan administration have all assumed this would be the case. It is a different world now and maybe we need to look at it again, but that is where that question goes, I think, and fairly directly.

I believe also that maybe it is the case that American troops make especially good targets. Almost any troops make good targets, any troops of major nations. They make good targets for troublemakers. People who would like to see a conflict persist or spread will target troops of great powers whom they think might be persuaded to stay in that case, or who will leave if they are targeted. Either way, they make good targets.

We do not have to be the best desirable target in all situations, however, to not want to put our troops in harm's way and make them a target, and I think that is the case in Bosnia. I continue to feel myself that our goals in Bosnia could be, which I think are real and important, could be achieved even more effectively by air and sea than by thousands of troops on the ground.

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. Let me make one point, if I may, about your latter point about our being the worst possible troops in this type of situation, American troops being the worst choice for troops to peacekeep, and I think there really is a larger issue here. That is that, generally speaking, when you have real peace, you do not need peacekeepers, and when you do not have peace, peacekeepers are useless, and we have had example after example of that.

There is a very narrow set of situations in which you have a peace but you want a kind of symbol to approve it, for instance, in the Sinai, which is not a real peacekeeping force, it is kind of a demonstration force, generally unarmed people. That is not really peacekeeping. What we have had in peacekeeping is Beirut, we have had Somalia, we have had in Bosnia. It does not work. And it does not work not only for most countries, but particularly it will not work for the United States because we are a target to anybody who wants to make trouble and make a political impact.

Second, our Armed Forces are unique in the world. They can do the kinds of things no other army, navy, air force can do. We saw it in the gulf. That is a resource that is absolutely priceless. It is the force of last resort against aggressors like Saddam and others who cannot be stopped, and it is a resource that ought not be squandered and risked in situations which either cannot be accomplished or could be accomplished by lesser powers.

So I think there is a much larger issue. Americans, generally speaking, ought never be peacekeepers. That ought to be an axiom, and somebody who wants to contradict that needs a lot of evidence and a very strong case and I do not think it exists here.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you.

Just an observation based on what you have just said, Mr. Krauthammer, and other hearings we have had, too, even the U.N. troops in Bosnia, UNPROFOR, from all these countries, the United Kingdom, France, the Dutch, the Swedes and Irish, everybody who has been in the act on the ground, they have had an impossible job because they have been called upon to be peacekeepers when there was no peace to be kept, and so they were not suited to do something like that. As you suggest in your example of the Sinai, they were supposed to go in there and do humanitarian-type things and be observers and those kind of things and not really enforce a peace because there was no peace there for them to enforce.

Either we recognize that, as far as I am concerned, and just have peacekeepers in only those situations, or we make the determination to make peace when the people do not want to make peace and we force it on them. That is another route to go. I do not know if we are prepared to do that or not, but it seems that we are, because I am afraid that what we are signing up for in this new arrangement is to make peace and force it on people who do not want to do it themselves, and that is what concerns me. I do not think we want to be in that position, but we have not yet decided that, I guess.

I want to thank you both for your testimony. We have had a series of hearings on this question and no one has shed more light on the problems than the two of you. We certainly appreciate it and we apologize for keeping you this long. Again, our thanks.

Mr. KRAUTHAMMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:51 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES IN BOSNIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
Washington, DC, Thursday, November 30, 1995.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd Spence (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will please come to order. I would like to welcome everyone to this hearing and before I give my opening statement, I would like to announce that we are going to try to conclude this hearing in the space of 2 hours, if we can, because Secretary Perry has just gotten back from Europe last night and had a breakfast early this morning and I know he is done in by now, as are our other witnesses. They have been awake too, so we are going to try to accommodate them and let them get out and then I will cut my remarks back as much as I can.

Today the committee continues its consideration of America's military involvement in Bosnia. With the recent initialing of the peace agreement in Dayton, the President is a step closer to fulfilling his commitment to deploy up to 25,000 ground troops to Bosnia. In our hearing today the committee has tried to consider the two fundamental questions about this potential mission. First, is the policy wise; and second, how should this mission be properly defined and executed?

Despite congressional concerns, President Clinton has rendered the first question all but moot. The proverbial train has left the station and our troops are already on board. I remain unconvinced that America's national security interests are tied directly to the deployment of ground troops in Bosnia. I believe we will all eventually regret allowing American prestige and cohesion of the NATO alliance to be put at risk for a Bosnian peacekeeping mission.

Nonetheless, we are left to focus on the second question because little or no detailed information about the mission of the so-called implementation force has been available to date, we have been largely operating in the dark. I hope our witnesses today will begin to discuss a number of the operational details that have been absent from the discussion to date.

From the outset I think we need to focus on four things. First, we need to know where our troops are going in Bosnia. Bosnia is

a rough country, both geographically and politically. What are the threats they will encounter?

Second, we need to know how many are going? Not merely in Bosnia, proper, but how many troops in total will be directly and indirectly devoted to this mission? The announced figure of 20,000 ground troops understate the true size of the U.S. military force committed to this mission on land, sea, and in the air, surrounding this area.

In light of the circumstances surrounding the tragic death of our Army Rangers more than 2 years ago, in Somalia, I hope our witnesses can assure us that the American force that is deployed to Bosnia is adequate to conduct this mission safely and that its size and composition will, at all times, reflect the theater commander's professional military judgment on what is needed to get the job done.

Third, we need to know what our troops are supposed to do. This question has two dimensions. What are their tactical and operational military tasks and what are the larger strategic goals that these tasks are meant to accomplish?

I am especially concerned with the administration's apparent willingness to equate an exit date with an exit strategy. Moreover, there does not seem to be any link between a mission end date, withdrawal after 1 year, and a strategic end date. If, as the President has asserted, peace in the Balkans is linked to the larger peace in Europe, how can we insist upon withdrawal after only 1 year? Our commitment to European stability will presumably not expire after 12 months.

Finally, we need to know what burdens this mission will place upon the broader U.S. military. Our Bottom-Up Review force is already stretched by growing commitments and ongoing contingency operations. What will the impact of the Bosnian deployment be on our military's ability to execute the national military strategy? What will the deployment of this force mean for training and readiness of its various elements, for these elements left behind?

This impending deployment will have wide-ranging implications for a far broader segment of the U.S. military than most realize. This committee needs to explore this issue in the weeks and months ahead.

Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, I once again look forward to your testimony on these issues which are of profound importance to all of us.

At this time, I would like to yield to my colleague, Mr. Dellums, the ranking member.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I join with you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming Secretary Perry, Secretary Christopher and General Shalikashvili to today's hearing on the peace agreement to end the slaughter in Bosnia and the plans to implement it.

I would ask unanimous consent at this point, Mr. Chairman, that my longer, more detailed statement be made a part of the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Your request is granted.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman.

When this panel last appeared before the committee there was only a hope that such an agreement could be reached. Now, we must struggle with how to implement it. And let me note, at the outset, that I have found the decision making on this just as difficult as it has been for each of my colleagues.

Despite the obstacles, the anger and the hatred spawned by the war, the parties to the conflict have signaled their desire that the killing end. My view has always been that only diplomacy was capable of ending this tragic conflict. So, in that regard, Mr. Chairman, I extend my most profound congratulations to all parties for having come to this agreement.

Much work remains to be done to cement the agreement and to give it full meaning. Work by others on economic reconstruction, refugee resettlement, and implementation and protection of civil and political processes will be required to achieve the goals of the agreement, just as will peacekeeping. They are the glue that can ultimately allow for a durable and stable environment to emerge in this war-torn region.

The agreement also shows that each party subscribed to the idea that fairness required establishing a military balance among the states in the region. In this context, I applaud the commitment to pursue arms control and reduction mechanisms as the primary method to achieve such a balance. Reducing the level of armaments in the region offers greater possibilities, in this gentleman's humble opinion, for restraint and stability than would be launching an arms race.

I hope that in the implementation stage this arms reduction effort receives high priority attention. Many have been properly concerned, Mr. Chairman, with how the United States and NATO could successfully conduct a peacekeeping mission, on the one hand, with its demand for impartiality and participate, on the other hand, in arming and training one party to the conflict? The inconsistency of the two goals should be avoided if the peacekeeping role is to be given its best chance for success.

I would hope that our distinguished witnesses today will clarify this issue for us so that we can better understand how this concern has been addressed and balanced with the parties' interest in securing a military equilibrium.

Mr. Chairman, let me make three final brief points. First, if we are to succeed as peacekeepers, our forces must act in an evenhanded fashion. When today's witnesses were before this committee in October, Secretary Perry made the point that any violations would be dealt with equally and with impartiality. I would appreciate knowing how this evenhandedness will be undertaken and whether all parties to the agreement understand the implementation of U.S. intentions to act in this fashion.

Second, the President talked of "meeting fire with fire, and then some." Secretary Perry, you have indicated that U.S. forces would be the "meanest dog on the block." These metaphors strike me as

very combative, perhaps needlessly war-like when we consider that the parties have striven to reach a peace agreement and have pledged their efforts to ensure that the implementation force, known as IFOR, will not be subject to attack.

I understand that perhaps this aspect may be over-emphasized, especially in order to meet domestic political concerns and potential criticism about the risk of our troops and communicating to those forces in a region where you stated, Mr. Secretary, that this is a rough environment.

However, these metaphors may inadvertently confuse our citizens about whether we are sending our troops to wage war or sending them to keep the peace. So, on the one hand, if we are talking about peace plan and peacekeeping, to use war-time metaphors confuses people at a time when, at the grassroots, we must begin to establish an understanding about what we mean with respect to the issue of peacekeeping.

I look forward to hearing how our force can be deployed safely, yet, with a view toward avoiding actions that may, if not inadvertently, reignite the conflict. In this regard I am especially interested to hear of how our forces plan to avail themselves of the military commissions that will be comprised of representatives of each of the parties to aid in the resolution of disputes between the parties.

Third, I understand that the reality of the body politic may seem to argue for a muscular force. In your previous testimony, Secretary Perry, you indicated that you wanted a robust force initially, but that you would consider drawing them down as conditions might warrant. What conditions could lead you to recommend to the President, what conditions would obtain that would allow you to recommend to the President that the IFOR could be reduced or modified?

The idea of the United States playing a major peacekeeping role is still new to our Nation. As I have said on more than one occasion, this is a whole new lexicon in the context of the post-cold war world that we must come to grips with. Perhaps the perceived contradiction of using military forces to keep peace and the confusion it generates for citizen and elected official alike, is perhaps simply at the end of the day a part of the dynamic of this post-cold war transition period. And in periods of transition there are substantive questions that have to be raised that lead to confusion. We must mount the stage and clarify.

While we try to resolve these questions and apparent contradictions, advocates for peace must be responsive to those who seek our help to end the violence that consumes them, especially when they reach an open agreement through diplomacy to do so, which we have always considered a superior approach.

We, the Congress, must now consider fully how to grapple with the moral, strategic, and practical issues at hand and we must do so without partisanship or parochialism.

I very much look forward to the panel's testimony in helping us meet this responsibility and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

I yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dellums follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT
HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS, RANKING DEMOCRAT
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
HEARING ON BOSNIA PEACE PLAN
NOVEMBER 30, 1995

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I join with you in welcoming Secretary Perry, Secretary Christopher and General Shalikashvili to today's hearing on the peace agreement to end the slaughter in Bosnia and the plans to implement it. I would ask unanimous consent my longer text be made a part of the record.

When our panel last appeared before the Committee, there was only a hope that such an agreement could be reached. Now, we must struggle with how to implement it. Let me note at the outset, that I have found the decision making on this to be just as difficult as it has been for each of my colleagues.

Despite the obstacles, the anger and the hatred spawned by the war, the parties to that conflict have signaled their desire that the killing end. My view has always been that only diplomacy was capable of ending this tragic conflict. So, I extend my most profound congratulations to all parties for coming to

this agreement

Much work remains to be done to cement the agreement and to give it full meaning. Work by others on economic reconstruction, refugee resettlement, and implementation and protection of civil and political processes will be required to achieve the goals of the agreement, just as will peacekeeping. They are the glue that can ultimately allow for a durable and stable environment to emerge in this war torn region.

The agreement also shows that each party subscribed to the idea that fairness required establishing a military balance among the states in the region.

In this context, I applaud the commitment to pursue arms control and reduction mechanisms as the primary method to achieve such a balance. Reducing the level of armaments in the region offers greater possibilities for restraint and stability than would launching an arms race. I hope that in the implementation stage this arms reduction effort receives high priority attention.

Many have been properly concerned with how the

United States and NATO could successfully conduct a peacekeeping mission on the one hand — with its demand for impartiality — and participate on the other hand in arming and training one party to the conflict. The inconsistency of the two goals should be avoided, if the peacekeeping role is to be given its best chance for success.

I would hope that our witnesses today can clarify this issue for us, so we can better understand how this concern has been addressed and balanced with the parties' interest in securing a military equilibrium.

Mr. Chairman, let me make three final brief points.

First: If we are to succeed as peacekeepers, our forces must act in an evenhanded fashion. When today's witnesses were before this Committee in October, Secretary Perry made the point that any violations would be dealt with equally and with impartiality. I would appreciate knowing how this evenhandedness will be undertaken, and whether all parties to the agreement understand the implication of U.S.' intentions to act in this fashion.

Second: The President talked of meeting "fire with fire, and then some." Secretary Perry, you have indicated that the U.S. forces would be the "meanest dog on the block." These metaphors strike me as very combative, perhaps needlessly war-like when we consider that the parties have striven to reach a peace agreement and have pledged their efforts to ensure that the implementation force — IFOR — will not be subject to attack.

I understand that perhaps this aspect may be overemphasized — especially in order to meet domestic, political concerns and potential criticism about the risk to our troops. However, these metaphors may inadvertently confuse our citizens about whether we are sending our troops to wage war or sending them to keep peace.

I look forward to hearing how our force can be deployed safely — yet with a view towards avoiding actions which may, if only inadvertently, reignite the conflict. In this regard I am especially interested to hear of how our forces plan to avail themselves of the military commissions that will be comprised of

representatives of each of the parties to aid in the resolution of disputes between the parties.

Third: I understand that the reality of the body politic may seem to argue for a muscular force. In your previous testimony, Secretary Perry, you indicated that you wanted a robust force initially, but that you would consider drawing them down as conditions might warrant. What conditions could lead you to recommend to the President that the IFOR could be reduced or modified.

The idea of the United States playing a major peacekeeping role is still new to our nation. Perhaps the perceived contradiction of using military forces to keep peace — and the confusion it generates for citizen and elected official alike — is simply a part of the dynamics of this post-Cold War transition period.

While we try to resolve these questions and apparent contradictions, advocates for peace must be responsive to those who seek our help to end the violence that consumes them — especially when they reach an open agreement through diplomacy to do so.

We, the Congress, must now consider fully how to grapple with the moral, strategic and practical issues at hand — and we must do so without partisanship or parochialism. I very much look forward to the panel's testimony in helping us to meet this responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Without objection, the prepared statements that the gentlemen might have will be submitted for the record, and we will begin with Secretary Christopher.

STATEMENT OF WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, many thanks to you, Mr. Chairman and to Mr. Dellums, for your very courteous and considerate welcome for me and my fellow panel members.

As we all know President Clinton addressed the Nation earlier this week to explain why American troops should join our NATO allies to help peace take hold in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili and I are here to further explain our purpose and our plans, to answer your questions and to seek your support.

Mr. Chairman, I think I can be quite confident that by the end of our presentations you will have had answers to a number of the questions that you raised in your initial comments.

In this situation we have a fundamental choice. As the President made clear if the United States does not participate there will be no NATO force and if there is no NATO force there will be no peace in Bosnia, the war will reignite. We do not have to imagine the consequences of such a reignition. We know what would happen. There would be more massacres, more concentration camps, more hunger, a real threat of the war spreading and immense danger to our leadership in NATO, in Europe and the world, as a whole. Those are alternatives we simply must avoid.

The war in Bosnia has certainly been a threat to our Nation's interests and a threat to our Nation's values. We have been a witness to horrors and sacrifices that my generation—the generation that fought World War II—once thought we had consigned to a dark and distant past. We have hated to face, during this period, the constant threat of a wider, even more terrible war in a very unstable part of Europe.

This summer the crisis in Bosnia reached a boiling point. At that point, the President launched a carefully conceived initiative that took us step-by-step from the most horrifying events of this conflict—that is the massacres in Srebrenica and Zepa—to what I really regard as the most hopeful point, last week's comprehensive agreement in Dayton.

We now have an opportunity to secure an enduring peace, an opportunity that exists because of American strength and American diplomacy. We will achieve that goal only if America continues to lead. The parties have taken great risks for peace and we must, I believe, support them.

Our national interests in the implementation of the Dayton settlement are very clear. We have a strong interest in ending the worst atrocities in Europe since World War I. We have also a strong interest in making sure that this conflict does not spread. A widening war would threaten our allies and destabilize a region where shifting frontiers and ethnic unrest have long been a source of conflict among the world's great powers.

Peace in this part of Europe matters because Europe matters to the United States. Twice this century we have sent millions of American soldiers to war across the Atlantic. Our leaders, both Democrats and Republicans have acted to protect our vital interests in European stability. If we do not take this opportunity for peace that we now have before us, we could be faced with the prospect of action in Europe far costlier, far more dangerous than anything that is now being contemplated.

Whether we take action now in Bosnia is an acid test of American leadership. After creating this opportunity for peace, through the President's initiative, we simply cannot afford to walk away. I can tell you from my personal experience as Secretary of State that if our country does not follow through on our initiative no nation around the world will follow us—not in Europe, not in the Middle East, not in Asia, not anywhere. It is in our absolute national interest to maintain our leadership in the world by following through and taking this next step in the President's initiative.

The Dayton agreement advances our national interests and gives us every reason to believe that peace can take hold in Bosnia. It was negotiated against the backdrop of 4 bloody years of war, and certainly it includes many hard-fought compromises. But on every important issue it meets the principled and practical standards on which my negotiating team and I insisted all throughout the negotiations. It is an agreement not just of goals, but also of means.

And let me just tick off a few of the high points in the agreement. It preserves Bosnia as a single State with Federal institutions that represent the Croat, Muslim and Serb communities alike.

It reunifies Sarajevo within the Federation of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and it connects Gorazde to the Federation by a land corridor.

It gives the people of Bosnia the right to move freely throughout the country. It gives refugees the right to return to their homes, and it creates a mechanism for settling claims to property.

This agreement also makes possible for democratically held, internationally run elections to be held next year, from 6 to 9 months after the agreement is signed.

In connection with elections, I spent hours in Dayton convincing the parties that refugees should be given a choice between voting where they currently live or voting in their original homes. The agreement also excluded war criminals from serving in office in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and it explicitly obligates the parties to cooperate with the investigation and prosecution of war crimes.

It protects human rights and creates new institutions to investigate and punish violations.

Perhaps most fundamentally of all, it ends the war and requires the parties to move their armed forces behind agreed lines.

Sometimes, Mr. Chairman, and members, in a negotiation like this, there is a tendency to take short cuts to deal with the hardest problems in ambiguous ways, what is sometimes called creative ambiguity. But in Dayton, we insisted on concrete and detailed commitments on the most critical issues. So we have an agreement that's comprehensive and detailed and, thus, much more likely to endure.

Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili will, quite appropriately, speak in greater detail about our participation in IFOR. In the remainder of my statement, Mr. Chairman, I would like to just raise and respond to two or three of the most important questions that seem to be asked by the public.

First, I know many Americans are wondering why Europe cannot provide all of the ground forces for the NATO force in Bosnia. NATO was built, as this committee would know so well, on the sharing of risk and effort. We are NATO's largest member, we are the core of NATO's strength and resolve. The alliance simply cannot undertake the most important, the most serious mission of its history, if we decline to do our share.

At the same time, I would emphasize that we're contributing only one-third of the troops. Two-thirds come from all the other NATO countries, from Russia and from many of the new democracies in Western Europe that are part of the partnership for peace.

Another question that has been asked is whether, after 4 years of bloodshed, the parties would be willing to carry through on their agreement. Of course, we secured the agreement because peace is the key to what all the parties want, from reconstruction of their country, to justice, to rejoining the international community.

In addition, I would say we constructed the agreement so it would be sure that it would be carried out by the parties. For example, we made certain that the sanctions against Serbia, which is our main source of leverage against that country, would be reimposed if the agreement is not implemented. Sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs will remain in place until their forces withdraw behind the agreed boundary lines.

As we negotiated in Dayton, we constantly insisted on an agreement that our military could effectively implement and enforce. Each part of the agreement was carefully constructed to take into account the needs of our Armed Forces and the advice of the outstanding members of the military team who were there with us in Dayton.

Let me assure you that IFOR's mission is well defined and limited in scope. Our troops will enforce the military aspects of the agreement, enforcing the cease-fire, supervising the withdrawal of forces, and establishing a zone of separation. But they will not be asked, they will not be asked to guarantee the success of democracy or reconstruction, or to act as a police force.

One of the lessons that we painfully learned in the last 4 years is that our military should not and cannot be a guarantor of peace. It should only create opportunities that others must seize to improve their countries.

Because IFOR's mission is well defined, as Secretary Perry will outline, I want to simply stress here that we're committed to achieve a stable military balance within Bosnia and among the States of the former Yugoslavia, so that peace will endure. This should be achieved to the extent possible through arms limitation and reductions, as Mr. Dellums said.

It is not likely, however, that arms control measures alone will be sufficient to achieve military stabilization. The armed forces of the federation, which have been the most severely constrained by

the arms embargo, will likely need to be supplemented by equipment and training in order to establish an effective self-defense capability. For our part, the United States will ensure that the federation armed forces will receive the necessary assistance.

But neither IFOR nor the U.S. military will directly participate in this effort. The best approach, and the one that we will pursue, is for the United States to coordinate an international effort to provide the necessary assistance.

I also want to stress that civilian agencies from around the world will carry on a separate program to help the people of the country of Bosnia rebuild. Our European allies will pay for most of the vital civilian effort. International organizations, the well-known ones, will play important roles in this civilian effort. The organization for security and cooperation in Europe will supervise elections. The UNHCR will coordinate the return of refugees.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the gentleman to yield?

Mr. HUNTER [presiding]. Let's suspend for a minute, because we're getting close to the time to vote here.

Mr. DELLUMS. Would you yield to me briefly, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. HUNTER. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. DELLUMS. As I understand it, the Chair and several of my colleagues on this side of the committee chose to leave in order to have a rolling chair. I would suggest that that is wholly inappropriate, given the magnitude and the significance of the issue.

All of the Democrats have sat here to: First, dignify the testimony of the witnesses, and second, I think we all ought to be on the same page with respect to information. I think that you encumber members when some of them are not here for all of the testimony. This is perhaps one of the most significant votes that we will make, and I hope that we will simply recess and rush back here very quickly. All of us are mature enough and professional enough to do that, and I think the process argues for that approach.

Mr. HUNTER. If the distinguished gentleman will hang on for a second, this is H.R. 1788, which is final passage coming up, and I take it we have a few minutes. But I understood the Chairman wanted to do this because he thought you had very limited time.

Will your schedule accommodate us recessing for 10 minutes or so?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, we certainly want to accommodate the committee. I think Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili and I all have engagements later this afternoon. But to the extent we possibly can, we will certainly accommodate the committee.

Mr. HUNTER. In that case, we'll recess for 10 minutes and let's go vote.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. The committee will please come to order.

We still have people out on a vote, but I thought we had better go ahead and proceed. I was going to try to leave early and come back and resume the chair, to keep it going to meet the schedule. But, in any event, where were we?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, I was just about to conclude. Let me just say a few more sentences and then we'll turn to Secretary Perry.

In Bosnia there is no middle ground between peace and war, and the choice between peace and war, as the President put it so plainly last Monday night, "America must choose peace."

Many years from now, I have no doubt that Americans will look back on this particular month as being a decisive month, and it's my hope and belief that we must look back on this period as one in which we grasp the opportunity for peace rather than putting it to one side in hesitation.

The President has certainly made his choice. The United States must now act as the great Nation that we are. We must protect our interests, we must uphold our ideals, keep our commitments, and above all, we must sustain our position of leadership.

In the coming days, Mr. Chairman and members, we will be consulting with you fully as this important matter goes forward. We are confident that we can make a strong case and that we should move forward. After Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili have concluded their presentations, we will welcome the opportunity to try to answer your questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Christopher follows:]

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Thursday
November 30, 1995

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On Monday night, President Clinton addressed the nation to explain why American troops should join our NATO Allies to help peace take hold in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, and I are here to further explain our purpose and our plans, to answer your questions, and to seek your support.

We have a fundamental choice. As the President made clear, if the United States does not participate, there will be no NATO force. If there is no NATO force, there will be no peace in Bosnia, and the war will reignite.

We do not have to imagine the consequences. We know what would happen. There would be more massacres, more concentration camps, more hunger, a real threat of a wider war, and immense damage to our leadership in NATO, in Europe, and the world. That is the alternative we can and must avoid. We must continue to secure the peace.

The war in the former Yugoslavia has been a threat to our nation's interests and an affront to our nation's values. We have been witness to horrors and cruelties that my generation -- the generation that fought World War II -- once thought we consigned to a dark and distant past. We have faced the constant threat of a wider, even more terrible war in an unstable part of Europe. We have had to contemplate the possibility that our troops would be called upon to rescue our allies from Bosnia under fire.

This summer, the conflict in Bosnia reached a crisis point. The President launched a carefully conceived initiative that took us step by step from the most horrifying events of the war -- the fall of Srebrencia and Zepa -- to this hopeful point.

At the July London Conference, we persuaded our Allies to take decisive measures to protect Bosnia's remaining safe areas. We led a NATO bombing campaign to convince the Bosnian Serbs that nothing more could be gained by continuing the war. Our diplomacy produced a cease-fire and a set of constitutional principles for a single Bosnian state. And last week, we led the parties to a comprehensive settlement in Dayton. That settlement will be formally signed in Paris on December 14.

As a result of the President's initiative, the fighting has stopped. We now have an opportunity to secure an enduring peace because of American strength and American diplomacy. There can be no doubt that we will achieve our goal only if America continues to lead. The parties have taken risks for peace and we must continue to support them.

Our interest in implementing the Dayton settlement is clear.

We have a strong interest in ending the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II -- atrocities that are all the more pernicious because they have been directed at specific groups of people because of their faith. By helping peace take hold, we can make sure that the people of Bosnia see no more days of dodging bullets, no more winters of freshly dug graves, no more years of isolation from the outside world.

We have a strong interest in making sure this war does not spread. Bosnia lies on a faultline in a volatile region of Europe. To the south are Kosovo, Albania, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the likeliest flashpoints of a wider war, as well as Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies. To the north and east lie Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, fragile new democracies deeply threatened by the prospect of ethnic conflict in the Balkans. To the north also lies the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia, which could yet spark a regional war if the Dayton accords are not implemented.

Peace in this part of Europe matters to the United States because Europe matters to the United States. Twice this century, we have sent millions of American soldiers to war across the Atlantic. The first of this century's great wars began with violence in Sarajevo. The second began with aggression in Central Europe and with horrors that the world ignored until it was too late. Ever since, our leaders, Republican and Democrat alike, have acted to protect our vital interest in European stability. If we do not take this opportunity for peace, we could be faced with the prospect of action far costlier and more dangerous than anything being contemplated now.

The United States also has a vital interest in maintaining our leadership in the world. Acting in Bosnia now is an acid test of American leadership. After creating this opportunity for peace, we cannot afford to walk away. I can tell you from my personal experience as Secretary of State that if we are seen as a country that does not follow through on the work it begins, no nation will follow us -- not in Europe, not in the Middle East, not in Asia, not anywhere.

Mr. Chairman, the agreement we initialed in Dayton advances our national interests and gives us every reason to believe that peace can take hold in Bosnia. The settlement was negotiated in 21 long days against the backdrop of four bloody years of war. It includes many hard-fought compromises. But on every important issue, it meets the principled and practical standards on which my negotiating team and I insisted. It is an agreement not just of goals, but of means.

- It preserves Bosnia as a single state with federal institutions that represent its Croat, Muslim, and Serb communities alike.

- It reunifies Sarajevo within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and connects Gorazde to the Federation by a secure land corridor.

- It gives the people of Bosnia the right to move freely throughout the country. It gives refugees the right to return to their homes. And it creates a mechanism for settling claims to property.

- It makes it possible for democratic, internationally-run elections to be held next year. I spent hours in Dayton convincing the parties that refugees should have a choice between voting where they currently live or in their original homes.

- The agreement excludes war criminals from office. And it explicitly obligates all the parties to cooperate with the investigation and prosecution of war crimes.

- It protects human rights and creates new institutions to investigate and punish violations.

- Most immediately, it ends the war, and requires the parties to move their armed forces behind agreed lines.

Sometimes in a negotiation like this, there is a temptation to take short cuts, to deal with the hardest issues in an ambiguous way. But in Dayton, we insisted on and received concrete and detailed commitments on the most fundamental issues that divided the parties. Because the agreement is comprehensive, it is far more likely to endure.

In the long run, restoring the fabric of Bosnia's society will still require an immense effort. But at least that effort can now begin. After all, only with peace does Bosnia have a chance to exist as a single state. Only with peace does it have a chance to build a multi-ethnic democracy. Only with peace will we have a chance to bring war criminals to justice, and to ensure that no more war crimes are committed.

The Dayton accord does require the parties to take extremely difficult steps on the road to peace. I believe that each is prepared to carry out its commitments, but only if it is confident that the other parties will carry out theirs. That is why each party made it clear that they would reach settlement <u>only</u> if NATO agreed to lead a peace implementation force.

Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili will speak in greater detail about our participation in IFOR. But let me address some of the questions I know are on your mind.

I know many Americans have wondered why Europe cannot provide all of the ground troops in this NATO force. We created NATO's integrated military structure to ensure NATO's effectiveness through the sharing of effort and risk. We are NATO's largest member, the source of its strength and resolve. The Alliance cannot undertake what will be the largest mission in its history if we decline to do our share. At the same time, we should remember that other nations, including nearly all our NATO allies, Russia, and many of our new partners in Central Europe, will contribute 2/3 of the troops in IFOR.

Others have asked whether, after four years of bloodshed, the parties are willing to carry through with this agreement. We constructed the agreement with that concern in mind. We secured the agreement because peace is the key to all the parties want: from reconstruction, to justice, to rejoining the international community. We have made certain that sanctions against Serbia, our main source of leverage with that country, will be reimposed if the agreement is not implemented. Sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs will remain in place until their forces withdraw within the agreed boundary of the Serb Republic. Moreover, our troops will have the strength and authority to enforce key military provisions of the agreement.

In addition, let me emphasize that it was not enough for me that President Milosevic was specifically authorized to negotiate the accord on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. I insisted that the Bosnian Serbs initial it as well. In Dayton, President Milosevic promised to obtain their agreement within 10 days; as it turned out, he did so in just two days. This kind of response increases my confidence that this accord will be carried out.

Mr. Chairman, as we negotiated in Dayton, we constantly insisted on an agreement that our military could implement and enforce. Each part of the agreement was carefully constructed to take into account the needs of our armed forces and the advice of the military members of our team. As a result, the military annex to the agreement contains the kind of detailed provisions our military considered essential to their task.

As someone who helped to negotiate the Dayton accord, I can assure you that IFOR's mission is well-defined and limited. Our troops will enforce the military aspects of the agreement -- ensuring the cease-fire, supervising the withdrawal of forces, and establishing a zone of separation between them. But it will <u>not</u> be asked to guarantee the success of democracy or reconstruction, or to act as a police force. One of the lessons we have learned in the last few years is that our military should not be a permanent guarantor of peace. It should only create opportunities that others must then seize.

Because IFOR's mission is well defined, we have a concrete exit strategy, which Secretary Perry will describe in detail. I want to stress that as one element of that strategy, we are committed to achieve a stable military balance within Bosnia and among the states of the former Yugoslavia, so that peace will endure. This should be achieved, to the extent possible, through arms limitations and reductions.

Arms control measures alone, however, will not be sufficient to achieve military stabilization. The armed forces of the Federation, which have been most severely constrained by the arms embargo, will need to obtain some equipment and training in order to establish an effective self-defense capability. For our part, the United States will ensure that Federation armed forces receive the necessary assistance. Neither IFOR nor the U.S. military will directly participate in this effort. The best approach -- and the one we will pursue -- is for the United States to coordinate an international effort to provide the necessary assistance.

Civilian agencies from around the world will carry out a separate program to help the people of Bosnia rebuild. Our European allies will pay for most of this vital civilian effort. International organizations will also play an important role. The OSCE will supervise elections. The UNHCR will coordinate the return of refugees. The World Bank and IMF will help Bosnia's economy recover, with the EU also playing a leading role. The UN will help monitor and train local police.

But none of these important tasks will be carried out unless the peace agreement endures. There is no middle ground between peace and war in Bosnia. And in the choice between peace and war, as the President so plainly put it Monday night, "America must choose peace."

Many years from now, I have no doubt that people will look back on this month in history as a critical turning point for the United States and Europe. Let us be certain that it will be remembered as the moment when our country grasped the chance we ourselves created for peace, not as the moment when we hesitated to act.

The President has made his choice. The United States must act as the great nation that we are. We must act to protect our interests. We must act to uphold our ideals. We must keep our commitments. And we must lead.

In the coming days, Mr. Chairman, the Administration will continue to consult fully with you and with the Congress. We will continue to work hard to gain the bipartisan support of the Congress, just as we work to gain the support and understanding of the American people. We are confident that the case for moving forward is clear and strong. We are prepared to answer your questions and to hear your concerns today. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Perry.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. PERRY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary PERRY. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to put my testimony in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Secretary PERRY. Then I would like to highlight it with some summary comments.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be fine, thank you.

Secretary PERRY. I will use the podium and the charts to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed as you wish.

Secretary PERRY. My apologies to the people who are sitting behind the charts.

So far this month, Mr. Chairman, I have traveled extensively throughout Europe and the United States preparing the plans for United States participation in IFOR. I have met with the leaders of the warring parties in Dayton; I have met with the defense ministers and the chiefs of defense staffs of all of the NATO countries, and virtually all of the non-NATO countries planning to participate. I have met with all of our NATO commanders several times: General Joulwan, Admiral Smith, General Walker.

I have gone to the training ranges in Germany, where during the last 2 months every battalion, every United States battalion that's going into Bosnia, has been there for an extensive exercise, specifically oriented on preparing for the Bosnia mission. Now, on this first chart I would like to summarize what those questions were.

Why is the United States committing forces to IFOR? What will our mission be? Who else is sending troops? When will we go in, and when will we come out. These were the questions which were in their mind.

To the best of my ability, I answered all of these questions fully and frankly, and I believe that they were satisfied with my answers. Today, I want to give the Congress and the American public the same answers which I gave our soldiers last week.

On the first chart I will deal with the first question: why is the United States committing forces to IFOR? I believe there is an iron logic which leads from the first premise here, which is the United States has vital political, economic and security interests in Europe to the conclusion that we must make this commitment.

I don't believe I need to explain to this committee that the United States has these vital interests in Europe. We have, after all, for the past 50 years, pledged our lives and treasures to protect Europe from a Warsaw Pact invasion.

That threat is now gone, and in its wake are ethnic hatreds and nationalistic rivalries that have fueled instabilities and conflicts. We are creating, and have been creating for the last few years, new structures to deal with these new problems. The Partnership for Peace is one. Expansion of NATO is another. And the so-called pragmatic partnership with Russia is a third.

These are positive developments, but the war in Bosnia threatens to disrupt these developments. Indeed, the war in Bosnia threatens our vital interests in Europe. This is not just because of the killing and the atrocities in Bosnia. They challenge U.S. values in the most fundamental way. But the danger that the war will

spread, and that is a real and a probable danger, would truly threaten the most fundamental security interests of the United States.

I have to tell you that just 2 months ago I thought the prospect of a major war erupting between Serbia and Croatia was at least 50–50, and all during the last 4 years there has been the danger of this war spreading south into Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania, and perhaps even involving Greece and Turkey.

We now have the first real opportunity to end this war. Obviously, this is an opportunity that we want to seize. But to seize it does require a commitment of U.S troops as part of a NATO peace implementation force.

For the last 2½ years we have consistently said there would be no commitment of United States ground forces in Bosnia without a peace agreement. It is also true that there will be no peace agreement without a commitment of U.S. ground forces. The real alternative—not a theoretical alternative but the real alternative—to the commitment of U.S. forces is to simply let the war continue, including the risk of letting that war spread.

I believe that the risks to the United States of allowing this war to continue are greater than the risks of enforcing the peace. None of your witnesses here today—Secretary Christopher and myself or General Shalikashvili—will minimize the risks. We simply contend that the risks of allowing the war to continue are greater.

I talked with our soldiers about what IFOR will do. This is the mission spelled out in the Dayton peace agreement. First and foremost, they will have the military task of protecting the IFOR, protecting the force, ensuring both the south defense and the freedom of movement for IFOR. We will avoid the mistakes made by the U.N. force that was there before us. We will not be pushed around, and we will not let our freedom of movement be restricted.

We have a large force, well armed, well trained, and the rules of engagement permit us to act as necessary.

We will enforce the required withdrawal of forces to respective territories, and we will do that in an evenhanded way. We will establish and man a zone of separation, which is 2 kilometers on either side of the line of separation. That amounts to about a 2½-mile-wide zone that will essentially be a zone in which troops and weapons of the other forces are prohibited, and we will enforce that.

We will provide a secure environment which permits the conduct of the civil peace implementation function. I want to emphasize NATO/IFOR/U.S. forces do not conduct these functions. The functions of reconstructing the roads, rebuilding the economy, resettling refugees, overseeing elections, these are performed by other groups and other functions. Our job is to provide the secure environment. Those functions could not succeed were we not there to provide that environment.

I have told you that there would be risks, and we have taken actions to minimize those risks. The most important action is we're not going in in the absence of a peace agreement, which is being complied with, but also we are taking decisions on our own to have a large force, a well-armed force, a force with very firm rules of en-

gagement, and this force is well trained. This will be the best trained force we have ever had going into a military mission.

I told you that I was at the training ranges just a few weeks ago to see this training in process. I want to show you a few pictures from that.

This is a scene at Grafenwoehr, Germany, where one of our platoons was undergoing mine familiarization and mine clearing. We know that one of the great risks of this operation will be literally millions of mines in the countryside. The peace agreement provides for the warring parties to clear those and to identify and chart them. We do not believe, no matter how hard they comply with that, that that can be fully successful. Therefore, one of the main dangers, one of the main risks to our troops, will be mines. We know how to deal with mines, but it requires training and it requires vigilance on the part of the troops. This training was dealt with at issue.

We also have taken the occasion to upgrade the basic combat proficiencies of our troops. Every unit that is going into Bosnia has, within the last 2 months, upgraded their basic combat proficiency. This is a picture of Grafenwoehr, where one of the tank crews is going through live ammunition training against targets.

Finally, every battalion going into Bosnia has spent 5 days at Hohenfels training range, where we have set up a mini-Bosnia, the villages, the roads with the potholes, a simulated Bosnia-Serb Army, a simulated federation army, civilians, paramilitary groups, politicians, and CNN. We have the whole spectrum of situations which they will confront when they go in there, and every one of them has had to go through, day after day, a scenario of dealing with more and more difficult problems.

General Joulwan, who set up this whole program, the philosophy is that the scrimmage should be harder than the game. This is the scrimmage, and we are deliberately making it harder than what we believe they will run into. This is serious training. It's the most realistic training that's ever been done for this sort of peace enforcement operation.

This chart shows you the zones that our troops will be operating in in Bosnia. The northern zone, around Tuzla, will be where the U.S. division is located. The southern, around Sarajevo, there will be a French division, and in the western zone there's a British division. Each of these divisions will have troops of other countries as well.

The risks involved probably focus in three particular areas: Gorazde, which is in the French division; Sarajevo, the French division; and Brcko, which is in the American division. So we will take special precautions and have special training relative to those particular areas.

Two particular missions called out in the peace agreement are enforcing the zone of separation—the parties must have withdrawn all troops and all weapons from that zone within 30 days. We are there to chart the area and enforce that zone of separation. And then, within 120 days, all forces are required to be removed to cantonments and barracks, and we will also enforce that.

I told our soldiers that we're not going in alone, and this picture gives you some feeling as to who is going in with us. Every NATO

nation is participating in this operation, every nation except Iceland, which does not have an armed forces. Fifteen NATO nations are going in.

Just to give you some feeling of the size of the commitment, the British are going in with approximately 13,000 troops, the French are going in with approximately 8,000, the Germans, 4,000, Italians and Spain, about 2,000 each, and all of the rest of these nations, about 1,000 each. Proportional to the size of the countries, each of them is making a commitment comparable to the U.S. commitment to this mission, and every one of them is committing.

When I was at the defense ministers' meeting yesterday, I talked with all of these defense ministers, and I can tell you, Mr. Chairman, I have never seen a stronger feeling of unity of NATO and a stronger belief that what we're doing is right than what I saw at that meeting.

There is also going to be a participation of many non-NATO nations. Austria, for example, aside from providing some troops and some transport, is providing rights of passage through Austria. Hungary, just yesterday the Hungarian Parliament voted over 300 to 1 to allow Hungary to be used as a staging area. It will be our primary staging area when we go in to Bosnia.

Russia is a case of particular interest. I have met four times in the last 7 weeks with the Defense Minister of Russia, and the purpose of those meetings was to try to arrange a basis on which Russian troops could participate in this operation.

At the NATO defense ministers meeting in Williamsburg 2 months ago, all of the defense ministers unanimously said that they wanted Russian participation, but it could not be at the risk of having split or dual commands. We somehow had to solve the problem of getting their participation while maintaining the unity of command. It took four long, hard meetings to get that agreement worked out. It is now agreed to. Russia will have a brigade, about 2,000 troops, that will be embedded in the United States division, and will be under the operational control of General Joulwan and under the tactical control of the United States division commander, General Nash.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have been I guess what you would call a cold warrior for almost all of my career. Five years ago, even five months ago, I could not have imagined a circumstance which would have a Russian brigade operating under an American division commander in this peace enforcement operation in Bosnia. That is now agreed.

In addition to the participation of these countries, as I have described here, I want to cull out several of particular importance. The four Nordic countries—Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland—are creating a Nordic brigade. To that brigade will probably be added soldiers from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and possibly Poland. That brigade will be over 4,000 troops. They have offered that to be part of the American division.

One of the great advantages to us is that many of those troops have been in Bosnia, in that very area around Tuzla, for the last year or so, and they bring a knowledge and experience with them.

The Turks have now a battalion in Bosnia, also in the Tuzla area. They have offered to reinforce that battalion and make it a

part of the American brigade. So the multi-national division then, commanded by General Nash, will have about 20,000 American troops and probably 7 or 8 thousand troops of other countries, all of them under the command of General Nash.

The final two questions which I answered for our troops, when are we going in and when are we coming out? When are we going in was easy. I said you're going in after the signing of the peace agreement, starting a day or two after that, and we now know that the peace agreement is to be signed on December 14. So they will be going in mid-December.

The plan to phase them in is over a period of—we expect half of the force to be in in about 3 weeks, and the full force to be in in 6 to 8 weeks. This is a very rapid insertion of forces. We're doing that because we can send the force in over land, the bulk of it coming in from Germany, where the 1st Armored Division is based. They will go by rail from their bases in Germany to the staging base in Hungary, which the Hungarian Parliament just yesterday approved, and from there they will go by road into Bosnia. They will go by units, on their tracked vehicles. They will not be towed in, so they will go in in the position——

Mr. HUNTER [presiding]. Mr. Secretary, if you could pause just for a second here, we are going to continue the session because I understand our guests are going to leave not too long after 4 o'clock. I understand this is the last vote, is that correct?

Mr. DORNAN. That's what we've been told.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary PERRY. The last question which I answered for them is when will you be coming out. I told them you'll be coming out—the whole force will be coming out about a year after they go in.

I wanted to describe to you what I expect to have been accomplished in that year's time. I call this the end state of IFOR.

We believe that all of the military tasks will have been long since completed, that the cessation of hostilities will be maintained, the forces will be separated, territories transferred, and perhaps most importantly, the pattern of violence which has been going on there for the last 4 years will have been broken for a year as of that point.

While all of this is going on, there will be, in parallel, a civilian implementation underway. It is not our job to do that civilian implementation, but we create the secure environment which makes this possible. We are a necessary but, of course, not a sufficient condition for this action to take place, and we fully expect that all of those functions will be underway by the end of the year, but we expect those will have many years to go. Our job is to get them safely launched.

Finally, we believe that the conditions for a reduced and stable region military force balance will be achieved, and we can discuss that in more detail. But the main point here is that the peace agreement calls for an arms control process to be established. It gives it 6 months to get this established, and it calls for a drawdown, a build-down of forces based on the CFE treaty model. It involves not only the three warring parties, but the whole region.

This is an exemplary program. There will be a conference in Bonn the week before Christmas to put together the details of how this whole arms control process is going to be conducted.

If, on the other hand, at the end of 6 months this is not showing progress, is not showing success, we believe we cannot accept an instability, an imbalance in the military forces in the region at the time we leave. Therefore, we are prepared to work with other countries, through third parties, to build up the arms in the Bosnian Federation, if necessary. I make that point because I want to point out that one of the major causative factors in the war was the imbalance between the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serbs to begin with. We do not want to leave that imbalance and, therefore, an instability factor when we leave, and we want to solve that problem and believe we can solve that problem in this 1-year time period.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I did want to make a final wrap-up statement.

We fully understand the dangers of participating in this peace enforcement effort in Bosnia. But make no mistake about it. If we let this war continue, we will also have the danger of dealing with a continuing war. That is the real alternative to going in with this peace implementation force.

We do not live in a world without risks. We have to make choices, and if we choose to let the war continue, we must be prepared first of all to avert our gaze at the scenes of killings and atrocities which will follow, and secondly, prepared to take the risk of this war spreading.

I believe that we should, instead, take the first risk, the risk of sending a peace implementation force in, which is a risk for peace. Thank you very much for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Perry follows:]

Statement of
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry
On the Deployment of U.S. Troops
with the Bosnia Peace Implementation Force

House Committee on International Relations
House Committee on National Security

November 30, 1995

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Secretary Christopher has already described the Bosnia peace agreement that was initialed in Dayton. This agreement was achieved through tireless efforts of the Secretary and his lead negotiator, Dick Holbrooke. Dick's team included LTG Wes Clark from the Joint Staff and Jim Pardew from my staff. As a result of their efforts we have a real opportunity to achieve peace in Bosnia and protect and advance America's security interests in Europe.

Last Friday I spoke to 700 leaders from the First Armored Division -- every leader from the Division commander down to the company NCO's. I can tell you they understand the mission we are giving them, they are trained and ready and enthusiastic. The First Armored Division will be the core of the U.S. ground component in the Bosnia Peace Implementation Force (IFOR). They had five questions they wanted me to answer and I want to tell you and the American people what I told our soldiers.

The questions were, "Why should we commit U.S. forces to IFOR in Bosnia? Who else is sending troops? What is our mission? When will we deploy? And what is our exit strategy?"

After I answer these questions, GEN Shalikashvili will talk more about the specific mission tasks of our forces, their capabilities and the command structure. He has just come from reviewing the NATO plans with the NATO Military Committee.

Why should we send ground forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina?

I believe there is a set of propositions that create an "iron logic" as to why we should commit ground forces to Bosnia as part of the NATO implementation force:

The United States has vital political, economic and security interests in Europe.

The war in Bosnia threatens these interests.

We now have an opportunity -- the first real opportunity in four years -- to end this war.

To seize this opportunity, a NATO force is required to implement the peace.

The United States is the only nation that can lead that force to success.

Finally, although there will be risks associated with this operation, the risks to the United States of allowing this war to continue and perhaps spread are even greater.

It is this "iron logic" that drives the decision that we should, at this time, commit ground troops to the NATO IFOR. Let me expand on each of those points very briefly.

The United States has vital political, economic and security interests in Europe. I regard this as an indisputable fact. For the past fifty years we pledged our lives and treasure to preserve the security of Europe against the threat of the Warsaw Pact. We understood that keeping Europe stable and secure ensured our own security. The threat from the Warsaw Pact has passed from the scene, but the collapse of the Soviet empire unleashed ethnic rivalries that continue to threaten stability in Europe and Central Asia. We are in the process of creating new structures to deal with these problems -- the Partnership for Peace, an expanded NATO, and a pragmatic partnership with Russia, but the war in Bosnia threatens those positive developments.

When I say the war threatens our interests, I am not referring to the actual war itself and the direct consequences of the war, as appalling as those are. Many of you will support this commitment in part on the grounds that we have a moral obligation to seize this opportunity to end the killing and the atrocities. I am deeply sympathetic to that view, but as the Secretary of Defense I try to base my recommendations on colder analysis.

I'm talking instead about the danger of this war expanding to a wider part of Europe. This is not an academic concern. Only two months ago, I would have given you even odds that the Croat offensive in Bosnia would provoke a renewed, all-out war between Serbia and Croatia. And all during the last three and a half years, the danger has been palpable that this war would spread south into Kosovo and Macedonia, involving Albania, and perhaps Greece and Turkey. Given that we have the opportunity, there is certainly a moral imperative to stop the bloodshed and violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it is that danger of a wider war that is the most significant threat to U.S. interests. The best way of avoiding the spread of the war is to stop it.

We now have such an opportunity. It is the first time in four years that we have been able to get all of the parties to step forward to sign an agreement. I talked with each of the presidents involved and their delegations in Dayton. I believe there were two factors that brought them reluctantly to this agreement. First of all, a war weariness -- four years of fighting, a quarter of a million people killed, two million refugees. They are just sick of the war. Previous diplomatic efforts had been thwarted by the belief of one or more of the parties that they had more to gain by continuing to fight.

The second factor was that the warring parties were impressed and awed at the military capability of the United States and NATO. They got a sample of that during the bombing raids. They witnessed our military power, but they also came to believe that, in the context of an agreement, that power would be used constructively, not to harm them, but to enforce the peace. That was the solid foundation which allowed them to step forward and make the necessary compromises to reach this peace agreement. Compromises, by the way, for which the three Presidents will be criticized in their own countries.

Therefore, in order to seize this opportunity for peace, we must make an American commitment to participate. None of the parties, certainly not the Bosnian Federation, and also surprisingly, neither the Croats or Serbians, would have been willing to sign the peace agreement without an American commitment to participation in the IFOR. And one of the parties has already publicly stated that they would withdraw from the agreement if that commitment to participate is not met.

So the real alternative to implementing this peace agreement, to passing on this chance for peace, is to allow the war to start up again. Failure to meet the American commitment could lead to another six months, another year, another two years of war -- resulting in humanitarian tragedies in Bosnia and risking the danger of the war spreading -- and thus endangering America's interests in European security.

This is not a blind plunge into a conflict. For four years and two administrations, we have, in the face of great pressure, refused to enter this war as a combatant on the ground. And we will not send U.S. troops into a war in Bosnia. We have said we will engage only to implement a peace agreement -- with the consent of the three parties. We now have that agreement and that consent. If the parties don't sign or if they otherwise renege on the consent, we won't go forward.

And we will be taking every possible action to minimize the risks necessarily entailed in the IFOR. NATO is going in with a large force -- 60,000 total on the ground in Bosnia. Sixty thousand is the number of troops that GEN Joulwan, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, has determined he needs to accomplish the mission. Additional support troops will be located in neighboring countries. The air strike component will also be located out of country -- the commanders will have access to as much NATO air power as they require. Some have argued that we could get by with a smaller force on the ground. A large force has advantages both from the point of view of deterrence and for planning our deployment. In any event, if we err, I prefer it to be on the side of sending in too many. If it turns out we don't need that many, we can pull some of them out. That is a lot better than not sending enough and scrambling to put more in later.

The American component of this force will include 20,000 ground troops in Bosnia. There are sound military reasons to organize our military presence around a full American division which has the advantage of self-sufficiency and organic support

elements. The American force will be able to protect itself under any circumstances. This large a force also is indicative of our size and our leadership position in NATO.

We are going in with a well-armed and well-trained force and with robust rules of engagement. The U.S. ground contingent is built around the 1st Armored Division. Nobody should doubt that the 1st Armored Division is capable of taking care of itself. The 1st AD's Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, artillery, and Apache helicopters will be sufficient to take on any opposition in the region.

Who else is going?

Two thirds of the IFOR will be non-U.S. While there will be 20,000 Americans in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as of today, more than 25 nations have stated an intent to join this force. Every NATO nation except Iceland plans to send troops. The British 12,000 to 14,000; the French 7,000 to 9,000; the Germans 4,000; Italians and Spanish about 2,000 each; and nine other nations about 1,000 each. In addition, there are more than a dozen non-NATO nations that have offered forces.

The 1st AD commander, MAJ GEN Bill Nash, will have under his command his own division plus some other U.S. units, but he will also command soldiers from seven to 10 other countries.

He will have a Nordic brigade of 4,500 troops, who are well-trained and well disciplined, and know the terrain. This brigade will consist of Norwegians, Finns, Danes, Swedes, and perhaps a Polish battalion. A very positive aspect is that many of their personnel have served a year or more on the ground in the Tuzla area where our troops will be centered. We can learn from them; in fact, our survey teams already are benefiting from the experience of the Nordic forces.

MAJ GEN Nash will also have a Turkish task force of one or two battalions. And he will have a Russian brigade. This poses some challenges to MAJ GEN Nash, but it's also a historic opportunity. I've spent most of my life as a "Cold Warrior," and as recently as a few years ago I could not have imagined the prospect of a Russian brigade serving under an American division commander.

I have met with GEN Grachev four times in the last seven weeks, trying to hammer out the agreement for Russian participation. We agreed on an arrangement putting the Russian brigade under GEN Joulwan's operational control, but giving him a Russian deputy who will transmit Joulwan's orders to that brigade. GEN Grachev agreed that MAJ GEN Nash will have tactical control of that brigade.

In addition to the military arrangement, GEN Grachev and I discussed the issue of political control. We reached agreement "in principle" on an arrangement that gives Russia the opportunity to consult, to be fully informed and to have input on matters involving Russian forces. This will be done through a formal consultative committee.

But the final decisions of political control will be left to the North Atlantic Council, preserving unity of command. NATO and Russia would take each other's views into account, but if any disagreement cannot be resolved through this committee, the decisions would stand. Russia, of course, would have the option to withdraw from the operation, but we do not expect that contingency to develop. In any event, inability to agree would not prevent NATO from proceeding.

I have invested so much time on this issue because of the impact that Russian participation will have on the future security in Europe. Last month, I met with all the NATO defense ministers in Williamsburg, Virginia. There was unanimous agreement that we wanted Russian participation -- providing it could be arranged without jeopardizing unity of command. In the Europe of the future, we do not want to isolate or exclude Russia. We want to find a way to include them inside the circle working with us, rather than outside the circle in a posture of confrontation.

The wide participation in the IFOR is a symbol of the new Europe. The effort will define how security in Europe is going to be handled for decades to come. In effect, we will be defining what post-Cold War Europe is all about and how its security will be assured. We will be creating new relationships with these military leaders of other countries, not just NATO countries, that will have a positive effect on the security of the United States for decades to come. But the entire effort depends on U.S. leadership. That is the lesson of Dayton, where U.S. leadership made the difference in diplomacy. That is the lesson of the NATO bombing campaign, where U.S. leadership stiffened the resolve of NATO. And that is the lesson that European leaders repeat to me at every meeting -- if the U.S. leads, the military job will be done right and we will succeed.

What is the mission for IFOR?

The mission of IFOR is to oversee and enforce implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreement: Cessation of hostilities, withdrawal to agreed lines, creation of a zone of separation, return troops and weapons to cantonments. And, of course, IFOR will be responsible for its own self-defense and freedom of movement. The forces, their training, their equipment and their Rules of Engagement (ROE) are geared to these missions. I've just completed my second trip to the units getting ready for the operation. I have talked with every commander in the U.S. chain: from SACEUR, GEN Joulwan, who will be in overall command; to ADM Smith, who will be the theater commander; to LTG Walker, the ground forces commander; to MAJ GEN Nash; to the brigade, battalion and company commanders and the senior NCO's. They understand the mission; they have the training and equipment they need; they are ready to go if the order comes.

This mission will be even-handed. If they get any provocations, either by the Bosnian Serbs or the Bosnian Federation forces, they will respond. They will have the authority to move anywhere in Bosnia. They will be based primarily in the Federation, but will be enforcing a zone of separation which goes several kilometers into Bosnian

Serb territory and will have to maintain lines of communication that pass through Bosnian Serb territory. Therefore in the peace agreement, we insisted on and got the authority to go anywhere in Bosnia to carry out our mission.

Our troops have all trained extensively for their mission. They will have robust Rules of Engagement and have been trained and disciplined in how to apply the ROEs. If our forces are attacked, or if hostile intent is demonstrated by opposing forces, our rules of engagement will permit the immediate and effective use of deadly force. Our troops are well-disciplined, and well-trained. They know how to react across the full spectrum of situations they might encounter. They will use force as required and have been trained to control the level of violence, but make no mistake, they will have full authority to use deadly force if they believe they need to.

It is important to be prepared for the mission, and we are. But the commanders also understand what they are not going to do. The IFOR will be operating under NATO military and political control, not under UN control. We expect the UN to give a mandate to a whole set of military and civil operations in Bosnia. IFOR will be the military side of that mandate. The civilian programs will include rebuilding the infrastructure, revitalizing the economy, bringing refugees back for resettlement, and providing for free elections. Those tasks will not be IFOR's job, but none of them can be done without IFOR successfully accomplishing its mission. IFOR must provide the security environment that allows all those other things to be done.

Our troops are not going to equip and train military forces. However, in order to achieve a lasting peace in the Balkans, it will be essential to achieve stable and balanced force levels within Bosnia-Herzegovina and among the states of the former Yugoslavia. That military stabilization should be achieved, to the extent possible, through arms limitations and reductions, rather than by the introduction of large quantities of new arms into the region. All of the parties agreed to an arms control process modeled after the CFE agreement which would result in stability through a build down of arms. As significant as the arms control measures in the Dayton agreement are, they may not be sufficient to achieve military stabilization. In that case, the United States will work with other countries to ensure that Federation armed forces obtain the necessary equipment and training by the time the NATO-led implementation force withdraws from Bosnia-Herzegovina. But we hope and expect that arms control will succeed because of the interest of the parties and their neighbors in Europe. One week after the Paris signing there will be a conference in Bonn to structure the arms control process.

We have recognized that there will be risks in this operation. But because the governments have consented, the risks do not come from entering into a war as a combatant and fighting organized units. We do expect that there may be individuals or gangs who challenge the authority of IFOR or try to harass the forces. We also expect problems from harsh weather, poor infrastructure and mines -- there may be as many as six million mines in the country.

Our forces have trained against these risks. Three weeks ago I visited our training areas at Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany. At Grafenwoehr all the units of the 1st AD went back through refresher training in their combat skills, such as tank gunnery practice. They then transitioned to Hohenfels where EUCOM has created a mini-Bosnia -- complete with villages, villagers, Serb and Federation armies, para-military units, blackmarketeers, smugglers, UN and NGO officials, bad roads, snipers, mines, mud and even CNN. The units are run through every conceivable scenario we could think up, and we had the help of British, French, Dutch and Canadian peacekeepers who have served in Bosnia and seen it all. If they succeeded in solving the problems, the trainers just made it harder. The objective, as stated by GEN Joulwan, was "to make the scrimmage harder than the game."

When will the troops deploy?

The timing of the operational deployments is dependent on the signing of the peace agreement, the UN Security Council resolution, and a North Atlantic Council decision to deploy the IFOR. I expect that GEN Joulwan will be given authority by the NAC today to deploy enabling forces, including some U.S. personnel, so that after the agreement is signed he can quickly stand up IFOR using European units already in Bosnia. This preparatory step is needed if the main body of U.S. and NATO troops are to be able to enter swiftly and safely, if the order to go is given. This step does not preempt Congress's consideration of our plans because the combat units of the 1st AD will not begin to flow until after the agreement is signed.

After the signing, the force would build up rapidly, moving from Germany to Bosnia by rail and road. By the end of the second month, we will have our entire force in and we'll maintain that and build down in the last few months. General Shalikashvili will lay out the schedule in more detail.

What is the exit strategy?

We believe the mission can be accomplished in one year, so we have built our plan based on that timeline. This schedule is realistic because the specific military tasks in the agreement can be completed in the first six months, and thereafter IFOR's role will be to maintain the climate of stability that will permit civil work to go forward. We expect that these civil functions will be successfully initiated in one year. But, even if some of them are not, we must not be drawn into a posture of indefinite garrison.

By the end of the first year, we expect that we will have achieved perhaps several months of a stable security environment, will have broken the cycle of violence and will have the civil program efforts starting to take hold. That is why I believe that the London Conference to get reconstruction and economic efforts off to a quick start is very important.

In the final analysis, it is up to the parties to achieve peace. Our effort will give them that opportunity.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize my belief that this is both a commitment that is important to our national interests and an achievable mission. History has demonstrated the consequences of instability in Europe. Two generations of Americans paid the price. The conditions for peace in the Balkans now exist. But they require American commitment and leadership. If we do not fulfill that commitment we will rue the consequences for the long term security of Europe and for our own security.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

General, we would like you to give your statement at this time. I might ask the witnesses, because of the fact that we've had a couple of interruptive votes here, and we've had some fairly extensive initial presentations, the time for our members to ask questions is being compressed by the moment. If you can perhaps make arrangements, we would like you to stay longer than the 4:20 time.

Is there a chance we could get you to stay around until 5 o'clock or so?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, I would really like to accommodate you just as much as we can, but 4:30 stretches it and it cuts into my next obligations.

Mr. HUNTER. General, how about you? Can you stick around for a while?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Yes, sir.

Mr. HUNTER. OK. Secretary Perry, can you stay possibly——

Secretary PERRY. I can stay until 5 o'clock, Mr. Chairman. Also, we would be prepared to have a follow-up meeting next week, if you would like, either a briefing or informal discussions, or a continuation of the hearing, if you prefer.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you so much. I appreciate it.

Secretary PERRY. We understand this is a very important issue to you and we do not——

Mr. HUNTER. Yes, it is, and the members have a number of questions. Unfortunately, the questions—this is a complex situation and some of the questions are complex and will take a while.

General, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI, U.S. ARMY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General SHALIKASHVILI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I know the time is short, but I would like to take just a few moments to brief you on NATO's plan for the implementation force, and on the part that U.S. forces will play in this implementation.

Before I begin, let me assure you that throughout the negotiations in Dayton I and my staff have been in constant contact with the negotiators, to ensure that the military tasks that would be assigned to the implementation force would be appropriate and would be executable. I am satisfied that the military tasks are, in fact, clearly defined, are appropriate, and are executable.

With that said, let me turn to the current situation in Bosnia and to the major threats that will face the IFOR.

The current situation as we have it today on the ground is as you see there. It has essentially remained stable for quite some time now. Nevertheless, our soldiers have to be prepared to deal with the threats shown on this chart. This has been the emphasis of this very extensive training that Secretary Perry talked about, and it will continue to be the emphasis of our training.

Now, the next chart outlines the mission of the IFOR. The mission is very clear and very limited in scope. The chain of command is straightforward, and the rules of engagement will properly protect our troops and allow them to get the job done.

With the help of the next two charts, let me show you the specific military tasks outlined in the agreement that the IFOR is expected to implement.

Secretary Perry already touched on these tasks. I just wanted to show you in more detail the time lines involved and exactly what they entail.

Could I have the next chart, please.

Now, just as important as it is to understand the tasks that the IFOR must be prepared to accomplish, so it is equally important to understand what tasks will not be the responsibility of the IFOR. Among these, the IFOR will not be responsible for the conduct of humanitarian operations. The IFOR will not be a police force. It will not conduct nation-building. It will not have the mission of disarming, or collecting, or controlling weapons, and it will not be responsible for moving refugees back.

With that, let me show you the chain of command. This NATO chain of command is straightforward. It will run from General Joulwan, to Admiral Smith, to British Lieutenant General Walker, who will command all the ground forces in Bosnia, and on to Major General Nash, shown in the lower left-hand corner, who will command the American division.

Let me just say a word about the rules of engagement. Under NATO's rules of engagement, our soldiers will have the right to use force, to include deadly force, to protect themselves against hostile acts or hostile intent, and they will be able to use this force, to include deadly force, if necessary, to get the job done.

The next chart, please.

In order to get the job done properly, and safely, the plan calls for this total force of approximately 60,000 troops in Bosnia. Of this number, this 60,000, the U.S. contribution will be, as Secretary Perry mentioned, 20,000 in Bosnia, with an additional 5,000 stationed in Croatia, and additional United States support forces, probably in the vicinity of 7,000, stationed in rim countries, such as Italy and Hungary, to provide the logistic support for the force in Bosnia and in Croatia.

This operation will also require a selected reserve callup of approximately 3,500 personnel in specialties such as civil affairs, psychological operations, military police, just to mention a few.

The operation will consist of five phases, and we are now in the first phase, the preparation phase. Phase II, the entry phase, will begin immediately following the signing of the peace agreement in Paris—Secretary Perry said on the 14th of December—followed immediately by the passage of the United Nations Security Council Resolution, and then the issuance of the activation order by NATO, which we expect to occur a day or two after the signing of the Paris peace agreement. So around maybe the 15th or 16th, we could expect the main forces to begin to deploy.

Let me discuss the deployment in more detail. As the President stated in his Monday address to the Nation, a small number of military personnel will have to be moved into the area early, ahead of the signing of the peace agreement, to establish an essential communications command and support structure, to enable the rapid arrival of forces once the peace agreement goes into effect.

The United States portion of these enabling forces will be 735 in Bosnia, with some 730 in Croatia, while other early deployments will go to Italy and Hungary to establish these forward staging areas.

Once the peace agreement goes into effect and NATO activates the deployment, French and British division headquarters will move in from the south to the two ports of Split and Ploce, while the United States division headquarters, with appropriate security forces, will enter from the north, from Hungary, through Croatia. At the same time, the IFOR headquarters and the ACE rapid reaction corps, that is the ground component headquarters for the operation, will move to Sarajevo and Kiseljak respectively.

As soon as these headquarters are established, IFOR will assume control of all UNPROFOR forces currently in the area and theater.

The establishment of headquarters will be quickly followed by the arrival of lead brigades, and most forces should be in place by the middle of February. Once the forces are in place, the divisional areas will look as you have seen on the previous chart that Secretary Perry showed you, and I would like to show you here once again.

Let me focus on the American sector, the American area. There are today, already, two UNPROFOR units located in the American area. That is the Turkish battalion task force and the Nordic battalion in Tuzla. Both of these units were previously referred to by Secretary Perry. Both have been most helpful in providing information assistance to our commanders since they have been conducting initial reconnaissance of the area in trying to familiarize themselves with the operation.

Our initial elements—that is, an assault command post with the requisite security forces—will move into Tuzla where right now the Nordic battalion is located.

Once all forces are deployed, our full division headquarters will be in Tuzla, together with an aviation brigade, and distributed throughout the area will be not only our two United States brigades, but also the Russian brigade, a Nordic brigade, and a Turkish battalion task force.

The plan also calls for the establishment of joint military commissions, composed of IFOR commanders and senior military commanders of each of the entities. The purpose of these commissions is to resolve military implementation issues and to ensure that the armed forces of the entities involved also take on the responsibility of doing many of the things that need to be done. You need to understand that these joint commissions will be established not only at the IFOR commanders level, but at all level of command all the way down to battalion commanders, who will also meet with their entity commander counterparts.

It is very important to understand that the success of the overall effort in Bosnia will depend not only on that which the IFOR does, shown here in blue, but that just as important is the civilian effort that must be ongoing, shown here in green.

Let me close with some final comments. After long consultations and discussions with my fellow Joint Chiefs, on Monday I met with my fellow NATO chiefs of defense in Brussels. We spent a long time going over the NATO plan for this operation. We concluded

that the mission and tasks were clear, that the chain of command was right, without any dual keys, and that the rules of engagement were appropriate to the tasks at hand. So we approved the plan and we sent it on to the North Atlantic Council for their approval, which we will hopefully gain by the end of this week or sometime this weekend.

I must tell you that while the mission is tough, and while we must be prepared to accept casualties, I firmly believe that our soldiers have trained very hard, that they're well trained, that they understand the task at hand, and that they understand the threats they are going to be facing, and that they are ready. I believe that the mission is doable.

With that, let me close, Mr. Chairman, and I believe now Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry and I are prepared to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much, General.

To start, the gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Christopher, at some point there's a possibility that you are going to be in a room with the President, where if there should be a terroristic action like the ones that occurred in Somalia that led to literally a stampede and an overwhelming wave of public opinion to the effect that we should leave quickly, and that could possibly happen in this situation.

You may at some point be in a room with the President, after a terroristic act, with the President's poll numbers going down, with a large percentage of the American people shouting for an early exit from this operation, and you and Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili have talked about all of the preparations that you've made, for all the contingencies. But that's a very possible contingency.

I haven't seen in this administration the political backbone, if you will, the moral authority, if you really believe that this is a mission that has to be accomplished, to stand and continue to maintain a force in the face of overwhelming negative public opinion.

Have you addressed that contingency and are you prepared to advise the President to maintain this operation in the face of very adverse CNN and other news media and an adverse public opinion in the United States?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Congressman, I don't purport to be a political expert. I try to do the job that I've been assigned as well as I can with the expertise that I have.

But one thing I would say is this has to be a demonstration that the President is not unduly motivated by polls, because if he were, he would not be recommending the deployment of American forces. By all accounts, this action is not popular, and yet he's doing it because he believes it's right. I believe that's the way he would weigh the situation if the contingency that you mentioned came to pass. This is a matter that he regards as fundamental to American leadership. It will have great consequences for America if we have come this far and if we now step aside, if we now falter.

The President last midsummer, when the matter was at crisis point, initiated this new initiative. He took several steps that have

been successful, that have brought about first a major bombing campaign in Bosnia, that produced the circumstances in which a peace agreement could be reached, first a cessation of hostilities and then the comprehensive agreement in Dayton. We have come this far. We have a chance for peace.

I met yesterday with the Prime Minister of Bosnia, Harris Soladic, who I have spent a lot of time with, and he said to me, "Chris, we're just 1 inch away from peace." He said, "We can't falter now." He regards this decision by the American people and Congress as the most important decision for Bosnia in the 4 years that he's been in his office. So we have a chance for peace and I think that's the way the President will weigh this decision. I have not seen him be affected on this particular issue or, indeed, on other issues, such as many issues he's taken, be it NAFTA or Mexico.

Mr. HUNTER. I was thinking of Somalia. We were literally driven out of Somalia, Mr. Secretary, by the national news media, and overwhelming sentiment to exit.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Hunter, I would have to say that Somalia was an instance which was a learning experience for us. We have all, I think, benefitted from the lessons of Somalia. Clearly, the mission went beyond where it was intended. Clearly, we were engaged in some activities there that we would not repeat here.

For example, it is not the intention of IFOR to try to track down war criminals, even though they've been indicted. So yes, we learned some lessons from Somalia, Mr. Hunter, and I hope there will be no repetition of that.

We will be watching the situation as it develops. The American troops are going into a situation in which the parties want peace. If war resumes, clearly we will be in a new situation. But I think IFOR has to have the capacity to deal with rogue elements. We don't expect any organized resistance, but if there is sporadic resistance, then IFOR must be prepared to deal with that kind of a situation.

I emphasize that this is different than Somalia. This is different than Vietnam. It's different than Lebanon because here we have a peace agreement between three parties, who want our assistance in carrying out their peace agreement.

Mr. HUNTER. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Montgomery.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a great picture here, and I'm sure our witnesses saw it today, that shows a little Bosnian boy following our great American soldiers into that country. I hope this is as good sign, that young boys like to follow American soldiers. I was very proud of that picture.

To our witnesses—and you should know this—it seems today that the House of Representatives, if they took a vote, a resolution of support would be defeated in the House of Representatives. That's my personal opinion, and I have moved around pretty well today. That doesn't mean a week from now it could change. But I think this would happen today, and probably next week, that the House of Representatives will defeat any type of support for putting Americans on the ground in Bosnia.

Now, one of my questions is, if I am wrong correct me, as I understand it the President is going to put the main forces on the ground whether this resolution passes or not. I am just really searching. Am I correct in that assumption, if he does not get the support of the House?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Congressman, let me answer in this way. Certainly not any of us, here at the table nor the President, would intend to surrender his constitutional responsibilities, his constitutional authorities. I think he is taking the same position that President Bush did at the time he sought the support of Congress with respect to the activities in Desert Storm.

But that being said, let me emphasize what the Congress does is very important. The actions that Congress takes will be very significant. So I do not think that it is possible to just put this to one side and say the President is going ahead in any event. He will maintain his constitutional authorities, as I believe he must, but nevertheless, he has come asking the Congress for support.

And whatever the situation today, Mr. Montgomery—and certainly I have to respect your very experienced view—I believe strongly that as Congress considers this more fully, as the facts are more fully laid out that Congress will come to see that they should support the President in this situation because the alternative is so dreadful.

Secretary PERRY. Mr. Montgomery, could I add to that?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Secretary, you can do anything under my time.

Secretary PERRY. I told you that last week I met with our troops and tried to answer their questions. I should also tell you they asked me a question. And the question which I got from most of them was when we go into Bosnia will our Congress support us? Will we be able to keep this issue separate from partisan politics?

I will meet with them again in a few weeks and I hope at that time that the answer I can give them is, yes. that answer is not only important to us, it is very important to the troops who are going to be out there.

Mr. HUNTER. Will my friend yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Let me go ahead and get these questions. That leads into some options. We have been thinking about some options. I hope the White House has, too. Why even send a resolution up here if the American people do not support it, and that has an effect on the House of Representatives. We pretty well listen to what the people of this country want and our calls are 10-to-1 in opposition to putting troops on the ground, so why even send it up here?

Second, why do you not wait until the main forces are on the ground in Bosnia and then ask support for the troops? [Laughter.]

I did not think that is funny, maybe it is.

Third, send a supplemental appropriation, a funding resolution to fund the troops for special pay, ammunition, and food.

Secretary PERRY. We believe, first of all, that the interests and values of Americans support this mission. And we believe we have a case to make, we are making it to the public, we are making it to the Congress. And we believe that we are going to succeed in that case. As I have indicated to you, in my talking with the troops,

not only will we feel better about this but certainly our troops will feel better if they see they have the support of the Congress when they go into this operation.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bateman? Oh, excuse me.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. There is just one other thing. I will get back to this National Guard Reserve. There is a tendency not to use the combat arms of the Guard and Reserve. You are using them in the air. But if you are putting the forces in there, the Guards train, you pay them well, you use both the combat and support. In the Persian Gulf war they did not use much of the ground forces as they should have in combat of National Guard, in my opinion. I just wanted to put that on the record.

Secretary PERRY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Montgomery.

Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I thank our distinguished panel of witnesses.

The American commitment was made by the President to put American ground forces on the ground in Bosnia if there was a peace agreement. And, of course, we have the peace agreement now.

I have spent some considerable time looking at the terms of the peace agreement. There are some things in it that bother me and I wish had been negotiated a little differently but that is not the point of my concern.

The real point of my concern is whether or not this peace agreement is more than a document. Is it something that we have a very high level of confidence that the leaders of the three warring factions, who signed it, are going to be supported by their people that they purport to lead in support of peace as the best alternative rather than continuation of the struggle?

In this document there are certain things that the previously warring parties are obligated to do. They are to, for one thing, very promptly after the transfer of authority to have all foreign forces—and here my concern is the radical Islamic elements that are there—withdrawn from country. There are other movements of forces that are supposed to take place early on after the agreement is entered into.

It would seem to me more than prudent for our deployment to abide the happening of those things as a test of whether or not the parties do, indeed, want and are, in fact, going to substantially comply with what they have undertaken to do in the terms of the peace agreement.

Barring that, it seems to me that the commitment that we have made is not being reciprocated by the commitment they have made to peace in fact, as opposed to peace in theory. I am particularly concerned about the radical Muslim element which our military people are talking about as a substantial risk factor for our people.

If, in fact, the previously warring parties are unwilling to make the withdrawals, to do the things they are committed to do, then I would assume that the whole premise of our sending people is destroyed because they do not want peace, they want the continuation of hostilities. In which case, the premise is bogus. I am very concerned about those elements.

There is another element that I do not know if you all can address today that I think needs to be addressed. That is whether or not, given the President's decision to make this deployment and the obvious cost involved, we are going to have a defense appropriation and authorization bill. It seems to me that this makes it of paramount importance that that be done. We cannot continue making more and more commitments, bigger and bigger deployments and spending less and less for defense and criticizing the Congress which is trying to provide more adequately for the defense.

I think these things have to be addressed and they are a part of whether or not I think the Congress prudently can support the President as I think most of us will. We want to do it. But we are not sure it is, we are not totally convinced it is the right thing to do, but we want to find a way to do it if we can be persuaded that it is the right thing to do for our country.

You would go a long ways with me if the substantial deployment of American forces abided compliance with some of the critical military aspects of the agreement that has been signed as a test of whether or not it is an agreement that will hold and will be abided by.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Bateman, that is a very thoughtful question and I think it deserves as serious an answer as we can give. The three leaders, the three Presidents came to Dayton. I was very concerned that they would come in a half-hearted mood. And that they would threaten to leave or would leave in a very short period of time. I spent a lot of time in Dayton. I went there four times during the 21 days they were there.

I was very impressed with the seriousness of their purpose. They are men who have had strong differences in the past and, yet, they stayed all 21 days. President Tudjman had go to back to reform his Government but judged by that, I think there was a determination to seek peace in this situation.

We, of course, were not prepared to go ahead with deployment until there was an actual peace treaty signed and that has not happened yet. And we are watching things day-by-day. But if the peace agreement is signed in Paris and if it appears that the parties are proceeding toward implementation, then I believe it is time for us to deploy. Any very substantial delay will, I think, undermine the very result we are trying to achieve. I think it would be very counterproductive if we did not deploy as we have been asked to do by them under the agreement.

Now, the reports I have had back from the region are, in the large, in the main, very encouraging. President Izetbegovic has been very much lauded by the Bosnian population for what he achieved. Prime Minister Silajdzic mentioned that to me yesterday. I think that President Milosevic, in Serbia, has been well received, and certainly President Tudjman has, I think, gotten the approbation of his country.

Clearly there were some changes made in the map. There were some decisions and compromises made that will be unpopular in various segments. For example, the result in Sarajevo, which substantively speaking is a very positive result—that divided city has now been reunited under the federation, a better result, really,

than I could have anticipated when we went into the negotiations—that has caused some dislocation.

But the Bosnian Government is reaching out to the Serbs in the city and is attempting to reassure them that they can live in tranquility and peace within Sarajevo. So I understand your question, I understand the importance of it, but I do believe that deployment must take place promptly so that we can carry out, NATO can carry out its responsibilities under the agreement and give the agreement the best chance to succeed.

I do not know whether, Secretary Perry, you want to comment?

Secretary PERRY. I would only comment to one particular issue of importance to us. That is the compliance with the clause in the agreement which says that foreign troops would be removed. We are particularly concerned with the Mujahedeen forces being removed from there.

As recently as yesterday, President Izetbegovic confirmed that that would be done.

Mr. BATEMAN. If I might be indulged. Do any of the witnesses have any comments with reference to the defense appropriation or authorization bills and their prospects?

Secretary PERRY. I would be in a much stronger position to discuss that tomorrow. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from Colorado, Mrs. Schroeder.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I want to say to the three witnesses I appreciate your indulgence of this question and I will stipulate that I am a minority on this committee. But let me just tell you my frustration. I have been talking about burden-sharing since I got here. And I have always felt the United States taxpayers have subsidized Europe forever in their defense, big time. And I think I can prove that every way from the Moon. And Europe has come up with a safety net that is the dream of a Pat Schroeder, oh, to have health care for every citizen; oh, to be able to have child care for any kid that needed it; oh, to be able to provide free college education. They could spend their money that way because we provided their defense.

I understand why it was needed in the beginning. I think it went on too long. But in the name of burden-sharing, and in the name of today let me build on what Mr. Bateman was talking about. Because I cannot believe that the President is thinking about signing the DOD appropriations bill in this light.

Even during the cold war we never put more money in defense than the Joint Chiefs and the Pentagon asked for. And now we have got $7 billion more in there for things like B–2 bombers. I would love to know how B–2 bombers are going to help in Bosnia, but never mind.

So we got this bill with $7 billion more, and it is no secret to any American that this place is absolutely deadlocked on a budget where we are struggling to try and just hold together the very meager little safety net we have in the United States, that probably would get an "F" by comparison to any European standards, and we may blow it up.

And what I am hearing is that people are telling the President he has to sign this defense bill if he is going to go to Bosnia. Is

the bill going to Bosnia going to be 7 billion dollars' worth of addons that you gentlemen did not even ask for? Is that what we are really getting on top of everything else? I mean I am really troubled by this.

I think if that is what it is, those of us who have been talking about burden-sharing forever, it blows my mind.

And I also would like to know what percentage of the air support is being done by European allies, as a percentage basis; what percentage of the naval support; what percentage of the intelligence? Because I think we are doing a majority of that so to say, we just keep talking about, oh, we are only doing one-third of the ground, but there is a whole lot of the rest of this operation that we are bearing up under.

And so I just refuse to be feeling guilty and, at the same time, looking at, are we going to close down how many Head Start centers, and how many vaccinations are going to be shut off? That really troubles me and that is what I come to the table with.

Secretary PERRY. I will make three comments on that, Mrs. Schroeder. The first is that the President's decision on the defense appropriation bill is going to involve a complex set of issues which have as much to do with other appropriation bills he is looking at as anything else. He will make that decision tonight. I do not want to foreshadow his decision. That is up for him to make and announce.

Whatever the defense appropriation bill is and whenever it is signed, the proximate $2 billion cost of this operation will have to come out of that bill. It will be reprogrammed from sources in that bill, and we understand that.

I think this would be a lot better discussion to have tomorrow than today.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. But do you not have any input into that decision? I mean does the President ask you——

Secretary PERRY. Yes, I have made my input clear and explicit to the President as to what action I wish he would take. I do not want to share the advice I gave the President. I think that is private between me and him.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. But then you would be saying to me that instead of a $7 billion addon it would really only be $5 billion because you get the $2 billion out of there?

Secretary PERRY. At whatever level the defense appropriation bill is, $2 billion will come out of it for this purpose.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Could I have an answer to the question about the air, and the naval and the intelligence?

Secretary PERRY. Yes. We will be about one-third of the ground force, as we have said. As far as the naval force is concerned, we do not anticipate having dedicated naval forces to this operation after the first month. We will have, and have always maintained a powerful fleet in the Mediterranean, which patrols in the Adriatic. But we do not anticipate the need for naval forces to support this operation directly.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. And we are most of the Adriatic fleet though, right?

Secretary PERRY. We have our own fleet in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. And we keep it there for reasons beyond our support of NATO.

We are a world power and we project power in the Mediterranean, as well as other places in the world, just as we have a major fleet in the Pacific.

In terms of the air forces we have what, about half of the air force that is in Aviona.

General SHALIKASHVILI. We have sightly less than half the airplanes that participate in this operation.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. And what about the intelligence resources, the satellites and so forth?

Secretary PERRY. Each country supplies their own tactical intelligence. We have a unique capability in what we call strategic intelligence, some of which will be applicable to this mission. It is not an extra, it is not an incremental cost to us. It is something that falls out of missions we are conducting for other purposes.

When we accumulate costs of this operation we tried to identify those costs which we would otherwise not be incurring and we estimate those to be about $2 billion. That is incremental to what we would be spending otherwise.

That does not, for example, include the salaries of troops because we would be paying the salaries for troops anyway.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Schroeder.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank all three of you distinguished panelists for coming in. Secretary Perry, as you know, I have a great deal of personal respect for you and was somewhat taken aback in your response to a question by Mr. Montgomery where you raised an issue of partisan politics in a vote on whether or not we are going to support our troops.

I say I resent that because there is not going to be any partisan politics in this body or in this committee on whether or not we support our troops. I mean, I think that, in my own mind, that is a ridiculous assertion.

Let me say this to you, Mr. Secretary, at this time——

Secretary PERRY. Mr. Weldon, it was not——

Mr. WELDON. This, your comment was partisan politics, I wrote it down. Over the past 2 years, this Congress has gone on record on a number of occasions, in a very bipartisan manner, to tell the President and this administration that we want the arms embargo lifted. It was not a partisan vote, it was a bipartisan vote, in both bodies.

In the last 3 months this body, in a bipartisan vote, has sent the signal that we do not want ground troops in Bosnia and it is not some isolationist policy that we do not want to be a part of NATO. Many of my colleagues, including myself, support the air strikes, the airlift, the sealift, the command and control, and all the other support we are providing.

We just have a problem picking up the bulk of the load in terms of the ground troops because of what we feel is the risk to our

troops. But it certainly has not been a partisan debate and it will not be.

In fact, let me say this to you. I hope there is not a vote. I know what the numbers are. I hope there is not a vote because I do not want to see our President undermined in terms of a decision he made. He made the decision to send the troops there long before we could even get involved in a debate and we knew that.

The reason why we voted 2 weeks ago was because the final agreement had not been negotiated or signed, yet, we knew ground troops were going to be a part of it, in spite of the fact that we voted in a bipartisan manner against that.

I hope we do not have a vote. But I can tell you what you can tell those troops when you go back, in terms of whether or not we will support them, we are going to support them with every ounce of energy in our body. And I will tell you what we are not going to let happen. We are not going to allow a repeat of Somalia where a political decision is superimposed over a request made by a commanding general in the theater of operation. We are not going to let that happen.

And, in fact, I think that is where the focus should be. When General Joulwan is in place and tells us he needs additional tanks or armor or troops we had better give them to him and I will be there to fight for that, everything that he asks for. We will be there for our troops, make no mistake about it. They will get every ounce of energy and muscle that this country has to provide because we are behind our men and women.

So I hope we do not have the vote, Mr. Secretary, because I think it will do damage to the integrity of this President as the leader of our country even though I think it is a failed policy.

Let me say this to you in further regard to what I think our concerns are from my own standpoint. The personal safety of our troops is not based upon some armchair decision I made. I have a personal friend who spent the last 3 years in Somalia. In fact, he has been a volunteer from Rhode Island, a volunteer firefighter, John Jordan, who was honored by ABC News as their person of the week for providing emergency response to the people of Sarajevo, of all factions by the way, working with Keenan Slinick, who was the fire chief in Sarajevo who was assassinated at the age of 31.

John Jordan is an American volunteer, who enlisted 50 other Americans to go over with him for the past 3 years and work with the people of Sarajevo. I asked John Jordan what he thought, largely because he is an American, he has been over there and been on the ground. He has been shot twice. He has had his chest punched in by the butt of a rifle by a Serbian officer. He has had concussions and shrapnel wounds.

John Jordan gave an AP interview on October 22. And let me show you what he said. This is what John Jordan, American citizen, 3 years in Sarajevo said, "We are going to face some very, very ugly, heavily armed, prone to violence people who are totally unafraid of the United States. I have had more than one Serb commander say to me, I really wish the United States instead of the French were running the airport. If we can just get enough of you in one place, at one time, we can kill 200 or 300 of you, who will

be out of this war forever, and you will not be a problem any more. You will leave just like you left Beirut."

I know that is not what any of you will tolerate and we will not tolerate it, but that is what scares us to our bones in this body and it is not partisan politics.

So let me say, in closing, that I would ask for your consideration of our concerns and reservations about what we are about to embark on. I have grave reservations about our technology, for instance, in being able to deal with 6 million landmines. I understand that we have no technology that we are taking over there that can concretely allow us to identify plastic mines. That the equipment we are taking over is designed to allow us to use and detect metal mines, but when it comes to plastic mines, we have no technology ready to go.

The only thing I know we have is an infrared camera which is only successful under ideal conditions. And it scares me to death, in closing, that when asked in a recent Newsweek article about the daunting problem of mines in Bosnia, General Reimer, the Army Chief of Staff is quoted as saying and I quote, "The IFOR warriors will be down on their hands and knees with bayonets probing and praying."

Secretary PERRY. Mr. Weldon, I would like to comment on a few of those points. First of all I appreciate your comment that when a commander is asked for equipment and other means to support their troops that you will support that. I am here to tell you that I do not need anybody to tell me what our soldiers need. When our commanders need weapons and equipment I will see that they get them. I will welcome your support but you will never have to counsel me on this question.

Second, on the——

Mr. WELDON. I was referring more to the President than you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary PERRY. I sign the deployment orders. I send those troops out. And I go to their families when they are injured or killed and talk to them and explain to them. So I take this very personally.

On the mine question, I would like to ask General Shalikashvili, who has had considerable experience with commanding forces, operating in very heavy mine environments. I do not want to minimize that problem at all, it is a very serious one.

I also want to say something about the comment from the Bosnian Serb that you made. The Bosnian Serbs have been making threats and bombast and bluster to us for years. They have been doing it relative to our air strikes, what they were going to do to our pilot, what they were going to do to our airplanes.

We have not let that stop us from doing what we thought was the right thing to do. We will not be bluffed. We are the premier military power in the world and we will not be bluffed by boastful statements like you put up there. I understand it was not your statement, it was one of your friends quoting the Bosnian Serbs. They have been doing that consistently for the last few years, we cannot let that influence U.S. policy.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Let me first second what Secretary Perry said about the danger of letting statements like that influ-

ence us. I believe in the long run our soldiers will pay a heavier price if it becomes known out in the world that we will be scared away from doing what needs to be done by statements like that or by killing American soldiers that we will prematurely withdraw or can be scared away.

But let me address the very serious issue that you raised about mines. There are many people who run around and give you the number of mines that are out there. I don't know how they know. If we knew how many mines are out there it would be very easy but we do not know how many mines are out there. I ask you not to trust some of the predictions and numbers that you hear.

It is clear that there are many mines out there. It is clear, also, that we do not know where all of them are. We have been in Germany for a long, long time now tracking, to the best of our knowledge, every week the number of minefields and mine locations. It is a data base that is updated every week, based on information we get from UNPROFOR on the ground and anybody else, including Bosnian forces and others. So we do have a data base on quite a few minefields and mine locations. I happened to review it this morning, the data that we have now.

We have written into the agreement that within a very short period of time of the agreement going into effect, it is the responsibility of the former warring factions, the parties to mark those minefields that they know about. And they do not know about all of them but they know about an awful lot of them. And then to begin to remove them and to remove any other roadblocks or incendiaries or boobytraps that might exist.

I have operated in an area that was mined probably as many sections in Bosnia when I was the commander of an operation involving some 32,000 troops in northern Iraq and eastern Turkey. The conditions were not much different than here. There was snow on the ground in the mountains. There were later on torrential rains, and mines would literally wash down the road and you never knew what you were going to step on.

The best guarantee I know is because there is no technology that would allow us to detect all mines, as you so correctly said, is to use first of all, whenever we can, equipment to clear mines that endangers our troops the least. We have plows and mine beaters that can be attached to track vehicles that proceed the track vehicles that can explode mines ahead of our movement. But they cannot be used everywhere.

So then sometimes in some places where you cannot get mine detectors in or you cannot get these plows in or where you are sure that there are plastic mines that cannot be detected by mine detectors, you must go back to the old-fashioned way of probing for mines.

And while it is the responsibility of the warring factions to remove those mines, we have to train our people to be extraordinarily aware of it, and when they do run into an area where the mines have to be cleared for their own protection, not for somebody else's, that they know how to do the job. That is why an awful lot of 1st Armored Division soldiers have been spending an awful lot of time on their hands and knees learning the old-fashioned way how to do that in case that is the only alternative you have left.

We managed to go through, for a number of months in northern Iraq, without losing an American life to mines. We did that principally because of extraordinary mine awareness and training and discipline, ensuring that lanes are cleared and troops are permitted only to move through lanes and small unit leaders insisting that they have good control over their troops and they know where they are moving and not moving.

And even after you do all that right, there is no guarantee that mines will not cause you casualties. That is why we have devoted so much time to that issue. So I do not want to minimize the issue that you raise, it is a very serious one, and I wish there were some gadget, some technology that we have all been looking for that would help you detect mines or even disarm them, we do not have that. But I think we have the training and we have maximized the awareness as best as we know how on this issue.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Skelton, the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. SKELTON. Gentlemen, the U.S. Army Field Manual regarding peacekeeping FM100–23, page 13, states, "Peacekeeping requires an impartial, evenhanded approach."

Our committee heard testimony from retired generals and others who stressed the need for peacekeepers to be neutral, to be evenhanded, to be absolutely impartial. And soon our American soldiers, some 20,000 of them are scheduled to arrive in Bosnia as peacekeepers between the three warring sides—the Croats, the Bosnian Serbs, and the Bosnian Muslims.

And, yet recently, at a White House meeting, Strobe Talbot told me of plans for the United States Government to arm and train the Bosnian Muslims. And after I, along with others, such as Mr. Bateman of Virginia, criticized this plan of our Government arming and training Muslims, as it would put our troops in danger by destroying their required impartiality, a new plan to arm and train them appeared.

There is nothing in the Dayton peace agreement that requires the United States to arm and train anyone. There has been a slight change to a policy of arming and training to be contracted out, to be farmed out by third parties under U.S. guarantee and under U.S. coordination.

Nevertheless, there will be American fingerprints of red, white, and blue all over this effort. Secretary Christopher has written testimony that sets forth two unacceptable principles. The first is that the United States will ensure the Federation, which is the Croats and the Muslims, armed forces receive the necessary arms and training assistance. The second, the best approach, is for the United States to coordinate an international effort to provide the necessary assistance.

This statement, this policy violates the required impartiality of the U.S. Government and that lack of impartiality will be transferred to our soldiers who serve as peacekeepers. This policy puts the American corporal who tries to solve a dispute between a Serb soldier and a Muslim soldier in a very difficult position. American soldiers will be received as favoring the Muslims and being against the Serbs and not be impartial.

Ordinary military risk is one thing, inviting vengeance by a party or parties against our troops is another. Those who came up with this wrong-headed policy should learn the Missouri/Ozark wisdom, those who aid my enemy become my enemy.

The Serbs will look upon American troops as enemies. The Muslims will expect favors from the American troops. This policy violates the absolute impartiality precept and it is wrong-headed. According to the morning paper, our NATO allies do not like it either.

The Secretary's statement regarding this policy creates a danger to our forces and it can be a death warrant for scores of American men and women in uniform. Taking sides in previous peacekeepers efforts, 1983 in Beirut, and 1993 in Mogadishu, brought tragedy to Americans in uniform. We should learn from the past. This effort to distance our country from arming and training the Muslims just will not work. The U.S. Government will be up to its eyeballs in the arming and training because the United States guarantees it.

The President agree to furnish 20,000 American troops for peacekeeping, not 20,000 targets for vengeance. This policy paints a bull's-eye target on every American soldier, I cannot support this policy, this statement, this potential death warrant for American soldiers. Remember this is the Balkans. This is the place where we have centuries of hate, centuries of killing and centuries of vengeance. There is no reason for American troops to be made victims of vengeance which will be the direct result of our being implicated through thinly disguised arming and training of Muslims.

Secretary Christopher, I urge you to change this policy to that of true, evenhanded impartial peacekeeping and not insist on this dangerous road that will lead to unnecessary tragedy for our troops.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Congressman, let me take a moment to try and put our policy in some context. One of the things the agreement does call for is to create a balance of forces, an equilibrium between forces. And I think it is important that we do that before IFOR leaves. Indeed, if we were to leave and leave a disequilibrium, if we were to leave one of the parties in a situation where it did not have enough forces to be a deterrent, I think we would run the greatest risk of recreating the war situation from which I think we are now hopefully departing.

But one of the things I think your comment, your thoughtful comments, Mr. Skelton, do not take into account is the way the agreement is organized and what its structure is. It provides that for a 6-month period, the parties are obligated to negotiate, pursuant to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to try and establish an arms control regime that all would respect. And to there is a fairly strong incentive for the parties to agree to such a regime because the default provisions, that is the provisions that go into effect if they do not agree to such a regime, are really quite onerous.

So we have high hopes that that arms control regime that build-down can accomplish an equilibrium of forces but if there is not such an equilibrium of forces, I think it is very much in the interests of long-term peace for there to be created some balance of forces in the region before we leave the region.

Many people think, Mr. Skelton, I think equally sincerely as you do, many people think it is absolutely essential that before we leave we create some balance of forces. Now, we are sensitive to your comments that the United States and IFOR should not take sides, that they should be evenhanded. And we intend for them to be evenhanded.

At the same time, I do not think that rules out the United States participating with others in establishing this balance of equilibrium of forces which means that when we leave peace has a fair chance, we do not recreate the situation that produced the conflict that we are now trying to depart from.

So I take very seriously your comments, Mr. Skelton, because of your long experience and expertise, but at the same time, I think there are countervailing factors here which we are trying to take into account in the way that we have approached it.

Secretary Perry and I and General Shalikashvili have worried a great deal over this problem and we think the present solution is the best balance between trying to create an equilibrium of forces, and at the same time to do it without the involvement of either U.S. troops or IFOR.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Perry.

Secretary PERRY. Let me add just one point to what Secretary Christopher said. I believe the prospect of this arms control process succeeding and, by itself, bringing about the necessary balance of force is greatly enhanced by the prospect, as far as the Bosnian Serbs are concerned, that if it does not succeed, the Bosnian Government will have some way of correcting the imbalance.

So, it is very important for the long-term stability in the region to get to this balance. I would have been, a month ago had we talked about this a month ago, I would have been very apprehensive about having any chance of making the arms control process succeed. What has turned my thinking on this is the fact that we not only have it described in the agreement but all of the parties signed the agreement and understood the importance of getting this to work.

So I am much more optimistic about this now than when we talked about this a month ago, Mr. Skelton.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dornan.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One very quick predicate. If you three gentlemen knew the high regard with which you are held on both sides of the aisle it would make you very proud. This has no personal connotation at all, our questioning of you, and I am sure that is true at international relations.

Here is a quote by Mr. Izetbegovic, who one of you quoted in a favorable way, back in the 1980's, late 1980's about the Islamic cause. He said, and this is about his courting Teheran and other Islamic powers. He said, "There can be no peace or coexistence between Islamic faith and non-Islamic faith and non-Islamic institutions." This was in his 1970 Islamic declaration repeated later.

He continued, "The Islamic movement must and can take power as soon as it is morally and numerically strong enough, not only to destroy the non-Islamic power but to build up a new Islamic one."

Now, given the centuries-old hatred there, I am going to resist believing that Mr. Weldon was correct and that we are going to see the same heartbreaking casualties in this area that we saw in Somalia. I believe that you gentlemen have steeled yourself against the loss of 19 of our very best men as happened on October 3, 4, and 6 in Somalia and well you should.

If we cut and run after this one—as the Norton Sun in Haiti, as we did in Somalia, and the greatest disgrace in the history of this country, as we did in Vietnam, leaving 2 million people to die in Cambodia, hundreds of thousands in Laos, 68,000 of our friends, many of them in uniform, to be executed because they trusted in the penultimate free power in the world on the free side at that time—if we cut and run from this one, we are finished as a superpower no matter what military strength we have. So I think you are going to tolerate several hundred casualties before the pressure builds.

I am going to take a different tack than Mr. Weldon. Here is what I think is going to happen. I think the Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims, and the Croatian Bosnians are going to tell the Islamic secret police, the MOIS and the Hamas and all the other people in there targeting Americans, they are going to tell them to lay low or they will turn on them, and wait it out. I think it is going to be like Haiti, that the minute we leave in force or are about to leave they will let us go, as Aideed let us leave Somalia without the loss of a single person.

The briefing I got this morning shows such overwhelming strength and the Russians taking one of the toughest sections that they are going to hunker down for a year, wait out a U.S. Presidential election as Ho Chi Minh did twice. He died after the 1968 election on September 3, 1969, but he waited them out twice. It is all in their history books, read General Giap. We fought the war based on American Presidential election cycles.

I think if God was good to us—as he was with Scott O'Grady and the same three of you sat there the day I said he is in the weeds, because I swallowed that he is dead, believing that he was, I said, he is in the bush and he was—I think we are going to luck out here. And I think they are going to wait until we are gone, and as they are still fighting in Somalia, and as centrifugal forces are starting in Haiti and it is about to spin out of control, as it is going to happen in Haiti, if we are lucky we will get out of there and the killing will go on after we have departed. I expect a good operation.

Now, here are four suggestions of what to do, for us Congressmen, by General Seib in the Wall Street Journal. Pass a resolution disapproving of the deployment forcing Clinton to decide whether to send the peacekeeping troops on his own. This is a recipe for disaster, constitutionally, diplomatically, and militarily. Troops will be sent anyway though with an explicit signal that they do not have national support. I think that signal is out there anyway in all the polls.

Conversely, if Clinton were to pull the plug on the peacekeeping mission, Republicans in Congress would find themselves blamed for whatever horrors followed. Not going to happen.

Avoid a vote entirely, leaving Clinton out on a limb alone. This often appeals to younger lawmakers, I have had freshmen tell me

this today. But in practical terms this is not much better than the first option, troops still would go without any sense of national support. Worse, for Congress, by washing its hands—Pontius Pilate style—I added that, in this matter we would forfeit a chance to influence how the troops are used, which is what we all would like to do.

Third, pass a resolution, gulf war style, that simply endorses the Bosnian mission. That would be Clinton's dream and it is only a dream, not going to happen.

Fourth, pass a resolution approving the deployment, expressing misgivings, and attaching some conditions. This final option may seem the coward's way out, but under the circumstances makes a lot of sense. There are some legitimate policy questions to be decided. Mr. Weldon mentioned one. No more Morton Halperin denial of what a field commander wants.

How far will America go in arming the Bosnian Muslims? So long as they can defend themselves while also playing the role of peacekeeper, what are the outer limits on the size, scope, and duration of the American deployment?

Gentlemen, there is the next to last man killed in Somalia, maybe Gary Gordon died a few seconds after he did. The last man was Matt Rearson, direct hit on the hangar headquarters at Mogadishu and 2 seconds later a dud mortar landed at the feet of a two-star American general we did not even know was there, General Garrison, Commander of Operation Ranger.

That Matt Rearson death on the 9th sealed it, we were out of there. We would have probably left with the 18 deaths a few days before.

I know you are going to take a lot of casualties before you even consider pulling out, bugging out is the military expression. Good luck. I can honestly tell you I have not a clue what I want to do now, except support the men in the field and figure out how to punish the war criminals.

General Zini wrote me a letter that rattled my cage good about taking his daughter to Dhakow. I have been to 19 concentration camps. Took my son, Mark, to the six extermination camps in Poland. I want those war criminals punished, but remember this, Tudjman, welcomed in Dayton, sitting there with you, Secretary Christopher, he bulldozed into ashes and dust Yusonavach, Musiem, and concentration camp memorial, where hundreds of thousands of Jews and Serbs were killed by Ustassi Nazi-type Croatians. Now, we are closer to the Croatians and the Muslims than we are to the Serbs and the whole thing is still a mess.

God bless you, good luck and though you are sincere in what you are trying to do, you give new meaning to the words, good soldiers, but remember this, the jokes are flying.

When the troops move, Clinton goes to England and we have a triple draft evader that is now posturing in England and now Northern Ireland today, and other men, better men than he, men whose the straps of their boots he is not fit to tie, we have a strange problem. And I will figure out what I am going to do in the next 2 or 3 days but I know I will probably be over there within 60 days, as the chairman of military personnel telling our troopers, God bless them, they are the best the world has ever seen.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Dornan.

Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

That is hard to follow. I think my good friend, Mr. Dornan, may be the only man in America that remembers the date that Ho Chi Minh died. [Laughter.]

Mr. MCHALE. He takes credit. [Laughter.]

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, all three, for very forthright answers to our questions. Let me ask you, since there is no time certain now for withdrawal, just an approximation, what will be the criteria for when we withdraw and will our logistics capability be necessary to enable our allies to withdraw also?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We have agreed on this operation that logistics support going in, while there and coming out is a national responsibility. I do not believe our logistics capability will be necessary. Having said that there are some nations that will most probably come to us, going in and coming out, to see if they can contract for some of our sea or air lift. That is probably the extent of it.

Mr. SPRATT. How long do you estimate it would take to withdraw under benign circumstances?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I think if we wish to do that correctly, we will wish to do that deliberately and not rush the effort. So if the circumstances are such that we can do it deliberately we probably would take approximately 2 months going out, as we did 2 months coming in.

Certainly if the need arises to get out of the way, take for instance the Tuzla area, to get out of the way and get into Croatia or just across a few miles to get into Ukraine, you can to this very quickly. So it just depends under what circumstance you are doing it.

My hope is and my deep expectation is that we are strong enough, and that our intelligence is good enough that we will be able to do that in a very deliberate way at our speed and not somebody else's speed.

Mr. SPRATT. You have described, before, our sector as being advantageous in the sense that the Tuzla airport as being a good facility for launching our, getting in and getting out of the area. I saw something on CNN the other night where it represented this airport as being infested now with land mines, all over the place. How much has to be done to make this a usable airport, and a low-risk facility and what are the perimeter defense problems?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I cannot tell you for sure yet what needs to be done to the airfield. We have an Air Force survey team going in to make sure that we understand exactly what the status of the aprons is and the runway, itself, and so on. We know that the airfield is good. We also know that there are extensive mines around the airfield.

Both the Federation forces and the Nordic Battalion have already started mine clearing around the area. And, as a matter of fact, I saw on CNN the other day, a member of the Nordic Battalion saying that they were busily removing mines to make sure that we can have a good welcome when we come.

I cannot tell you for sure how much of a problem that will be. My sense is that it is manageable. What has kept that airfield from being particularly usable in the past is Serb indirect fire that has deterred people from bringing in transport aircraft.

Mr. SPRATT. This means you have to have a pretty wide perimeter of defense if we are not going to let somebody take out our C–17 with a mortar.

General SHALIKASHVILI. You certainly have to have an assurance exactly that your approaches are right. You also, I am sure, know that in the agreement, in the Dayton agreement is a stipulation that all the air defenses are shutdown upon the start of this operation and that all radars associated with the air defense system are shutdown and stay shutdown.

So we can do an awful lot but obviously there is the likelihood that there will be factions that have shoulder-fired missiles, for instance. If you look at the position of Tuzla and if you look at how the new lines are going to be, there is a reasonable chance that all of it will be over Federation territory and that, therefore, we should have the expectation to be dealing with one faction as we use that airfield. Hopefully it will be easier, but, again, I do not want to minimize it, we have our work cut out for us.

Mr. SPRATT. One final question. The most problematic part of our sector is possibly in the corridor. And this looks like a choke point which the Bosnians, themselves, could use if the Serbs in the southeast decided that they wanted to secede or for whatever reason this would be a pressure point and one of the most likely flash point.

What will be our responsibility for policing it, for keeping it open, for surveilling the traffic that comes through it, both ways?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Our responsibility for the Posavina corridor is essentially no different than it is for any other stretch of the line that separates the two. That is we will have to ensure that the demarkation line between the two is properly marked, that the 4-kilometer zone is identified and that the forces and their weapons withdraw behind those 4-kilometer lines. That 120 days later that all forces and all heavy weapons go back to their garrisons and containment areas.

We will, in the first instance, observe that. If, in fact, any rogue element fails to move beyond that 4-kilometer zone, we will enforce that.

Mr. SPRATT. That means you will engage the rogue element and you will drive them out?

General SHALIKASHVILI. If that is necessary, that is correct, and that is why we have the rules of engagement that allow us to use the force. And that is why we are there in such numbers with heavy weapons and armored vehicles to ensure that we, in fact, have the capability to do that.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much.

Secretary PERRY. Mr. Spratt, I would like to clarify one point which is that the bulk of our forces are not going to go in by air. They are going in by road. And we do, however, want that airport for resupply and, therefore, as soon as possible we would like to have it fully functional. And we are prepared to do the mine clear-

ing and preparing of air traffic control and the runway paving that is necessary for that to happen.

And the Nordic Battalion, which will be working with us, are already there and are already taking steps to make that happen.

The second point is that while it is possible that the Serbs could, at a remote distance from that airport, shell it indirectly with artillery. We will have, in Tuzla, artillery locating radar and counterartillery and I can assure you that anybody that shells that airport is going to be taking an activity which is nonhabitforming.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I understand that Secretary Christopher needs to go, so, Mr. Secretary, I thank you again and we will see you later.

And I understand also that Secretary Perry and the General might be able to stay a little while longer. I applaud you for your tenacity and if you are willing to do it we will continue for another half an hour.

Secretary PERRY. I can stay until 5 o'clock if you would like, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir, that will be fine.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Thank you very much for the courtesy of the committee. I have stretched my stay about as far as I can. I appreciate it very much.

The CHAIRMAN. We understand. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Buyer.

Mr. BUYER. I do regret that the Secretary is leaving because a lot of the comments I have I think, Mr. Secretary, if you can go ahead and read these, we can have a conversation perhaps later.

I know you must go. Thank you.

Secretary PERRY. I certainly will look at them in my office.

Mr. BUYER. The last time the three witnesses were before this committee, you left this committee with strong bipartisan skepticism with regard to the proposed peace agreement. That is why we voted on the Buyer-McHale resolution and it passed by 315 votes.

So I was pretty startled and taken aback, Dr. Perry, by your comments about some fear of some partisanship with regard to foreign policy. I know those were not your words, but when you quote somebody else's words, by implication, you are using them for a purpose. So that really bothered me because I have a great deal of respect for you.

Because we did that, because we wanted to send a message to the President and the three warring Presidents that please do not negotiate a peace agreement on the precondition or the predicate that the United States will have troops on the ground to implement whatever agreement you sign and to make and enforce a peace.

We want the parties to focus on the real reasons they have been killing each other for centuries not because we will be there as the meanest policemen on the block and just separate them, let them cool their heels and they can return to killing each other.

Well, that, despite the Secretary of State saying that "what Congress does is important and significant" I think it is pretty significant when this Congress passes a resolution by 315 votes. It is equally significant that the President, the administration would ig-

nore such a vote even though the Secretary says that what we do is significant.

You had on the blinders, you kept going so we had the second vote. If you are going to deliver a blow and rebuke of the President's foreign policy when do you do it? While the parties awe still at the table or do you do it after they leave? That is why we held the vote on the Hefley amendment but you continued.

Now, what we are faced with—and I must admit that I do resent the fact that the will of the House has been ignored. I also resent the fact that the position that the American people have been placed in, the position that the American troops have been placed in and the fact that you have placed this U.S. Congress in a very difficult position.

Sending U.S. troops on foreign soil is of no ordinary magnitude. I know you know that, General. I also feel that it is time for us, as a Congress, to recognize that you are going to send these troops despite whatever this Congress does. So we have a duty in the Congress, a congressional oversight responsibility given to us by the Constitution, if the President is going to send these troops no matter what, yes, we are going to support these troops and we are also going to know the parameters and clearly define the criteria to minimize the loss of life and try to ensure the success of the mission.

A couple of things bother me a lot. Ike Skelton, I will tell you I respect him a lot and he is right on point with regard to training the Bosnian Muslims. See, one of the reasons a lot of us have fear about the confidence of the parties and their commitment toward peace is because they really did not get a chance to talk about why they are killing each other. And that bothers me a lot.

And when I look back at this—I just want to have a substantive conversation with you—when you look at centuries-old of vengeance and retribution, if you look at the capsule of time I almost have this sense that U.S. ground troops are going in at half-time. We are going on the field at half-time and that the parties are going to take this opportunity to arm and train each other to move to a balance of power and you say, but, Steve, have confidence in the parties and their commitment toward peace.

Well, I have heard that and I am trying to be a good listener. But I would like staff to pass this out. Staff, would you please pass this to the members who are here?

These are the comments that were made by the Bosnian Army Chief of Staff. Now, this is on Tuesday, the second session of the AID mobilization group of Islamic countries opened in Teheran, Iran. Are you familiar with this? So you have seen the comments?

He said, "In fact, we have gained"—would you make sure the two witnesses also have that? "In fact we have gained what we have already taken and preserved through our military forces. We do not know what the future will be because the unjust peace may cause fresh clashes in the future."

That concerns me a lot. And I would ask for your comments relative to these comments from the Bosnian Army Chief of Staff and those countries present. We had the Deputy Foreign Ministers for the International Affairs and the Army Chiefs of Staff from Iran,

Malaysia, Indonesia, Jordan, Bangladesh, Turkey, Pakistan, Bosnia, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia. It is a whole group.

So, please try to instill confidence in myself and this committee when they are making comments like this.

Secretary PERRY. The first comment I would make is that the President of Bosnia signed this peace agreement. All of the other parties signed the agreement. This is different from the other cease fires in the past, different from all other cease fires that have failed because this is the first time that all the parties have not only agreed to stop fighting but agreed on the basis of a comprehensive peace plan.

I have been very skeptical that we would reach a peace agreement. I was invited by Secretary Christopher to come to Dayton and talk with the parties, a little over a week ago, and did that. I can give you my own opinion and that is that there are two factors driving them forward at this stage and these are of fundamental importance. It is more than just a signature on a piece of paper.

The first is the war weariness. Which is to say we might not have been able to get this agreement a year ago or 2 years ago. This war weariness is palpable in talking with the people. It is on all sides.

And second, a belief that fighting further was not going to advance their cause. A year ago, the Bosnian Serbs did not believe that. They believed that fighting further was going to advance their cause. The events this summer changed their mind on that point of view. And one important component of those events was the vigorous action of NATO air which is symbolic of a new resolve, I believe, on the part of the West.

In terms of the comments in Teheran, the least you can say about them is that they are unhelpful and the most you can say is they are almost subverting President That's signature on this treaty. I find them, I am very disturbed by them. I will not try to gloss that over.

Mr. BUYER. It is highly significant that this many countries in the Middle East would be——

Secretary PERRY. I would not ascribe that statement to all of those countries, but I am very concerned about it coming from the chief of staff.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Taylor, the gentleman from Mississippi.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you two gentlemen for staying around as long as you have.

Mr. Perry, I want to start in response to your partisanship comments. I am a Democrat. I opposed the insertion of ground troops into Bosnia when George Bush was President and Dick Cheney held your job. I am opposed to it now. I do not think anything has changed. If Marshall Tito with the iron-fist of communism, after 45 years, could not get those people to quit killing each other, then we certainly cannot in 12 months. This is not a partisan issue.

Also, I am opposed to your idea that only those who vote to send these kids off to get killed, in what I think is a useless war, sup-

port the troops. I support the troops. I do not want them dying for something that will not last.

As recently as a month ago I had a conversation with a very high-ranking American officer, who drew something on a piece of paper and said, 10 years from now what was Bosnia will be equally divided between Croatia and Serbia. That is the senior American military officer. That is his opinion.

Why are we going to send kids off to try and stop the inevitable? What purpose is served? How do I tell their parents that somehow this was all worthwhile? It is not.

And I am going to ask one more question. Mr. Buyer raised the question. How many votes do we have to have in Congress to tell the Democratic President, and I am a Democrat, that this is foolish. This is not a dictatorship. I also read the Constitution, it says, we shall provide, the Congress, for an Army and a Navy.

The President is not asking for a declaration of war. The President, we also have the U.S. Senate that studies whether or not we should have mutual defense treaties with other countries. And then we, on a case by case, make the decision to send young Americans off to defend Britons, and French people, and Germans.

You have not asked the United States Senate if we want to have a mutual defense treaty with the people of Bosnia. This is the sort of thing that a dictator would do. And I resent it. And I resent the implication that if I vote against sending those kids off to get killed, one more time, that I am somehow not in support of them, because I am. I am supporting them in the best way that I know how and that is to keep them from being sent there.

The idea of sending those people into Bosnia, in February, does nothing but play into the hands of those people who want to do us harm. Your own senior military advisors have told me that the smart weapons that work so well in the desert will not work in the cold, wet, fog. That in particular from 10 o'clock at night until 6 in the morning. So those kids are pretty well going to be vulnerable on the gravel roads of Bosnia as far as resupply in a country that the General has very articulately told us is well-mined, as far as trying to resupply them.

The pilots will not be able to use their night-vision devices because it will not work in the cold, wet fog. Mr. Perry, I have the greatest of respect for you. I would hope that you would be a stronger voice to a President who obviously does not fully understand the implications of this decision.

And if you wish to respond, I welcome your remarks because I do respect you as an individual. I also wish the President of the United States would respect the vote of the Congress of the United States on two separate occasions.

Secretary PERRY. Mr. Taylor, I am here representing my best judgment of what this country should do in Bosnia. I am telling you the same thing I have told the President. I may be wrong in my judgment, but I am offering you my best judgment on it. It disagrees with your judgment, that is quite clear. But it is my honest judgment and it is the same judgment which I have given the President.

Let me comment and let me be clear on my earlier question. I have been asked the question whether this decision will be biparti-

san? I fully expect that this action is serious enough and important enough that this Congress will take a bipartisan action. And on both sides of the aisle will be yeses, and on both sides of the aisle there will be noes. And the decision will be made yes or no, for reasons that have to do with other than with partisan judgment.

I can assure you that not only will my actions be bipartisan but any time I testify to the Congress on this question, including right now, that that fully reflects my view that this is a very important issue which can only be regarded as bipartisan. And it is in that spirit, which I testify to you and it is in that spirit that I fully expect this Congress, and certainly this committee, will act. That does not mean that everybody in this committee will agree with the recommendation that we make to you but it does mean that I am confident that you will take it and treat the matter in a bipartisan fashion.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I suppose it is not necessary for me to reiterate what several have already said that our questioning has nothing to do with our personal admiration and respect for you two gentlemen.

But it is hard for me to imagine that we could be in a worse predicament. We are about to commit troops in an area of historic instability, where there is a very high probability of casualties that will be unacceptable under the circumstances. There is little support in the Congress, there is even less support in the country.

I have talked to several of our members whose calls and faxes are running 90 to 1 opposed, and in our own district it is running 18 to 1. And those 18, many of them are vehemently opposed to it, while the one part, you know, about 6 percent of the people are, you know, they say, gee, I guess we ought to support the President.

If this is an important mission it should have been possible to sell this to the Congress and to the American people. That clearly, clearly has not been done.

How did this effort fail? And who failed?

Secretary PERRY. Mr. Bartlett, I simply do not accept the premise that it has failed. We are making our case——

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, clearly, sir, when you have 18 to 1 calling in, or 90 to 1 calling in saying that—and I do not know where the national polls come from because I have not talked to a member. You know, poll the people here, if you want to know how our people are responding. You know what the mood of the Congress is, the Congress voted overwhelmingly not to do this.

You know, if this is an important mission, and I could argue that it would be an important mission. If I were in high school and I were on a debating team, I could take the other side and I could argue very effectively for it. But, you know, clearly the argument has failed. How did it fail and who failed?

Secretary PERRY. Again, I simply——

Mr. BARTLETT. We just should not be here, sir.

Secretary PERRY. I do not accept the premise, Mr. Bartlett. We were making the case and we will continue to make the case.

Mr. BARTLETT. You mean you think that there is support for this across the country?

Secretary PERRY. We will continue to make the case. And I believe the American people and I hope the American Congress will support us in this.

Mr. BARTLETT. I just am really shocked that we are here, in this predicament, about to send troops that desperately need the support of the Congress and the people. This mission needs that support. Clearly at this time it does not have this support. I just cannot imagine how we would get ourselves in a predicament like this. And now what do we do to get out of it, is the question?

How do you make the best of what many people consider to be a very bad situation? And I guess we need counsel. You know, I need counsel because I, with many of the other members here, have some very serious reservations, shared by a vast, vast majority of people in our districts.

Secretary PERRY. I can only hope that your assessment of the lack of popular support is not correct and that is certainly not the assessment I am getting.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. McHale?

Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, good afternoon. In the JCS handout, that accompanies your testimony there is a page on IFOR mission which states that the mission is to enforce compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement. And then beginning on the next page it lists the military tasks of the Dayton agreement.

My first question to the Secretary is, When did we determine the military tasks of the Dayton agreement?

Secretary PERRY. When?

Mr. MCHALE. When.

Secretary PERRY. In the process of preparing the Dayton agreement, a military annex was prepared which laid out these tasks. That was done with the full import, full cooperation and support of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In fact, there was a senior representative from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, full time attendance all through the Dayton meetings. And they were in continual consultation with both General Shalikashvili and myself on the preparation of that annex.

Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Secretary, when did the President determine and announce that the approximate size of our ground force would be 25,000?

Secretary PERRY. I do not have that date in my head, Mr. McHale, but we believed for some time that it would require a force that large. I testified to this committee, I think several months ago on that point.

Mr. MCHALE. You did and that is really at the heart of my question.

Secretary PERRY. I also said in that testimony that until we get a final peace agreement, until we have this military annex, that we cannot be sure of that figure. As it has turned out the agreement has been very close to what we anticipated at that time.

Mr. MCHALE. How could we have determined in advance of the mission the size of the force necessary to accomplish it?

Secretary PERRY. We estimated, as I testified to this Congress, we estimated what the mission would be and I also said, at the time of my testimony, this may be premature testimony because until we get the final agreement we may find out that the military task, the annex will differ in important respects from what our assumptions are.

It has not differed in important respects, and so, therefore, our estimates were reasonably correct.

Mr. MCHALE. With regard to the duration of the mission, General Shalikashvili appeared before this committee previously, as well. And when asked on an earlier occasion how we came up with the 1-year period of time, General Shalikashvili testified that that 1-year period was based on his judgment that it would take that long to train and equip the Bosnian Government forces so that they could be an effective military force.

And yet, when I look at the tasks of the Dayton agreement, the training and equipping of the Bosnian Government is not listed as one of the military tasks to be completed under the agreement. Yet, the 1-year commitment remains.

Can you explain that?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Yes, let me see if I can. When we appeared before you our view on equipping and training was different than it is now. And, as a result, of listening to this committee and other committees before which we appeared, it became clear that the issue of the safety of our American troops dictated that we not only not involve American troops in any way in arming and training, but also that we exclude that totally as a task for the IFOR.

Mr. MCHALE. If I may, I understand that against Mr. Skelton's concerns as to whether those are mutually exclusive goals, to train, equip, and serve as a neutral peacekeeper. My question doesn't relate to that aspect; it relates to the 1 year. If in fact that mission has now been excluded, why does the 1 year remain?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Well, if I may.

Mr. MCHALE. Please.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Because we changed our role in that, the military's role in that, either as the IFOR—it is the U.S. military. It is not now one of the listed tasks. Nevertheless, it is our view that at the end of the time that we depart, it is advantageous to have a military balance in the region. And so while we are not going to do it, and it is our hope that this will be accomplished through the build-down that is provided for in annex 1(b) of this plan that you refer to, we nevertheless also stated that if, for some reason, that does not happen, third parties——

Mr. MCHALE. Will conduct that mission.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Would conduct. And it would take them approximately the same time that it would take us.

Mr. MCHALE. Well, even if we accept that, that does not explain why we stay for 1 year, in light of the fact that the mission is no longer ours, but instead belongs to a third party.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Because we think that if we leave before that kind of a balance exists, the likelihood of conflict restarting is very great. Therefore, we ought to see three things in place at the time that we leave. One is the one we just talked about. The second one is the completion of the military task that you alluded to here.

And third, that we have been there long enough, and through our presence provided the secure environment, so the military tasks that must be performed will have had a chance to take root and get started.

Mr. McHALE. General, I thank you. My light has come on. Let me just close with this very brief statement. It would seem to me, that both the size of the force and the duration of the military commitment were determined on the basis of criteria, and I would suggest political criteria unrelated to the mission and the tasks subsequently assigned, and it is my belief that it is very difficult, under those circumstances, to justify prudent military planning in light of the evolution of the facts that I think I have now documented.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Mr. Chairman, may I please respond to that.

Mr. McHALE. And I would welcome that, if the Chairman——

General SHALIKASHVILI. Mr. McHale, I have stated from the beginning that two things ought to dictate the size of the force we send in. One is the task at hand. The other one is the size of the force to be sufficient, so when things go wrong, we are sized properly and we have all the supporting forces, and everything, to take care of ourselves, even if everything turns south on us.

And so I have, early on, concluded, that it is most prudent for the safety of our troops, that we send in approximately a division size force, with all the supporting arms that a division would have. Because that would provide the greatest security for the force. And that in this particular case, we not let the specific troop to task drive us as much as the safety of our troops.

And that is why it is that we were able to—we were speaking, early on, that if we have to implement a peace agreement, we would wish to have something that is about a division size force. And that is why it is today the same thing.

Mr. McHALE. I am worried that a decision may not be large enough, and I question how did we choose a division before we defined the mission?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired a while back there.

Mr. McHALE. I thank the Chairman.

Secretary PERRY. Mr. Chairman, may I just be indulged for one statement on the underground—the thrust behind Mr. McHale's statement.

I want to make a direct and a clear statement. Whether this number is right, or whether it is wrong, it came from General Shali to me, and from me to the President.

Mr. McHALE. Two years before Dayton.

Secretary PERRY. Never have I been given guidance by the President on what the size of this force would be. I want to be very——

Mr. McHALE. Oh, I think the issue is clear and we do not have to belabor it. The numbers were picked before the mission was defined.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cunningham.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you.

Secretary Perry, this committee has been pretty bipartisan, in general, and the defense bill passed out of here, I think, with just

one or two people that voted against the defense bill, Republicans and Democrats.

And on the floor, we had over 300 votes, bipartisan on the defense bill.

Mr. Secretary, do you, in your role as Secretary of Defense, before this National Security Committee, support that bill? Yes or no?

I'm not asking what you recommended to the President.

Secretary PERRY. Could you get a little closer to the microphone, please, Mr. Cunningham.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Oh, yes, sir. Do you support the defense bill that passed out of this committee, and on the floor, in a bipartisan manner?

Secretary PERRY. I will treat the defense bill that comes in this committee in a bipartisan manner. Yes. And I will testify to you, honestly, about what I believe about the merits and the demerits of any bill you come up with. I owe this to you, and you can expect it of me.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I am saying we passed a bill out of this committee, and on the House floor, and do you support that bill?

Secretary PERRY. I am not the one that signs bills, Mr. Cunningham. I will make my recommendations to the President based on my best bipartisan judgment.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I know, and I am not trying to be cagey with you, Mr. Secretary. I am saying that as the Secretary of Defense, before this committee, which is responsible for authorization of the bill, I was just asking if you support it.

Let me tell you some of the things that I like. First of all, most of us feel that United Nations has many flaws in our military tactics, and being successful, and I think having NATO at the head of this is very good. I like that. I like the fact that you are going to try and remove as much of the Mujahedeen, and there is over 4,000 of them there.

We are talking radicals. We are not talking the Bosnian Muslims, but the radicals. These are the people that really hurt our kids, I think.

And I would also encourage you to double the efforts of all of our intelligence forces over there to make sure that, you know, this is carried out. And I think this committee would support that, and I think the Intelligence Committee would as well.

Let me ask a question direct. I do not know if it is true or not. Just a rumor. Do you know of anything of an agreement by this administration, between Saudi Arabia and the United States to reduce oil prices if we supported the Muslims?

Secretary PERRY. No.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. OK. I do not know, and I would like to state for the record, that is secondhand.

Second, you know, this administration said that Haiti was a great national interest, and security interest. That is why we went there. But these articles are saying the boat people are starting already, Aristide is—his government, there are a lot of murders starting back up, his number one opposition was just shot to death.

And if that flares up, we have got Haiti, we have got the potential of Saddam Hussein, we have got North Korea.

Do you feel that we have the military forces necessary, if we get bogged down in Bosnia, to meet these other threats?

Secretary PERRY. Based on my best judgment as to what these threats might be, and what they might demand of our military forces, the answer is yes. That is not a hypothetical question. We looked very carefully at what we considered to be the most likely contingencies. In particular, the possibility of a conflict with Korea is always with us. And we frequently look at how, unit by unit, what forces we would deploy, and how we would deploy them in order to meet that threat.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I just think if we do get bogged down we would have a real tough time.

Secretary PERRY. I would like to ask General Shali to comment further on that.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. And I will ask you the question. Let me go through a series of questions here for you, and I will give you time, General Shalikashvili, to answer it.

I look at the figures of $2 billion, and most of us feel there—you know, it is not just 20,000. I have heard all the way up to 32,000, total, with people that we put over there, and everything. But I know General Boyd said that our portion of the deal would be between $2 and $6 billion. I do not know what the real number is.

But I also know that NATO is broke, and there will be a long-term NATO involvement there, and when we look about who is going to pay for these things—I know who is going to end up paying for it. I have a concern there.

I also look at, when you say nation building, I do not think we have ever gone into any nation where we have not had an active role or participation of paying for that nation building, whether it is roads or what. And I know the President said the primary source is Europe, but that left the door open for—are you telling me that—and the question is that we are going to pay zero for nation building.

I have another concern, too, and it is not just the President. This is an election year, Mr. Secretary. The President is going to be in a campaign mode over the next year, at the same time we are there. Congress is going to be in a campaign mode.

And I know that George Bush and Dick Cheney, and Colin Powell put their full attention—and I am sure you will too—but I am saying that other factors in this thing—it is not a real good time to go in there, and I have great concern with that.

I also look at your—when you say "training." I think it is relative, because, you know, Scott O'Grady, and I talked to him personally with Mr. Dornan, he said—and General Shalikashvili I think has gone to remedy some of those things—that he was not ACM qualified Air Combat Maneuvering qualified. That I have talked to other pilots that had come back, and they said, "No, we do not have the right training."

We do not have any more in the Navy. "Top Gun" does not have F–16's anymore. The Air Force does not have the 64th and 65th aggressor squadrons. The reason I am alive today is because of that kind of training. That is all gone. And so are we ready? Yes, but I think it is relative. And we do have concerns in that, and I do not know what role Montenegro is going to have as a jump-off

place, but I just want you to know, we do have—and it is not partisan, and I appreciate your comments—but too many of us have seen where we have been left out to the dogs, and are left there, and gotten a lot of our guys killed, and I do not want that to happen here, and I am afraid it will, Mr. Secretary, and General Shalikashvili.

Secretary PERRY. A quick comment on some factual data. Our best judgment of the personnel involvement in this, military personnel, will be 20,000 in Bosnia, 5,000 in Croatia. We will continue the 2,000 "deny flight" in Italy, that we have been doing, and we estimate about 7,000 logistics personnel in the rim countries. That comes to a total of 30,000 people who will be dedicated to this mission, not counting Navy, because we will not dedicate naval forces to this mission.

We will continue to have, as we have always had, a large fleet in the Mediterranean and Adriatic, but it will not be dedicated to this operation, as they were during Sharp Guard operation.

We estimate that this will cost $2 billion a year, and that cost is the incremental cost—it is what we would have to take out of other things in our budget in order to do this. It does not, of course, include the cost of the salaries of the troops which we would be paying in any event. That is incremental cost, $2 billion. That is a pretty good number.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Dellums wants to wrap it up, I think.

Mr. DELLUMS. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that we are coming to a close, and I appreciate you giving me the opportunity, as ranking minority member, to make a few observations.

I have tried to listen very diligently to the remarks of my colleagues and their exchanges with our witnesses. First, it is very interesting to me that the majority of my colleagues here support a big military budget, support a big military force, and if I am hearing correctly, the discussion today, it appears as if you are saying we only want the Pentagon to do the "big ones," and we will sit back and wait until things escalate, until it is a "big one" and then we will go in and do the "big one."

And I have some trouble with that logic; it does not register well with me.

Second, in terms of the number 20,000, and I do not think one has to be a brilliant rocket scientist to understand where that comes from, I think we are presently experiencing the pain of the transition from the cold war to the post-cold war, and the pain of the transition from war fighting to peacekeeping.

Because we are in peacekeeping in its infancy in this country, and have not turned our brains around to deal with ourselves as a post-cold-war nation, dealing with peacekeeping, mistakes have been made.

I would imagine, and I certainly was not in the room, I will say to my colleague, that someone probably said if peacekeeping is a responsibility that we will engage in as we move to the 21st century, if we have to do peacekeeping in Bosnia, how do we do peacekeeping in Bosnia and answer the question to the American people, how do we minimize risk? Because Somalia got thrown up as a big case in point.

I would imagine the response was very simple and straightforward. Give us a division, we can cover our behind, cover our front, and cover our flanks, and that is how you got to 20,000. No big conspiracy theory on that.

Third, Mr. Chairman, you and I walked in the door together here, 25 years ago, and we both were black-haired people, and you know probably better than anyone here, that I have great experience sitting on this committee, being out of step with the overwhelming majority of the committee as a man of peace, and as a peace advocate.

And in the context of the cold war, I had to learn how to be comfortable going against the grain of the majority thought and will of this committee. My great hope and prayer was that in the context of the post-cold war world, we would all take off our cold war labels, and approach the challenges of the post-cold war with new energy, and new thoughts, and new ideas, and trying to reach to new paradigms.

I think that the new era of the post-cold war world has ushered in an incredible moment, where, in my humble opinion—perhaps I am wrong—I believe that the enemy of the post-cold war is war itself.

And I think that the challenge of the post-cold war is, indeed, a challenge of peace. Again, perhaps I am wrong. But I believe, as now, a 60-year-old peace activist, that the post-cold-war world has now given this generation the first real opportunity to challenge the whole notion of the use of force, and war as a way of solving conflicts, as an effective method of conflict resolution.

In our wildest imagination, we never could have comprehended this moment, where we have an opportunity to really challenge the whole basic principle of war and the principle of the use of force, as human beings come together to address conflict, and to deal with conflict resolution.

The question, I believe, that is before all of us is, Is Bosnia a significant opportunity for us to grab that point? As have tried to say on many occasions, I believe the post-cold war gives us two opportunities. We either can paint boldly across the canvas of time, and think of new relationships, and new methodologies of how we address each other, and give the future generation an incredible opportunity of a world of peace, or we can, because of our fears and our prejudices, and our biases, and whatever, fritter away, tinkering at the margins of change, and allow the window of opportunity to slam shut, and we do not seize this great moment to challenge the whole notion of force, and bombing and killing and maiming as a way of solving problems.

Finally, to the moral question. I was sent to Congress from a community that asked me to argue the questions of war and peace on moral terms.

The issue in Bosnia. If a group of people left the battlefield, walked to the diplomatic table, and at the end of the day said, "We have produced a peace plan, here it is, not perfect, but here it is; but he killed my daughter, I killed his son. He killed my mother; I killed his father. We killed 16,000 of our children, 250,000 of our neighbors. We raped and plundered women that we knew. And so we do not quite trust each other right now, and maybe we need

somebody to help us transition from war to peace." I ask the moral question: What is our moral obligation in that situation?

So those are the two questions as I see it. On moral grounds, do we have a responsibility, sometimes, to stand there and help people who do not trust each other, and who are paranoid about each other, to transition from war to peace? Are we then willing to risk peace in those terms, and go after the whole notion of war and the use of force?

Finally, it seems to me, the question is, Does Bosnia present us with this enormous opportunity, an opportunity that we have never had in the 60 years that I have been alive and breathing in this world, where we can actually challenge the notion of force, and war, and violence as a way of solving problems? Here is the moment.

Do we paint boldly, or do we tinker at the margins, and change? Those are my observations, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GEREN. Mr. Chairman, would my friend yield for——

Mr. DELLUMS. Happy to yield to him.

Mr. GEREN. I cannot let a comment you made at the beginning of your——

Mr. DELLUMS. I just think this moment is a big moment. I just think this is a large moment. That is all I am suggesting to you.

Mr. GEREN. Would you yield for an observation, though.

Mr. DELLUMS. I would be happy to.

Mr. GEREN. I cannot let a generalization that you made at the beginning of your remarks go unchallenged.

You characterized the opposition to the deployment of force—and many of us are still struggling with this question—but you characterized the opposition as we want to use our force in the "big ones"——

Mr. DELLUMS. I did say "the" opposition. I said some people——

Mr. GEREN. Could I finish? Please, could I just make my——

Mr. DELLUMS. I still have the time, and I am happy to yield, but I will yield to you fairly, but do not——

Mr. GEREN. Let me just tell you what I heard.

Mr. DELLUMS. I would be happy to yield to you.

Mr. GEREN. You said many people on this committee who advocate a strong defense budget, and you said that we—as I heard you—we are willing to use these forces to fight the "big ones" but not the "little ones."

My concerns about this issue—and I think I speak for many of my fellow members——

Mr. DELLUMS. It is not quite what I said, but I will let you——

Mr. GEREN [continuing]. Because we have had so many conversations, you know, there is nothing like the issues of war and peace to focus your attention. And so many of our colleagues have discussed this in great earnest.

And I guess it is the same reason that so many of us took offense at the inference that we drew from the Secretary's comment—I think it was unintended, but it was an inference that many of us drew—but it is not whether or not it is a "big one," my friend, or a "little one." It is whether or not we have a vital national interest at stake here.

And I think there is significant disagreement on this committee as to whether or not we have a vital national interest at stake.

It does not matter if it is Haiti, and it is little, or if it is Bosnia and it is great big, or if it is France or England, and it is even bigger.

But do we have a vital national interest at stake here? And so I just have to take issue with your characterization of the opposition to this deployment, and I will say no more than that.

Mr. DELLUMS. I appreciate that——

Mr. GEREN. But I think that reasonable minds can differ on whether or not there is a national interest at stake here.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me for one quick response. I appreciate that and I accept that. That is what politics is all about. We get out there and we slug it out on ideas, and I respect the gentleman.

I would simply say in response to the notion of national vital interest, you know, many of us sat back and said, How in the world could the world have allowed 6 million people to be killed in the context of Nazi Germany?

You know what I found fascinating? That a number of people who sat where we are sitting now stood before microphones and said it is not in our vital national interest.

I believe sometimes that there is a compelling moral high ground that takes us beyond narrowly defined, narrowly construed national vital interests, and I believe that sometimes that is about saving human lives.

Mr. GEREN. If you would yield for one last comment. The people who made that point, when you had 6 million Jews slaughtered, were wrong then, and the judgment of history is that they were wrong. We will have to look back and suffer the judgment of history on this decision, and we will not know until years into the future, who was right and who was wrong, but I think that we certainly owe all of our colleagues respect for their differing opinions on this, and I think——

The CHAIRMAN. And the gentleman knows that is where I am coming from. I respect everybody's point of view.

Mr. GEREN. I know that it is. I have read something into your characterization that troubled me, and I wanted to make sure that we agreed. So I appreciate your indulgence there, because I think as we move into this debate, it is so important that we have respect among our colleagues in this debate, and both with the administration and among our colleagues, across the aisle, this is the most important thing any of us will do in our life, is vote on the matters of war and peace.

And if we, in any way, countenance others questioning our motives, to me, we have done great disservice to our colleagues and to the process. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate it.

Mr. DELLUMS. I certainly did not do that, and I hope the gentleman recognizes that, and I would appreciate it if——

The CHAIRMAN. As a great fellow down home said one time: "We are all brothers and sisters in the same lodge."

And with that, Mr. Secretary, we again appreciate, and General, your indulgence, and the——

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. KENNEDY. I hope that we have an opportunity, obviously, to submit statements for the record, but that we would have liked the opportunity, not having that, to have taken our own 5 minutes, because of the time constraints of our panel and because of the number of witnesses who have testified—my colleagues—I did not get a chance, but I nonetheless feel very strongly about this, and would like an opportunity——

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. If you can submit——

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. To state on the record, Mr. Chairman, what my feelings are.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. If you can submit a statement for the record, it would be great. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 5:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]

PATRICK J. KENNEDY
1ST DISTRICT, RHODE ISLAND

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS

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Statement of Congressman Kennedy before the House National Security Committee
November 30, 1995

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you Secretary Perry, Secretary Christopher and General Shalikashvili for testifying on Capitol Hill today.

First, I want to congratulate this Administration on the success of your tireless efforts in bringing together the warring factions of the former Yugoslavia for the purposes of achieving a peace agreement and bringing to an end the bloodshed and atrocities committed in the Balkan region these past three and a half years.

Second, I want to be clear about my position regarding the use of the United States military in the former Yugoslavia. I support the use of our military to maintain the negotiated peace settlement in the former Yugoslavia. A peace-keeping/peace-enforcement operation is a level of US involvement that is commensurate with our interests in maintaining US moral, political, economic and military leadership in the post-Cold War world. But, as I have stated on a number of occasions, I do not support the use of US ground troops as combatants in a civil war. Fighting a war in the former Yugoslavia, a war that does not directly involve our European allies, is not in our vital national interest. Thus, it is critical that the Administration, the Congress and the American people closely and carefully monitor the situation and ensure that the role of our troops remain that of peace-keeper and does not cross over to that of participant in a ground war.

I believe the role of peace-keeper/peace-maker is consonant with our goals of ensuring the horrendous atrocities committed in the region have come to an end as well as preventing the start of World War III, which is certainly possible should the conflagration re-ignite and spread beyond the current borders. I also believe there are other measures short of the use of military force that the US can take, measures the US must take that will contribute to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. On November 20th of this year, the day which marks the 50th anniversary of the first day of the Nuremberg trials, I introduced a Resolution which affirms support for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, expresses the sense of Congress that all nations of the former Yugoslavia must cooperate with the Tribunal and states that there can be no amnesty for indicted war criminals. In short, there can be no peace without justice

On this issue, where Americans are united, we must lead. All Americans are horrified at the tragedies that have occurred in the former Yugoslavia. While nothing can compare to the systemic evil that was the Holocaust, evil is evil and it must be punished. We all believed that such nightmares had been consigned to our past and that Europe would never again witness such wholesale violations of human rights. Let us build on this unity and lead the world in pursuit of justice. Here in the pursuit of justice, we can exert our unparalleled moral leadership. Here we can offer unequaled intelligence gathering and technical expertise and make a difference.

DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES TO BOSNIA

House of Representatives,
Committee on National Security,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, December 6, 1995.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd D. Spence (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

The Chairman. The meeting will please come to order. This morning, the committee continues its series of hearings on the situation in Bosnia and the deployment of United States ground troops as part of a NATO peace implementation force.

This morning, we are pleased to welcome Mr. Walter Slocombe, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and General Howell Estes, the Director of Operations on the Joint Staff. Gentlemen, we appreciate your willingness to appear before us today.

I would like to state that it is the intention of the chair to grant priority recognition to those members present at last week's hearing who were unable to ask questions. This is an important issue. There is a lot of member interest and all members ought to have a chance to engage with the administration.

I continue to have serious concerns about the commitment of the Balkan parties to adjust in lasting peace and the advisability of using United States ground troops to enforce the provisions of the Dayton agreement. With the deployment now of an enabling force of more than 1,400 American military personnel in the former Yugoslavia in preparation for the arrival of 25,000 United States troops, an American military presence on Bosnian soil is now a reality.

There is a lot of ground to cover and I know my colleagues are anxious to proceed. Let me therefore once again welcome you to this morning's meeting and thank you for your testimony. If there are no objections, your prepared statements will be submitted for the record.

Before turning it over to the witnesses, let me first recognize Mr. Dellums, our ranking member, for any remarks he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses, and second, concur in the process that will govern these proceedings. I think that that is wholly fair and appropriate. I would like to say to Ms. Harman that your name is on the list as one of the four people that will raise questions early on.

In order to give our colleagues adequate opportunity to engage the witnesses, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to insert my remarks at the appropriate point in the record and I would yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dellums follows:]

Opening Statement
Hon. Ronald V. Dellums, Ranking Democrat
House National Security Committee
Hearing on Bosnia Deployment
December 6, 1995

Mr. Chairman:

I join in welcoming Under Secretary of Defense Walt Slocombe and Lieutenant General Estes, the Joint Staff Director of Operations. I look forward to their comments on the plan to deploy U.S. troops to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I appreciate their availability to appear before the Committee in aid of its consideration of the policy and implementation plans associated with the Dayton peace agreement.

It is important for this Committee to inform itself fully on the implications of the plans to use U.S. forces in the implementation of the peace plan. To the degree that questions remain unanswered from last week's appearance before the Committee by Secretary Perry, Secretary Christopher and General Shalikashvili, I trust that today's witnesses can provide the required answers.

Under Secretary Slocombe: While today's hearing focuses more on the operational aspects of the deployment, you are well informed to

discuss the larger policy issues underpinning the President's view that we should deploy U.S. forces to implement the plan. In addition, I would appreciate your sharing with us your view as to how the military tasks of the IFOR will be integrated with the economic reconstitution, refugee resettlement, political and civic tasks of the other organizations implementing the peace agreement.

General Estes: Would you please share with us your insight into the operational plans — how NATO proposes to implement the plan and to do so while minimizing the risks to forces participating in the IFOR.

I hope that we will resist the urge to attempt to micromanage the military leaders who bring years of professional service to the task before them, that we will remain mindful of our respective responsibilities and confident in the military judgment being brought to bear on this task.

We all know that any task or operation carries risks with it, whether the operation is peacekeeping, humanitarian or warmaking. The orders of magnitude lower risks associated with peacekeeping operations has been noted previously in testimony before this committee and it bears remembering. With regard to risk, we will appreciate hearing from our

witnesses on how it is that the political leaders and the force commanders plan to keep those risks relatively low, especially from Secretary Slocombe regarding the parallel plan to arm the Bosnian government, and from General Estes regarding the actual deployment of our troops.

Thank you Mr. Chairman; I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Gentlemen, you can proceed as you wish. Mr. Slocombe.

STATEMENT OF WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is, in a sense, a continuation of the hearing at which Secretary Perry, Secretary Christopher, and General Shalikashvili appeared last week, so none of us have extensive opening statements. With the chair's permission, I would, however, like to briefly outline the case for the necessity for U.S. participation in this operation and to update the committee on events since the hearing last Thursday, then turn to General Estes for an update on the current situation.

We also have with us Mr. Chris Hill, who is from the State Department. He is the Director of the Office of South Central Europe and he has been an active and fully involved member throughout the period of the negotiation with Ambassador Holbrooke's negotiating team, so that he is available to provide responses on questions in that area.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hill, we welcome you this morning.

Mr. HILL. Thank you.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am glad to have this chance to talk with the committee about why the Congress and the American people should support the President's plan to send United States troops to Bosnia to help with our allies to implement the peace agreement that the parties have signed. We should do this because it is right, it will help end the terrible war and huge civilian casualties and millions of refugees.

But this is not a humanitarian mission, or at least not just a humanitarian mission. Peace in Bosnia is critical to our national security interests in the most calculated sense, because stability in Europe would be threatened if we let this war start up again and likely spread to more countries. We have seen twice in Europe in this century that letting Europe's conflicts fester does not keep us out. It only means we have to fight later in even harder circumstances.

Acting now will also confirm United States leadership and influence in Europe and in the world. We have critical interests, economic, political, and strategic in Europe. We have critical interests in maintaining the credibility of our standing around the world. Acting now will confirm that leadership. Hanging back would be a grave blow to that leadership and that influence.

The implementation force is a sound military operation. Our troops will have a clear, limited military mission focused on the tasks set forth in the military annex in which American military officers, spokesmen for the Department of Defense, were intimately involved in the negotiations. Those tasks, the separation of the forces, enforcement of the cease fire, securing an environment for civilian implementation but not undertaking that implementation themselves. We will be sending a powerful force centered around the First Armored Division from Germany with attack helicopters, air support, and a full combat capability.

Without us, there will be no implementation force and no peace, but our allies and others will share fully in the burden. The United

States will send only about a third of the troops and will be responsible for only about a third of the territory. Europeans are, in most cases, sending proportionately a larger percentage of their military forces than we are.

Our troops will be well armed, well trained. They will be under a NATO chain of command with no dual key. They will have robust rules of engagement to ensure that if anyone makes or even threatens trouble for them, they will respond immediately and powerfully.

Of course, there are risks. There are risks in any military operation. There is no more solemn undertaking that a President takes or that the Department of Defense takes than sending American military personnel to do the jobs that our national security requires in potentially dangerous circumstances. But the risks of letting the war restart and abandoning U.S. leadership are far greater.

The President has asked for an expression of Congressional support. I and my colleagues are here this morning to continue the discussion of this critical issue with you.

Let me just briefly review some of the events affecting this matter which have occurred since last Thursday. On Friday last, the North Atlantic Council, that is, the representatives of all the members of the NATO alliance, approved the secure operations plan, 10405. The approval of this plan represents the formal allied endorsement of the concept of operations.

Importantly, it also includes approval of a very robust rules of engagement, the very substantial force, the straightforward and unified NATO command and control, and the other planning arrangements that U.S. and NATO military officers have recommended in order effectively to carry out the military mission of implementing the military aspects of the Dayton accords.

Friday's NAC also authorized General Joulwan in his capacity as the supreme allied commander for Europe to begin deployment of enabling forces to Bosnia and Croatia to prepare for the arrival of the main body of U.S. troops. The mission of the enabling force is to make possible the expeditious, efficient, and safe deployment of IFOR once the peace agreement is signed and NATO and the President give the final go-ahead. They will provide infrastructure, command and control, communications, and intelligence preparations, prepare for movement and set-up liaison with troops of cooperating countries that are already in the theater. General Estes will provide additional details.

On December 3, President Clinton was briefed by General Joulwan on the overall plan as approved by the NAC and also on the U.S. contribution to the enabling force. He gave his approval at that stage.

On December 4, Secretary Perry announced that about 3,800 reservists have been notified for training in preparation for being called up for the deployment to Bosnia. The formal request for a Presidential selective reserve call-up will go forward, I believe, tomorrow. And again, General Estes will have additional details on this issue.

On the same day, Secretary Perry signed an order for a force of about 3,000 U.S. support troops to go into rim countries, primarily

Hungary, some in Italy, for logistics and engineering work connected with the potential movement of the main body of the force.

I want to stress that the actions which have been taken already are not the deployment of the main body. That decision remains to be taken, but they are steps which are essential in order to have the option to move the main body forward expeditiously once the agreement is signed and the final orders are given.

Yesterday, Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher met in Brussels with their NATO foreign and defense minister colleagues and gave ministerial-level approval to the plan. The resounding theme of this meeting was a message of unity and resolve on the part of all 16 allies in support of the IFOR mission in Bosnia. Our allies strongly support the principle that this must be a robust force and a militarily achievable mission, that it will be done under unified NATO command and control.

Very significantly, this meeting, which is itself very rare, there have only been one or two similar meetings of all 16 foreign and defense ministers in NATO's history, at this meeting, the French announced that they will move closer to cooperation with the military side of the alliance. It is clear to us that this decision, which we welcome, on the part of the French Government is in large part a product of vigorous United States leadership of the alliance, which has served to convince the French that in order to have an effective European security apparatus, it must be based on NATO and on continuing involvement of the United States in European security, not on an effort to set up a separate system.

Significantly also, the ministers yesterday in Brussels approved the participation in the implementation force of an initial group of 14 non-NATO countries, drawing primarily but not exclusively from BFP partners in Central and Eastern Europe. Discussions will continue with a number of other interested nations. The willingness, indeed, the eagerness of countries in Central and Eastern Europe to support this operation with substantial forces of their own is a testament to the importance of this operation for general European security.

With respect to the forward plan, we expect that the Paris conference which will result in the formal signing of the agreement by all the parties and its witnessing by the United States and other major countries, will take place in Paris on the 14th of December. Almost immediately after that, the North Atlantic Council will meet again and, based on the review in all governments, including in the United States, of the final arrangements, will give the final formal approval, in effect, the execute order for the operation to go forward.

With that overview, I would like to turn to General Estes to ask him to make his presentation.

The CHAIRMAN. General.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HOWELL M. ESTES III, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (J-3), THE JOINT STAFF

General ESTES. Mr. Chairman, how are you this morning?

I think what I will try to do in just a few minutes here is give you a state of play. Secretary Slocombe has laid out a broad framework of events that have happened involving decisions this country

has taken or not taken as of this moment concerning forces going to Bosnia. He has discussed with you the decision on the enabling force. The enabling force, as all of you know, is the force that is going to Bosnia and Croatia. It totals a little less than 1,500 United States troops, about 2,600 total for NATO, and the approximately 1,500 is split about evenly between Bosnia and Croatia.

Those forces are already moving. You have seen pictures on the news of U.S. forces arriving at both Sarajevo and at Tuzla. Our first aircraft arrived this morning at about 7 eastern time with 15 or 16 Americans on board. The composition of what was on board was primarily people who are advanced team members of the First Armored Division, which is the primary United States division—it is the only United States division going to Bosnia, some of the lead group of that.

In addition to that, there were some air field people on board from the Air Force that are going to help set up the Tuzla air field as the primary node in which U.S. forces will flow as they come in by air and for support of those forces. So that is where we are in the enabling forces and we will try to keep you posted as we go through these series of events as to what the flow of forces looks like and how it is progressing.

The second group of forces that we have not discussed today but was discussed with you all by General Shalikashvili and the Secretary last week is this group of United States support forces, national support forces not going into Bosnia or Croatia itself but rather setting up a support base from which we will operate to support the main body force that will be positioned in Hungary.

The authority has been given by the President to authorize those forces to move. There are approximately 3,000 of those forces. We are making preparations now to start that flow, but it has not started moving yet. We have some negotiations to do with some of our friends in terms of transient rights between where they are located now in Germany and where they will be located in Hungary. The intervening countries, we have to sort the agreements out with them to allow the forces to pass through and we are in the process of doing that.

You will see those forces primarily flowing probably within a couple of days, we hope. All of the forces, the enabling force that we described earlier, which is the NATO enabling force which enables the main body to come on very short notice. Once the decision is made by the NAC to deploy the NATO force and once the President, after discussions with the Congress, makes the decision to deploy U.S. forces, if that decision is made, why, we will be able to quickly move it in in accordance with the NATO time lines to accept command of the theater and to start to carry out the very specific tasks that have been outlined for us as part of the agreement initialed in Dayton and then placed into the NATO plan as a result.

The support forces, I might add, the U.S. support forces are going to a city. The railhead for us, the rail network will end at a city called Kaposvar and the air head is called Tazar. They are very close together. They are about 35 or 40 kilometers from the Hungarian-Croatian border, so it is a fairly forward position and it will

serve as the place from which we will support our forces in Bosnia around the Tuzla area.

The only other comment I would have for you, then, would be dealing with the reserves. Again, as has been mentioned, the Secretary said the number of reserve call-up will be approximately 3,800 when the President so approves. Most of these reserves are U.S. Army in the Army Reserve or in the Army National Guard. They come from about 23 States. They will be going to Bosnia and Herzegovina, some of them. Some of them will be going to Croatia. Some of them will be doing backfill in Germany and here in the United States.

And as we get more visibility on this, as it becomes more clear as to exactly where everybody is going as the planning is completed and is made available to us, we will report to you further on the disposition of reserves, because I know how critical that is to each and every one of you.

With that, I think that completes the update about where we are and what is actually happening. The Secretary has really hit for you the key events coming down the road in terms of decisions that need to be made and consultations that will take place as we proceed toward making decisions about commitment of additional forces and decisions on the main body force, which will come after the signing in Paris on the 14th.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. I understand, Mr. Hill, you do not have a statement to make, so we will still welcome you to the committee this morning and we will probably get to you during the question and answer period.

As previously announced, the Chair will now proceed by recognizing those members who were present last time and did not get an opportunity to ask questions, and then we will pick up with the regular order.

We will begin with Mr. Chambliss, the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just open by saying that like so many of the members of this committee, I continue to have grave reservations about the decision of the President to deploy troops. We have been having hearings and discussions about this issue for in excess of 4 months in this committee now. There remain an awful lot of questions out there that simply have not been answered, and some of the questions that have been answered, in my mind have not been answered satisfactorily. We are receiving more definitive answers than ever before, and frankly, some of those answers that we are getting are not satisfactory as far as in my opinion to enable me to support the President.

However, General Estes, I want you to take great comfort in the fact that I personally, and I think all other 434 Members of the House are going to fully support those troops in the field. Whether we agree with the President or disagree with the President, one thing we all agree on is that you and those troops should have every piece of equipment, armament, and support necessary to do whatever the ultimate role is that is defined for your deployment in Bosnia.

In addition, I want to just associate myself with some comments that were made last Thursday by Congressman Weldon, Congressman Montgomery, and Congressman Skelton. I concur in the position that was set forth by those three gentlemen and I just would like to, in lieu of an opening statement, associate myself with their remarks.

Mr. Slocombe, I will direct my question to you and would ask, General, if you or Mr. Hill have any additional comments, please feel free to answer. I remain extremely concerned about our role as a "peacekeeper" in this mission. We have been in the position of bombing Serbian positions for several months. We had one downed pilot who was shot down in his F–16, a very highly publicized issue, both in Europe as well as the United States. He is a hero in the mind of every American. He is the enemy in the mind of every Serb, and he is a U.S. Air Force officer.

We are going into Bosnia with a definite role in part of training and possibly arming Muslims. It is not clear in my mind whether that is the United States training and arming those Muslims or whether it is a NATO effort to train and arm those Muslims.

I would like for you to expand on that and tell me how in the world the United States can be perceived as a peacekeeper in this mission if, No. 1, we are known by one of the factions over there to be the enemy, and if further we are in the position of training and arming one of the three factions that possibly is going to continue warring with one or two of the other factions.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Let me begin by trying to explain what our policy is with respect to equipping and training Bosnian Federation forces. Our objective is to create the conditions for a sustainable peace. I would not agree with the characterization of these forces as peacekeepers in the traditional U.N. sense. I will come back to that in a minute.

It is a fact that the imbalance between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Government forces, particularly with respect to heavy weapons, was a causative factor in the war and its continuation. When we leave, we think it is important not to leave behind a military imbalance which creates an inherent instability and could create the seeds of a new war.

We set our policy in this respect within the framework set up by the agreement. The agreement provides for an arms control effort to produce a build-down in the forces on the two sides. Those negotiations will start almost immediately. There will be a conference in Bonn shortly after the signing of the formal accords to begin that negotiation.

The agreement also provides for a delay, in effect, a delay in the lifting of the arms embargo so that, as you know, for 3 months, no arms supplies can be sent into Bosnia, and for a period of 6 months, no heavy weapons can be sent into Bosnia. One effect of this is that it allows a substantial period of time during which the implementation force is getting itself established, enforcing the provisions of the agreement before there is any question of an arms supply coming principally from anywhere.

That said about the importance of trying to do what we can with arms control, we are committed to ensure that there is a balance when we leave and whatever is not done by arms control, we will

take steps through third countries to ensure that it happens. This will not be a function of the implementation force. It will not, in fact, involve U.S. military personnel. We have talked to a variety of third countries about the possibility of working to make this happen and I have every reason to believe that that process will go forward.

We are starting the planning. We will be ready to do the initial organization so that we will be able to do this effort. We will base it on a careful assessment of the need so that we have an estimate of what is required in order to produce the balance that we think is necessary by a combination of reductions on the Serb side and a limited supply arranged through third parties. That is our policy with respect to equipment.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Before you leave that, are we talking about NATO doing this? Are we talking about the United States doing this, or who exactly are we talking about doing this?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. In an open forum, I think it is not appropriate at this stage to discuss the details of how we are going to do it. We will ensure that it happens. We will not have American military personnel do it. We will not have NATO personnel as such involved in it. None of the people involved in the implementation force will have anything to do with this effort, so that it will not be a mission of this force.

Now, there is no question that this is a dangerous place. It may be dangerous because Serbs feel that the United States, which, after all, participated, as you say, participated in the Deny Flight operation, participated in the bombing. One additional reason they may have a prejudice against the United States is our role, which exists, in arm and train. There will be plenty of other factions which have reason to object to the presence of NATO forces. You may have seen the reports of objections on the part of some certain groups in Bosnia to the French.

Our troops will go in not relying on political judgments by anybody to make them respected and safe from attacks. What makes them safe from attacks is not political judgments, it is their powerful weaponry, their training, the rules of engagement, the clear lines of command and control.

I do not dispute there are risks. Some of them arise from the factor you identified. They arise from a lot of other factors, as well. Our military has done all that we know how to do to minimize those risks. Maybe General Estes would like to describe some of the specific steps. But that is the approach we are taking. This is not going to be solved at a political level but at a level on the ground.

General ESTES. I think from our standpoint in the military, it is very important that we distance ourselves from this issue. It is an important issue for us nationally because of what the peace agreement says, but we are concerned and have been from the start that if there is an association of U.S. armed forces with this particular aspect, arm and train, we run into a great difficulty for our soldiers on the ground, and we all recognize the great dichotomy.

We have arm and train being essential in some aspects to the exit strategy from the standpoint of achieving some degree of military balance, which we have all stated is one of the primary three

reasons, the three parts of the exit strategy, so we have that piece and that is sort of diametrically opposed to this issue of if we are seen doing it, especially the U.S. military involved in this, that we have people on the ground who are at great risk, and so we have to strike the right balance here.

But I can assure you that I am in a position in my current job in the Pentagon that if there were any U.S. forces involved in this operation, I have to know about it, because the order is something that we prepare for the Chairman and the Secretary. They must direct this. There is no such order, and so contrary to what you may be hearing or reading, there are no U.S. forces who have been assigned the mission of having anything to do with arm and train. We are just not involved in it.

So that is really important to us on the ground as we put forces in there, because you are exactly right. They would be at great risk. They would become targets rather than people in there trying to enforce a peace agreement, and that is absolutely not what we are trying to do.

The other piece of this that is critical to us from the standpoint of the military is the way in which we are going to try to prevent the kind of thing from happening that you described, sir, of us having done a bombing campaign or been part of it under the NATO auspices, having lost Captain O'Grady early on before really the bombing campaign started in the early summer due to an SA–6 puts us in a position of being the hostile force to the Serbs, the Bosnian Serbs.

But I think that what we find in Dayton is all parties are tired of the war. They are ready to move on with this. They have agreed to do what they have said they are going to do and we are going to be there in an evenhanded way, and that is the critical thing for the U.S. military as we go in there, is we have got to be evenhanded. We have to be perceived as being evenhanded.

And the rules of engagement that we have given to the forces and the instructions and the training, which has been intense, especially for the First Armored Division, and some of you may have had the opportunity to visit the training at Hohenfels and Grafenvere in the last couple of months, but we have done rigorous training. General Bill Crouch, the U.S. Army in Europe Commander, and the Division Commander, General Bill Nash, have worked very hard on training these forces to be evenhanded. It is very important to us in the perception of both sides as we go into this operation in Bosnia.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Geren.

Mr. GEREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just to briefly follow up on the question by Mr. Chambliss, obviously, the training and arming portion of this is filled with risk and if the Serbs or anyone bent on mischief were going to attack some aspect of this effort, it would be the training or the delivery of arms. A third party is going to handle this delivery of arms. A third party is going to handle the training. Who is going to protect that third party from terrorist attacks? Will it be IFOR?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It will not be IFOR, no. The internal security within the Bosnian Federation will not in general be provided by

IFOR. IFOR will obviously protect itself, but it is not there as a general police force for——

Mr. GEREN. No, I am not talking about a police force. You have training in military operations of the Federation's military. I assume it is going to be taking place out in the open. It will involve all sorts of maneuvers. It will be spread out over a large area. I would expect that you would have to have tremendous security around that. Otherwise, there perhaps could be terrorist attacks directed at the training or the delivery of arms. Who will be the guarantor of the security of that training? Would it not be IFOR?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The Bosnian Army, after all, conducts training operations now.

Mr. GEREN. The arm and train aspect of this that is going to be done by this outside government—that is how you described it, I mean, a third party—who is going to guarantee the security of that arm and train aspect of this operation?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We expect that most of the training will be conducted outside Bosnia, so the training in the use of the weapons and the unit training of leaders and so on will be conducted outside Bosnia. The delivery of arms will presumably be through the normal routes into the country, the security of which will largely—the internal security in both the Federation and in the socalled Republic of Srpska, will be provided by the police and the armies of those two entities and it will not be provided by IFOR, and I am quite sure it will not be provided by any other American or NATO or foreign forces.

Mr. GEREN. So you are talking about the entire arm and train operation will not have its security guaranteed by IFOR?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is absolutely correct.

Mr. GEREN. What happens if the arm and train operation starts to fall victim to terrorist acts? Will IFOR not see it as a responsibility to step in and protect it from that, or will we just stand back and say, well, that is somebody else's problem?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Obviously, if it endangers IFOR itself or the mission of the force, IFOR will take action, but it will not in general be the responsibility of IFOR to do internal security against terrorism within the territory of either of the entities, whatever the source, whether it is terrorism from outside ostensibly directed against an arm and train operation or whatever its character.

Mr. GEREN. But would it not be accurate to say that IFOR would be the guarantor of the security of the arm and train operation as it is——

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No, I am sorry, it would not be true, no, any more than it will be the guarantor against other kinds of internal problems within the Federation, or, for that matter, within the Republic of Srpska.

Mr. GEREN. You consider the arm and train aspect of this to be essential to leaving behind a government that can withstand the pressures that will surely come after we leave.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. As I said when I answered Mr. Chambliss' question, it is our view that to have a sustainable peace, which is what we want to try to leave behind, it is important to eliminate the imbalance between the Bosnian Serb forces and the Bosnian Government forces, which has been such a source of instability up to now.

Mr. GEREN. And so you are saying that even if this arm and train aspect of it is thwarted or defeated by efforts to derail it, that IFOR will not assume responsibility for ensuring its security? That is an accurate statement?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Mr. GEREN. I would like to get to some of the——

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I have to say that the efforts of the Bosnian Army to improve its capability are—they are, after all, going on now. They will continue to go on, presumably at basically the same bases which have been deliberately put by the Bosnian Government in the more secure parts of the country. I do not see this, of all of the various problems that may arise, this does not seem to me to be likely to be at the core of the problem. So I think it will be possible to carry out both the general operation of IFOR and to carry out the necessary equip and train efforts without this being a fundamental obstacle to success.

Mr. GEREN. The red light is on. I am sorry I spent so much time on that.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is an important issue.

Mr. GEREN. I just want to make one last observation. The more I read about the accords, the more that calls to mind the role that General MacArthur had in Japan at the end of World War II. We had put ourselves in a position of trying to guarantee free and fair elections, to handle property claims. We were going to be in charge of retribution cases and have some role as to whether or not the war criminals are being properly sought out.

I question how we are going to conduct all of those sort of operations, get them done within a year and would like at some point to hear more about what sort of specific day-to-day responsibilities, in addition to just the military aspects of this operation, that we in our military are taking on.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am happy to address that. I do not know what the rules are with respect to the time, but subject to that, let me answer it briefly. Those will not be military missions, the ones which you have identified. They will be a very important part of making the peace agreement work.

In parallel with the international military effort, there is an international civil effort to set up reconstruction projects, to arrange for the holding of elections, to deal with the problem of refugees, both people who choose to move as a result of the territorial changes, people who move back to their original houses or move back into the country from refugee camps outside.

Those will not, however, be IFOR missions, and, therefore, the analogy to the post-V–J Day occupation of Japan is not an appropriate one. The government of Bosnia will continue to function. There will be a large-scale civilian implementation effort, an international effort largely directed by Europeans, which will be taking place in parallel.

Maybe Mr. Hill would like to expand a little bit on what the civilian side is going to look like.

Mr. HILL. Yes. In fact, we have a further major conference which will take place in London at the end of this week to discuss the civilian implementation, which, as you correctly note, is rather extensive. This is a peace agreement with 11 annexes and it is only

annex 1–A that deals specifically with the tasks of the IFOR, which I think are very clearly spelled out.

There will be a so-called high representative and that high representative, that civilian representative, will be based in Brussels, will have deputies who will be in Sarajevo, and their task will be to coordinate the various international agencies, including the OSCE and other agencies and other U.N. agencies, as well, in implementing some of the civilian issues.

These will include, of course, the elections. I think that is probably the centerpiece of the efforts and we expect the elections to happen at around the 6-month period, but they will also be establishing commissions for setting up means for refugees and displaced people to return to their homes, setting up the entire constitutional framework of the central government, setting up an international police force, a trained police force, as well as some public corporations for common railroads and issues like that, as well as a commission to preserve national monuments.

So we have really thought of a lot of things. It is a tall order, but Mr. Slocombe is absolutely correct that this is not the military's responsibility.

Mr. GEREN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to ask.

I want to direct these questions to Secretary Slocombe. One of the problems, one of the hurdles I am having to come to grips with to support the President on this is to answer the question of whether it is indeed our national interest in going to the Balkans. The President in his speech to the nation last week said, in fact, he closed his speech by alluding to a conversation he had with the Pope that we should be in there because one of our great wars of the century started there. Secretary Christopher made the same observation when he testified last week, and in your opening remarks, you said the same thing.

What I would like to know, and my understanding of history is that Europe in 1914 was a whole lot different than Europe in 1995. You had nations that, frankly, were very aggressive in Europe and that atmosphere and that is certainly not the case in comparison now.

But since that is one of the basic arguments that I need to be convinced of, what our national interest is, tell me what your understanding is of the comparisons of 1919 and 1995 and why we ought to send ground troops there.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you. That is, of course, the fundamental question. Obviously, the Europe of 1995 is very different from the Europe of 1914 or the Europe of 1939 or the Europe of 1945 or 1948. I think the common factor, what has not changed, is that the stability and security of Europe are vital United States interests and the war in Bosnia threatens that security and stability.

It threatens, it seems to me, in three general ways. The first is, it is simply inconsistent with the kind of order that it is in our interest to see prevail in Europe to have this large-scale war with

horrible atrocities, large-scale casualties, massive refugee movement continue.

But, you may say, well, there are a lot of places in the world where horrible things happen. We do not send American forces to go and fix them all. The answer to that seems to me that Europe is, if not unique, it is not the only place where we have this scale of interest, it is one where we clearly do have it.

We have economic interests in European stability. We have political and strategic interests in European stability. It is still collectively our best customer. It is still collectively the largest center of military power in the world. We also have cultural and social connections.

And as I said in my opening statement, we have learned in a very different context that the Europe of 1914 was different from the Europe of 1940, from the Europe of 1948. But we have learned that we cannot simply say, Europe is Europe's problem. Their quarrels are not our quarrels. That is, unfortunately, not true. It is not true in other parts of the world, as well.

Also, U.S. leadership on military and strategic and political issues is a source of U.S. influence and power on other issues we care about, and in some sense, that is at stake.

Let me talk a second about why I think there is a risk of the war spreading, and that is the most direct sense in which we have an interest in the war. Secretary Perry is fond of saying that a few months ago, he would have given better than even odds that the war would spread and would spread in a specific way, with the Croatian attack in Eastern Slavonia, which would have had a very, very high risk of bringing Serbia proper, the Belgrade Serbs, into the war.

This area is, as you know, full of potential conflicts. The most obvious danger of the war starting up again is an intervention, either a more direct intervention by Croatia than the one which already exists to a substantial degree, of the direct involvement of the Belgrade Serbs, the potential for the fighting here, the potential resumed fighting in Bosnia, to lead to trouble either in the Albanian populated area of Kosovo or the Hungarian populated area to the north in the Vojvodina, with the risk of drawing in Albania and Macedonia, and because of the connections among those countries, a very real risk of involving Greek forces and Turkish forces.

I do not want to set up a new domino theory. I am not saying that a resumption of fighting in Bosnia will automatically produce these results. I am saying that only a few months ago, we were very, very worried about the first step in this, that is, a Serb intervention either in response to a Croatian attack or continued Croatian-Bosnian successes against the Bosnian Serbs. So I think is a very real problem.

Another aspect of this is refugees. There are already millions of refugees from this war. We know from our own experience the potential of large-scale refugee flows to create problems. That could happen in Europe in a very destabilizing way.

And finally, we depend for the structure of peace on a system of international institutions, in some sense, that they will work. To a considerable degree, the United Nations has already been grievously damaged by this war. We now run a risk that NATO would

be so damaged. We really face a choice with respect to NATO. This can either be the use of this instrument as a way of resolving this problem or as an example of the inability of the institution and the United States working with Europe to resolve this problem. That is the choice we face.

The collapse of NATO would be a major blow to European security and a major blow to the United States, a major blow to our ability to influence and shape the security structure of Europe, and that is still a problem. None of us know what is going to happen in Russia. None of us know what is going to happen in places like Algeria. I mean, we are all focused this year on the Balkans. A couple years from now, we may be worried about events somewhere in the former Soviet Union, about events in the Middle East, about events in North Africa, and in that context, we are going to want to have the institution of NATO around to help, and in an important sense, that is what is at stake in this debate.

It is not like Kuwait. It is not oil. It is not as simple, as blatant aggression across an international frontier. But in a very concrete sense, I think our national security interests are very directly affected by the opportunity we have here to end this war.

Mr. HASTINGS. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just briefly, I cannot argue with what you say, but you draw a potential picture in the future whereby setting a precedent now that we will commit ground troops in an area where I have a problem supporting that concept of committing ground troops, that now we commit ground troops in every conflict that may come up in that area. I guess that is what bothers me, not that we should not be involved in some way but it is the issue of ground troops. That is where I have a tough time overcoming. Thank you.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Obviously, if there were a way to do this without sending American ground troops, we would be very anxious to do it. I think the short answer to that is we have, in an important sense, tried that for the last several years. The circumstances have been different, and so on.

But what the ministers of defense told Secretary Perry yesterday and what they have told him before is we are with you in this operation. We will go in with you and we will keep people there. In many cases, it is an issue of keeping troops there by countries that have had troops there for several years, of continuing what is an expensive and heavy and costly burden for them. We will go in with you. We will operate with you. We will do it under NATO command and control, even for the French, even for non-NATO members, even to a considerable degree for the Russians, which is one of the more remarkable aspects of this. We will come out with you. If you do not go, we will not go.

I think, given the fact that this genuinely is a common interest, that is a perfectly reasonable position for them to take. This is something the United States has not done before. This is a situation in which we have finally gotten what we have been asking for all these years, a situation in which we share the burden, but this is not like Korea in 1950, where we had an international effort but we were overwhelmingly the dominant force. We will be about a third of the force. We will have responsibility for about a third of the area.

Sometimes people ask me questions which imply they have some notion the United States will provide all the forward ground forces and other people will do the radios and stuff. That is not the case here, as I think you saw in Secretary Perry's briefing of General Shalikashvili's briefing. The country will essentially be divided into divisional responsibilities. The Europeans and other countries will provide two-thirds of the troops who will be doing in their areas exactly the same thing we are doing. This is a situation where, because we have a common interest, we have to share a common burden.

If there was a way to do it without anybody's ground troops—the Dutch have no particular enthusiasm for sending ground troops for the sake of sending ground troops, or the Danes or the British or the French—everybody would be happy to find a way to do it without having to do that. But once you acknowledge the requirement for ground troops, and I do not think there is anyone who claims there is a way to avoid that, then the case for everybody sharing in the burden seems to me pretty clear.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank my ranking member, Mr. Dellums, as well for allowing me the opportunity to ask my questions of the panel. I want to thank Secretary Slocombe and General Estes for your testimony.

There are many important issues that are being raised today about the concern for our troops in Bosnia but the one that I am compelled to highlight is that of ensuring our troops on the ground do not become combatants.

I also want to mention for the record my conviction that Congress must vote on whether or whether not to provide the President with the authorization to send United States ground troops in Bosnia. In addition to voting in favor of the Buyer-McHale resolution, I have personally communicated my sentiment to President Clinton. I believe support of the American people via the expression of this committee and this Congress is crucial for the mission's success.

But, Mr. Chairman, I want to clarify here the issue before us is not about the support for the President. It is not about the support for our men and women in uniform. Nor is it about our support for this country as a world leader. Neither is this issue whether we should or should not be involved in trying to bring an end to the horrible war in the former Yugoslavia, because we already have been involved in doing that and we will continue to be involved.

Keep in mind, it was through United States-supported air campaign and it was from the United States cooperation in effectuating successful economic sanctions on the warring parties that we have already helped dismantle Serbia's ability to continue to wage aggression and bringing both sides to the table. So I disagree with the notion that there are no other alternatives but to put ground forces there to effectuate a peace settlement in this area.

But again, the issue I am compelled to raise is to ensure that our forces do not become combatants. I think it is fairly self-evident from the members of this committee that they desire peace in this

area, but I also think I am confident in saying that there is no support here for deploying United States armed forces in a civil war in the Balkans and in Bosnia.

Mr. Chairman, with the rhetoric employed so far about being "the meanest dog on the block" and "we will meet force with force and then some" reflects the very real possibility that this mission of our men and women on the ground could move from that of being peace enforcers to combatants, and this is where my question will come.

Because of the multiplicity of our mission, the civilian component, and it was brought up by Mr. Geren, cannot be separated from the military component because the way it will be perceived is that it is part of the agreement that we are part of. So with one goes the other, and with one failing, I want to know where the military is going to be involved here.

We are not operating in a vacuum here with respect to training the Bosnian Muslims, ensuring elections, going after the war criminals, and then suddenly we have this military mission on the side here. I do not think that we can confuse the two because I do not think the Serbs are going to confuse the two when we are approaching implementing this agreement here, because it is all part of the same agreement, as Mr. Hill has already said.

Specifically, what I want to know is what are the signals that our military and our policy analysts are going to take into account in terms of the escalation here that may take place and when will you determine that we have crossed the line from being peace enforcers to combatants? I think it would be helpful for the committee for you to provide us with examples on how our force may be used in a number of situations, ranging from being subject to sniper fire to witnessing an outbreak of fighting between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, how are we going to be involved in that, and what will the extent of Unite States troops' involvement be in such situations?

Again, I want to go back to the rhetoric that has been employed here. We are going to be "the meanest dog on the block." Once we get fired upon, I think it is safe to say the American public is going to demand, the President is going to have the onus on him to respond in kind, and once that happens, there are going to be innocents who are going to get caught in the crossfire, and as a result, they are going to feel like we are to blame.

I think from that point onward, we are going to get caught into this thing and it is going to be very difficult for us not to be perceived on either side as taking sides, and I think that is what is troubling most of the members of this committee and me, in particular.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I want to turn to General Estes to discuss that in more detail, but we will be evenhanded in the enforcement of the military provisions of the agreement. We will not be neutral in any sense of the world about people who pose a threat to our forces or the implementation forces as a whole. That is not inconsistent with being evenhanded or being accepted as such by the parties. In my view, in fact, it may be essential.

The U.S. forces, the NATO forces, will have full authority to respond to people who are endangering them and who are using force

or the threat of force to resist the execution of their mission. I do not believe you can have a force able to do a job like this unless it has the authority to protect itself vigorously and, if necessary, to use force to get its limited and precise mission done.

I would like to turn to General Estes to discuss—this is essentially a question of rules of engagement and also of what we mean by evenhanded. Evenhanded in this context, from a policy point of view, means that all of the parties are pledged to implement this agreement. If between now and the signing in Paris something happens which makes us conclude that the parties, any of them, have abandoned their commitment to this agreement, this deployment will not take place as scheduled.

We rely on the proposition that the parties are willing, however reluctantly and with however many complaints and however many regrets, to end the fighting. But we do anticipate that there will be people who, for whatever reason, may be inclined to resist the decision of their leaders to maintain local, to refuse to comply in local areas. That case will be part of the mission, insofar as it has to do with the military aspects of the agreement, that will be part of the mission of IFOR.

There is absolutely no question that in terms of threats to the force itself, they will be able to respond effectively. I personally believe that whatever you think about the politics of the Haiti operation and any other aspect of it, I believe that one of the reasons the military side of it worked out as well as it has is that on the very first weekend, a group of Haitian police or irregulars of some kind made the mistake of trying to draw weapons on a group of American Marines.

The response, which was a firefight in which a substantial number of the attackers were killed, made very clear that whatever your other views on Haitian politics, they were going to leave the multinational force alone. That was a very important lesson. It is a lesson we may have to teach in Bosnia. But it is absolutely critical, not simply to the safety of our troops, though it is critical to that, it is also critical to their ability to carry out the mission.

Now I would like to ask General Estes to address some of the rules of engagement issues.

General ESTES. Mr. Kennedy, I will tell you, I think that is an excellent question. It is an issue which obviously we are paying a lot of attention to and there were a number of aspects to your question. Let me see if I can try to tackle a couple of them.

First of all, what we were trying to say earlier when we said that we were not going to be involved in some of the aspects of the civilian implementation with the military force and that there is no connection, obviously, that cannot be true. There has to be a connection and the connection is a fairly straightforward one, and that is we want to be sure that we do not assign the military any tasks which they are not capable of doing.

I mean, clearly, some of the civilian implementation tasks that are indicated in the agreement, the military is not trained for it and should not be involved in it. But what the military can do in the accomplishment of the tasks it is assigned is create the conditions in which some of these civilian things that you have discussed and that you have mentioned can, in fact, be carried out. Elections,

movement of humanitarian concerns in terms of flow of people back to homelands, things of that kind are obviously a fallout of a peaceful condition created by the fact that the forces are there.

So while I do not have the specific task to do that, the fact that they are there doing what they are supposed to be doing is going to lend to help with the conditions in which those things can be carried out.

The second point I would make is that we have to remember that this is not a condition of war. This is a condition of peace. The parties have agreed to this peace settlement that was initialed in Dayton. No party likes all parts of it. That is the nature of a compromise. So a lot of the rhetoric we hear coming up now from the various parties should be expected.

We do not have a signed agreement yet. They are skirmishing to try to get last-minute changes made, which we have heard from Secretary Holbrooke, Secretary of State Christopher, and, in fact, I think even the President that we are not going to accept changes at this point in time. The agreement is what was signed and initialed and that is what we are going to go forward and hopefully get signed in Paris.

But the fact of the matter is, the rhetoric we hear now which is causing concern to some people I do not think should be unexpected. The parties agreed to separate the forces. The parties agreed to do all of the things that are listed in the agreement, and if, in fact, we find that the parties are not going to carry forth on those agreements, then we have a basis for not carrying forth the agreement and the military aspects of it.

We do not see that. We see the possibility of rogue elements, and I think we will find they are very limited, who may not be controlled totally by the government creating a small problem in some area, and this is where we have to be evenhanded.

The comments that you hear today about the importance of putting in a force which is capable of protecting itself is very important to the perception of the parties as the IFOR, the implementation force, comes in, as compared to UNPROFOR that has been there. We are trying to let folks know this is not the same kind of force. It has different tasks. It has a different mission.

Do not think you are going to get the same response out of this force that you are going to get out of UNPROFOR, because they were constrained by rules of engagement and we, with our air power, were constrained by the dual-key apparatus controlled at the political level, especially on the U.N. side. So I think it is very important that we consider that.

Now, to your question in which you said, what are the signals of escalation that we are looking for? I will tell you, as an individual in uniform, this is not our decision in the military. This is a political decision that will be made when, in fact, the escalation has reached the level at which it is not acceptable, we do not feel we can do what it is that was agreed to do, and the peace agreement cannot be carried out in terms of the military aspects.

But clearly, we are looking for things. We already have said that the primary problems we expect to face in Bosnia as the people in uniform are, one, these small skirmishes from rogue elements. Occasionally, we are going to have somebody that does not agree to

do something, like move on the proper side of the cease fire line or some other element in terms of what the military is supposed to enforce and we expect to deal with that.

Hopefully, we will not have to use force to achieve compliance. We have the rules of engagement to do that. We have the rules of engagement that authorizes us to use up to and including deadly force to enforce the military aspects of the peace agreement, but that is not where you start. This is a peace operation and you start at the very low end of the spectrum.

Now, again, to your specific question on sniper fire, we have to be very clear on this. We in uniform will not ask our soldiers as leaders to go and expose themselves if they cannot return fire, and we have to try to create conditions in which we try to separate forces, create conditions in which we are evenhanded right from the start, and we all know this from watching American forces operate around the world.

In the vast majority of cases, the American solider carries the day because they are well-trained, and these soldiers that are going to go in there, I can only emphasize to you again what I said earlier. I do not know how we could have given them better training. They know what they have to do and they will carry the day on this evenhandedness role.

If we have a situation in which somebody decides as a small group that they are going to shoot at one of our troops, we cannot put those forces at risk. We have got to give them the authority to protect themselves, and I know you all would have it no other way.

We run into the problem you described, sir, of what if they are firing from an area with civilians around and how do we handle that. The troops have gone through this in training. They have thought this thing through. We do not want to try to give them direction from, say, my level. This is what training is all about. The training is so critical, and as I say, I do not think we could have done any better on this particular issue.

So again, without going any further, I hope that answers some of the key pieces. I will be happy to talk to you further about this at your convenience, but that is the best I can do in the time allotted.

Mr. KENNEDY. I just want to make a final observation, that I do not think we can confuse the people of Haiti with those that are war-torn in the Bosnian region. These are hardened warriors. They are not going to be as dissuaded by our show of force, having seen what they have seen over there, as the Haitians were.

Furthermore, I do not see any of these people begging a conflict with us because, I agree with you, we are the best in the world and we will take them down. The problem is, they will know that and they will try to sniper us. They will try to destabilize our force through terrorist attacks.

We need to hear better sort of answers to when our intelligence tells us that this—if I am a Serbian Government official, I am not going to formally sanction any overt action against United States forces. I would be foolish to. But I might say, let us spread it through the grapevine. Let us fire up some of our rogue elements because they will be our best key to getting the United States to

reconsider its role in this mission, and they are going to distance themselves as quickly as they can because they do not want to be the ones to pay for it, either.

But do not mistake the fact that they may well be part of any effort to destabilize our forces there, and as of now, I do not know how much we have heard in terms of on the policy end, when we make that cut and determine that they are against this and that it is too much of an effort to incorporate all these missions into one.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Let me try to respond to that. I said that we would not go forward if we became satisfied between now and the signing that the parties are reneging, that any one of the parties is reneging. If we came to the conclusion—which we do not expect to—if we came to the conclusion in the course of the operation that one or more of the parties had decided on a course of general resumption of fighting, the force would continue to be able to protect itself but we would have to make very fundamental decisions because we do not intend to stay there and intervene, either to intervene in the fighting on one side or another or to find ourselves in a position where the force does nothing except protect itself.

I think the administration has been clear about that from the very beginning, and, indeed, that is explicitly the NATO position. We would still have the same strategic problem. We would still have the same concerns and we would have to figure out ways to meet those concerns. We would not do that by leaving the force there as a combatant force and still last as a force which does nothing except hunker down and protect itself.

Mr. HILL. I would like to make another comment, as someone who has been in Belgrade and Sarajevo 12 times in the last 2 months and I will be going for the 13th time tomorrow night. I think it is very obvious to me that the sides there want peace. I mean, they are ready for it. It is equally obvious to me that the key factor in bringing them around to this was the fact that the United States was going to be a full participant in this peace settlement.

We have given a lot of thought to the evenhandedness question, because this is obviously the key element. I mean, can United States forces play this role? I think one point worth mentioning is that we have no historical animosity toward the Serb people and they do not have any animosity to us. We were allied in World War II. I think anyone who has lived there—I lived in Belgrade for 2 years—is very aware of the fact that there is a very warm feeling toward Americans.

I think the fact that the Serb leadership in Belgrade and the Serb leadership in Bosnia, the Pale Serbs, agreed to initial this accord is directly related to the fact that we are such full participants in the implementation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Harman.

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Dellums.

Secretary Slocombe and I were contemporaries in law school several hundred years ago and I am very comforted that he is part of the administration's brain trust on this issue. Nonetheless, as he recalls, a very famous professor there, Roger Fisher, has coined the

term "getting to yes" and I am having a lot of trouble getting to yes on this issue.

Since last week's hearings that were referred to by the witnesses, I have held my own town meetings with the substantial Croatian-American community in my district and with veterans and they are overwhelmingly opposed to what the United States is now doing for two reasons.

First, they question the means, that is, the introduction of ground troops, and we have been over that at length this morning, so I do not want to belabor that. But they also question the ends, and that is what I want to ask a question about.

I posted in this town meeting the map I was given last week about where we will be and how this new country, what the borders of this new country are. It does not take much to see how wiggly all the lines are. It kind of reminds me of these congressional districts that are being reviewed by the Supreme Court at the moment. At any rate, there was not one person in the room who thought that those contours had a good chance of surviving the year.

So I want to ask a little about the end game in two ways. First, how do you handicap the chances that peace, meaning a cease fire and some kind of civilized relationship in that region, will survive the end of the U.S. military engagement? That is one general point.

The second point is, how do you handicap the chances that a new country more or less along the lines of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, as we all know, is going to hold these democratic elections during the year, will survive the end of this process and into some reasonable future?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I want to ask Chris Hill to start because he has been so deeply involved in the negotiations and I think is the best witness available to the committee right now on the acceptance by the parties.

Mr. HILL. First of all, I never bet on a game that I am playing in, but let me tell you that what you refer to as borders we refer to as inter-entity boundaries, and we use that rather cumbersome expression for a reason, which is that they are not borders. I mean, these are supposed to be boundaries that join the two entities of Bosnia into a single state of Bosnia. We spent a lot of time working on these boundaries.

One of the reasons they look like such a jigsaw puzzle is it has to do with where populations are, and in trying to form these boundaries we wanted to look for a minimum of refugees, of displacement. That is, if Serbs were suddenly put into a Federation area, many Serbs would feel they have to leave, and indeed, we are facing that situation in Sarajevo, which I think is the real key aspect of implementing these boundaries. But by and large, the cease fire line was followed to minimize further flows of refugees.

But we also spent a lot of time, apart from the map issues, we spent a lot of time on the constitutional issues and trying to form a state in which there would be a superstructure between these two entities, and at this superstructure, which will include a presidency, a national assembly, a court system, that we would form the superstructure in a way that all the peoples of Bosnia, the Croatian people, the Serbs, and the Bosniacs or so-called Muslim people, be-

cause you cannot really just say Muslim because there are others involved in that, can feel that their interests will be protected and that they can live in Bosnia and live there and feel that they do not need to fear the tyranny of a majority.

It is not an easy effort, and you are quite right to focus on this, to say, is this really going to work? The answer is, we do not know if it is going to work but we feel we have created the best conditions possible to make it work.

I think anyone who has studied the area knows that Bosnians of all nationalities, to use that Balkan word, have lived together for hundreds of years and have, for the most part, avoided conflict. I mean, at the time when the War of the Roses was raging in England, Bosnia was a very safe place, in fact. That is why many Jews settled there. Bosnia was a place where people have really worked out ways to live together.

Some terrible things went wrong in the last 3 years and it is going to be very difficult for them to put it back together, but they have done it in the past and we feel that we have established the framework, the constitutional framework, the political aspects, and a territorial settlement which will allow people to have the confidence that they can live there in the future. That is, indeed, what we are trying to do and we feel very satisfied that we have preserved Bosnia as a single state, two entities which are joined together in that single state.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Like Mr. Hill, I do not bet on things like this, but in an important sense, we do make a bet. The Defense Department would not have recommended to the President going forward with this operation unless we were satisfied that not only can it be done in the purely military sense but that there is a reasonable chance of obtaining the objective, which is to create a sufficient period of reasonably stable conditions as between the two entities that there is a good opportunity for them to make it work.

For the reasons Mr. Hill says, we have some reason, some substantial reason to believe that for all the hatreds and all the things that have gone wrong over the last few years and over the centuries, there is some willingness in the area to make it happen. We believe that having a period of enforced stability will build the basis for self-sustaining stability at the time we leave.

That is the answer. Yes, we believe, if you will, the odds—nothing is certain, but the odds are very substantial that this will turn out to have been a successful operation, not merely in the sense of getting the immediate military job done but getting the broader political job, creating the conditions where the civilian effort can continue and so on.

General ESTES. If I might just add one point for just one second, I think it is real important, though, to acknowledge and to have a clear understanding from our perspective, this is not without risk. We are going to put Americans in Bosnia. I mean, make no mistake about that.

So I do not want to have the impression go that we think this thing is going to be just fine and do not worry about it. I mean, we are all smart enough to recognize that we are going to have incidents happen. Hopefully, they will be minimized through the conditions that we have stated, but we are going to have nonhostile

losses. We have them every day in the military. We lose people due to accidents. We lose people due to disease, illness.

We are going to lose them there for those reasons, and hopefully, if history is any kind of a pattern, in operations like this, the what I would call non-combat loss, the nonenforcement loss is going to be much greater than anything due to any hostile activity.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but General Estes's comment prompts me to say that that is why it is so critical that our assessments of the chances for peace be high, because we are putting so much at risk.

I just want to say one more sentence, and it is a metaphor someone in my town meeting used and it is kind of apt, I think. He said, it is like a hostile force coming into your living room and taking over half your living room and then a third party comes in and says, okay, he is here. We are going to stand in the middle and this is the way things are going to continue.

Now, I know we can argue about that, but there are strong views that this new line, whatever you want to call it, not a boundary, invades people's territory and ratifies ethnic cleansing that many people, all of us, abhor. If those strong views persist, it may make it hard to get to peace. So I just put it out there and tell you that it is hard for us to get to yes because of that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dellums.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to first make an observation and ask you, Mr. Slocombe, to comment, and then I would like to also ask a question. I preface my remarks by reminding my colleagues that the late Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Rabin, once said in response to a question asked by my colleagues, you do not have to make peace with your friends, you make peace with your enemies. Therefore, peace is an extraordinarily difficult proposition. It is not easy.

In that context, we are now looking at methods of helping people move from the battlefield to peace, peacekeeping, peace making, peace implementation, peace enforcement. These are relatively new in the American lexicon. They are not concepts that necessarily wears easily with elected officials. They are not necessarily concepts that are readily understood at this particular juncture by the American people.

But we live in the context of a democracy, and at the end of the day, at the grassroots level, that is where the support must reside. My colleagues here are representatives of that grassroots perspective.

Having said that, I would like to make a point that I thought the gentleman from Rhode Island was making and he took it in a little different direction. This morning and over the last few weeks, we have heard the term peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace implementation. General Estes in a very articulate manner said, look, these are not war conditions. These are conditions of peace. We do not start with the concept of the use of force. We start with the notion that this is a peace operation, that maybe some of these or many of these violations would not have to be met with force.

Those are very powerful and eloquent terms. What I would like to point out is that if we are attempting to be part of the educative

process, to bring American people and elected representatives to the notion of peacekeeping as an important function in the context of the post-cold war, to bring people from killing and maiming each other to peace, that the rhetoric of robust rules of engagement, meanest dog on the block, we will blow you away, these are concepts of war.

So the point I would like to ask you, Mr. Slocombe, to address is this, because I think that those notions befuddle and confuse the American people and intimidate elected officials, because if you are talking on the one hand of conditions of peace, operations of peace, peace implementation, peacekeeping out of one side of the mouth, but then on the other side we talk about robust rules of engagement, powerful responses, meanest dog in town, then American people say, well, if you are spending all of this time focusing on responding militarily, then is this indeed a peace operation?

I think it is important to clarify those things, and I do not think the point that I am making is too subtle. It is confusing to people, because peacekeeping on the one hand and battle concepts on the other hand seem to be contradictory, and I would appreciate it if you would respond to that.

The second part, you mentioned earlier, Mr. Slocombe, in response to Mr. Chambliss' question, you said very early on that this is not peacekeeping in the traditional sense and I will elaborate later, but you did not get a chance to elaborate. I would like to give you an opportunity to elaborate as to whether that is a technical concept, a political concept, or a military concept.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Let me respond first, though, to your very important, more general observation. I think there is no contradiction at all between the proposition that we are going there to enforce a peace, a peace which the parties have signed, a peace which, on the whole, we have reason to believe the broad range of the population wants to happen. They may not like the boundaries—they do not like the boundaries—but they are resigned, is perhaps the best word, to those boundaries as the price of an end to the war.

There is no contradiction between going to enforce that agreement against rogue elements or holdouts or people who have gotten into the habit over the period of the war, and making the point that we are not going in as combatants, we do not intend to become combatants in what we think the extremely unlikely situation where we could only stay if we were prepared to become combatants, we would not, and the proposition that particularly with respect to the safety of the force, we have given our commanders full authority to do what is necessary to protect the force.

This kind of goes to the distinction between what I would call traditional peacekeeping and what I prefer to call peace implementation here. I regard traditional peacekeeping as a situation in which there is a highly stable, maybe even a hyper-stable situation, in which the function of the peacekeepers is simply to be there to observe, to be a presence.

That is clearly not what we are doing in the initial stages, in a situation where you are going in with an agreement which is still being implemented by the parties, and you want to have an outside force which is there, capable of doing more than simply observing

violations and, I guess in principle, hopefully deterring them but without any threat of consequences for failure to deter.

The idea here is, first of all, to protect the force, and I think my personal view is that that is entirely consistent with traditional peacekeeping, that there is nothing in traditional peacekeeping doctrine that suggests that the peacekeepers have to be neutral about people who are attacking them.

Mr. DELLUMS. Sure.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is point 1.

Point 2 is that we are also there, and we need to be candid about it, we are there, if necessary, as General Estes says, after other methods have been tried and are not successful, to be prepared to use force on a limited scale, as necessary, to produce compliance in a situation where we are dealing with, as he says, a place that is not being evacuated as it is supposed to be or something like that.

I take your point that this is not like going and liberating Kuwait. It is not like going and defending the Fulda Gap against a Soviet onslaught. On the other hand, it is also not like going to Cyprus and it is important that we have that distinction in mind, in the sense of going to Cyprus, which we do not do, but to be a part of the very longstanding force that is essentially an observer force.

Mr. DELLUMS. Just one follow-on. I understand the notion of the security, the ability of the troops to defend themselves. What I am commenting to is the heavy rhetoric, and the rhetoric has been extremely heavy. As I mentioned in a meeting that I had with you before, sometimes the best thing that an elected representative can do is sit all weekend and watch television because that is how the American people get briefed, not in the confines of this room.

So I sat all weekend and watched the television because I wanted to get a sense of how the American people are getting this. So on the one hand, they hear peacekeeping, peace making, peace implementation, peace plan. On the other hand, they heard this very heavy war rhetoric, and I am simply saying to you, observing all of that, that is extremely confusing.

One of the rationales for that has been what we are trying to do is communicate to the rogue elements over there that we do not want them challenging us in any way. Now, you may be communicating that to CNN, but you are also being interviewed on ABC, NBC, CBS, and American people are listening to that.

I am simply saying to you, I am running a red flag up the pole and saying to you that that heavy war rhetoric flies in the face of trying to be educative about the role of peacekeeper and peace implementor in the context of the post-cold-war world and I am not sure that those twains are meeting appropriately. I understand your concept, but I am saying out there, there is mass confusion because the rhetoric seems to be heavily leaning in the opposite direction.

I find it fascinating, in fact, I mentioned it to the staffer, that you have General Estes, who seems to be much more sensitive about raising the peace flag as opposed to the war implementation flag. In some kind of way, it turns things around. I am just saying that in some kind of way, what he is trying to say has to be something that gets out front. I hope I am making my point.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We are not going there looking for a fight. I have had an opportunity to observe some of the training, and one of the things which the training of the leaders is focusing on is how to resolve confrontations, how to resolve problems of compliance, indeed, in some degree, how to resolve threats to the force without having to use military force.

I do not want to seem more belligerent than General Estes, but I think often it is the case that one of the best ways to be able to do that is to know that you have in reserve the capacity, first of all, without question, to protect yourself, and second, if necessary, to compel a result.

I think one of the problems the U.N. had was that because for a variety of reasons, many of which were entirely understandable in the circumstances, it was extremely reluctant to use force, which it had full authority to do. The U.N. force was reluctant to use force to compel compliance with some of the things they set up as their missions. We have tried very hard not to take on missions that we do not see a way to accomplish.

General Estes?

General ESTES. Mr. Dellums, I would simply add one comment. Your insight is extremely useful. One of the things that I get to do, like it or not, on about a daily basis when we have an operation like this is have a lot of contact with the press. I will take your suggestion and try to work this issue in a very careful way, because what you communicated is exactly right.

I think what you are hearing in terms of the strong rhetoric is to communicate clearly to the warring parties and factions over there that this is not the UNPROFOR force. Things are going to be different. We owe it to the troops, to their families, to allow them to protect themselves. We want to make clear to the warring parties that this is the case.

But the confusion to the public, I can absolutely understand what your point is and I will try to play this out with the media at the Pentagon over the next few days in trying to set the record straight a little bit from my position as a person in uniform, and hopefully I can help with this issue. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses. I will try not to take most of my time adding to the rhetoric so that I will not be able to get some questions in, and I have a number of them.

One of the questions, General Estes, is I understand 3,500 reservists will be called up. I am sure you cannot give me the names of the individuals or the units. I am interested, however, in the general plan of the call-up. Are we calling up distinct, identifiable units with special skills? Are we yanking individuals with special skills from units? What kind of a mix will it be in terms of that call-up?

My major problem here, unlike some of my colleagues, is not whether or not this country should be involved and has a role in the Balkans and in trying to bring an end to this conflict.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am sorry, sir, I am having difficulty hearing you.

Mr. BATEMAN. My problem is not whether or not we have a role in trying to bring an end to this tragic conflict in the Balkans and in Bosnia. I think that we clearly do. But what disturbs me is the degree to which we have made a commitment of land forces on the ground if you come to a peace agreement when I am very, very doubtful, quite frankly, as to whether or not the parties for whom the signatories or the people who initialed the agreement in Dayton really are sufficiently determined that they want that peace.

What I read in the newspapers recently of General Bachelet, the French general, as to his lack of confidence that the arrangements dealing with the Serbs in Sarajevo, is going to be workable, whether it will be respected. Obviously, they do not like it. I would not expect them to like it, but there are 100,000 people involved. What do we do if 50,000 or 60,000 of them are rampaging up and down and through the streets of Sarajevo neighborhoods?

There are things in the Dayton peace agreement that are very specific that call upon the parties to take certain actions. Is there a checklist that has been furnished to all of the parties as to what are the things you are to do and give us a status report on what activities you are undertaking to see that you do them and that you do them fully and within the agreed time lines?

We need some confidence-building measures that these people do, indeed, want peace if we are going to go forward with a commitment, because the commitment is predicated upon the fact that the people who signed the agreement are truly representative of the desire and the sentiments of the people they purport to represent to come to a peaceful resolution of their conflict. These things are very, very badly needed.

Arming and training of the Bosnian Muslims, the more I hear of this, the more schizophrenic I think the position of this country has become. On the one hand, it seems to be going toward satisfying a political view here in the Congress and in certain political leaders that we should have lifted the arms embargo against the Muslims long ago, while at the same time we are assuaging concerns from my colleague from Missouri and others, including myself, how can you be a neutral peace enforcer if you are taking sides and if you are going to arm one of the potential combatants who would be warring with the other?

Your Dayton agreement has within it provisions for disarmament. Are we going to enforce the disarmament? And if we are saying either covertly or otherwise, we will see that the Bosnian Muslims get armed on what we conclude with their consent is parity, how are they ever in these disarmament negotiations ever going to conclude that they have parity when if they do not come to terms, they are then being assured that we will arm you. You will get new arms, maybe better arms, and we will train you or we will see that you get trained.

It does not seem to have any logical consistency in terms of how you are going to deal with the very appropriate goal of seeing that you have a balance of forces at the point where we hopefully will be out of there so that there will be a deterrent to the resumption of the conflict. But, frankly, I think it is truly a schizophrenic approach to a very real problem.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Mr. Bateman, maybe I can ask General Estes to address first the reserves question and then we will deal with the others.

General ESTES. Mr. Bateman, the reserve call-up will be somewhere between 3,500 and 3,800 people. It is still being formulated. The Department of Defense released the day before yesterday a list of units that are going to be trained for possible call-up and deployment. All of them may not be, in fact, sent.

Mr. BATEMAN. All of them on the list, the entire unit would be called, not just people from those units?

General ESTES. Yes. It lists the location of the unit, the type of unit, and the number of people where it is known at this point, and I will be sure you get a copy of this because that is the current state of play.

Mr. BATEMAN. It was ambiguous as to whether or not it meant the entire unit or what elements of the unit.

General ESTES. Exactly, and what I would say to that is that in some cases, depending on the unit, the whole unit will deploy. In other cases, there will be individuals that deploy and not the full unit. So it will be a mixture of the two that you mentioned. There is not a need, for example, for a full unit of MP's to deploy in all cases. There will be a certain aspect of it, a certain percentage of it that will go, and so the entire unit may not deploy.

These particular reserve forces that will be called up, the majority of them are in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. There is some Air Force, about 400 Air Force positions. You see none of them listed here because the Air Force is trying to do it all with volunteers, but that is not clear yet as to whether they will need a reserve call-up, so they are going to ask for authority for it when it goes forward to the President and I think you will see this materialize in the next few days.

We have to ensure—one of the things that General Shalikashvili, I think, mentioned to you when he was here last week and I will just repeat for those of you who were not able to hear the testimony is that we are not going to send soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, in the cases where that applies, to Bosnia if they have not been adequately trained. There is a very detailed listing out of what kind of training they need to go through, and so it is particularly important for the reserve forces that we pay attention to this. So we need to get them in the process of starting to train, which is what this was all about, before the selected reserve call-up.

About 23 States, I think, are involved, as I remember from my last count. Some will go to Bosnia. Some will go to Croatia. Some will be backfills in Europe, and then there will be some limited number of backfills here in the CONUS for the United States for people that deploy forward.

But that is about where we are now, and I think as we get more visibility into it, clearly, all of the members will have access to that and we will be sure we keep you as informed as possible. I know how critical this is to you.

The issue of when will they go is another question that keeps coming up. Clearly, with the holiday season coming on us, that is in people's minds. We want to be sure we do not affect the mission by holding up people, but there is no sense in trying to get people

over there. Since we have a training issue we need to do with them, most of them will probably depart after the holidays or soon thereafter. That would be my guess at this point in time.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Mr. Bateman, let me address the issue you raise about the evidence of the willingness of the parties to comply, because that is the fundamental issue. We are going into this to enforce a peace, not to impose a peace or to come in on any side.

I think it is important to bear in mind that we already have a fair amount of compliance in a very important sense. There was a cease-fire agreement which has been in effect now for a couple of months which has been—there have been incidents, as you would expect, but there has been quite general compliance. There was a pullback of heavy weapons around Sarajevo and a cessation of the endemic shelling of the city.

The roads to Sarajevo and Gorazde have been opened—not perfectly, there are still problems in various areas, but there has been much more cooperation on the part of the Serbs with getting convoys and supplies of various kinds through. The utilities have started flowing into Sarajevo. The airports have been opened.

Now, those are not conclusive, but this is not a situation where you have full-out total war going on and you ring a bell and expect everybody to stop. We have some evidence on the ground of their compliance.

Mr. Hill, who participated in the negotiations, has told the committee about his judgment and the judgment of our negotiators about the fundamental decisions that have been taken by the leadership in the three factions. I would not put stock in that they decided that continued war is no longer in their interest and therefore they will agree to a settlement.

We will be watching very closely to be sure that we get appropriate expressions of support and acceptance of the agreement from the leadership between now and Paris, between now and the deployment and on a continuing basis. I cannot say more than just that we fully understand that this is a critical factor.

Mr. BATEMAN. If I might, Mr. Chairman, my concern is that we need to have a reaffirmation of Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic. What we need—what I need—is to see that the people below them are indeed accepting that which they signed up for.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is exactly right and that is the standard we intend to apply.

With respect to the arms control aspects of it, I would like to ask Mr. Hill first to explain how the provisions of the agreement work in this connection.

Mr. HILL. Sir, first of all, let me mention that tomorrow night, we will be leaving on another trip to the region. I will be going with Ambassador Holbrooke and representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the NSC, and we will be visiting Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Zagreb. This is part of the process of ensuring that we continue to have the support for the peace process as we approach the final signing in Paris next week.

So we are very much on top of this one. We are very much concerned about ensuring that we have the support and we are continuing to work on it. In fact, I just got back from a trip last Friday

to do the same, and again, let me reiterate, we do have the support that we feel we need to carry this ahead.

With regard to the arms control issues, we have asked the parties to agree to a set of arms limitations which were designed to reduce tensions and create stability within the region and we are pleased that the parties have agreed to this. Any equipping and training of the Bosnians would be consistent with these provisions and would also be consistent with the U.N. Security Council resolution on the phased lifting of the arms embargo.

The CHAIRMAN. We are taking too much time on these things, gentlemen. We are running way past our five minutes and getting into filibustering. I would appreciate it if you could please limit your time.

Mr. Weldon.

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I thank you all for coming in today. I am going to be brief and make a couple of points and ask one question.

First of all, in response to the questioning of Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher and General Shalikashvili last week, I had a letter sent to me by a 15-year veteran of the U.S. Army Special Forces stationed in Fort Bragg. Unfortunately, much of what we have seen here has been the perception that our military is lockstep behind the President and somehow that Congress is not supportive of our military. I would like to read part of this letter, Mr. Chairman, and enter the entire letter into the record. I do not know this fellow and I am removing his name to protect him.

Mr. Perry, it says,

Contrary to what he said, Mr. Perry, any and all coworkers that I know, peers, seniors, and subordinates, do not agree with the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia. We are not wondering when Congress is going to back us up by giving either genuine or tacit approval of this "peacekeeping mission". Conversely, we need someone in Congress that has no compunction on stating the obvious in this matter, no strategic interest.

I can tell you unequivocally that numerous soldiers like myself, who have a deep sense of pride and respect for our great country, our military, and its way of life are totally fed up with our current administration's foolish use of the armed forces. Yes, we will go where ordered to go and complete any mission to the best of our ability, but only out of respect for our country, our armed forces, and because it is our job. If this administration wants to interpret that to be willing support, so be it.

I, for one, have had enough and am currently seeking employment outside of the armed forces that I so deeply love and respect. Please do not stop questioning these people and holding their feet to the fire considering this matter, as the truth is that we do not have any compelling strategic interest in that part of the world at this time and to rationalize otherwise and get Americans killed over there is nothing less than criminal.

Again, that is a 15-year veteran of the U.S. Army Special Forces stationed at Fort Bragg, NC.

[The letter of Mr. Weldon follows:]

Dear Curt, I am a fifteen year veteran of the U.S. Army Special Forces stationed at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. I was reading about your verbal exchange with the Secdef a few days ago and was compelled to let you know that contrary to what he said (Mr. Perry), any & all co-workers that I know (Peers, Seniors, & Subordinates) do not agree with the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia. We are not wondering when Congress is going to "back us up" by giving either genuine or tacit approval of this "peace-keeping mission". Conversely we need someone in congress that has no compunction on stating the obvious in this matter (no strategic interest) and questioning those that are so willing to risk American "combat" soldiers lives for humanitarian "moral imperatives".

I can tell you unequivocally that numerous soldiers like myself who have a deep sense of pride & respect for our great county, our military and it's way of life our totally fed up with our current administrations foolish use of the armed forces. (Haiti, Somalia, & now Bosnia). Yes, we will go where ordered to go and complete any mission to the best of our ability, but only out of respect for our Country, our Armed Forces, and because it's our job. If this administration wants to interpret that to be willing "support" so be it. I for one have had enough and am currently seeking employment outside of the Armed Forces that I so deeply love & respect. Please don't stop questioning these people and holding their feet to the fire concerning this matter, as the truth is that we DO NOT have any compelling strategic interest in that part of the world at this time and to rationalize otherwise and get Americans killed over there is nothing less than criminal. God bless you and keep up the good work.

Mr. WELDON. When I see the President staging a photograph like this, asking the troops to line up behind him to walk down so they can get a camera shot, much like we saw when the troops came down from Somalia, it really bothers me as a member of this committee.

But I want to question you, Mr. Slocombe, because you repeat again a perceptual line used by the President that I think we have to get the straight answer once and for all, and that is you again said, remember, we are only putting in one-third of these forces, 20,000. Now, damn it, that is not right and you know it and I know it.

In fact, I am aware, and perhaps you can tell me this is incorrect, of an internal memo being circulated inside the Pentagon where General Joulwan has said that he may need as many as 32,000 ground troops alone in the theater. That includes both Bosnia and in the neighboring countries.

Now, if we are going to send 32,000 ground troops in the theater, do not create the perception among the American people that it is 20,000 or 25,000. My question is, How many ground troops are we committing in total, and then on top of that, what is the size of the support force that is going to be needed in terms of air and sealift, in terms of air strikes, in terms of command and control, logistical support to complete this operation, because you cannot sit here and say that we are only putting in 20,000 out of 60,000. My best estimate is it is closer to 45,000 or 50,000 American troops involved in this operation.

Let us be candid with this committee, with this Congress, and with the American people. How many U.S. troops are going to be involved in the theater, not games about, well, they are in this country and they are in this country. How many troops? Is, in fact, the report that was reported inside the Pentagon last Friday, that there is an internal report issued by General Joulwan to the JCS asking for 25 percent above the 25,000 troops on the ground, and is there any political effort to have General Joulwan accept a number less?

The one thing I am going to say to you, I hope we do not have a vote on this issue in terms of embarrassing the President, because I think it would go down. But we are going to make sure that what General Joulwan wants and needs, based on the threat that he is going to face, we are going to give him, and I would like to know what that number is.

Mr. DORNAN. I have my pencil out and I am going to take these down and repeat them when I get to the floor.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. First of all, we do not need to be told that what is regarded as necessary for the——

Mr. WELDON. Excuse me. I have to interrupt you here. I heard that same response when we lost 19 young soldiers in Mogadishu, Somalia, just 3 years ago. We heard the same thing, "We do not have to be told." We go to those houses like the administration does. We are not going to let it happen again.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I repeat, we do not need to be told that if General Joulwan requires forces for this mission, he will get them. The number—which I will give you in just a second—the number is the number which General Joulwan regards as appropriate for the U.S. contribution for the NATO force.

If he comes in and says, "We need more people in Bosnia," we will send more people to Bosnia. If he says, "We need more people in the immediate surrounding area for support," we will not be bound by the number. We will obviously ask why he needs it, whether there is some other country that might be able to do the job, whether it might be something which could be contracted out, but if his judgment is that he needs American military personnel above these so-called ceilings, he will get them.

The numbers which have been repeated over and over are as follows. There will be 20,000 United States troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not more than, and all these are subject to the observation I just made. If General Joulwan says these are not enough, we will send more. But General Joulwan's recommendation as of right now and the one which has been approved is that there will be not more than 20,000 in Bosnia, not more than 5,000 in Croatia, and not more than 7,000 in the immediate rim countries, mostly in Hungary. Some will be additional forces sent in to Italy, and since there will be some transit, I cannot swear there will not be small numbers in other countries through which the trains will run.

Now, then, obviously there is in some sense the whole support establishment in Europe is available, indeed, in an important sense, the whole support establishment in the United States is available to support this operation. There will continue, as there have been, to be American air forces in Italy. The number of people involved in that, I do not have in my head, but it is——

General ESTES. 2,600.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. 2,600, and there will be from time to time, as there have been continually for years and years, American naval forces in the Mediterranean. For example, the aircraft carrier America is going through the Suez Canal today and will deploy to the Adriatic, and the size of that force is also a matter of public record.

Those are the numbers. They are the projections now for exactly the reasons you state. If they need to be adjusted upward, they will be adjusted upward.

Mr. WELDON. Then why do you continue to use the figure 20,000, as you did today?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Because it is the number of people who will be——

Mr. WELDON. But you just added up to 32,000.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I can add myself, sir. Because it is the number of people who will be in the theater where the actual mission will be carried out as contrasted to the support people. The 60,000 is the number of NATO troops. The 40,000 is the number of other countries' troops. All of them will have support operations, as well. I cannot say that we will immediately hop up to 60,000. We will not get up to 20,000 Americans for a matter of several weeks. But the 60,000 is comparable to the U.S. 20,000 number.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to have to break for a vote and we will try to come right back.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will please come to order.

The first questioner is Mr. Skelton, the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Mr. Slocombe, it is my hope that I live long enough to see what future historians will make of this effort. They will center, I believe, their writings about an issue to which I will refer in a moment, and I would predict that they would title the chapter "The American Folly of 1995."

It centers on the issue that has been gnawing at me, gnawing at this country lawyer for some time. It is an issue that deeply concerns the British, the French, other of our NATO allies. The issue is whether the United States guaranteeing and coordinating the arming and training of Serbs will violate the test as set forth by General Estes a few moments ago.

General Estes, I believe I have your words correctly. It is your testimony that it is crucial that our troops be evenhanded in manner and that the key is that our troops be perceived in an evenhanded way.

Secretary Warren Christopher's testimony of guaranteeing and coordinating the arming and training of the Muslims, and Mr. Slocombe, your words today, using the phrase concerning the same subject "how we are going to do it" marries the United States Government to the Muslims. Serb soldiers will see the only agent of the United States Government in sight will be the U.S. troops and the Serb soldiers will see them as favoring the Muslims over them, the Serbs. So the perception of evenhandedness as set forth by General Estes is destroyed.

If you cannot fool us regarding arming and training, you certainly cannot fool the Serb soldiers. So, Mr. Slocombe, I urge the State Department, I urge this administration to abandon this wrong-headed, this dangerous policy. Either send American troops in as peacekeepers or oversee the arming and training of the Muslim forces. You cannot do both. To continue this ill-conceived dual policy will bring unnecessary danger, injury, and death to fine American soldiers.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Mr. Skelton, the issues that you raise are extremely serious. The policy is, as you have stated it, it will not be a part of the mission of the American soldiers in Bosnia or of American soldiers or military people anywhere else to carry out the arm and train or equip and train effort.

There will be a variety of dangers to American troops in Bosnia and the one possibility is the one you outlined. There are plenty of others. Our troops have been trained as well as the American

military knows, both in combat skills to protect themselves and to do their mission in awareness of the situation that they are getting into, including the complexities of it and the number of reasons why the Serbs, probably mostly but not exclusively, also may resent the presence of American troops. We are also aware of the danger from other elements on other sides who may see reasons to resent the American troops.

The troops will be well prepared. They will have the best training and the best equipment and the clearest rules of engagement and lines of command that the American military knows how to give them to deal with this problem.

For reasons that we have discussed earlier, it remains our view that the policy with respect to equip and train is an important element of the overall approach, but I certainly respect very greatly your views. I am familiar with your letter of a couple of days ago to Secretary Perry which addressed——

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Slocombe, it appears that if we are to take sides, and varnish it all you want, arming and training one set of combatants, belligerents, is taking sides. If that is the case, maybe you should ask for a resolution of hostility against the Serbs rather than a resolution of support.

I am very, very disappointed in this, sir, and I would hope that the administration would take a good, hard look and rescind that policy.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I understand your position.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, there has been a lot said about the threat or threats that we face on the ground in Bosnia. Some of the information that we have received through sources other than the administration would lead one to believe that some of the threats have been understated or glossed over in some way, and I speak particularly of the threat posed by the Islamist inhabitants of the area, particularly non-Bosnian Islamists, some Islamist folks who are non-Bosnian who have become Bosnian and others.

I would like to just read you some of the information that we have received and solicit your response to it. For example, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been a Islamist cause since the late 1980's, even before Bosnia's independence was contemplated. This information has come to us through reliable sources. Since the early 1990's, Izetbegovic has courted Tehran and other Islamist powers. I think we all agree with that. This is not surprising, considering Izetbegovic's background and beliefs.

Let me quote to you from his writings. "There can be no peace or coexistence between the Islamic faith and the non-Islamic faith and non-Islamic institutions," he wrote in his book called "Islamic Declarations" in 1970. "The Islamic movement must and can take power as soon as it is morally and numerically strong enough not only to destroy the non-Islamic power but to build up a new Islamic one." Now, before you dismiss this as 1970 writings, let me remind you that his book was reprinted in 1992 and is today used in classrooms throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Then in the spring of 1992, at the time of the Bosnia-Herzegovina independence, we know that there were already orga-

nized Islamic forces among the Bosnian Muslim militias. From the very beginning, the forces of the armed Islamic movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the Islamic Jihad detachments, were organized and very well disciplined and equipped.

By the summer of 1992, Muslim forces included several hundred volunteers, primarily from Algeria, Egypt, Sudan and other Persian Gulf Arab states, as well as Turkey, most of them veterans of Afghanistan. In addition, Iran maintains in Bosnia-Herzegovina a corps of highly professional operatives, mainly from the ranks of the Lebanese Hezbollah, that provides expert training and assistance as well as to conduct the most sensitive covert operations.

By 1993, there was a dramatic expansion of the Islamic forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina due to both the accelerated flow of volunteers and the recruitment and conversion of Bosnian Muslims. The Islamists were organized in mujaheddin forces and used for "delicate operations" with distinct Islamic character.

Meanwhile, a new generation of better trained and equipped cadres were being prepared in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In early 1993, the deputy prime minister of Afghanistan said that Afghanistan was providing military assistance to various insurgencies because "we cannot remain aloof from what is happening to the Muslims in occupied Kashmir, Tajikistan, Bosnia, Somalia, Burma, Palestine, and elsewhere."

So by mid-1995, the primary military modernization and build-up programs underway in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been Islamist and the key to foreign reinforcements and weapons supplies from throughout the Muslim world.

I suggest that what we have heard through official channels is at least an understatement, perhaps a misstatement. Let me just review some of the things that we have been able to learn about the current forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly related to the Bosnian army.

The third corps in Bosnia, this is, of course, the main mujaheddin unit, serving as the primary assault troops for the Bosnian Muslim army, many imported from outside the country who have become Bosnian citizens by way of their laws. Their main headquarters, of course, is in Zenica.

Then there is an elite force, the volunteer mujaheddin battalion called the Ansar, A-n-s-a-r, and has about 300 to 600 troops. In addition, there is a new camp called the martyrs detachment that in the spring of 1995 absorbed a few hundred of the mujaheddin, including suicide terrorists and other types of experts.

Then there is another elite force known as the battalion of believers, which are mainly Arab, including Afghans, that arrived from Sudan. Whether or not they are Muslim citizens at this point, I do not know, but there are 300 to 600 of those troops, as well, according to reports that we have.

Then there is the Hanzer division, which is in the Sarajevo area, which is comprised of 2,500 to 3,000 elite forces deployed in Sarajevo with a 6,000- to 7,000-strong backup force at major training bases around Bosanka.

Finally, there are a variety of military experts. We believe there are a few thousand Islamic military individuals known as experts from Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia, and other Muslim

countries serving in key positions in the regular units of the Bosnian Muslim force.

When we ask questions about these folks, we are told that they are something to be concerned about. I believe they are more than something to be concerned about. I believe they are parts and infiltrated and integrated into the main Bosnian force structure, and I would just like to give you a chance to respond to this information here this morning.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. You are right that we are concerned about what you might describe as a radical Islamic threat. This, in an open hearing, is not the forum to lay out what we know about the threat. Just to say that I think the numbers you have used are substantially larger, but the basic pattern is not.

We understand that there is a basic presence. There is a substantial so-called mujaheddin, using that term to mean people who have come from outside the country and are fighting with the Bosnian army in various kinds of relationships. There is, of course, a substantial nominally covert arms supply relationship, most of it, not all of it, coming from Muslim countries. Bosnia is, after all, a substantially Muslim country. It is hardly surprising that Muslim countries have taken an interest in the fighting.

The agreement requires, as you know, that all foreign forces be withdrawn. We have made clear to the Bosnian Government that we regard their compliance with this as one of the essential conditions of our support for things that they want us to do, and indeed for the deployment of the implementation force and its operations.

Without agreeing with each and every detail of what you say, it is certainly our understanding that this is a real problem. It is one we are working on and will try to get solved, and its solution is provided for in the agreement.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, I would just conclude by suggesting that from what we know not only about the Islamic influence but about the Bosnian leadership, that the definition of foreign force or foreign troops or foreign individuals as we would use it is not necessarily understood to be the same as the Bosnian leadership would define it or use it.

And so to rest on the assurance that somehow these folks are going to leave the country, I think is a little like an ostrich putting his head in the sand. I do not believe for a minute that significant numbers of these folks are going to leave the country. That is not their intention when they came there. That was not the intention of the Bosnian leadership when they invited them there and I think it is a major threat and one not to be taken lightly in any sense of the world. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Slocombe, are we a participant in the recently concluded Ohio peace talks? Was our nation an active participant in those talks or were we just the host?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We were an active participant. We were an active participant in the sense that we were leading the effort to try to get agreement. Obviously, the parties are the three countries.

Mr. TAYLOR. Are there any representatives of the administration who have signed that document?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The agreement is witnessed by representatives of the United States, yes. My understanding is it was signed by Secretary Christopher, but it is certainly signed by the United States as a witness to the document.

Mr. TAYLOR. Is it a treaty?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No.

Mr. TAYLOR. What is the difference between it and a treaty?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is not an agreement which imposes obligations. First of all, the United States is not a party to it. We are a witness, which is very different from being a party to an agreement and there are many agreements to which we try to promote around the world to resolve problems that affect our interests to which we are not by any stretch of the imagination parties.

Mr. TAYLOR. Has the administration committed to defend the nation of Bosnia from outside aggressors?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No.

Mr. TAYLOR. Have we committed to defend the nation of Croatia from outside aggressors?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No.

Mr. TAYLOR. So tell me, if you would, refresh my memory, why are we sending armed Americans, 20,000, to Bosnia?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Because we believe it is in our interest to stop this war because of the danger it causes to European stability, to European institutions, and to our own very direct interest in security and stability in Europe, and that sending troops is a necessary step to make it possible for this peace agreement among the parties to succeed.

Mr. TAYLOR. Are we there to protect people?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. They are there to protect themselves, first of all. They are there to enforce the implementation of the military provisions of the agreement, specifically things like the separation of forces, the cease fire, the zones of separation, the handover of territory pursuant to the agreement.

They are not there to provide general security throughout the country. They are not there, for example, to provide security when the elections take place, as they are scheduled to do. And by their efforts to produce an enforcement of the cease fire and of the stabilization of the situation, they will have the effect of protecting the population but that is not their direct responsibility in the sense of a police function of protecting people.

Mr. TAYLOR. So if a group of armed Yugoslavs showed up outside one of the villages near Tuzla and started shooting people, what would their reaction be?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The guidance to the troops is that they will do what they would do in a situation almost anywhere in the world. That is, if a crime, and what you described is, among other things, a crime, is being committed in their presence and they have the means and opportunity and the commander on the scene judges that it is consistent with the capabilities and the safety and the mission of his troops, he is authorized—he is not required, he is authorized—to intervene if, in his judgment, that is something which can be done safely.

It is not his mission to go out because he hears that somebody is going to launch an attack against some village. It is not his mission to provide security for the village.

Mr. TAYLOR. Whose mission is it to provide security for the village?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Ultimately, it is the mission of the Bosnian, or if it is an attack on a Serb village, the Serb security forces. Any violation of the cease fire would be something which IFOR is responsible to try to suppress, but that is distinct from, and as we were talking about earlier, cease fire violations, failure to withdraw, things like that which could also lead to the situation you posed, those are within the responsibility.

But the image you draw is of the general responsibility to go out and ensure the safety and security of individual villages by garrisoning and protecting them and that is not a part of the mission of IFOR. It is to enforce the separation and to enforce the cease fire.

Mr. TAYLOR. Are you familiar with Colonel McDonough?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Not by name.

Mr. TAYLOR. Have you ever read the book "Platoon Leader"?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. One of the colonels in charge of the first ground troops on the ground, he will deploy out of Vicenza, is Colonel McDonough, who was a young platoon leader in Vietnam. He tells the story of his platoon was in the middle of a Vietcong area and for the year that he was stationed there, the Vietcong never could overrun his post.

At the end of his year, they went into the adjoining village, which was, by all accounts, a Vietcong village. Most of the young men from the village were gone because they were all serving in the Vietcong and they destroyed the village, killed the villagers, the Vietcong did. The point that they made very effectively to the people of the surrounding countryside was that, well, we may not have overrun the post, but the Americans cannot protect you.

I posed this question to Colonel McDonough, who is soon to go into Bosnia and may be in Bosnia now, for all I know. What did he think the American response would be to having 20,000 armed Americans there against the wishes of the people of America, only to see on CNN that we still cannot protect the people of Bosnia from the atrocities that we are allegedly there to prevent.

I will pose the same question to you. What do you think the reaction of the American people will be?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think the reaction of the American people will be to the events as they are likely to unfold on the ground. That is, that the parties will fall back to the lines which have been agreed. There will be some backing and filling about how that happens. There may even be situations in which we have to use military force after all other methods have failed to try to get that to happen. There will be a sustained period of cease-fire, as indeed there has been a reasonably sustained period of cease fire already, and that life will begin to move back more or less to normal, first of all within the entities, and then obviously at a slower pace between the two.

As I said in answer to your question, it is not the IFOR mission to go out and provide general security for the whole countryside. This is not a garrison or an occupying army. As I said, the forces have the authority, if they can do it subject to the conditions I mentioned, to intervene if they see human rights violations, atrocities, and so on being conducted. That is different from having a general mission of occupying the country and making sure it never happens.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one last question?

The CHAIRMAN. Everybody is running over and other people do not have a chance to get theirs in.

Mr. TAYLOR. Just one minute, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Slocombe, what are we paying the Croatians?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am sorry?

Mr. TAYLOR. What are we paying the nation of Croatia for the privilege of crossing through their country?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Nothing.

Mr. TAYLOR. No weapons, no money?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No.

Mr. TAYLOR. You are absolutely certain of that?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cunningham.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Let me say, it is a matter of public record that we have had on hold now since the beginning of 1995 a standard IMET military education and training program and standard defense contacts with Croatia. They have been on hold pending the resolution of the fighting. I assume those will be started up. Those are in no sense compensation to the Croatians for anything they are doing with respect to IFOR.

I do not want to pretend there will not be contacts between the American defense establishment and the Croatian defense establishment, and for all I know, there are other U.S. Government programs. I do not want you to be misled into thinking that we will have absolutely nothing to do with the Croatians, but there will be no arrangements for paying transit—and again, I cannot swear that there are not normal fees which are charged for the use of services in Croatia, but beyond paying normal fees, most of which we are trying to negotiate away with various degrees of success for all the countries that we will be transiting through.

Your question is clearly aimed at, is there a quid pro quo in which we will provide arms or provide goods and services or provide money in exchange for the transit and the answer to that is absolutely not.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Cunningham?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Estes, I would like to ask you a couple of questions in order and then go through some of my concerns and you can answer the questions at the end, if you want.

First of all, I know that the Air Force has not really bought any new airplanes in 3 years. I know, like the Navy, the F–18–C/D's, the top line they want to use in that portion of the world and the

service life is gone. Can you provide how many new F–15 strike eagles to replace even the service life would these operations require?

Second, the role of the C–17 will play an important portion in this, and I know it was a controversial program. Also, can you provide for this committee an updated air order of battle in country, both for United States and for the other participating nations?

Let me give you some ideas of some of the problems that I have with some of the testimony, not direct problems but maybe a different view. You and I both know, General, that training is relative. We know that in many cases, in our adversary, top gun does not have F–16's anymore to simulate MiG–29, MiG–31. The Air Force has lost the 64th and 65th aggressor squadrons. All of our adversary is gone. That amount of training that geared us up for like Vietnam and Desert Storm is all gone.

I think you cannot gear up people to train that have been deficient in 1 to even 6 months, so I believe it is relative, not that they are going to be fully up in this thing.

We talk about the issue of fairness, and I look at the media, and even members of the committee on both sides of the aisle and how they deal with the Serb and the Croatian and the Muslim problem. It is not in a fairness to even testimony here.

For example, Captain O'Grady, the media put out that he was shot at by the Serbs when he was rescued, but yet General Shalikashvili sat right there and said that it was not the Serbs, it was the Croatians that shot at Captain O'Grady and the Navy helicopter, that it was not until after he got over Croatia that he was shot at. The French, the British, and the Russian bomb experts have stated that it was a Muslim bomb planted in Sarajevo that killed those 40 people, not a Serb shell.

And then a reaction to those kind of things, and I have another concern when we say we are the meanest dog in town. There is a statement, a fighter pilot rows in the area allotted to him and in the manner he sees fit and when he sees the enemy, he attacks and kills. Anything else is rubbish. Well, that was Baron Von Richthofen. He never met Che Guevara. He never met the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan or even in Vietnam. So it is going to be a war, but it is going to be a hit and miss, not a direct confrontation, and I have real concerns with that.

Another concern I have, people on this committee said that Haiti was a real national interest and significance. Aristide has refused. He has come out a little bit that he is going to run. There are the new boat people from Haiti coming this way. Many of us feel that Aristide is a murdering butcher. I still feel that way, and yet that is about to blow up again. Are we going to commit to that? Are we just going to forget Haiti that was "a national interest" to this thing?

I look at the billions of dollars we spent there and in Somalia. Guess what? Aidid is still there, also, and I look at that problem.

I would recommend that you read a book by Che Guevara called "Chez". If you have not read "Mostache" by one of the greatest samurais in the history, and it is called "The Book of Five Rings", and take a look at some of those areas.

I also wonder, it is not 20,000 people, it is a total of over 30,000 people we are going to end up with there, and it is not going to

be $2.2 billion. Even if you say that it is budgeted, it is going to cost this country $3 billion to $6 billion. NATO is broke, billions of dollars. There is going to be an extension of NATO after the 1 year or however long it takes. Who is going to pay for that, Mr. Secretary?

Then we take a look at what the President said. The principal nation building will come from Europe. I would ask you, is the United States going to provide any funds in any source for nation building, and if so, are American firms going to have first priority on those contracts? I would think so.

The person that does not like this agreement the most is Izetbegovic. They wanted a Bosnia-Herzegovina in a Muslim state. They did not want it split between the Serbs and the Croatians. It would be to the Mujaheddin—now, the Mujaheddin is not just outsiders. These are the radical Islamic fundamentalists that have sworn a war against Jews, Christians, and the United States. These are real bad cats, in my opinion, that are going to hurt our guys and many of them are integrated into the national army now.

But it would be to Saddam Hussein's interest to tie down the United States so he can rear his ugly head again, and there is just a lot of real concerns we have. First, how are you going to pay for it, the training, the Mujaheddin, all the way across the board, and then plus, in my opinion, the lack of training that our military has had over the past couple of years and the lack of assets that we have given them. I know there are many members who feel that we increased the defense budget too much, but I do not believe we have with the deficit.

My time has run out, Mr. Chairman, if you would provide those for the record.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We will provide the information.

Mr. DORNAN [presiding]. Do you want to answer, General Estes, starting with the F–15?

General ESTES. How is your time?

Mr. DORNAN. It is just a couple of minutes.

General ESTES. Let me just say one comment about the F–15 in particular. One of my responsibilities I take extremely seriously at the moment is my Goldwater-Nichols responsibility as a joint officer and not an Air Force officer. I serve in a joint position. It is inappropriate for me to discuss the needs of the service. I will get the answer for you, Mr. Cunningham, but I will go to the Air Force to get it.

The answer on the C–17 and the role it will play, that I can answer. The C–17's are going to play a heavy role in this and the reason is the aircraft is absolutely suited for this mission. It will play in two roles. The humanitarian airlift is being started again. It was started, I think, yesterday. There is a select amount of cargo that needs to be moved. The C–17 is really well suited for this. It will help in that role. I think there are five or six aircraft committed to this mission.

The more important role, although that is extremely important, the carrying of humanitarian aid, but the more important one in terms of our forces and the support for them is the airlifting of those forces into Tuzla and you will see the C–17 involved in that. The reason is the space around Tuzla. The runway is in good

shape. It is a good size runway. We have no trouble landing C–17's, C–5's, C–41's, or C–130's for lift on that runway. Where we have a problem is on the taxiway. It is very narrow.

The C–5, for example, will be limited to runway operations only. We have to land it, offload it on the runway, close the runway down while we are offloading, turn it around and take it off. The C–17, because of the way it has been designed, has that tremendous capacity but can also operate off small taxiways, and so we are not going to have that restriction with the C–17's. So you are going to see a lot of C–17 use at Tuzla and very little C–5 use, as an example.

To get to some of your concerns that you raised, I would simply say that, clearly, this is an operation that we are getting involved in militarily that is not without risk. We all know this. We are not kidding ourselves. We recognize that there are problems, and we can all sit and dream up a lot of circumstances, and we do the same thing.

As I work the rules of engagement problem and trying to be sure that the U.S. worked hard and established very strong and positive rules of engagement for this force in giving the U.S. position, we literally sat down and tried to craft every condition in which we could see U.S. forces involved, including many of the conditions that the members have mentioned today. We wrote those down, we grouped them in categories and related them back to an IFOR mission to be sure the situation and the mission were tied back through a task.

Then we went the other direction and said, here is the situation. Here is what the troops ought to do. Here is what the commander's response ought to be, if the commander's response is necessary, and here is the rule of engagement that relates to that situation.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. General, I am not concerned at all about your tactics or the military's tactics. It is the civilian side that I am concerned about.

General ESTES. Then I will pause there and leave it at that. The dollar amounts and conditions in Haiti and relations to that I will turn over to Mr. Slocombe. The Secretary is in a better position to answer those questions than I am.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Just very briefly, with respect to the costs, we have provided the committee with our best estimates as they are available now. Those are, naturally, estimates. The operation has not started. We will continue to update that and at an appropriate time, I assume there will be a request for a supplemental to cover those costs.

You raised the point of being able to take care of other contingencies, should one arise. That has been very much in our mind and one of the things which we are looking at and taking steps to ensure, is that we have the capacity to respond, that we have not taken—the numbers are obviously not critical, but critical elements of the force that would be necessary are either being protected. In some cases, it would involve moving people around so as to make sure we backfill appropriately, not to deal with Bosnia but to be able to deal with another contingency if it should arise.

Mr. DORNAN. Members and witnesses, let us take a look at the tactical situation here. We promised our witnesses we would have

them out at 12:30 p.m. Mr. Edwards of Texas is next, then Mr. Lewis of Kentucky, then Mr. McHale, then Mr. Talent and then Mr. Mike Ward. We would like to ask the witnesses if they could stay at least for 10 more minutes. We have an R&D Subcommittee that has to come in here at 1:00 p.m., so I do not want to abuse your time, but let us just press along and see how many more members we can get to.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Certainly, at least from my point. General?

General ESTES. I do not have anything until 12:45 p.m.

Mr. DORNAN. You are not catching a C–17 to Bosnia?

General ESTES. I wish I were, to tell you the truth, but I, unfortunately, am not.

Mr. DORNAN. All of us, actually, would like to do that.

Mr. Edwards?

Mr. EDWARDS. Without editorial comment, let me just ask several quick questions. Does NATO's charter clearly authorize the use of NATO forces in countries that are not members of NATO?

Second, you talk about, Mr. Slocombe, the threat of NATO's future if we do not send forces there. Are there any nations in NATO that would drop out of NATO if we did not send forces?

Third, you talk about the spreading of the conflict as one strategic reason to go there. The conflict has not spread over the last four or five years. What makes you believe that if we do not send forces, it is going to spread, when that has not happened in the last four or five years?

Then very briefly, could you comment on our capability to handle another regional war once we have 37,000 troops plus other logistical support troops committed to this effort? If Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, do we have the capabilities and logistical numbers to handle that sort of situation under this scenario?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Let me take them at reverse order. We have looked explicitly at the very question you put last and the short answer is yes. Obviously, the details of how we do it are sensitive, but yes, we have made a conscious decision that it is important to protect the capacity to respond to an MRC.

With respect to the spread of the conflict, we addressed this issue in some length earlier. I will just summarize by saying that a few months ago, I think those of us who work on this problem would have given high odds that unless there was a settlement, there would be a conflict between Serbia and Croatia arising out of this situation.

That has been averted because there has been at least a tentative settlement between those two countries, but if the whole thing comes unraveled, then that judgment will no longer apply and there are a variety of other possibilities having to do with other minorities in Serbia, other possibilities of conflict between Croatia and Serbia, either separately or over Bosnia, the danger of spread to the south, particularly toward Greece.

With respect to the two questions you asked about NATO, the NATO charter explicitly provides for common action for matters affecting their security. It is the security of members, even though it does not involve a direct attack on their territory. Indeed, it has been the United States policy for years and years to try to urge NATO to recognize that it has responsibilities and security inter-

ests and concerns outside the formal boundaries of the members of the country.

With respect to whether anybody would drop out, I do not know that anybody would drop out but people would drop interest. They would drop reliance. They would turn to other alternatives because this would have been—would anybody drop out of NATO if we did not carry through on this operation? This would have been an opportunity for NATO to address in a very fundamental way a very important issue of European security which would not have been taken up. Whether countries would actually leave in the sense of call their embassies—but the diplomatic world is littered with institutions which do not work. People may still show up at meetings, but that does not mean they are viable institutions.

By contrast, we have here an opportunity to use this instrument which has been critical to our security in the cold war. We have an opportunity to use it in a way to meet a very important security concern in the post-cold war era and we would be foolish, indeed, to not do that and in the process to gravely injure an important institution.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you for your answers.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TALENT [presiding]. I thank the gentleman.

We have left me—it really was my turn—and then Mr. Lewis, Mr. McHale, and then Mr. Longley. Mr. Ward has indicated he does not have any questions. If he thinks of any in the meantime, the chair will give him an opportunity.

Let me cut right to the quick, then, and inquire a little more into my concern, which is, I think, what Mr. Edwards was getting at, the nature of this vital interest. I listened to Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher and then you, Mr. Slocombe, and you have all said—I am quoting you but this is representative of the statements—that peace in Bosnia is critical to the national security interest in the most calculated sense, and then the specifics you give are the danger of spread of the war in Southeast Europe, most catastrophically, I guess, between Turkey and Greece, if it were to bring those two in.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. At the extremes.

Mr. TALENT. And then also simply the danger that this instability might lead to some general conflagration, as it has twice in the century. You said twice in Europe, we have learned that letting the conflict fester does not end up in keeping us out and that this justified sending American ground troops to police this peace agreement.

Yet Secretary Christopher, and I presume you also would agree, made very clear that had the peace agreement not been concluded, we would not have considered sending in ground troops. So why?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. If we did not have a peace, we would still have the same problem. We would have to figure out a way to contain the conflict. There are things we could do. They would work less well. I believe they would be potentially more risky than backing up this peace agreement. Obviously, you play the hand you are dealt. It is the judgment of this administration and it was the judgment of the prior administration and it is clearly the overwhelming

judgment of the Congress that this is not a war which we want to intervene in as a combatant.

We would manage the problem, but we would have to manage the problem. We would do so under less favorable conditions and with potentially greater risks.

Mr. TALENT. In other words, if Milosevic or one of the others had at the end of the day, which we say a lot on this committee, at the end of the day said, well, no, I am not going to sign on the dotted line, then we would have simply said, well, we do not care about the possibility of a third conflagration in Europe or the breakdown of NATO and therefore we would not have sent any——

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No, that is not what I said. I said we would face that danger and we would have to deal with it as best we could. We have here an opportunity to deal with the problem of great instability in Europe and the immediate danger of a resumption of the fighting and the spread of the fighting by, in effect, nipping it in the—nipping it in the bud is the wrong metaphor, because the war has been going on for some time, but, in effect, in a preventive way. The alternative would be to do it in a curative way and we would have to face the consequences, which I think would involve greater costs and greater risks.

Mr. TALENT. Look, if this agreement breaks down, you said a little while ago, if it breaks down, one side or the other does not keep their obligations, violates the cease fire, the Bosnian Serbs infiltrate or something like that, we are clearly prepared to use the military force necessary to pacify this area on behalf of a peace agreement but we are not willing to do it if there was not a peace agreement. It seems to me that the vital interest of the United States or whatever interest is there is the same either way.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The interest is the same. The opportunity to vindicate that interest at lower cost would not be the same.

Mr. TALENT. So it is the cost factor?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The cost and the——

Mr. TALENT. In other words, if there had not been a peace agreement, you think the cost of intervening militarily would have been too great to engage in in order to vindicate these interests?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes, I believe that would be the case.

Mr. TALENT. How many casualties would be too great in order to——

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Again, I cannot give you a number but I can give you some sense of the scale. We are having, for reasons I understand, not inconsiderable difficulty persuading the Congress and the public that sending a force of this size to enforce an agreement which has broad support of the parties is good idea.

The estimates which the military have made, and these are not even for sort of entering the war as a combatant and making sure one side or the other wins but simply going in and imposing a peace by force, are on the order of several multiples, many multiples of this size of force. I think it is very questionable. This administration and the previous one judged that it was not in our interest to expend that kind of resources.

Mr. TALENT. I agree, Mr. Slocombe, and I do not want to get into a question of semantics.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. If you asked me if we knew absolutely for certain that there was going to be a fourth world war arising out of the Balkans, would it be worth intervening, I guess we would come and try to make that case. That is obviously not the situation.

Mr. TALENT. Let me just suggest to you, and then I am closing my questions, that you have phrased the issue and the interest as a vital one. I can understand you are putting your best foot forward to make the case. But it seems to me that what we are really talking about here is a second tier interest of vindicating the diplomatic interests of the United States, helping to eliminate an embarrassment in Europe and an inconvenience for us, and that if, in fact, this operation results in substantial casualties at all, nobody in the administration will believe it was justified, as they would if, indeed, the interests were as vital as you had indicated.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Let me be clear. We are doing all we can to minimize the risk of casualties both on the military side by training and preparation and all the things we talked about and on the diplomatic side by clear obligations on the parties so we will be able to hold them to agreements that they have made.

We have to face the fact that this operation carries with it a risk of casualties. We assume there will be casualties, not only from accidents and mines but from people shooting at the force and taking other kinds of violent action against them. I do not agree with you that if we suffer casualties, even if we suffer significant casualties, we will say, well, this was not worth the effort. That is not our position.

Mr. TALENT. I thank you for your patience, both with me and with the whole committee.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No, I appreciate it.

Mr. TALENT. Mr. McHale?

Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, good afternoon. Mr. Slocombe, are you familiar with the military acronym MET–T?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No.

Mr. MCHALE. That acronym is taught to all Army and Marine second lieutenants and it is a basic and helpful analytical tool in looking at a proposed military operation. It stands for mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am certainly familiar with the concept, not with the acronym.

Mr. MCHALE. The acronym is one that is used initially by second lieutenants but still used by those generals who are wise enough to remember it, and I raise it not to question your knowledge of what is or is not known at a tactical level, what you might or might not know at a tactical level.

I raise it because you earlier compared the Bosnian situation to that in Haiti, as did Secretary Perry when he spoke to this committee, and I realize you did it in a very limited way, specifically with reference to Camp Haitian and the strong response that was provided by the Marine Corps forces that engaged those Haitians and indicated to them that an attack on Marines would be met with a strong response.

Applying the acronym that I just described to you, I would caution you, as I would caution Secretary Perry, there is absolutely no

similarity between the military conditions in Haiti and those in Bosnia.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Look, I agree about that. I was only making the point——

Mr. MCHALE. It was a poor analogy and a poor point.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I was only making the point that in terms of gaining respect for a force coming into a situation, even if it is not a combat situation, and in that sense there is an analogy, it is important that the force be able to establish that if people make trouble for it, they will suffer dire consequences.

Mr. MCHALE. I agree with that, but——

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That was the only analogy I was drawing.

Mr. MCHALE. It is a poor analogy in light of the differing circumstances in Haiti and Bosnia. You indicated that it was "a lesson that we might have to teach in Bosnia". I would submit to you, in light of the differing mission, differing enemy, differing troops and terrain in particular, the likely response to a justifiable military action on the part of American forces could and probably would be quite different in Bosnia when compared to the forces in Haiti.

I do not mean to belabor that, but in Haiti, we had thugs with ancient handguns and no understanding of military tactics. The very strong response that you have described in Bosnia, which I, for one, would support, would likely produce a very different result, and the comparison, therefore, that you drew, I think is inappropriate.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am not sure about the utility of this argument by analogy in this case, but it is true that, in fact, that in recent months, the United States and other NATO countries have used military power, air power, on a very large scale in Bosnia.

Mr. MCHALE. Which I supported.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. And, interestingly enough, the reaction of the parties, and I think if Mr. Hill were here, he would underscore this as a negotiator, the reaction of the parties and specifically the Bosnian Serbs was not to say, well, we must then persevere in our fight and find new ways to make life difficult for the Americans or the U.N. forces. There are plenty of targets. But instead, they recognized that they had a different strategic and political situation to deal with.

Again, I do not want to mislead you or the committee. We understand there are risks. There is no way that we can prevent all of those risks——

Mr. LONGLEY. Would the gentleman yield for 20 seconds?

Mr. MCHALE. I certainly will.

Mr. TALENT. Actually, the chair is going to interrupt just for a minute. General Estes, we want to keep to our agreement. We know you have a 12:45 p.m. meeting with other members, so if you need to leave, we understand. Mr. Slocombe, the chair appreciates your willingness to stay. Your ordeal is almost over.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am almost there.

Mr. TALENT. I think Mr. Lewis is next.

Mr. LONGLEY. I would just interject, and the gentleman might even be aware of this, but I had an opportunity to study that incident and it came down, as I understand it, to an hour, maybe a

two-hour standoff and it was solely the split-second judgment of the lieutenant in charge of that force that was the difference between 10 Haitians being killed or 10 Americans being killed. I just want to offer that to compliment what the member is saying, that this is an incredibly risky situation in Haiti and could very well have changed the entire operation.

Mr. McHale. The situation is dramatically different in Bosnia, and I am not belaboring this without purpose. Your analogy, I would respectfully submit to you, in light of the differing circumstances, is entirely inappropriate, even in the limited way in which you presented it.

I would associate myself in the brief time that I have remaining with the words that were spoken eloquently and wisely by the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Kennedy, a little bit earlier. The reality is, because the enemy is different, the armaments are different, the terrain is different, that if we respond forcefully, as I believe we should to any attack upon American forces, rather than being met with passivity that we experienced with Haiti, we are likely to experience a further escalation in the conflict where they attack us.

We, feeling morally and militarily justified, respond, for instance, as we did in Lebanon, but that the response to our counteraction is an escalation of the violence where we move with awesome mission creep from the good intentions and the neutral peacekeeping role that brought us into the country to a violent, justifiable but unforseen combatant role as they fire upon us and we aggressively fire upon them.

Mr. Kennedy took you down that path, presented to you that scenario. The difference between Haiti and Bosnia is the difference between a passive response to our justifiable action and a potential military response, leading to a protracted conflict at the small unit level. Please do not expect that the result in Bosnia will be the same as it was in Camp Haitian.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Talent. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Slocombe, for your patience today. I want to go back to the national security interest, or the vital security interest, and I would like to ask you, do you think that during the time we were involved with the Vietnam conflict that we had vital national security interest in that conflict?

Mr. Slocombe. I think we had vital national—this is a large and complicated question to answer at the end of a long morning. I think the United States had legitimate interests, national security interests, in preventing the spread of communist aggression in Vietnam. It got to the point where the cost of vindicating that interest outweighed the benefits and the dangers that we were preventing.

Mr. Lewis. Then how would you compare the vital national security interest in Bosnia with those vital national security interests? It seems to me that if we have extreme vital national security interests in any situation, then we should stay the course. Do you think that, as Mr. Talent asked a little while ago, that if we see an escalation and a lot of casualties in Bosnia, that we will be able

to stay the course or do you think we will have to leave? And if we have to leave, how will that affect our leadership in NATO and in the world?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We seem to have descended into historical analogies at the end, but suppose in Desert Storm, if instead of the remarkably low casualties that were actually suffered, which were not what people expected at the time that this body—it is not what the public expected at the time that Congress voted to support the operation in Southwest Asia. Suppose instead of being off low by a factor of, I do not know what, 20, the casualties had been somewhat higher. It would have still been worth the risk.

Obviously, there comes a point at which you have to ask very, very hard questions, not I think so much immediately about the casualties as about the context into which you came. We are going into a situation in which we have the strongest possible reason to believe that the leadership of these three factions are prepared, however reluctantly, to stop fighting and implement the agreement they have signed. That is the premise on which our policy is based. Obviously, you can challenge the reality of that premise. You can say we are wrong about it. But that is the premise and I would argue there is substantial evidence that it is a correct premise for right now.

If at some point in the future it becomes clear that that premise is not being carried out, then you would be a fool to say, we have to stay the course. We still have to maintain and defend our interests, but to say we have to stay the course because this is the course we started out on, the circumstances have changed but we cannot change our policy, that would be foolish.

All I am saying is that in those circumstances, we would have to look at what we did and that certainly it is the administration's position at this point that we would not respond to that circumstance by becoming a combatant in the war on one side or the other or by doing what sometimes also people say we ought to have done a long time ago, which is going in and imposing a peace in the kind of, I do not know what the right kind of analogy is, but going in and enforcing a peace over the willingness of one of the sides to continue to fight a major campaign against it.

I do not want to sit here and predict what we would do. I do not even want to rule out that we would decide to use military force in some way. I do want to make the point that if the whole circumstances were to change, we would be foolish not to reexamine the policy which we had undertaken on a premise that was no longer true.

Mr. MCHALE. Would the gentleman yield for one question?

Mr. LEWIS. Let me just say this, and then I will.

But it seems to me like we should determine before we ever enter into any type of situation where there is the possibility that we would have to leave, that we should make sure those vital national security interests are so strong that we are committed to stay, we are committed to stay the course. We should make those decisions before we ever get involved it, and the reason I say that is because we have defeated our whole purpose when we do not do that. We are saying our vital national security interests are not that important.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Let me make a couple of points. One, despite the caricature which is sometimes attributed to us, we understand that there will be casualties. I certainly hope and I expect that if that happens, the reaction in the country will not be, we have had *n* people killed, therefore we must pull out. That is certainly not the administration's approach.

The way these things work out, we could have a situation where there is a highly localized disaster that involves significant casualties. I will not recite again all the things we are doing to try to prevent that from happening, but that is a fact. That is very different from a situation in which there is a general breakdown in the agreement. The possibility of a tactical disaster that causes significant casualties is something we undertake. We realize that. We have tried to be clear. We are not denying that possibility, and we would persist in the face of that.

That is very different from a situation, which may be even without a lot of casualties, where there is a general breakdown in the agreement. Then we would have to look back at whether or not a policy based on the premise, which we believe is a reasonable one, that the agreement would hold, that the parties were willing to maintain it. We would have to relook at the policy. It is not the same thing as saying, as soon as there are—pick some number—as soon as there are that number of casualties, we will reexamine the policy.

Mr. LEWIS. I understand that, but you are going into this with a major handicap and that is you have not convinced Congress and you have not convinced the American people that this truly is a vital national security interest. The President has not done that. The witnesses before this committee have not done that. It has not been done today. And until you are able to do that, you are going to be going into a situation where you will not have the support of the American people. For our troops, yes, but for the policy, it will not be there. It is just not there.

I am out of time, but Mr. McHale had asked me to yield.

Mr. TALENT. Given Mr. McHale's patience and his leadership on this issue, I will let him ask a question.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am at your disposal.

Mr. TALENT. You are very kind.

Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Slocombe, I thank you and I also thank the chair.

Mr. Slocombe, you indicate that it is not our country's intent to become a combatant, and I know that you are absolutely sincere when you give that assurance. My final question to you is, how do we avoid becoming a combatant if we are, in fact, repeatedly attacked?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Because we will respond to the attacks upon our forces but we will respond in an evenhanded manner. We are not going in there with the premise that all of side A's offenses against us will be excused and explained away whereas we will look for excuses to respond to side B. A combatant in the sense in which I think we both understand the term means an outside force which has come in to intervene on behalf of one side or another. We will not in any sense be neutral about people who make trouble and who threaten trouble for the force.

Mr. McHale. I understand that.

Mr. Slocombe. That is the situation you——

Mr. McHale. If I could suggest, that is not responsive to my question. I will give you one quick analogy and then I will conclude, thanking you for your patience. We did not intend to become a combatant in Lebanon. We came under fire. That was heinous. Americans were wounded. We felt morally and militarily justified in responding to that unsolicited attack. When we responded, historians I think now agree, we became, despite our good intentions, a combatant.

My question is if, based on the premise that we are, in fact, repeatedly attacked, accepting that as the premise of my question for analytical purposes, how do we avoid, consistent with the commander's guidance given by the President, voiced by the Secretary of Defense that we will be the meanest dog on the block, how do we then respond to those repeated attacks without becoming a combatant?

Mr. Slocombe. It is certainly the case that if one side chose to launch general attacks on the IFOR, two things would happen. One is the force would do the things which were necessary to protect it, and in that sense, of course, it would be a combatant.

The second is exactly the premise which Mr. Lewis raises would have arisen. That is the premise of general support by all the parties for implementation and for the presence of the American and other allied forces in country would no longer be valid and we would have to consider our options.

One of the things I do want to be clear about is that when we get a lot of flack about how many the troops are, I think there is no question that if things go the way we believe that most likely they will go, it will turn out we sent more than we needed. One of the reasons we have sent more than we needed is to be sure that if the situation you talk about develops, the force is able to take care of itself in a situation which is much, much worse than what we think is likely to happen.

The force will also have the capacity to pull itself out, just as it is going to have the capacity to put itself in. I have sat before this committee and talked about the situation we faced six or eight months ago, where there was a real possibility that we would be going in to help with evacuation. We do not want to have a situation where we have to call in—I do not mean that you would not have to call in some logistics and stuff like that, but the basic force would be able to evacuate itself.

The problem you put is a very real one. I do not dispute its seriousness. If, in fact, we find ourselves in a position where we are subject to general attack by one side, then I agree. I do not think that is likely to happen, but the basic premise of the policy will no longer apply and we will have to consider our alternatives.

I am sure you are right about the public attitude. You are obviously right about the attitude on this committee. I do think that if you look at the alternatives, you do not get to make public policy with ideal alternatives. You have to look at the realistic alternatives. If there were an alternative of the peace plan taking effect without anybody sending troops, that would be great. Everybody would be happy. If there was an alternative of the peace plan being

implemented without the United States sending troops, that would be great.

For a variety of reasons that I think we have covered mostly during the morning, those are not the alternatives. The alternatives are rather different and it is a complicated situation. It is hard to explain to people what the alternatives are and why you reached those judgments.

But your basic point, that if we get into a situation where we are in a constant firefight with one side or the other, then we would have to make very basic decisions about whether this has been a right choice is absolutely correct.

Mr. McHALE. I would suggest to you in closing that our policy will go through a dramatic revision if, in fact, that hostile intent and capability becomes a reality. That is the lesson of Lebanon, and if you lose as much sleep on this issue as I have, then today I have accomplished my goal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TALENT. I thank the gentleman and the Secretary. One thing these hearings have made clear is how deeply and profoundly these representatives of the Department of Defense and the Department of State have thought about these issues, and I do appreciate very much your patience.

I understand the ranking member has no further comments he wishes to make?

Mr. DELLUMS. I have nothing further.

Mr. TALENT. I will declare the hearing adjourned, then.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I appreciate it. I appreciate those comments very much. Thank you.

Mr. TALENT. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

CURRENT AND FUTURE UNITED STATES POLICY FOR BOSNIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 25, 1996.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd Spence (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will please come to order.

We were delaying the hearing this morning because we have had early conflicts that have come up, and people will be coming in later on. We decided we had better get started. We appreciate your indulgence in waiting for us.

This morning the committee continues its examination of U.S. policy in Bosnia, and in particular on the increasing likelihood that the administration will commit the United States forces to Bosnia past this December's withdrawal deadline.

To address these issues we have with us today the Honorable John White, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and General Joe Ralston, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Gentlemen, I welcome you both back to the committee and look forward to your testimony.

As you know, the committee originally requested this hearing in June. Although I am pleased to see our witnesses here today, I must state a degree of frustration that it has taken this long for the Department to accommodate our hearing request. The week before adjournment is not the most optimal time to discuss and try to understand the many policy issues associated with what is currently the largest ongoing American military operation.

Just over 1 week ago, the people of Bosnia voted in their first Presidential and Parliamentary election since 1990. Some have asserted that this election was a milestone in the transition of a war-torn country from a deeply divided battlefield back to a multiethnic and unitary state.

Now that the outcome of election is clearer, it is also apparent the healing process has a long way to go. The three elected officials that share power in Bosnia are all strong nationalists who were each elected with the support of an overwhelming majority of their respective ethnic communities. Some observers see this as a sign that Bosnia will remain hopelessly divided and politically unstable for years to come.

Potential for increased instability in Bosnia leads to a more immediate concern for Americans, a concern that is the focus of today's hearing, mainly what is the long-term United States commitment in Bosnia, and when can we expect American troops to come home?

Secretary of State Christopher and other senior administration officials have reiterated President Clinton's earlier assurances to the Congress that IFOR's mission will terminate this December and that American troops currently participating in Operation Joint Endeavor will be withdrawn. I assume that all Americans can expect these assurances and can take these assurances at face value.

However, the issue today is not whether IFOR mission will end as planned in December, but what will happen next. Will the end of IFOR mean the end of United States troops in Bosnia, or will it simply mean the beginning of a new phase of American military involvement and the continued deployment of significant combat forces as a part of a restructured multinational peacekeeping force under a revised mandate?

Already we have learned that an additional 5,000 United States troops will be sent to Bosnia starting next month as part of a so-called covering force to provide a degree of protection for the initial troops, with withdrawals which are scheduled to commence in December. It has been reported that a follow-on peacekeeping force may include up to 15,000 United States troops and may last for a period of up to 2 years.

In addition, the costs to the American taxpayer of the Bosnian operation have already nearly doubled to $2.8 billion from the estimate provided by the administration to this committee late last year. A continued United States military presence on the ground in Bosnia will inevitably further escalate these costs.

The administration is quietly preparing for a commitment of the United States troops in Bosnia well beyond this December's deadline, but does not want to admit such a fundamental change in plans prior to the November election.

I find these developments highly disturbing, especially in light of the fact that neither Congress nor the American people have been given a clear explanation of the administration's exit strategy in Bosnia, if, in fact, one exists. Such a major shift in policy deserves congressional review and debate, both of which are being denied by the administration's unwillingness to make its intentions clear prior to the pending congressional adjournment. However, the bottom line remains that the administration knows the answer to questions concerning what United States participation will be in Bosnia past December.

I have asked today's witnesses to appear before us to give us unambiguous answers to these unambiguous questions. I want to begin by welcoming Secretary White and General Ralston and thank both of you for appearing before us today. But before proceeding, I would like to recognize the committee's distinguished ranking member Mr. Dellums for any comments he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I join with you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses, Secretary White and General Ralston, to share with us the current development surrounding United States actions in the former Yugoslavia.

I also join with you, Mr. Chairman, in seeking to understand the administration's current thinking on the current developments and peace efforts launched by the Dayton Accords.

I note, as I have before, any understanding of military commitments the United States might be prepared to undertake can only be fully informed by insights into the diplomacy and reconstruction efforts underway. In that regard, it would have been useful to hear from the State Department, although I am certain that we will receive a credible recitation of these issues by Secretary White.

As we discuss these issues, I believe it is useful to review how we got to this point, Mr. Chairman, and why. Prior to Dayton, a quarter of a million human beings had been killed, at least 13 of them—13,000 of them children; over 2 million refugees displaced by the war in the former Yugoslavia. The killing continued. So-called safe havens had been overrun. Ethnic cleansing had run rampant, and the conflict always threatened to spread beyond Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. U.S. humanitarian instincts were alarmed. In addition, significant United States national security interests in NATO harmony, especially between Greece and Turkey, and Baltic stability were at stake. Some considered these vital interests.

For all of the accepted shortcomings, the Dayton Agreement and its implementation have stopped the large-scale killing and have provided the prospect for continuing the peace and commencing economic and political reconstruction. Persisting in seeing the glass half empty, many commentators urge the United States to wash its hands of any continued involvement. They dispair the continuing animus between the parties. They point to the presence of Iranians in Bosnia and the development of relations with so-called rogue states as points of concern. They decry the imperfections of the elections and the shortcomings of the commitments to economic reconstruction.

Yet one can also see positive developments in the fact that elections were held, that the lines of conflict have been disentangled, that heavy weapons and deployed troops have largely been cantoned, and the long-time strategic adversaries, the United States and Russia, have served side by side in a peacekeeping mission that was unimaginable less than a decade ago. When significant numbers of Russian troops are operating under the command of an American military person, Mr. Chairman, neither you nor I just a short time ago could have envisioned this incredible development, yet it is indeed occurring as we speak in Bosnia.

In addition, the first serious test of NATO's resolve and the resolution of NATO's most significant internal crises are also the beneficiaries of this action.

It is important for Congress to be a partner with the administration in the implementation of our international security policy. On that we agree. In that role it is often easier to be the critic or the cynic pointing out failings and shortcomings. This is especially so when our Nation is engaged in new types of undertakings of some unfamiliarity and significant complexity, and that is indeed the order of the day in the former Yugoslavia.

However, I would submit that the harder role, the most difficult challenge, and the appropriate challenge for this post-cold war era is for Congress to aid in redefining our national goals and in solving the problems necessary to achieve these goals.

Taking this viewpoint, I believe the important question that we must ask ourselves is how do we best continue to secure a difficult peace in Bosnia, and what are the realistic costs associated with the strategy we adopt? If peace in Europe is indeed a vital national security interest of the United States, why would we not be prepared to stay the course to give that peace a chance?

We have stood for decades in South Korea to maintain the peace and to deter war that could engulf the region. We served notice on the People's Republic of China just this past spring that we were serious in our commitment to see the issue of Taiwan resolved through nonmilitary means. Why would we not be prepared to sit out a realistic cooling down period in Bosnia if it meant that we could forestall the eruption of war that has already claimed the lives of 250,000 men, women and children? How much are we prepared to risk for peace in Bosnia? And what would be the price of our failure to take these risks? These are questions we must explore among ourselves with each other, challenging us to the highest order of intellectual, political, ethical, and moral considerations.

I believe that Secretary White and General Ralston cannot give us the definitive view of where all these things are going. The United States is currently discussing with our allies in Europe what the future might hold. We must assess what requirements might exist to give this fragile and, as of yet, imperfect peace a chance to blossom into truly regional stability. It is in this context that I welcome our witnesses along with you, Mr. Chairman, in the hope that they can share with us the questions we should ask to get the answers which cannot yet be fully known.

And with those remarks I thank you for your generosity, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dellums follows:]

Opening Statement
Hon. Ronald V. Dellums, Ranking Democrat
House National Security Committee
Hearing On Bosnia
September 25, 1996

Mr. Chairman:

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I join with you, Mr. Chairman, in seeking to understand the administration's current thinking on the current developments in the peace efforts launched by the *Dayton Accords*.

I note, as I have before, that any understanding of the military commitments the United States might be prepared to undertake can only be fully informed by insights into the diplomacy and reconstruction efforts underway. In that regard, it would have been useful to hear from the State Department,
although I am certain we will receive a credible recitation of these issues by Secretary White.

As we discuss these issues, I believe it is useful to review how we got to this point and why.

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For all of its putative shortcomings, the *Dayton Agreement* and its implementation have stopped the large-scale killing and have provided the prospect for continuing the peace and commencing economic and political reconstruction. Persisting in seeing the glass "half empty," many commentators urge the United States to wash its hands of any continuing involvement. They despair the continued animus between the parties. They point to the presence of Iranians in Bosnia and the development of relations with so-called rogue states as points of alarum. They decry the imperfection of the elections and the shortcomings of the commitments to economic reconstruction.

[MORE]

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and the resolution of NATO's most significant internal crisis C are also the beneficiaries of this action.

It is important for the Congress to be a partner with the administration in the implementation of our international security policy. In that role, it is often easier to by the critic or the cynic, pointing out failings and shortcomings. This is especially so when our nation is engaged in new types of undertakings of some unfamiliarity and significant complexity.

The harder role C and the appropriate challenge for this post-Cold War era C is for the Congress to aid in defining our national goals and in solving the problems necessary to achieve those goals.

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I understand the Secretary White and General Ralston cannot give us the definitive view of where all of this is going. The United States is currently discussing with our allies in Europe what the future might hold. We must assess what requirements might exist to give this fragile and, as of yet, imperfect peace a chance to blossom into true regional stability. It is in this context that I welcome our witnesses, in the hope that they can share with us the questions we should ask to get to the answers which cannot yet be fully known.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

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The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman, and Mr. Secretary and General, we might proceed as you'd like, and your complete statement can be submitted for the record.

Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman with your permission both General Ross and I will submit our statements for the record, and also, if we may, would like to make sure our oral statements——

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WHITE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. WHITE. We appreciate the opportunity to share our views on the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

It was only a little more than a year ago that fighting raged in Bosnia, and the Bosnian Serbs went on a rampage, overrunning the safe areas in Srebrenica, committing unspeakable atrocities, and this became a turning point for Bosnia and NATO. The outrage turned into action, and NATO announced that if the Serbs continued with this violence, NATO would respond.

In addition, the President made the decision to make an all-out effort to negotiate a peace in Bosnia. Two weeks later the Serbs began shelling Sarajevo. This violated the NATO ultimatum and led to a response led by the United States of a massive air campaign. That air campaign was totally successful, broke the morale of the Serbs, and drove them to the bargaining table with U.S. insistence. Those negotiations led to the Dayton Agreement, and following the Dayton Agreement, again President Clinton made the decision that the U.S. would commit forces and lead the allies in an implementation force to enforce and assist the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

Fifty thousand peacekeepers led by the United States went into Bosnia last December in one of the harshest winters in recent memory in Europe. These forces were well prepared. They had a clear mission. They moved quickly. They met their milestones with very low casualties. They separated the warring parties, completed the key military tasks laid out in the Dayton agreement.

This brought real hope for the future of Bosnia and assisted in the civilian implementation. Today you can see that hope in terms of the revival of economic activity in the country, and can you see it in the national elections, which went off smoothly again with help from IFOR and went off without violence despite many dire predictions.

I should submit, Mr. Chairman, that in addition NATO and IFOR accomplished a lot more. It was the largest operational mission in NATO's history. It strengthened NATO in Europe, and it strengthened European security. Sixteen non-NATO nations played a part, most notably Russia. The Partnership For Peace initiatives, which we have led, paved the way for this cooperation. The Russian participation signaled a new commitment and arrangement in Europe on security between the rest and Russia, and, in fact, I should note that the Secretary of Defense is meeting with his Russian counterpart today.

This all bodes well for the future of security in Europe. We now face, as you know, municipal elections which we anticipate in No-

vember. It will be IFOR's mission to assist in those elections as it did in the national elections just recently.

IFOR's mission will be successfully completed by the end of the year, and the drawdown will be possible. As you noted, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. plans to deploy a covering force to provide security. That covering force is a force of combined arms to protect U.S. forces, and it was much like the protection force in the so-called SETAF arrangement we did last winter. We will provide the details to the Congress as we firm up the exact plans with respect to that force, and that will be very soon, but no formal decision has yet been taken.

Mr. Chairman, the withdrawal will be completed in the weeks after December 20. The schedule will be consistent with the order and safety of our forces as determined by their commanders. As a practical matter some United States forces will be in Bosnia into the first few weeks of 1997 as the final withdrawal takes place.

The implementation force deployment ends after a year, but the United States and international community will not walk away from Bosnia after that year is up. We continue to be committed to providing economic assistance and building strong democratic institutions, and we continue to be concerned about their security interests.

Before turning to the next year, let me make a few points I think should be kept in mind. This administration and the Congress did what we said we would do—excuse me, the administration and NATO did what we said we would do. We deployed a robust and capable force to maintain a cease-fire. We created conditions for civilian reconstruction. We met all the deadlines and the tasks laid out in the Dayton Agreement, and we have given the parties a chance for peace, reconstruction and reconciliation. Now we must look to the future.

The recent elections have created a new environment in Bosnia that we are now beginning to assess. We have asked NATO military authorities to begin looking at the anticipated security situation in Bosnia next year and to develop a range of possible security options, including possible missions, force structures, and force allocations. We have several key goals, including strengthening the capabilities and mandate of the international police task force, and completing ongoing efforts to establish a military balance among the parties at reduced weapons levels.

No decisions on whether a continued international security presence in the region is needed or what forces NATO might need to provide will be made until options developed by NATO planners have been reviewed by members of the alliance, including the United States. These options are being framed now at defense ministerial meeting in Bergen, Norway. These are informal meetings, and no decisions will be made, but the general consensus of the meetings, I can report to you this morning, is one of continued support for the Dayton process.

The ministerial meetings have developed four options to be examined by the military authorities with respect to future military roles, and I can give them to you briefly, although I do not have a complete readout. One would be total withdrawal of NATO forces. A second one would be a pure deterrence or war prevention rule

and may consider forces in the country or forces outside the country to meet that mission requirement. A third would be sustainment or provision of general security inside Bosnia. And a fourth for completeness would be a full IFOR continuation including IFOR's tasks as laid out in the Dayton Agreement.

We will consult with Congress as this process moves forward, and we will also want to consult with the Russians and other countries outside NATO who are participating in IFOR. We will decide the appropriate U.S. role based upon the NATO study. We are prepared to consider U.S. participation if the study shows that it is appropriate and necessary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. White follows:]

Statement of
Hon. John P. White
Deputy Secretary of Defense
before the
House National Security Committee
Hearing on
Bosnia

September 25, 1996

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to appear here today before the House National Security Committee to discuss the ongoing implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and Operation Joint Endeavor. I am accompanied by General Ralston, who will review the current status of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Operation Joint Endeavor. Let me first provide for the Members of the Committee a brief overview of the progress we have made over the past year, then outline some of the challenges we face for the remainder of the IFOR mission, and finally discuss with you our preliminary thinking on the post-IFOR security environment in Bosnia.

Looking Back

In the spring and summer of 1995, continued fighting between Muslims and Serbs, and Croats and Serbs, raged throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. By mid-August, two of the UN "safe areas," Zepa and Srebrenica, had fallen to Bosnian Serb attacks -- and many Bosnian Muslims were mercilessly slaughtered. The third safe area, Gorazde, was almost overrun and was subjected to a brutal siege by Bosnian Serb forces. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was simply trying to hang on, helping to deliver humanitarian aid, but unable to accomplish many of the other tasks assigned to it. Meanwhile, to the west, Croatia was undertaking a large-scale military offensive against the Krajina Serbs.

Amidst all of the fighting, NATO military planners were hard at work on an intricate, costly and potentially very risky operational plan to evacuate UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia, a plan which would have put significant numbers of American troops on the ground in a situation of continuing hostilities. Indeed, in the summer of 1995, NATO faced one of the most significant internal crises in its history.

In response to aggressive actions, particularly Serb moves against UN safe havens last summer and the lack of effectiveness of UNPROFOR, the United States, together with our NATO allies, took action. With the support of the United States, the Multinational Rapid Reaction Force was formed by Britain and France. Also, as the result of a U. S. initiative, NATO resolved to use air power if attacks on UN-protected enclaves continued. Simultaneously, President Clinton decided that the time had come for an all-out effort to negotiate an end to the conflict.

In August, 1995, in response to continued Serb attacks on Sarajevo, American-led NATO airstrikes struck effectively at numerous Bosnian Serb targets, forcefully demonstrating our resolve to halt further fighting. Aided by this use of force, American-led diplomacy last fall sought a political settlement. Three brave and dedicated American public servants died in that effort. After much work and under the skillful direction of Secretary of State Christopher and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, negotiations led to a cease-fire in October and then, after three weeks of intensive negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, in November, in the General Framework Agreement for Peace. This agreement has brought peace to Bosnia for the first time in nearly four years.

The Deployment of IFOR

From the beginning of this administration, President Clinton had said that while the United States would not intervene on the ground in the midst of the Bosnian civil war, we would join a NATO implementation force if peace was effectively agreed to by the parties. Accordingly, having led the process that produced the Dayton Peace Accords, the United States also has played a central role in assembling the Implementation Force (IFOR) that was formed to ensure the Accords were given a chance to succeed.

Beginning in December, 1995, NATO and non-NATO countries deployed over 50,000 highly trained, well-armed and dedicated troops, during harsh winter conditions, into a country that had suffered the ravages of a prolonged and brutal conflict. IFOR had a clear concept of operations, the equipment and training it needed, and robust rules of engagement to ensure it could carry out its difficult mission. As a result, IFOR moved quickly and successfully to separate the former warring factions, oversee the establishment of the Zones of Separation and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), ensure freedom of movement for itself and other international organizations, oversee the military demobilization of the former warring factions, and enforce other military aspects of the Dayton Agreement. To a large extent, these tasks have been completed successfully and consistent with the timelines stipulated by Dayton.

Now, nine months into the IFOR deployment, Operation Joint Endeavor continues to be a success. This is in large part due to the skill and dedication of the men and women of the U. S. armed forces and other national forces deployed to Bosnia.

When NATO began planning for IFOR last fall, we had three principal military concerns: organized resistance from the former warring factions; attacks from rogue elements; and the threat to our personnel from mines and other hazards. IFOR has worked very hard to overcome each of these threats, and it has been tremendously successful in meeting these and other challenges.

IFOR has also demonstrated the value of the NATO alliance in the post-Cold War era. The fact that NATO countries had well-established command and control procedures, and had trained and worked together for many years has contributed significantly to IFOR's success. IFOR also marks the first time that U. S. and Russian troops have worked side-by-side in a peace enforcement operation - truly a history-making event unimaginable only a few years ago.

Americans can take pride in the U. S. military's part in IFOR's accomplishment. To paraphrase General George Joulwan, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, last fall we identified the force, we shaped the force, and then we deployed the force into Bosnia. Since then, it has been skillfully and effectively carrying out its mission of overseeing the implementation of the military tasks of the Dayton Agreement. Contrary to many predictions, the cease-fire has held and no significant fighting has occurred between the parties since IFOR took up its positions. Peace has replaced the military offensives of the previous four years.

Support for Civilian Implementation

Within its capabilities and subject to the fulfillment of its primary military mission, IFOR has also increased its support to the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement. IFOR has not taken over the process of civilian implementation, but will continue to facilitate the work of the various international civilian agencies which have the primary responsibility for this enormous task. Such facilitation and coordination is accomplished primarily through IFOR's Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) teams. NATO has deployed more than 400 Civil Affairs personnel, of which 313 are U. S., to support such organizations as the Office of the High Representative and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) during Operation Joint Endeavor.

Often, projects that allow IFOR to better accomplish its primary military mission have incidental benefits for civilian reconstruction. An example is the reconstruction of road and railroad networks in northeastern Bosnia necessary for IFOR's own operation

and support, but also helpful to economic recovery and to improve cross-IEBL transportation links and freedom of movement. IFOR's measured assistance with the civilian aspects of Dayton has been both important and compatible with IFOR's main mission, for it remains my firm belief that there can be no overall success in Bosnia without the success of the civilian effort.

To date, IFOR has also played a supporting part in nearly 3,000 civilian economic reconstruction projects, including work on transportation, public works, and civilian infrastructure assignments. These projects are chosen by the commanders on the scene as those where IFOR can help advance both the military mission and its supporting reconstruction tasks in order to advance the overall peace process.

Freedom of Movement

In carrying out its principal tasks, IFOR has provided a stabilizing presence throughout the country. Such a presence has also benefited freedom of movement, which remains key to the success of all civilian activities in theater. While primary responsibility for guaranteeing civilian freedom of movement lies with the parties to the Dayton Agreement, IFOR and other international organizations have made significant contributions over the past nine months in establishing conditions conducive to the free flow of people and commerce throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

IFOR has patrolled throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina to facilitate civilian freedom of movement. IFOR soldiers have systematically dismantled roadblocks and illegal checkpoints. In cooperation with the International Police Task Force (IPTF), IFOR has also developed procedures with local police forces designed to give groups of refugees or short-term visitors adequate protection when crossing the IEBL or other contentious areas. IFOR has also made substantial progress in opening up the country by making or supporting improvements to the transportation infrastructure, such as repairing or rebuilding 55 bridges, repairing roads, and opening up vital rail links, such as the one from Sarajevo to Mostar and Ploce.

IFOR has also encouraged freedom of movement through expanded patrols in both the towns and the countryside. During the first few months of Operation Joint Endeavor, IFOR concentrated primarily on patrolling in the Zone of Separation and along the nearly 700 mile-long Inter-Entity Boundary Line. By building on its successes in separating the former warring factions and ensuring compliance with the related military aspects of Dayton, IFOR has been able to expand its presence throughout Bosnia.

While much work remains to be done in improving freedom of movement, IFOR's actions to date have resulted in some notable successes. Since May 11, when

IFOR personnel in Sector Northeast first began measuring movement across their section of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, there have been over 1.2 million civilian crossings and over 450,000 vehicle crossings of the IEBL.

Bosnian Elections

The national elections held on September 14 represented an important step forward in the rebuilding and reintegration process for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Conducted less than one year after fighting ended, the elections proceeded smoothly, with virtually no incidents of violence. Over 70 percent of eligible voters in Bosnia and 80 percent of Bosnian refugees, almost 2 million people, voted in the first democratic elections ever held in that country.

IFOR's extensive and proactive support to the OSCE during the pre-election period was crucial to the entire elections effort. For example, IFOR identified and surveyed over 4,400 polling stations throughout the country; distributed voter education materials and voter registration lists; provided communications support, mine awareness training, and emergency medical support to OSCE personnel; provided access to IFOR flights; and assisted in voter education efforts through the use of IFOR's Information Campaign, which included the use of radio broadcasts, posters, and other media support. IFOR also provided extensive planning and logistic assistance to elections supervisors and observer organizations.

Now that the OSCE has announced the results of the elections, we are awaiting their certification by the OSCE's Provisional Election Commission. Once that occurs, the United States and our friends and allies will be working to assist the Bosnians in setting up the common governmental institutions that were created as a result of the elections. The entire elections process as outlined in the Dayton Agreement will be completed later this year following the Bosnian municipal elections. These elections, postponed last August because of registration irregularities on the part of the Bosnian Serbs, have now been re-scheduled for November 22-24. Within the capabilities and the limits of its primary military mission, IFOR will be assisting the OSCE, the IPTF, and the entities with security and other arrangements in support of these municipal elections.

War Criminals

IFOR also continues to provide substantial support to the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Throughout the spring and summer, IFOR provided area security, threat assessments, communications support,

accommodations, storage of ICTY-owned heavy digging equipment, and emergency assistance for Tribunal teams investigating war crimes in and around Srebrenica, Brcko, and other areas of Bosnia. This assistance has been provided under procedures for practical cooperation worked out between COMIFOR and the ICTY chief prosecutor.

It remains a mission of IFOR to detain indicted war criminals and hand them over to the International Tribunal if they are encountered by IFOR personnel during the performance of their normal duties and the tactical situation permits. IFOR, however, has no mandate from the North Atlantic Council, which provides its policy guidance, to seek out and hunt down indicted war criminals. The United States and NATO will continue to press the parties through all diplomatic means to fulfill their obligations under the Dayton Agreement to turn over all persons indicted for war crimes to the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague.

Force Protection

Providing effective protection for our troops remains our number one priority. U. S. commanders have adopted robust force protection measures in order to reduce the danger to our troops from terrorism, snipers, mines, and other potential threats. These measures include, but are not limited to, elaborate perimeter security at each base camp, requirements to wear kevlar vests and helmets when on patrol, minimum four-vehicle convoys for travel off base, and a ban on the consumption of alcohol.

It has been said that some of these force protection measures are overly cautious and, not surprisingly, the troops themselves often complain about a few of them. But Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili and I believe that these measures have been instrumental in keeping our casualties so low. U. S. forces, which represent about 33 per cent of the forces in Bosnia, have suffered only about 10 per cent of IFOR casualties in Bosnia. To date, U. S. casualties in Bosnia total 4 killed and 24 injured, none of them the result of hostile fire. In my view, the force protection measures our commanders in the field are taking are a small price to pay for minimizing the risk to our troops.

U. S. commanders also have adopted specific tactics to combat the threat of terrorist attacks. Any known or suspected groups who could pose a threat to U. S. personnel are continually monitored. Physical security measures include adequate perimeter lighting, the use of guard towers and vehicles, and restricting movement on high-speed avenues that approach the perimeters. Perimeter walls and barriers are continually being improved and added to as necessity demands. Check points have also been established where ID cards are checked, and vehicles are checked and/or inspected. Security is constantly provided by both U. S. forces and by the military of some of the

host countries. Alarm systems are being either considered or implemented with added features to alert for any necessary evacuations.

In addition to all of these measures, occasionally incidents will occur that require additional protective measures beyond our normal high alert condition. The decision to execute Operation "Fear Naught" in early August, designed to increase the security posture of IFOR personnel located in the Bosnian Serb Republic, is one example of proactive measures sometimes undertaken by the IFOR commander to ensure protection of the force.

Bringing Long-Term Stability to Bosnia: Arms Control and Equip and Train

While the mission of IFOR continues, the United States and our allies are working in two specific ways to bring about long-term stability in Bosnia. The first revolves around arms control measures for Bosnia-Herzegovina as outlined in the Dayton Agreement. The second involves the Train and Equip program for the Bosnian Federation.

With regard to arms control, we welcome the agreement signed in Florence on June 14 that reduces and regulates arms in the former Yugoslavia according to the provisions as outlined in Article IV of Annex IB of the Dayton Accords. Negotiated under the auspices of the OSCE, this agreement represents a major step forward in our efforts to create a stable and secure Balkan region for many years to come. It establishes limits that will require reductions in major armaments, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and helicopters. We believe these reductions, once implemented, will make a significant contribution to redressing the imbalance of power in the region.

Currently, the Bosnian Serb Republic is presenting the largest challenge to compliance with the arms control agreement by underreporting its weapons holdings and seeking to evade its reduction liabilities. We are pressing the Bosnian Serbs to provide accurate information on their current weapons holdings and to implement the entire range of required reductions and the accompanying inspection and monitoring regime. We are also urging our key allies to place concerted pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to comply with all aspects of Article IV.

While an agreement on arms control represents an important milestone in our quest for long-term stability in Bosnia, arms control alone will not be sufficient to restore the balance of power and preserve the peace once IFOR leaves. Thus, arms control must be complemented by a Train and Equip program to help ensure that, in the future, the Bosnian Federation -- which for many years found itself outnumbered and outgunned by

the Bosnian Serbs -- can defend itself from any future aggression. Such a Train and Equip program also gives us leverage in moving the arms control process along and will be especially important for Bosnia if arms control reductions falter.

Under the leadership of Ambassador Jim Pardew, the Train and Equip program is well underway. A substantial military assistance package has been assembled with the participation of both the United States and other contributors around the world. As this committee is aware, we are, pursuant to specific congressional authorities, in the process of sending $100 million of American military equipment to the Bosnian Federation to get the Train and Equip program off to a successful start. The first tranche of equipment arrived by air in Sarajevo on August 29-30, and included small arms, ammunition, and communications equipment. The remaining equipment, to include tanks, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters is scheduled to arrive early next month by sealift. Additionally, on July 16, the Bosnian Federation signed a $40 million contract with an American firm, Military Professional Resources, Incorporated (MPRI), to begin training a professional Bosnian Federation military. However, I should emphasize that neither the U. S. military nor IFOR has any direct role in the Train and Equip effort.

The Train and Equip program is receiving key support from other countries as well. On a bilateral basis, Germany is offering helicopter and maintenance training. Equipment negotiations are currently underway with Poland. Additionally, an aggressive U. S. diplomatic effort has resulted in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Malaysia, Brunei, and the United Arab Emirates agreeing to contribute by providing funding, equipment, or training. Pledges from those countries total $142 million in cash, in addition to offers of in-kind help, military training, and equipment. $100 million of this total has been deposited with the U. S. Treasury, acting as a trustee of the donors, and $40 million has been committed to the program.

Challenges Ahead

Much is left to be done, but Bosnia is slowly and steadily recovering from the horrors of war. People are back out in the streets, in shops and cafes, buildings and roads are being repaired, and new businesses are opening as the country begins to return to normal.

But while we welcome such a revitalization, many important tasks lie ahead. Over the next three months, IFOR will continue to concentrate on its primary military mission of maintaining a safe and secure environment in Bosnia that allows implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement to proceed. The zone of separation will continue to be monitored and patrolled, the cease fire enforced, and forces and heavy weapons of the formerly warring factions will be kept in designated cantonment areas.

Both Operation Volcano, the recent destruction of over 250 tons of Bosnian Serb ammunition found at an unauthorized storage site, and Operation Relocation, the forced consolidation at authorized sites of 3000 tons of additional Bosnian Serb ammunition discovered at unauthorized sites, are examples of IFOR's determination to continue to enforce the military provisions of the Dayton Agreement. As Secretary Perry told U. S. troops when he visited them in Bosnia on Independence Day, we must not become complacent now simply because things have gone so well, for the remaining months of this mission could easily be tougher than the preceding months.

Other important challenges which lie ahead of IFOR and the international community between now and December 20 include assisting the OSCE with the organization and execution of the previously postponed municipal elections and working with the parties to install the common governmental institutions that were created as a result of the September 14 elections. Additionally, IFOR will need to continue to monitor the security situation in the sensitive area of Brcko as the arbitration process prescribed in the Dayton Agreement proceeds. For the duration of its mandate, IFOR will also continue to assist the international community with the overall economic reconstruction of Bosnia.

IFOR's Drawdown and Redeployment

In June, NATO foreign ministers approved an IFOR drawdown schedule that maintained the force at full strength through the Bosnian elections. With the first phase of those elections now successfully completed, General Joulwan, Admiral Lopez and their staffs have begun planning in earnest for the last three months of IFOR's mandate, including its redeployment. One factor which will affect the redeployment schedule is the timing of the postponed municipal elections in Bosnia. SACEUR and the NATO Military Committee have recommended delaying any large-scale redeployment of IFOR forces until after the municipal elections are held, preferring instead to carry out only limited force reductions until that time. The North Atlantic Council is currently analyzing this recommendation.

Overseeing the IFOR redeployment from Bosnia is Headquarters, Allied Land Forces Central Europe or LANDCENT, under the command of U. S. Army General William Crouch. This command and control structure was recommended by General Joulwan and subsequently approved by the North Atlantic Council in order to simplify command procedures for the redeployment phase of Operation Joint Endeavor, and allow Admiral Joseph Lopez to resume his other duties and important tasks as commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). Headquarters LANDCENT will soon replace the current IFOR headquarters led by Admiral Lopez and will also replace the headquarters of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, led by British

Lieutenant General Michael Walker. Upon taking over as COMIFOR later this year, General Crouch will oversee the successful completion of the IFOR mission in Bosnia.

The deployment of Headquarters LANDCENT to Sarajevo builds upon the outstanding work of Admiral Leighton Smith and Admiral Joe Lopez, both of whom distinguished themselves as commanders of the NATO Implementation Force. The superb leadership of Admiral Smith, Admiral Lopez, General Walker, and their subordinate commanders, such as Major General William Nash, USA, Commander of the U. S.-led Multi-National Division North, has been instrumental in enabling IFOR to achieve the successes it has experienced in Bosnia over the past nine months.

As the drawdown of U. S. forces in Bosnia proceeds, the United States plans to deploy a covering force to provide security for our troops. The covering force is a balanced combined arms unit that will provide protection for U. S. personnel as they go about the tasks of closing up the camps utilized for Joint Endeavor operations. Just as the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) deployed from Italy to provide protection for troops during IFOR's deployment last winter, a brigade from the U. S. First Infantry Division will soon deploy to Bosnia to undertake a similar function during the U. S. redeployment from Bosnia.

IFOR will complete the withdrawal of all troops in the weeks immediately after December 20, on a schedule set by the NATO commanders consistent with the safety of the troops and logistical requirements for an orderly withdrawal. As we have made known to this body in previous communications, this means as a practical matter that U. S. troops will likely remain in Bosnia into the first weeks of 1997.

The Post-IFOR Security Environment in Bosnia

While IFOR's deployment will end after approximately one year, the United States and the international community are not going to walk away from Bosnia after the year is up. As was well recognized when the Dayton Agreement was signed last December, international economic assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina will go beyond 1996. Also, the United States and other countries will remain involved with nascent Bosnian political institutions in the wake of national elections so as to provide for the foundation of a democratic, unified state.

On the security side, the United States and NATO will also retain an interest in ensuring a peaceful Bosnia that contributes to overall security and stability in the Balkans. To that end, the United States and our NATO allies are beginning the process of assessing the current and projected security situation in Bosnia, now that national elections have taken place, to determine if a post-IFOR international security presence is required.

While we believe that it is still too early to arrive at any conclusions, I would like to provide the Committee with some initial views on the subject.

Before I do so, I believe a few points should to be kept clearly in mind. When Secretary Perry appeared before the Congress some nine months ago, he outlined the nature of the IFOR mission in Bosnia. Since then, this Administration and NATO have done exactly what we said we would do: we deployed a robust, capable implementation force to help maintain the cease-fire, separate the factions, and create the conditions so that civilian reconstruction could begin and peace could flourish. We have given the parties an opportunity to choose peace and begin the process of national reconstruction and reconciliation. In December, IFOR will complete its mission in accordance with its NATO and UN mandate, and the troops deployed under IFOR will start coming home.

It remains a separate consideration as to whether a requirement exists for a post-IFOR international security presence to support the peace in Bosnia beyond December. No decision has been made by the United States or NATO regarding a possible post-IFOR force. We have asked NATO Military Authorities to begin looking at the anticipated security situation in Bosnia next year and to develop a range of possible security options. We will decide the appropriate U. S. role based upon the NATO study. We are prepared to consider U. S. participation if the study shows it is appropriate and necessary.

In consideration of such a follow-on force, several questions must be analyzed and answered before any decision can be made. First, what possible missions could be assigned to such a follow-on force? Additionally, what type of force would be needed to complete the mission successfully? Could air power, alone, fulfill mission requirements, or would a ground-based Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) be required? If a ground-based force is needed, how large should it be, what type of equipment should it utilize, and where should it based? Would it have to be located in Bosnia or could it be located in a nearby country, such as Croatia or Hungary? If such a force is needed to deploy into Bosnia, what must be done in advance to prepare for such a deployment? And, perhaps most important of all, who should be responsible for such a force?

All of these questions must be studied and answered in the days and weeks ahead. Only when we have that information can various countries, including our own, that have contributed troops to IFOR make any decision on a possible post-IFOR international security presence in Bosnia. We will, of course, consult with the Congress as that process moves forward.

Conclusion

To summarize, Mr. Chairman, IFOR and Operation Joint Endeavor have a broader significance for European -- and indeed global -- security. If Bosnia has been Europe's pre-eminent post-Cold War security challenge, IFOR is the pre-eminent European security response. If Bosnia has been the hardest challenge to U. S. post-Cold war world leadership, our leadership in IFOR is the pre-eminent demonstration of continued U. S. capabilities and will.

Since the end of the Cold War, U. S. leadership has contributed to the attainment of several European security milestones. The United States has assisted in the reformation and revitalization of NATO to meet future challenges. Specifically, we have led major changes in NATO's doctrine while also creating a robust Partnership for Peace program, which supports both NATO's enlargement and the strengthening of security relationships in the larger European environment. Additionally, the United States has formed new and constructive relationships with former adversaries such as Russia. U. S. participation in IFOR has only solidified such successes. Our leadership in Operation Joint Endeavor has helped to further our long-term security needs with respect to Europe. It has also given us the opportunity to work closely with Russian military units in an unprecedented show of cooperation. In doing so, the United States has come to understand once again that keeping Europe secure and stable ensures our own security here at home, and that leadership in NATO reinforces our reputation for leadership worldwide.

The IFOR mission in Bosnia is the crucible in which the new European security system is being created in practice. Responding to the need to create an effective means of acting in Bosnia, we and our IFOR partners have cut through many of the theological debates on European security, and created a model of effective cooperative security that will have far wider implications.

The United States and all the 15 other members of NATO, each one making a contribution, are sending the message that NATO is the bedrock on which the future security and stability of Europe will be built. We are demonstrating in Bosnia that NATO can meet new challenges. NATO is joined in this effort by troops from other countries that include newly freed nations of Central and Eastern Europe, historically neutral European nations, Islamic countries, and, perhaps most remarkably Russia itself. IFOR, including the non-NATO and Russian contingents, is commanded through established NATO channels, headed by General Joulwan, as SACEUR, with the theater-level IFOR command, also exercised by a U. S. officer. U. S. leadership in NATO, and NATO leadership in European security, acts as a model for successful security arrangements here, as they do more broadly.

Our success in Bosnia has demonstrated that NATO's structure and procedures work. The patterns of cooperation developed over the nearly 40 years of NATO's growth are evident in the superb cooperation among the land, air, and sea forces of its members -- and the flexibility -- and continued relevance -- of that structure is demonstrated in its ability to include forces of so many other nations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Committee may have.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH W. RALSTON, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General RALSTON. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the status of operations in Bosnia and your concerns about the future of the United States military presence past the planned December withdrawal.

As the members of this committee know, U.S. Active and Reserve Forces joined a coalition of over 30 other countries to carry out the military tasks outlined in the Dayton Agreement. More than 20,000 U.S. troops, who became part of the 50,000 plus multinational force of NATO and non-NATO nations, deployed in support of the operation.

Prior to last year's deployment, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified to the Congress on his concerns about the risks involved; particularly the potential resistance from warring factions, possible attacks by rogue elements, and the dangers of mines. These issues weighed heavily on the minds of the Joint Chiefs.

As we now know, some of the concerns were valid, especially with respect to the danger of mines and the potential for increased tensions as Muslim and Serb refugees began returning to neighborhoods now under control of the opposing party.

To mitigate these concerns, we insisted IFOR do whatever is necessary, including lethal force, to ensure maximum protection for our forces. Additionally, commanders directed that troops remain in full protective gear and refrain from participating in activities that might jeopardize their safety. I believe you will all agree that these measures have been prudent.

From the very beginning of operations last December, IFOR pursued clearly established objectives with respect to their mission. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assured this committee that the military tasks outlined in the Dayton Agreement could be completed within 1 year. To accomplish this we established a carefully constructed set of milestones to which we would closely adhere.

As planned, at 30 days into the operation, the former warring factions completed their withdrawal from the cease-fire zone; on D+45 the former warring factions vacated territories to be transferred, and IFOR assumed control; on D+90 control of transferred territories passed from IFOR to the former warring factions; and on D+120 the former warring factions moved their heavy weapons and forces to cantonment areas which we monitor and enforce today. And on or about the D+180 mark, we expanded the scope of our patrols from primarily the Inter-Entity Boundary Line to include all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This expanded IFOR presence promoted a secure environment and freedom of movement which were necessary for the elections on September 14.

September 17th marked the 9-month point of the planned deployment. I can report to this committee that it is our assessment that NATO's first major operation in the post-cold war period has been a remarkable success given the missions they were asked to perform.

IFOR's primary military mission was derived from the General Framework Agreement for Peace and was negotiated with military participation. The tasks assigned included enforcing the cessation of hostilities, assisting with the withdrawal of UN forces, demarcation of the various zones included in the accords, overseeing the withdrawal of Federation and Bosnia Serb forces to their respective territories, and ensuring redeployment of heavy weapons to designated areas.

Once forces withdrew to their respective areas, IFOR was to monitor a zone of separation between the Bosnian Federation and Bosnian Serb Republic. These major military tasks have been accomplished, providing an environment secure enough for diplomatic and civilian initiatives to proceed.

IFOR was not responsible for normal police functions and direct humanitarian relief, nor were they tasked to participate in reconstruction projects other than those directly related to mission support. These missions were best left to civilian authority and nongovernmental relief organizations.

One of the last challenges that remained for IFOR involved election support to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, commonly referred to as OSCE.

Some 60 officers supported OSCE offices throughout Bosnia, providing advice on security and related issues important to ensuring credible and fair elections. IFOR provided a secure and stable environment, facilitating the movement of civilians throughout the region.

IFOR also printed maps of polling places, delivered ballots and election materials to over 4,400 polling places, and returned completed ballots to central countinghouses after balloting was completed.

As this committee knows, the elections proceeded without major incident. Not everyone is happy with the results, but this is typical of any democracy. The completion of legitimate elections represented a capstone event within the Dayton Agreement.

New types of nonmilitary challenges are now emerging: Refugee transit, citizen claims against seizures of property, the establishment of a rule of law, and the development of effective local government processes are among the upcoming hurdles. IFOR is not equipped to address these nation-building issues, nor should it be asked to. Ensuring a nation develops the requisite institutions for effective governance is a job best tackled by the civilian experts.

IFOR has created the initial conditions for peace, but only Bosnian Croats, Muslims and Serbs can ensure a lasting peace. If the commitment by the people isn't there, then staying longer than a year won't help.

The time to begin discussing the post-IFOR security environment has arrived. The decision about the nature of any post-IFOR operations must be made in concert with our NATO allies and the other IFOR participants and in expected consultation with the Congress. Until now there have been at least as many recommendations on post-IFOR requirements as there are participants in IFOR. Secretary Perry is currently in Bergen, Norway, meeting with the NATO Ministers of Defense for the first discussions of this issue.

I want to close by emphasizing that the success of this endeavor has had tremendous ramifications for future operations. Not only did it reaffirm the importance of U.S. leadership within NATO, but the integration of very capable Russian forces into IFOR continued the confidence-building measures our national security strategy considers key to future regional stability We reaped immense benefits from U.S. and Russian forces working together in the field and at NATO Headquarters.

We must remember that we still have 3 months to go. Whether the situation remains stable after IFOR's departure is now up to the people in the region and civilian institutions. We must ensure the focus continues shifting away from military operations to important civilian issues. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Ralston follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT BY
GENERAL JOSEPH W. RALSTON
VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
SEPTEMBER 25, 1996

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the status of operations in Bosnia and your concerns about the future of the US military presence past the planned December withdrawal.

As the members of this committee know, US active and reserve forces joined a coalition of over 30 other countries to carry out the military tasks outlined in the Dayton Agreement. More than 20,000 US troops, who became part of the 50,000 plus multi-national force of NATO and non-NATO nations, deployed in support of the operation.

Prior to last year's deployment, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified to the Congress on his concerns about the risks involved; particularly the potential resistance from warring factions, possible attacks by rogue elements, and the dangers of mines. These issues weighed heavily on the minds of the Joint Chiefs.

As we now know, some of the concerns were valid, especially with respect to the danger of mines and the potential for increased tensions as Muslim and Serb refugees began returning to neighborhoods now under control of the opposing party.

To mitigate these concerns, we insisted IFOR do whatever is necessary, including lethal force, to ensure maximum protection for our forces. Additionally, commanders directed that troops remain in full protective gear and refrain from participating in activities that might jeopardize their safety. I believe you will all agree that these measures have been prudent.

From the very beginning of operations last December, IFOR pursued clearly established objectives with respect to their mission. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assured this committee that the military tasks outlined in the Dayton Agreement could be completed within one year. To accomplish this ... we established a carefully constructed set of milestones to which we would closely adhere.

As planned, at D+30 the former warring factions completed their withdrawal from the cease-fire zone; on D+45 the former warring factions vacated territories to be transferred and IFOR assumed control; on D+90 control of transferred territories passed from IFOR to the former warring factions; and on D+120 the former warring factions moved their heavy weapons and forces to cantonment areas which we monitor and enforce today. And on or about the D+180 mark, we expanded the scope of our patrols from primarily the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) to include all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This expanded IFOR presence, promoted a secure environment and freedom of movement which were key to the elections on September 14.

September 17th marked the 9 month point of the planned deployment. I can report to this committee that it is our assessment that NATO's first major operation in the post Cold War period has been a remarkable success ... given the missions they were asked to perform.

IFOR's primary military mission was derived from the General Framework Agreement for Peace and was negotiated with military participation. The tasks assigned included enforcing the cessation of hostilities, assisting with the withdrawal of UN forces, demarcation of the various zones

included in the accords, overseeing the withdrawal of Federation and Bosnia Serb forces to their respective territories, and ensuring redeployment of heavy weapons to designated areas.

Once forces withdrew to their respective areas, IFOR was to monitor a zone of separation between the Bosnian Federation and Bosnian Serb Republic. These major military tasks have been accomplished, providing an environment secure enough for diplomatic and civilian initiatives to proceed.

IFOR was not responsible for normal police functions and direct humanitarian relief, nor were they tasked to participate in reconstruction projects other than those directly related to mission support. These missions were best left to civilian authority and non-governmental relief organizations.

IFOR still participated in nearly three thousand small and large projects supporting the deployed force ... many of which also had secondary benefits to the civilian community. These projects included transportation improvements ... public utility assistance ... and other basic infrastructure tasks. The Civilian-Military Cooperation Office established for Bosnia was critical to ensuring the smooth coordination of appropriate actions and maintaining a separation of functions.

One of the last challenges that remained for IFOR involved election support to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, commonly referred to as OSCE.

Some sixty officers supported OSCE offices throughout Bosnia, providing advice on security and related issues important to ensuring credible and fair elections. IFOR provided a secure and stable environment, facilitating the movement of civilians throughout the region.

IFOR also printed maps of polling places ... delivered ballots and election materials to over 4,400 polling places ... and returned completed ballots to central counting houses after balloting was completed.

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The time to begin discussing the post IFOR security environment has arrived.

The decision about the nature of ANY post IFOR operations ... must be made in concert with our NATO allies and the other IFOR participants ... and in expected consultation with the Congress. Until now ... there have been at least as many recommendations on post IFOR requirements ... as there are participants in IFOR. Secretary Perry is currently in Bergen, Norway ... meeting with the NATO Ministers of Defense ... for the first discussions of this issue.

Whether a well armed Police Task Force is sufficient ... or we will need some type of "rapid reaction" force to respond

immediately to a crisis after IFOR departs ... is a topic for further analysis and discussion.

I want to close by emphasizing that the success of this endeavor has had tremendous ramifications for future operations. Not only did it reaffirm the importance of US leadership within NATO, but the integration of very capable Russian forces into IFOR continued the confidence building measures our national security strategy considers key to future regional stability. We reaped immense benefits from US and Russian forces working together in the field and at NATO Headquarters.

We must remember that we still have three months to go. Whether the situation remains stable after IFOR's departure is now up to the people in the region and civilian institutions. We must ensure the focus continues shifting away from military operations to important civilian issues.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General, Mr. Secretary, as I said in my opening statement, this all sounds familiar. If we think back on when the administration first committed 20,000 troops to Bosnia, the Congress kept asking questions about how many troops, if any, we were going to commit and the duration, and in all of these questions—we were told time and time again, we can't tell you these kind of things because we have to wait until the Dayton Agreement is completed, and then we can tell you, all the while putting Congress off and the American people off, the answers to these questions. And then by the time the final decision was made, Congress was presented with a question of having nothing to say really beyond deciding to question whether to cut off funds or not for the operation in Bosnia.

Now the same pattern seems to be emerging again. We have been told by everybody in the administration from the President on down that it's 1 year and the operation is going to be over. The troops are coming home. The troops in Bosnia have been told that, and they are looking forward to it. Now we have other questions arising, suggestions maybe we are going to have continued involvement, and so we ask the questions again of what about this? Are we going to renege on our commitment to come home or not? And then we are told, we can't tell you right now because we still have negotiations going on, and we are having to wait for the bureaucrats in NATO to decide this for us. We can't tell you right now.

And we had this same problem again with Congress adjourning within the next week or two, and we still don't have the answers, the consultation, the input we would like to have, and we are going to be faced then with the same thing. It looks like a done deal. We come back in next Congress having to cut off or go ahead with the decision that has been made in the meantime, and we haven't had an opportunity to really have much input into it.

So I would like to again, just for the record, ask unambiguous questions, and I would like to have unambiguous answers to these questions. I will read them off to you.

First, when IFOR ends in December, what will take its place? Second, will the United States forces participate in any IFOR follow-on ground force? Third, what would be the size of a mission of such a follow-on American military presence? And fourth, what would be the cost associated with such a force, and how would the administration propose to finance these costs? And finally, what would be the necessary conditions to permit, and the associated timetable, for the complete withdrawal of American ground forces from the Bosnian theater of operations? And I would like for you to, as I said, answer these to the best of your ability.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, if I may, as I indicated in the statement, I have tried to give you literally the most current information I have; in fact, information from today's discussions. And I talked to members of the American party in Bergen this morning to make sure that I could do that.

Second, as I indicated in the statement, the implementation force will be withdrawn at the end of this year. In our view, as General Ralston said, bearing in mind that there are still 3 long months to go, nevertheless in our view we are confident that the mission will

be completed, the troops have done a superb job, and therefore NATO's IFOR force will be withdrawn.

Next the question is whether or not there will be some other follow-on force and what would be its mission. As I indicated in the statement, as of today we do not know whether there would be a follow-on force, and therefore we do not know what its mission would be. That issue is now under consideration by NATO. Once we understand or NATO understands the mission that they think is appropriate and the force configuration, the United States will make a determination as to whether or not we will participate in such a force, and at that point we will be able to tell you the configuration of our participation and its cost.

As I also said in the statement, Mr. Chairman, we will consult with the Congress during this process. As it unfolds, we will make that commitment to make sure we will consult with the Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dellums.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I had an opportunity to make a fairly broad opening statement, and I note the presence of a number of colleagues particularly on this side of the aisle, and I would reserve my time and ask you recognize Members more junior to me at this point in seniority, not age.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Montgomery.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. The gentleman from California said recognize by seniority, but not age, but I get him in both, so it is my time.

Mr. Chairman, I, like most Members of this committee, have been to Bosnia, and I certainly agree that our forces in the air and at sea—and talking about the Army, I saw some professional people over there, and I was impressed, and from the private up to the brigade commander basically knew what they were over there for, and they didn't gripe that much to us. Some of them do. They take us off to the side. They looked good. They were wearing the uniforms, and I was impressed. I thought all along that I would hope you would get out in December, I guess that is what you are telling me, unless other developments occur; is that what you are saying?

Mr. WHITE. I am saying, Mr. Montgomery, that the implementation force mission will be completed in December, and the implementation force will be withdrawn. Then the question becomes since we are certainly not, as a matter of policy, walking away from the region, we have got commitments there which we intend to fulfill, many of those contemplated to be after a year.

Of course, on the civilian side we have to look to the security environment and see whether or not there is anything else that is needed and appropriate. NATO is beginning that examination now. We will participate in that examination and make a decision later about, A, whether there should be such a force; and B, if there is, should we participate.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Indirectly I heard that the bottom line would be after December to support the NATO forces—maybe General Ralston can comment on this—that we would keep a small force there. I don't know what my reactions are to that, but what about that, General Ralston?

General RALSTON. Sir, let me go back so we have a clear understanding. The forces that are there now, the IFOR forces, we made a commitment that they would be out within a year, and we have

every intention of holding firm on that commitment that we will have them out.

There will be some forces required as we withdraw the force after December 20, but we are talking about a short period of time as we get those forces out. This is, as you know, a very difficult time of the year for weather. People have been there for a long time. They are tired. The safety of that withdrawal is very, very important to us, and that is why we want to make sure that we have adequately planned for that withdrawal.

With regard to whether or not there are U.S. forces on the ground after that, again, that is a NATO decision on whether or not forces would be required of any kind, and then the U.S. would have discussions as to whether we would be a part of that NATO force, and then the configuration of that force and the U.S. contribution needs to be discussed. Is it air only? Is it air with a quick reaction force off the coast or in some other country? Or does it require ground forces on the ground in Bosnia? Those are decisions that have not been made, and we will have to discuss with the Congress and others.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I think that answer is still not quite clear, after NATO meets further, whether we will have some Americans on the ground or doing other missions; is that correct?

General RALSTON. I think that is correct. That it is not clear.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Buyer.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am not surprised at all that we are on the horns of a dilemma. This Congress, I think, overwhelmingly was in disagreement with the President with regard to the ground troop presence in Bosnia. You pretty much did as you pleased, and I am not surprised we are in the dilemma. The dilemma is, sir, that on the word "commitment"—I am pleased to hear you say we are not going to turn our back on a commitment. Many of us were very confused when the President would give remarks and say, well, we gave them the opportunities for peace. If they return to violence, that is what happens, but we are going to be out at the end of 1 year. That makes us cringe.

We on this committee, though, understand that a date certain is not an exit strategy. If you tell the American people that we have to go to Bosnia because there are vital national security interests at stake, then the word "commitment" is there. So I am one that says, you know, I didn't want to have ground troops there. I would be more than happy to provide all types of cover, and wanting Europe to take a leadership role, you are not going to find difficulty for me with regard to is a follow-on force necessary because I believe in the commitment.

But what I need to ask is when you say, well, we are going to have a force of 5,000 as a covering force on the withdrawal, then there must still be a very strong threat presence. So if there is a strong threat presence that you need such a large cover force as we withdraw the 50,000, you should tell us what is the threat presence.

The other thing that concerned many of us is that we have watched this all along that IFOR has done its job, but the nation-

building schedule, even though your testimony, sir, has met the deadlines, there are a lot of problems. Suspected war criminals remain at large throughout the country; ethnic divisions remain very sharp, as evidenced from the recent elections, about the nationalistic tendencies; the human rights violations continue; refugees being prevented from returning to their homes; attacks on civilian partisans continue; confrontations continue to occur between the Bosnian Serbs and IFOR at times; political differences between the Muslims, the Croats; Mr. Skelton's concerns about the arms and training programs and the Europeans on how they sense and feel about those funds coming in there. I know some of the tanks and our M–16's have been delivered, even though it is from a different corporation out there. But there are some very strong concerns.

So let me throw that to you for your comment, Secretary White.

Mr. WHITE. Let me make a couple of points about the covering force first, and I am going to be relatively brief, because as I said, not a final decision has been made, but I want to be clear on a couple of things.

First of all, this force has been recommended by General Joulwan. We, as General Ralston has said, have spent a lot of effort making sure that force protection was job one. We think that has paid great dividends, and we continue to keep force protection important.

The second point is that this covering force is not a net addition to our forces in Bosnia. It will replace forces in Bosnia. It is not as if we are not adding to our force.

Mr. BUYER. So the covering force could be IFOR number 2, or if NATO makes a decision, and we somehow go along with it, the covering force could end up being that second force?

Mr. WHITE. You raise the question about adding forces now to Bosnia. I am saying we are not adding forces to Bosnia. We are replacing some forces, some other forces, so the size of the IFOR by the introduction of the covering force for security on withdrawal does not increase the net size of the implementation force other than take forces out now as we put other forces in now.

Mr. BUYER. Let me ask General Ralston, knowing the military, obviously there are decisions that are out of your hands at the moment, but let me ask you this: Are there currently any plans underway? Have they asked for you to establish planning for follow-on forces in Bosnia? Are you preparing those?

General RALSTON. No, sir, we are not.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you.

One last question I have. Would you please tell me about the arm and train program? What is going on with that program; why are some of the allies expressing some of the concerns; and your support—lack of the support and payment for the program?

Mr. WHITE. As you know, we have such a program. We think it is going quite well. We have committed $100 million. We have asked for support from others. A number of the Muslim countries have supported us with equipment and with money, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and others. In addition to that, some NATO countries have been supportive, including Turkey, including Germany. Some other countries in Europe, including Po-

land, have been supportive of our efforts. The result of that is about 100—additional $140 million or so that we can provide.

We have put on the ground a—or they have, I should say, the Federation, has hired a contractor, a U.S. contractor, with expertise in training. They are there now conducting that training. We have by air shipped a very low number of supplies to them so far. We are planning to ship by sea a substantial additional amount of equipment sometime in the near future.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, and, Mr. Secretary and General, welcome to our committee.

Mr. Buyer asked the question regarding the equip and train issue that, as you know, Mr. Secretary, I was deeply interested in and, frankly, critical of, and I am still very concerned about it. I think, however, you did cover the waterfront in answering Mr. Buyer on the issue.

One subquestion, I suppose, regarding that is equipping and training, promoting a unified Bosnia is already creating new friction among the factions.

I also have a second question. If I may pose this to you, then let you carry the ball on both the questions, Mr. Secretary, and of course, if the General wishes to add to it, we can do it.

The second relates to Muslim fundamentalist mercenaries. There continue to be reports that Muslim fundamentalist mercenaries remain in Bosnia, and in some villages they burrowed in, allegedly marrying then intimidating locals, and threatening international forces that are on patrol, including Americans. And there have also been reports of hostile surveillance.

What is your assessment of the number and risk posed by those mercenaries that remain in Bosnia and the prospects of ensuring their removal by this new Bosnian Government? If you would touch on both those questions, I would appreciate it.

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

First, with respect to Equipment and Train, it is not adding to the—to any friction, and there is friction, among the two—between the two parties, the Croats and the Muslims. Quite the reverse.

We have demanded of them that in order for us to provide these capabilities to the Federation, that they must not only pass the defense law, which they have done, much with our support and urging—Ambassador Pardew has been very active in that regard. But they also must implement such a defense law if they are to get this kind of support.

So we are using this as appropriate encouragement to them to get their implementation done with respect to the past defense laws. So I think it has been a big advantage from a policy point of view.

Second, with respect to fundamentalists, as you know, from the beginning this has been a great concern of ours. We have worked very hard with the government there, particularly with Mr. Izetbegovic, to see that these fundamentalists were removed. We have monitored it very closely. We knew, as time unfolded, that some people would stay. They would obtain citizenship. They may marry indigenous women in Bosnia.

Our estimate today is that to the extent there are such people, and there are press reports even this week of that sort, they are numbered probably around 100 to 200 at most, that they are not in organizations, that they are not actively trained or cohesive in terms of units that could act against us. But, obviously, from a security point of view, we try to keep an eye on them.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Talent.

Mr. TALENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary White, I want to get at what seems to me to be a change or evolution of the policy regarding our mission in Bosnia. And to do that, let me—let me just ask you if you would agree that representatives of the administration in the Department have made statements in the past which are not consistent with the statements you have made today with regard to the possibility of American troops being in Bosnia next year.

Mr. WHITE. I don't know that that is the case.

Mr. TALENT. All right.

General Shalikashvili said, and it is representative of a number of statements, he said: I am absolutely convinced that America will not participate with military forces in Bosnia at the conclusion of this year. I cannot imagine circumstances changing in such a way that we would remain in Bosnia.

I can't imagine how he could have said more strongly that he did not anticipate anything happening to cause us to stay with military forces in Bosnia, and you said today we will decide the appropriate U.S. role based upon the NATO study.

We are prepared to consider U.S. participation if the study shows it is appropriate and necessary, and you were echoing what Secretary Perry had said recently, which he specifically said if NATO decides to send deterrent forces or—it would be his recommendation that the United States participate, and that would include ground troops.

Now, isn't your statement and the Secretary's statement inconsistent with what General Shalikashvili said?

Mr. WHITE. I don't know the context of that quote, so it isn't productive, from my point of view, to try to react to it because I'm not aware of it. I would have to go back and look at it in its context.

Mr. TALENT. Even in its abstracting context, there are other quotes that were made similar to General Shalikashvili. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, the President has given a very clear commitment on the 12 months. This is our policy. It will remain our policy.

I mean, there is a reason for it and I don't know how you can possibly maintain that these statements aren't contradictory. But I don't know how we can have a debate on this subject, as both the Chairman and the Ranking Member have suggested, if we are not prepared to acknowledge what is actually happening here.

Now, there was a reason for the 12-month commitment, and again General Shalikashvili went into great length about that. He said the reason why we want the 12-month commitment is we don't want mission creep. If we stay there longer, then we might end up getting involved in some form of nation-building which we don't

want to—he didn't say that. I am paraphrasing it. I could read you the quote if you want to. And then Secretary Perry echoed that.

And it seems to me that we were in danger of doing exactly what we were assured is not going to happen. Now, General Ralston said, new types of nonmilitary challenges are now emerging. Refugee transit, citizen claims against seizures of property, the establishment of a rule of law, the development of effective local government processes are among the upcoming hurdles. This is what is going to be happening in Bosnia next year.

Now, if we are involved with ground troops of any kind, aren't we going to be involved in doing that? Isn't that nation-building and isn't that a change in policy?

Mr. WHITE. As I said earlier, whether or not we make a contribution from the—from the point of military forces next year, will determine what comes out of these deliberations with NATO and our judgments in terms of whether or not our participation is appropriate.

I think there has been a lot over the—over the last year, a lot of discussion and concern about mission creep, and I think the IFOR's activities and performance is a good illustration of the lack of mission creep. In fact, we have very carefully performed what we said we would perform in terms of the military mission.

Mr. TALENT. Well, Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up.

I would just say it seems to me that mission creep is what the Department is considering and what the administration is considering when it says we are prepared to consider U.S. participation.

I am not even certain that I would be against that, but I don't know how we can debate it if we are not at least going to agree that that is what is being considered here.

I appreciate the time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Sisisky.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, gentlemen.

First of all, I want to associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished ranking member here on why we are in Bosnia. I think he was very concise in saying why we are in Bosnia. I would like to hit on just two things, though, that I wasn't sure of.

The Chairman had mentioned that the budget has just about doubled from what we anticipated. I would like to know, number one, why? And number two, where are we getting the money from? We are not getting it from DBOF, are we, by any chance of the imagination? And I wouldn't put it past that we are, but I would like to know that.

The other thing I would like to know—General Ralston, you hit on this. We have been very, very critical of the Department of Defense as it relates to mines, and I would like for you to explain what we are doing. I think I know some of the things, but I think this committee really needs to know, because that is the one critical point and this just didn't happen in the last few years. I have been doing it now for 14 years in criticizing what we are doing with mines.

And the other thing that I must admonish you on, I look on, Secretary White, on page 11 of your testimony, which has to do with the follow-on force and the different types of things, and you men-

tion that United Nation's policy. Have we got a policy on whether air power would be the thing or we keep a Rapid Reaction Force in Hungary?

Do we have a policy on that? Do we know what we want to do in the negotiations? I think it would be very enlightening to us if we would know.

Mr. WHITE. With respect to your last question first, Mr. Sisisky, we do not—we are formulating, obviously, policy with respect to what happens after the—after this year. We do not yet have a policy in that regard.

With respect to your first question, let me ask—answer it in more detail. But let me first assure you that if we are dipping into DBOF, you will be the first to know. I will tell you.

Mr. SISISKY. Well, I wish I was—I wish I could rely on that as much as you say. I don't think we know who is dipping into DBOF. That is my problem.

Mr. WHITE. Let me run down, if I may, sir, the estimates because our initial estimates, as we know, were low and we, like you, are disappointed in that.

First of all, those estimates were made before we had detailed cost estimates from the military departments. The detailed cost estimates that we got raised the $2 billion number to 256.

As a result of the Scott O'Grady incident and some other actions on the ground when we got there, we determined we needed more intelligence and communications capability than we had. That added 139.

Beyond that, as we got in and deployed into Bosnia, we found the field conditions more challenging than we had thought. We found that the physical security costs more than we thought it would, and as we got into the region and made sure that we had the quality of life we wanted for our soldiers, particularly since they were going to be under very tough conditions in terms of no alcohol, very little liberty, wearing flack jackets, wearing helmets, et cetera, those three elements increased the cost by some $476 million.

In addition to that, as we have reconfigured the force and withdrawn some of the heavy armored forces, replaced them with police and other capabilities, that has added some $309 million.

So the current number through the end of calendar 1996 is $3,275.8 million.

Mr. SISISKY. It was budgeted at what amount?

Mr. WHITE. Well, our initial estimate was $2 billion. My recollection, sir, is the original budget estimation was more like $2.5 billion, but I don't have that figure.

Mr. SISISKY. The reason I raise the question, this is not unusual. I have been here long enough to know now, nobody ever budgets right. This is the darnedest thing I have ever seen in my life. You know, I used to budget a lot in business and I would always allow a little cushion there, but obviously the Pentagon doesn't do that when they do programs. So I admonish you for that. But I can understand how that happened.

Mr. WHITE. Well, let me make a personal comment because I, like you, from a business context, if we did this, you make sure you don't get caught by gross underestimates, and we are working very hard to improve our estimates for the future because, in my own

view, this sort of estimation is too much—there is too much error in this.

Mr. SISISKY. And in some other areas, too, that you will be getting a letter from me and maybe Mr. Bateman in another day or two.

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SISISKY. Do you just want to mention about mines, General?

Mr. RALSTON. Yes, sir. Let me go back to May of this year, when the President announced our land-mine policy and our personnel land-mine policy. Effective May 16, the United States renounced the use of nonself-destruct, antipersonnel land mines. There was an exception for our forces in Korea, but only for Korea, and that exception must be reviewed on an annual basis to make sure the situation is still such that we would need to use nonself-destruct, antipersonnel land mines.

With regard to self-destruct, antipersonnel land mines, we renounced the use of that in conjunction with an international agreement that would ban the use of——

Mr. SISISKY. Excuse me, General. I think you misunderstood what I was talking about.

Mr. RALSTON. All right.

Mr. SISISKY. How we counter mines. That is where we have been critical, that we have allowed the Department of Defense money every year. Nobody ever used that money. They reprogrammed on how we destroy mines that are already in there. And I think you have done some innovative and new things over in Bosnia in destroying those mines. That is what I was talking about.

Mr. RALSTON. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

With regard to Bosnia, we in fact are—we do have contracted efforts to demine areas, to destroy those mines.

We are also are spending money on technology programs to bring additional technology to bear that can, in fact, demine areas safely and protect the lives of our troops.

Mr. SISISKY. We put a lot of money into that, and as long as you are using it, that is fine. Don't reprogram it to something else.

Mr. RALSTON. Yes, sir, we are.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Chambliss.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Just following up on that mining question, General, we heard that back before we went over there about the huge number of mines that may be in place. Can you bring us up-to-date on that? Is there any updated information on the number of mines that we did actually conclude were there and where we are with respect to removing those?

General RALSTON. I will have to get you an answer for the record on exactly where we are with the exact numbers. There clearly are a lot of mines there.

It is a slow process to get rid of all of those.

Our forces, in fact, are—we are training other people to do that. We are removing those that are necessary, that are in the way of our forces, our force movement. And we have got contracted efforts to remove many of the others.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. White, what are our real prospects of maintaining peace once all of our troops are out of there?

Mr. WHITE. I think the maintenance of peace, once our troops are gone, depends on obviously a lot of factors. Our view is that these people are war-weary. They have suffered enormous casualties, as was reflected in the eloquent statement of Mr. Dellums.

We think that if we can help them do economic recovery, if we can do enough economic recovery to bring back into the country a lot of the talent that has, in fact, left the country, that—and get that economy going so people have a stake in the local economy and in the local society, then we will greatly reduce the likelihood of war.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Where is the money to stimulate that economy going to come from?

Mr. WHITE. I think most of it has to come from the Europeans. We have a program, through the State Department, that assists in that.

The World Bank and other international banking agencies are assisting. The Europeans have a larger commitment, as agreed to under Dayton, to provide economic assistance.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Do we have any assurance from the Europeans that they are going to significantly participate in that economic stimulation?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir, I think so. We clearly have under Mr. Bilk and others, we clearly have activity going on, so I think there is already evidence that they are, in fact, following through on those commitments.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. And I apologize if you are having to repeat something you testified about while I had to be out of the room, but how much money do we anticipate the total Bosnia operation costing the American taxpayers?

Mr. WHITE. The number that I have, that I provided to Mr. Sisisky through the end of this year, would be $3.275 billion.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. And do you have a source from which you expect that we can get that money?

Mr. WHITE. Well, most of this money has been provided—I don't have the details on—has been provided in the Congress through various supplementals or various reprogramming actions and so on.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. All right. Based on what you have said, I am not sure that anybody has a concrete feeling about whether or not peace is going to be there. But do you have any sort of concrete feeling about the fact that once we do pull our troops out of there and once we have expended this $3-plus-billion, that we are going to achieve the goal that the administration had before the Bosnia operation was entered into?

Mr. WHITE. I don't think anybody can give you an assurance, Mr. Chambliss.

I am relatively optimistic, if we can continue on the efforts that are ongoing, particularly the economic and related efforts, that we can be successful.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Well, it sounds to me like just from what I have heard that we are still speculating that there might possibly be hope for peace out there and that is the best we can ask for.

I, like everybody else, certainly hope that we do find peace there, but I want to be honest with you. I have not much comfort about

the fact that it is going to be a peaceful country once we do move out of there.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The lady from California, Ms. Harman.

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am happy to greet Secretary White, an old friend, and to see General Ralston.

I want to comment on the bipartisan nature of skepticism about the U.S. role in Bosnia for the present and the future. I certainly was one who joined with the majority in supporting the lifting of the arms embargo and opposing the commitment of U.S. troops. I was one who voted present on the day of the Dayton Accord negotiations when another resolution of disapproval was offered, because I thought the timing was ill-advised, not because I thought the content was ill-advised.

But then after we committed troops and after I had been to Bosnia to see—well, after I had been to Germany on the way back from Bosnia to see our troops about to head for Bosnia, I decided the only responsible move was to vote to support our commitment of troops, and I did that. And I voted against other more cautious resolutions that were then offered.

But in the year that is gone by, I have come to believe these things:

First, that our IFOR mission was well-conceived and has been well executed.

And, General Ralston, I heard you. Every deadline has been met and everything has gone according to plan. I salute you for that. I also salute our troops for their competence and dedication.

But second, I am still skeptical that our plans for a unified country will be able to be accomplished, not because we don't wish them to be accomplished but because the people on the ground are ambivalent about whether they should be accomplished, and old animosities remain there, and the elections were partially successful but not totally. And in addition to that, as some have asked prior to me, the economic assistance from Europe has not materialized as we expected.

So my bottom line is, the IFOR mission gets an "A" but the mission for peace gets an incomplete "C."

I want to state now, before we get to December, that I may not be willing to support any additional troop commitment. I certainly won't support it if it is unilateral by the United States, but as part of a NATO mission, if it is beyond our normal NATO involvement, I am not certain that it would accomplish anything constructive. And I don't want there to be any misunderstanding about the bipartisan nature of the skepticism on this committee. So I just put out there for your consideration, that while you have done your jobs very well, and the Defense Department, I believe, over the year, has performed with real focus and competence, many here will not be prepared to support a continued troop involvement after the year.

And a final comment, Mr. Buyer is no longer here, but he often lectures us on using the head and the heart. It is a good lecture. We need to use both. Certainly as a mother and a concerned citi-

zen, my heart goes out to the people who have suffered in Bosnia, and I did hear the Ranking Member about the number of senseless deaths, especially the deaths of children, and I agree with him, it is terrible. But my head says that the U.S. may not be able to fix this problem. And so I would just make the comment to you both and welcome any responses that you have.

Mr. WHITE. I appreciate your candor.

I, as you know, having been deeply involved in this, respectfully disagree. I think there is an enormous amount at stake, as you have said, and as Mr. Dellums and others have said. Those of us, as many of you, who have been there can really feel that; that there is an enormous tragedy of innocent people, and as you pointed out, children and other innocent people whose lives have either been literally destroyed or uprooted in no way we have seen since World War II.

It seems to us that we have an obligation to try to do, if it is feasible, to try to do what we can to assist these people in getting themselves back in the situation where they lead a normal life.

I would add that, as you know, we are doing that in much of the rest of Europe today. We are doing it with Partnership for Peace. We are doing it by reaching out to the Eastern Europeans and to the Russians. I think it is fair to invoke George Marshall's vision of Europe, and it seems to me we ought to do what we can not to leave the Balkans out of that vision.

Ms. HARMAN. General Ralston, any comment?

Mr. RALSTON. I certainly thank you for your words regarding the troops and the way that they have carried out their mission, and I will ensure that your words get back to them. I appreciate that.

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, ma'am.

Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you made the comment earlier that NATO will make a decision later as to its recommendations. Do we have any idea how much later?

Mr. WHITE. I don't know what that timetable is. They are meeting today, as I indicated, so I don't know what the timetable is.

Mr. MCHUGH. Help me to understand the NATO decisionmaking process on this particular matter. Who is at the table and how do they communicate with their governments?

Mr. WHITE. Normally what happens here, and General Ralston may want to give some more details, is the ministerial—out of the ministerials comes a set of guidance, and guidance is provided to the military community who is representing military officers from the various countries. They do a set of planning. We watch that planning. You know, we are knowledgeable of that planning.

From that, normally, recommendations are formulated. The recommendations go to the North Atlantic Council, which is the governing decisionmaking body. The North Atlantic Council is made up of representatives of the countries. So effectively what happens is once the recommendations are made, then the individual countries make individual judgments with respect to where they are

with respect to the recommendations, and they are communicated and discussed in the—in the NAC as a forum.

Mr. McHugh. We have, do we not, amongst NATO decisionmakers, representatives from the United States representing U.S. military interests?

Mr. White. Yes, sir.

Mr. McHugh. Are we communicating, are you communicating, with them as to what our recommendation should be or what our opinions are?

Mr. White. Well, we have such officers there. We will be communicating with them.

Mr. McHugh. Well, what are you communicating to them?

Mr. White. As of today, we are not communicating anything on this subject because it was only as of today that NATO has begun to even layout the process by which to take under advisement these various decisions.

Mr. McHugh. So our military people in NATO are attending this meeting today with no guidance from the administration or the——

Mr. White. No. The Secretary of Defense is at the meeting.

Mr. McHugh. Well, what might he be likely to indicates the administration's position?

Mr. White. As I reported earlier, the meeting was one to formulate a series of options, mission options, which would be given to the military committee for study.

Mr. McHugh. OK. You noted earlier in your comments to Mr. Montgomery that we have commitments that we intend to fulfill.

Exactly which commitments do you think we have made that will play an important part in the—in the future role of this Nation, on the ground in Bosnia?

Mr. White. I don't remember exactly my reference, but the commitments that we have made beyond this year do not have to do with military commitments. They have to do with civil commitments. That is, we, under Dayton, agreed with our allies that the civilian plan would go beyond one year. It was only the military part that was limited to a year.

Mr. McHugh. So you didn't intend your comment to Mr. Montgomery to mean the military commitment?

Mr. White. No, sir.

Mr. McHugh. OK. You listed four options, scenarios: Withdrawal, war prevention role, and sustainment of general security.

Could you fill out for my own understanding the differences and the level of—presumably level of military commitment that would occur between what you described as a war prevention role and that of a sustained and general security?

Mr. White. I can't today, Mr. McHugh. Those options I literally got this morning from one of our representatives in the meetings. That is as much as I have gotten, so it would be inappropriate for me to simply speculate what is meant beyond what I have been able to report.

Mr. McHugh. Fair enough.

Are we in either one of those situations right now? Are we—are we there in a war prevention role or sustainment of general security or neither?

Mr. WHITE. We are there under the implementation force rules, which have to do with very specific rules of separating the parties and maintaining the peace and conducting a number of other operations that General Ralston enumerated earlier.

Mr. MCHUGH. OK. Thank you.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Bateman—I am sorry. I am sorry.

Mr. Geren.

Mr. GEREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the gentlemen for their testimony.

I would like to go back to the Arm and Train program that Mr. Buyer and Mr. Skelton both discussed and would like to look down the road a little bit and see where that is going.

Mr. Secretary, you talked about we are giving $100 million. We have gotten $174 million from other sources. That is $274 million.

Mr. WHITE. I think it was $140 million, I think, rather than $170 million.

Mr. GEREN. OK. $140 million. But in military terms that is not much money. That is not going to last very long. And where does this Arm and Train lead?

At the end of a year, are these folks going to be back on the international black-market in arms trying to equip this force with going to Muslim governments around the world, some of which may be more or less friendly to Western interests?

I just—where does Arm and Train—where are we going with it? Are we in a position to continue this commitment?

And again, $100 million a year, it is a big number but it doesn't do much to support a military that is going to be trying to hold together this country. And they don't have the money to build up the civilian side, either. So it seems like that they are in a huge deficit to begin with. Where do you see it going?

Mr. WHITE. I think we ought to put the Train and Equip program in the larger context of the arms reduction, arms control efforts, for the region. As part of the Dayton Agreement, commitments were made by the parties to reduce their arms. Those commitments are now—implementation of those commitments are now underway.

We are urging the parties, as vigorous as we can, to stand by those commitments.

The Equip and Train program is a supplement, a modest supplement, as you have pointed out, for the Bosnians to that change because, in our judgment, they needed this assistance in order to be viable in terms of the threat that they would represent after the Dayton Agreement was implemented.

So it is modest, but at the same time I think it is important. My own view is it is particularly important with respect to the training, the integration of the two parties into a single force, the structure of that force, the training of their officers, the training—the field training of their troops and that is already under way. It is clearly an increment. It is not a solution. I think it is an important increment.

Mr. GEREN. I think it is, but again, where does it go? We are spending $3.2 billion in a year on 20,000 troops. And this will be

a fragile country when we leave, whether it is the end of 12 months or whether it is 24 months. And I just—how do you assess their military capability today and a year from now? And will we not be back where we started?

Regardless of how successful all of this nation-building may or may not be, you are going to need a military in this country and will that not push them right back into the hands of the—to the black-market arms dealers who again may not have Western interests at heart?

Mr. WHITE. I think the larger issue, Mr. Geren, has to do with what the parties, including the Muslims, but what all the parties will do with respect to arms reduction. If there is not arms reduction, then I think we have a serious problem.

The Serbs in particular have been particularly resistant to fulfilling their commitments thus far. We are just now into that. We are not a long way into it. It extends into next year.

So I think the issue of are we going to have a problem and is there going to be an increase in arms in the region and spending, as you indicated, precious resources they should use for economic activity, not arms, really depends on whether or not we can get a successful arms reduction program.

Mr. GEREN. But even with arms reduction, even in your most optimistic hopes for arms reduction, we are going to be gone at some point, our $3.0 billion a year that helps hold this together is going to be gone, as well as I don't know what the total NATO contribution is, $200 million—even with the most optimistic success in this arms reduction, this amount of money is still a drop in the bucket.

You are not going to reach a point where $240 million a year is going to be adequate to have a military to sustain this country. I can't imagine that we hope that.

So they are still going to need tremendous assets in the military area, even in the most optimistic arms reductions. And do you see us as having an ongoing commitment to provide funding for this military?

Mr. WHITE. I don't know. I don't at this time, no.

We have made this commitment. Whether or not we will make a subsequent commitment is not known. But I will say that, as you had said quite so, this is—these are very marginal contributions. I think they are important but they are marginal.

Mr. GEREN. Just real quickly, what do you estimate, assuming successful arms reduction, the cost to run the military in this government that NATO leaves behind on an annual basis?

Mr. WHITE. I don't have a number, Mr. Geren. I can give it to you for the record by the various parties, because we do have some general sizing of what those militaries ought to look like under the agreement.

[The information follows:]

(U) It is very difficult to estimate what the annual cost of running the Federation Army is. There are a number of reasons for this: (1) the Federation Army is made up of two formerly separate armies, the HVO and the ABiH, which have been resourced at significantly different levels; (2) the HVO and ABiH are armies whose inventories have been seriously attritted during a three-year war; (3) Bosnia's war-damaged economy makes estimates imprecise; (4) there are no plans for a Federation Defense Budget in 1997. We do not think that rough estimates can be made, at this time, of the Federation Army's defense budget. In particular, it would be

mistaken to make general comparisons with other armies in the region and attempt to generalize from their defense budgets.

Mr. GEREN. I would like to know that because I am just concerned that we are going to find ourselves paying a lot of those bills in the future and we are doing it in a de facto way right now and we are—I expect we will end up paying a lot of it once we leave.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, General Ralston, for being with us today.

I am one of those who is very pleased that the United States ultimately asserted a leadership position and brought a conclusion to the killing in the former Yugoslavia. I am also one of those who believe that it is naive in the extreme to ever anticipate that we would send forces there for one year and then everything would be over with and there would be no further need or requirement if we are going to maintain stability in that area.

It would seem to me to be very helpful if the administration faced up very clearly to that obvious fact and began talking to the Congress and to our allies in terms of choosing the proper option as to what kind of force and who would be responsible for contributing to it.

I find it disturbing to, for instance, see a statement attributed to Secretary General Javier Solano, the NATO Secretary General, that after December we would need a contingent force of some 50,000 troops with 30 countries, including, according to the statement, 15,000 from the United States.

I want to pursue with you a little further the line of questions broached by my friend and colleague, Mr. McHugh. It seems to me that this country and its political and military leadership has a responsibility to be asserting a position at the NATO ministerial conference and at the Atlantic Council as to what the United States' view is and seeking to have it accepted, rather than just reacting to what others come up with in terms of what they want from us. Because I think our experience clearly demonstrates that they want more and more and more from us, with less and less and less from them, and that should not be acceptable to us.

It is unthinkable that we are not going to continue to be involved. We know we are going to be involved in terms of logistics, intelligence, medical and other types of support that no one can provide except us.

But if we are going to provide all of that, certainly the American ground presence should be a very insignificant one, because there is ample ground-force capability available from those other allies and we ought to have our view of the size, the shape and the nature of those forces and the administration ought to be consulting with the Congress, and I almost have to say for a change, on where they are headed, rather than us being confronted with a fait accompli of a negotiation, if you can even call it a negotiation, with other nations, that end up with us having made a commitment that they then put the Congress in the position of either repudiating or

embarrassing our Commander in Chief or having to go along with it no matter how improvident we think it is.

I would like and hope that we are going to see something, and we ought to be seeing it very soon, in terms of the size, the nature, the configuration of what forces will be needed in Bosnia after December 15, and whether or not those forces contemplate an equitable participation by the United States.

The next thing I want to turn to is the cost of the operation, the $3.275 billion. Is that incremental costs, or is that the cost that includes monies and sums we would have expended anyway?

Mr. WHITE. That is the total—that is the total cost of our estimate with respect to this Bosnia operation through the end of this calendar year, Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. But costs which are above and beyond what we would be expending if we didn't have that operation?

Mr. WHITE. I think that is right, yes, sir. Right.

Mr. BATEMAN. Well, what I would like to see, and I think the committee needs, is an updated rundown on the new projected total cost and how it is being funded.

You have been very direct that it isn't being funded by DBOF or out of DBOF, but I would like something more specific as to how it is funded. Because these costs, if they are going to impact readiness accounts, are something that I, as Chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, have to be very interested in and concerned about.

I don't know, the red light is likely to go on, just has, but if I might make a further comment. The President has announced and I hope has now signed the Defense Authorization bill. But it is a little disturbing having said I am going to sign the Defense Authorization bill that there have been threats that he will not accept the level of spending in the Defense Appropriation bill which, if my memory is correct, proposes the appropriation of less funds than the authorization bill he is signing authorizes.

I don't find a lot of logic in that and I don't find a lot of logic in saying you must reduce the Defense Appropriation bill by several billions of dollars while the costs of the Bosnian operation are going up.

I would be happy to receive any observations from you now that I have used up all of my time.

Mr. WHITE. If I may, Mr. Bateman, a couple of points. One is we have been very, very careful in our planning to assure that the operation in Bosnia does not impact, negatively impact, our readiness. And I can assure you that that is the case.

We look at readiness every day. We have regular meetings. General Ralston and I chair those meetings every month where we examine carefully from all of our units, from the CINCs and from the services, their readiness reporting. So our readiness remains very high and we have not had a negative impact from Bosnia.

Second, I would associate myself with your remarks with respect to U.S. participation in these negotiations. This is not a passive exercise. We will be actively involved in the negotiations as part of NATO as, in fact, the leader of NATO. And we will—as I said in my opening statement, I made a commitment that we will keep the Congress informed as this activity unfolds.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Tanner.

Mr. TANNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank our witnesses for being here this morning, for their presentation. We appreciate not only that, but what you have done over the last year.

I thought Mr. Bateman's question, the first part of his question, was insightful and to the point. And I am one who had some doubt about Bosnia, but after having been there and having—after having read as much as I could find to read about the history of the situation, I am convinced that we can convince the American people that not only did this country do the right thing in going to Bosnia, but we very well could have influenced the history of the world in the post-cold war era, because if we had forsaken NATO on the European continent now, it is my judgment, based on my reading, that we would be asking for a lot more trouble than we have today in Bosnia.

So this is a choice, as we make choices. And our choice to go and be a part of a NATO force on a European continent in this post-cold war era, winding up today with the United States and Russian soldiers actually working together rather than figuring out ways to kill each other, is something that I don't think we can make light of and something we all ought to be collectively and together proud of. And I am, and I am proud of you all and the troops that are there that I saw when I was there.

I think, as Mr. Bateman suggested, as soon as you are in a position to do so, let's come and talk about what sort of post-year-long presence that we need to have there.

I think we need to have one. I think the American people realize that, particularly if it is explained and presented to them as to the options involved.

I mean, I don't have—we have troops in Germany. World War II is over 50 years ago. We have troops in Korea. We fought in the Korean Peninsula in 1951, 1952. The mere fact that we keep a presence in some place close to Bosnia, I don't think is one that should be—we should run away from.

I think everybody understands and realizes and appreciates what has happened, what we have done to stop massive slaughter in a way that really wasn't present on the European continent since World War II. I went to villages where there is nothing there. All the men, women, children, dogs, cats—dead, gone, killed, buried in mass graves.

No one in this country would sit by and say we can, as a Christian Nation, as some people call it—a Nation under God is what I prefer—countenance that.

So my question is, as soon as we get a reading from our allies in NATO, as soon as you can, Mr. Secretary, and others, give us some idea of what we need to do post-year military stopping the killing, which we have been successful doing, as soon as you can, if we can have a meaningful dialogue on that, many of us are prepared to do whatever is necessary to make sure that this is a success.

Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Tanner. We will consult with you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Secretary White, I have got to join with my colleagues who have expressed some concerns about the cost elements of this mission. And I suppose the cynics might argue that costs could be intentionally downplayed at the beginning to make it more palatable to get into some sort of a mission.

If that is not the case, then certainly to have missed the costs by—where it is double the original estimates is something that ought to concern us all, because I believe it undermines our mutual ability to provide what the forces need. It makes it certainly more difficult and it is something that we have all got to work to get better at, where we have a more accurate estimation.

The other part of the cost concern is the one that Mr. Bateman described, and that is where the Congress acts responsibly to provide what is required when the administration has a number of troop deployments in various parts of the world, including recently in the area around Iraq, and yet turns around—the administration then turns around and criticizes the Congress for acting responsibly, I think that also undermines what needs to be our mutual efforts to do what is necessary.

And I realize some of those decisions may be made in a different building than you work in, but we both have responsibilities in that regard.

What I really wanted to ask about that has not been covered, General Ralston, is what is going to happen to the mission between now and December?

In other words, it seems to me that for some months we have all been looking towards the elections. That has happened. Now there is going to be tremendous pressure not to let things fall apart, to see that the elections were productive and to encourage Bosnia to now come together and be able to live together after the elections occur.

It seems to me the pressures toward mission creep and to other sorts of things may be greater now than they have been at any point in the deployment. We certainly don't want to let the investment that we have put in to the country go by the wayside. And have you all looked at the changing circumstances and what that may mean for the period between now and December, regardless of what happens after that?

Mr. RALSTON. Yes, sir. Let me address that.

Certainly, with regard to the pressures for mission creep, they are always there, but I think so far we have been very successful in resisting those pressures for mission creep and we will continue that same attitude.

The big event that we have got between now and December 20 are the municipal elections. While the date for those is not yet firm, as I understand it, there is certainly the possibility that it will be near the end of November. The municipal elections will take at least as much effort as the national elections do. So I believe our troops will be well-occupied in providing a secure environment for the upcoming municipal elections.

Beyond that, we will continue to do the military tasks that are in the Dayton Agreement and we will look forward to the withdrawal after December 20.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Do you sense any greater incentive by some people in Bosnia to disrupt the municipal elections as opposed to the ones that we have just had?

Mr. RALSTON. You know, I don't want to project or speculate on that, but certainly the potential is there and we are taking it very, very seriously, that we have got to do everything possible to protect our people during that time period.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And let me echo the comments of several people on both sides of the aisle. I will have been your harshest critic on the deployment. I cannot use words to express how pleased I am that American casualties have been as low as they have been, that as many Bosnians have been protected. But I do see some things, both in what you say and between the lines that cause me some concerns about the future. I will go to General Ralston's comments.

On page 6, the time to begin to discuss post-IFOR security environment has arrived. The decision about any post-IFOR operations must be made in consult with the NATO allies and other IFOR participants, in expected consultation with Congress.

Secretary White, what concerns me first about the original deployment, which was done really without a congressional vote, or the congressional vote was after the fact, and this has happened three or four times since I have been a Member of Congress, despite the fact that the Constitution says Congress shall declare war. And obviously sending armed people off in this environment or several other environments that have taken place is as close to an act of war as I can see.

The Constitution is also pretty clear in that the U.S. Senate shall get involved in deciding our military mutual defense treaties.

If, as General Ralston says, whether an armed police task force is sufficient or we will need some type of rapid reaction force to respond immediately to a crisis after IFOR departs, that sounds to me like some sort of a mutual defense commitment.

If that decision is to be made, I think the proper place for it to be made is in the U.S. Senate. I think that is above the President's realm. You are talking about a long-term commitment.

I am not saying it is necessarily a bad commitment, given that we have already invested at least four American lives and a number of people who have lost limbs and, in some cases, other things. But it is something that should not be done unilaterally by this President or any other President.

The second thing is, getting back to Mr. Geren's and Mr. Bateman's questions, will there—well, let me back up a little bit. About a year ago, a high-ranking U.S. military official drew on a napkin what he thought Bosnia would look like 10 years from now. On one side it had a sea. On the other side it had an "S," and he said 10 years from now I think you are going to have a greater Croatia and greater Serbia and this thing called Bosnia would disappear. That was told to me in confidence, so I am not going to reveal who that person was.

I would think the only way—there are only two ways that could be prevented from happening. One would be a well-armed and well-

trained Bosnian force that could prevent that from happening, and number two would be some sort of assurance from the international community that that wouldn't happen.

I am curious how you think that can be prevented from happening? Otherwise, the efforts of the Americans who have done so well really would be for naught.

Mr. WHITE. Well, Mr. Taylor, I think that, as I think we discussed earlier in this regard, as you referred to your colleagues, fundamentally this has to be something that this society wants to do; that it wants to live in peace. That means that people in the society have to have a stake in that society. That means economic development, social development, the development of governmental institutions, a judicial system, a police force and civil order, and so on.

We are working hard on all of that; that is the international community is. And I am hopeful that that will continue to be the case and that we will make real progress.

So my hope, and I am optimistic about it, is that as long as we can keep that going we, in fact, will have peace in this part of the world. And it seems to me, as you said, we have made a great effort to do so. So far, so good, and we have—but we have more to do.

Mr. TAYLOR. What about—again, how do you—how do you take this gradual republic; considering in particular that the elections only tended to elect the three most nationalistic people? The loudest-mouthed Serb, the loudest-mouthed Croatian, and the loudest-mouthed Bosnian all won. That does not sound to me like something leading toward consolidation of the Dayton Accords. It sounds to me like we will wait until you guys leave and then we will go back to shooting each other.

Mr. WHITE. Well, I am not so sure that is true. They did carry the majorities but other people did win. I mean, there are other parties that, in fact, attained votes and other candidates in various elections.

We will see more of that, we think, in the municipal elections which, of course, we think will be more disaggregated, but we don't know that yet.

So, yes, there are three parties. We have always, though, contemplated that there would be three parties in the short-run. Our effort is one of bringing those parties together so that they cooperate with each other in terms of the vision of the Dayton Agreement, which has to do with creating one society. We are hopeful that will happen.

Mr. TAYLOR. If the Chairman would give me a minute for just one direct last question.

If there is to be a long-term commitment towards the future of the Bosnian Republic, is it the administration's plan to consult with the United States Senate as far as some sort of defense treaty with that republic? Or do we continue just kind of mulling around and reacting on a day-to-day basis as the Chief Executive chooses fit?

Mr. WHITE. I don't—I don't know of any conversation now under way or contemplations in the administration with respect to a treaty. But as I indicated in my opening statement, we are committed

to continuing to consult with the Congress as this—as the next stage of these planning activities go forward.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

I had some questions a year ago about the wisdom of the way we went to Bosnia. I have those same questions today.

If, in fact, there was a national security interest that brought us there, why would we commit to be there just one year?

It would seem to me that if, in fact, there was a national security interest that demanded that we be there, that we should have made a commitment that we were going to be there until the mission was accomplished. It seemed to me then and it seems to me now that telegraphing that we were going to be there but one year, was kind of a prescription for failure; that simply they would wait it out. They would rearm and they would continue doing, after we left, what they were doing before we came.

And I think it was fairly predictable a year ago that we would be here today discussing the things that we are discussing, that there is a real possibility that we need to stay on in Bosnia.

If, in fact, there was a national security interest in Bosnia, why did we initially telegraph that we would be there just one year?

Mr. WHITE. It was our judgment at the time, that, in fact, in the context of the Dayton Agreement and what was required of the military, that those tasks could be achieved in a year. We thought that then. We think that now. And as I indicated earlier, we think we will be able to meet all of those obligations and the implementation force will be withdrawn at the end of the year.

Mr. BARTLETT. Then why are we considering the possibility of the necessity to maintain some troops there after this year?

Mr. WHITE. The issue is whether or not in the larger context of our desires with respect to the region, the security of the region requires some military presence. We don't know that yet. We haven't decided that yet. But that is the question that we have to wrestle with.

Mr. BARTLETT. I don't have any more questions.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dellums, do you have anything?

Mr. DELLUMS. I would allow Mr. Dornan to go forward, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dornan.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Is there ever a discussion at the Pentagon about the constitutional authority of sending American troops anywhere, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Iraq, without the Congress playing a role? And lately, the discussion is we are not even consulted, but what about Congress signing off on this?

I told President Bush, Secretary Cheney, that they had no right to commit the amount of troops they were doing under Desert Shield unless they came to the Congress, and President Bush said to me, we will lose. I said, no you won't. It was 240 to 183 was the vote.

All the Democratic leadership voted one way. Admiral Crowe, who was then retired, said the sanctions would work. He came up to the Intelligence Committee later and said, if I had known then what I know now, I wouldn't have been for just the sanctions; endorsed Clinton. His reward was the Court of Saint James in England as the Ambassador. I have still never gotten over that.

But Bush—President Bush and Secretary Cheney realized that the Congress had to play a role with that massive amount of troops.

I think that plaque is still there in the front that quotes article I, section 8, and it is as you come in the door right here: That we declare war. We as the people's representatives have all authority over how our military operates.

In article II, section 2, there is only 16 words. It says: The President—the Commander—the President of the United States shall be the Commander in Chief, and then another 18 words follows after a comma, that when the militia is called up, meaning today the Reserves and the Guard, that he will be the Commander-in-Chief of that, and that is it.

Does anybody ever discuss that he is not an emperor, Clinton; that he just can't send people pellmell all over the world without the constitutional authority of the United States Congress weighing in and deciding who goes, how many and how long they stay?

Mr. White, I just want to know, is it ever discussed, the Constitution of the United States, and the role of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives?

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Dornan, yes, it is discussed. And I think before you were here, in my opening statement I said that as these deliberations go forward, we will consult with the Congress.

Mr. DORNAN. Well, on Iraq—well, I am going to have a closed session later with Mr. Deutch, the head of the CIA, and all the press speculates that he wants to come back and be SECDEF if Mr. Perry retires in January, that Mr. Perry, who is a pretty decent man has taken the Khobar barracks thing very hard.

We passed a resolution overwhelmingly on the House Floor that somebody should have had the institutional and corporate memory after Beirut Embassy bombing 1, Beirut 2, marine barracks 2, Oklahoma City, IRA bombings in London, that truck bombs were the way to go, the instrument of horror for modern terrorism. So I guess in Great Britain heads would have already fallen at the Cabinet level.

But if Mr. Deutch is coming back as SECDEF, then that makes him an important person. And I have an article that says Saddam Hussein is stronger in September than he was in August. That 44 pin pricks of Tomahawk missiles with 1,000-pound warheads only made him look like an even tougher alley cat on the Middle Eastern bloc.

And I just—there was no consultation, that I know of; no Gang of Eight, no Mr. Spence included, no Strom Thurmond included, no Larry Combest at Intel told anything, no Arlen Specter told anything, no Ranking Democrats on either Intelligence Committee or either House committee, nothing. And then here is Clinton in the Oval Office with a lectern, the triple draft-dodger strikes back. It

has reached the absurd, the obscene. I don't understand what the hell is going on.

You are going to consult with Congress. You haven't done it yet. When does it start?

I have a letter here circulated to the Commander-in-Chief saying that it is time to pull our people out of Bosnia if these people are going to hack at one another. It is outside NATO's footprint of the charter, a treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate in the late forties. Where is the treaty responsibility ratified by the Senate for us to have people in Bosnia outside of the NATO responsibility? I will just ask you that.

Is there ever going to be anything submitted to the Senate that says we—that they get to vote on our being in Bosnia, with 20 men, let alone 10,000 or the current 35 to 50, depending on how you count, that is there now?

Mr. WHITE. I don't have it before me, Mr. Dornan, but in terms of the overall NATO Treaty there is sufficient authority to act as NATO has acted in Bosnia.

Mr. DORNAN. Outside its perimeter?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Who gave the constitutional legal reading on that? NATO lawyers? European lawyers? Our lawyers? Pentagon lawyers?

Mr. WHITE. Our lawyers certainly did, yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. At the Pentagon?

Mr. WHITE. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. Well, Louis Fisher and all the scholars at the Library of Congress—and we have a professor in our midst there, Steve Horn, and he and I next year will come back to revisit this—all the scholars at the Library of Congress feel that this President is way off the reservation on his constitutional authority; that he is acting like Napoleon the Third, not the article II, section 2, 16-word designated Commander in Chief.

How we have expanded, under all Presidents, under Nixon, under Johnson, under everybody, this dictatorial authority of the President to send men and now our women into harm's way at their whim, gauged on political seasons. It has just reached a constitutional crisis.

I just wanted my thoughts on the record because, Mr. Spence, if you are getting consulted, I know you are letting us know when it happens. And it is not happening.

I have nothing more to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dellums.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, with the exception of just a few minutes, when I had to withdraw from the hearing room, I have been here all morning. I have tried to listen with rapt attention to all of the remarks, comments, questions of my colleagues and the witnesses.

And in that regard, I would like to go back and reiterate something that I asserted in my opening remarks. I said as follows: It is important for Congress to be a partner with the administration in the implementation of our international security policy. In that role, it is often easier to be the cynic or the critic pointing out failings and shortcomings. This is especially so when our Nation is

engaged in new types of undertakings of some unfamiliarity and significant complexity.

I further asserted that I believe that the harder role and the appropriate challenge of this post-cold war era is for the Congress to aid in defining our national goals and in solving the problems necessary to achieve those goals.

This hearing has borne out that assertion in spades, Mr. Chairman. It is a lot easier to be the cynic and to be the critic, particularly at times when our Nation finds itself in uncharted waters engaging in unfamiliar and very complex activities.

Peacekeeping is such an activity. There were a number of cold war experts. We have learned the art of waging war beyond people's comprehension and we continue to improve that capability. What we have not learned how to do, and that we are about the business of trying to learn how to do, is how to wage the peace in the context of the post-cold war world, all of us, civilian and military.

And in the framework of these unfamiliar activities, great levels of complexity, we want to find the A, B, C answer rather than trying to find what is, indeed, the appropriate questions that need to be raised at this significant point in our history and significant point in this process.

This is simply the beginning phase of this post-cold war dialog between the administration and the Congress. It is not time for partisan rancor. That is beneath the dignity of the significance of the issue. Two hundred fifty—as I said before, many people said they wished they had been around during the period that 6 million people were being killed in Germany. And I said, well, now I understand that your moral outrage can be triggered at 6 million.

250,000 people, 13,000 of them children, have been killed in this area of the world. At what number of deaths is your moral outrage triggered so that you say we must, as a people, do something?

This Nation decided that its moral fiber and its national interests were on the line with 250,000 people dying, brought people to a peace accord, an imperfect agreement. They came out and said we need you to stand among us because we have killed each other's children, each other's parents, each other's families, each other's friends. And around in this chamber and in these halls, many of my colleagues predicted dire consequences, mega death of American forces and IFOR forces. It didn't happen.

Mission creep, it didn't happen. These folks were totally focused, right on target and are prepared to move out in December.

When you end one mission and through a deliberative process decide that there is another mission, that is not my definition of mission creep. That means an evolution of your responsibilities.

General Ralston said clear, pointed, and without equivocation, that these—and he enunciated the challenges that are out there if this area is going to continue to grow, evolve and be stable.

Mr. DELLUMS. He said that is not a military function, that is a civilian function. So rather than engaging in the behavior of the cynic, maybe there is a role for the healthy cynic, the critic. But at this point we have a greater challenge, and that is how do we do this thing?

I wish that people would—we could separate people and say, all right, according to my formula, peace will break out in x number of weeks. It doesn't happen like that. And so as we are learning, as we are evolving, I don't see a conspiracy here. I see an incredible evolution taking place that has opened up tremendous challenges and possibilities in the post-cold war world. I am pleased that America stepped up and said we must play a role in the peacekeeping function, and we are learning.

Whether it makes sense to have a date certain to get out sets up one set of consequences; to open it sets up another set of consequences. And I have been around it long enough to know that sometimes my colleagues who are critical can be critical either way you go. If you don't say 12 months, they say, we are not giving you open-ended. If you say 12 months, they sit back and say, well, what made you think 12 months? Nobody is going to operate on that. We have a way of playing the game, and we are old enough around here to understand that.

And that is what tends to happen, rather than us asking the kinds of questions that move us down the road.

Mr. Chairman, I think this has been a good hearing, but I think it is important for us to understand that this is only the beginning phase of a dialogue that needs to continue between the administration and the legislative branch; that we must struggle to find the appropriate questions; that still the greatest challenge before us is to find out what is indeed our national goals, and how do we make the necessary improvements to achieve those national goals. That is the question that is worthy of our consideration here. That is the question that we have to continue to put out here.

It is not a partisan diatribe. It is not a cynical exercise. It is a time to come together to see how can we help people move beyond the brutality and the pain and the anguish of killing each other as a way of trying to solve problem. The human spirit has got to move beyond that antiquated, archaic notion of how conflict is resolved. I think that ultimately our challenge.

I posed a number of questions I think we need to deal with. Secretary White and General Ralston, at this particular moment, given the lack of certainty, because there is a deliberative process going on right now, and that deliberative process are members of NATO sitting down to talk and to discuss the same kinds of questions we need to be sitting down here talking about, but it is in the context of a very specific situation. To bang on witnesses at this particular moment when it is very clear that there is a process evolving here is an inappropriate way to operate. At the point in time where those things come together, then we come back. Then we talk about the efficacy of the next move when we know what it is.

I am a very aggressive person about the nature of Congress' role in being part of this process. I also understand that the founding persons never envisioned the world of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement even on their best day. It is also an evolved process, and we need to be an integral part of it.

I just lay those observations out, Mr. Chairman, in the hopes that we will continue this process, and we will get sharper and better as our role in the post-cold war becomes better and our ability

to function beyond the role of the warrior into the role of peace keeper becomes an even more capable concept. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Evans? Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

I am intrigued, and I compliment the ranking member, Mr. Dellums, on articulating the uncharted waters that we seem to have ahead of us. I think it is true we are entering in this post-cold war era, Mr. Secretary, some very murky, uncharted waters. When the Soviet Union was at its prime, at least they were somewhat predictable, and today in the world we find that we don't know what the threats are or will be.

We also, as has been pointed out, find ourselves doing something other than military preparedness with our forces. That, of course, is this peacekeeping effort in Bosnia, Haiti, and elsewhere which appears to be successful, thanks to the quality and training and resources of our military and our troops. But I have a concern that in all of this uncharted waters, as we sail through it as a Nation, that we lose sight of the fact that this is still a dangerous world in which we live. 1994, we found toward the end of the year we nearly had armed conflict on two sides of the world, nearly simultaneously—Korea, Saddam Hussein once again—which could only mean that if push came to shove, with the military might of the United States, we should not forget the main purpose of those who wear the uniform is to protect our interests and to protect our freedom. In addition thereto, we have the added missions of peacekeeping, peacemaking.

The bottom line, I think, Mr. Secretary, we should welcome opportunities because we are the bastion of freedom, but keep the quality of forces we have, not erode the numbers, take care of the troops, take care of their families, give them the equipment that they need for both missions, which means we must pay strict attention to the recommendations from your building to ours regarding the budget. I hope that in the days and years ahead we will be successful in all of these efforts and hopefully avoid those conflicts, but still be ready for them.

Mr. Secretary, there was a study that I was part of the review committee on it regarding the—and maybe General Ralston will recall this—regarding the air war in the Desert Storm. The bottom line of it was that you still can't do away with the ground forces. That study was not fully distributed, and I made sure that it was at a later date because it probably came out contrary to what some who wore the blue wished it to be.

So my comment is let's sail on, but have quality, have proper quantity, and have the proper budgeting so we will not shortchange those troops should push come to shove, and we deem them not only in on the battlefield, but in those new peacekeeping types of roles. Thank you, both of you gentlemen, for your appearance today.

General RALSTON. Thank you, Mr. Skelton.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Skelton. We have kept you long, and we appreciate your indulgence in staying with us. I still want to tell you about some of the frustration that some of us feel about this whole matter.

Going back to the very beginning again, I said the administration in no uncertain terms told us and the American people that we would be out of Bosnia in 1 year. There was no question about any kind of a follow-on force or any other involvement. We would be out at the end of 1 year, and that was the game rule we were operating under.

And it would be awfully easy in football, you know, if because one team is losing, you change the rules and say, let's move the goal line down, or let's go into another quarter even if we aren't tied up. By changing the rules you can do all kind of things.

And it seemed like to a lot of us the rules are being changed, however you want to look at it. You can explain things all kinds of ways that we have another follow-on mission. It is not the same thing. We are over with 1 year, that is it, and we kept our commitment, but now it is a new ballgame. We have new rules. We hadn't thought about this before, this follow-on business. So that is a new question. We have to go along with that. We will keep moving the goal line.

This business about consulting with Congress, that is what we are all here about. I think the definition of what that means is muddied sometimes, too. Consulting with Congress to me does not mean informing Congress after the fact, whether it is an action taken relative to Iraq recently when the consulting with Congress meant a telephone call that we get after the fact. It is letting us know what has happened.

And the same thing is true of the situation we are in now. After the agreement with NATO, then cause of action had been arrived at, then Congress will be informed as to what has happened, and we have the option then of cutting off funds and not going ahead and, as someone said, embarrassing the administration and the whole country.

So that is the frustration we have. And so if you can take back to the administration just play fair with us and tell us what to expect; let us be involved in the true sense of what consultation means with Congress so we can play our proper role in doing it. It is kind of, like someone said before, about when you make a mistake, the tendency of this administration is to say, well, I won't do it any more; then, first of all, I didn't do it, I didn't; then say, I won't do it anymore; then, I will give it all back, that makes the whole thing square, and we will start over from scratch and forgive. I hope that is not the case with this, as it has been a lot of other things. Please take that message back from some of us to the administration.

Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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